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A district level study on the deployment, allocation and utilisation of teachers between and within 
Malawi’s primary schools: an accountability and political settlement approach 
By Asma Zubairi 
Despite Malawian government policies being aimed at reforming the persistent unequal 
distribution of teachers, teachers continue to be concentrated in urban areas and in later 
standards of primary schools. Why these policies have failed remain underexplored in 
empirical research. The aim of this thesis is to identify what contributes to this persistent 
inequitable distribution of teachers between and within schools in Malawi. The thesis 
highlights the need to understand relationships of accountability related to teacher 
management and the effect of power and politics on these relationships. In doing so, this 
thesis contributes to an emerging field in international education that explores the influence 
of politics on service delivery.  
The study utilised the Levy-Walton framework which seeks an understanding of the impact 
of politics on service delivery. Additionally it focuses on the the multiple levels of 
governance within a sector such as education, starting at the top level where policies are 
made through to the bottom level of front-line service delivery.  
Guided by this framework, the thesis adopted an explanatory mixed methods design to 
explore the patterns relating to the deployment, allocation and utilisation of teachers. The 
focus of study was Zomba Rural district, one of the worst performing districts in Malawi 
with respect to unequal distribution of teachers between schools. Within this district, 
purposive sampling utilising a deviant approach was adopted in order to select two primary 
education zones and four primary schools. This enabled comparability across different cases 
of schools/ zones which were experiencing either a shortage or surplus of teachers.  
I collected administrative quantitative data from government sources for all primary schools 
in the country. These data were used to illustrate trends concerning the equitability of 
teacher distribution between schools. I also administered a school survey in the 26 primary 
schools falling under the two primary education zones selected for study. The purpose of 
this survey was to quantify how teachers were being allocated between different classes in 
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each school, and the time each teacher utilised for teaching. Lastly, I collected qualitative 
data from semi-structured interviews conducted with central, district and zonal government 
officials, together with headteachers and teachers in the four schools I chose. The interview 
data were intended to gain different stakeholder perspectives on the main reasons for the 
persistence of the inequitable and inefficient teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation.  
Through analysis of the administrative data, I found that approximately half of Zomba Rural 
district’s teachers were deployed to schools for reasons other than enrolment. This appears 
to be partly related to political interference resulting in a skew in teachers towards certain 
constituencies. During the Presidency of Joyce Banda (2012-14), whose home area is within 
Zomba Rural district, I found that the total number of teachers working in the district rose 
significantly. In addition with respect to the distribution of teachers within schools, my 
analysis of the survey data revealed a clear preference by headteachers to allocate teachers 
to Standard 8 – the last and only standard of the primary school cycle where national 
examinations take place. Moreover the practice of “team-teaching” – where two or more 
teachers share teaching responsibilities for a class officially meant to be taught by one 
teacher – resulted in actual time spent by teachers teaching being well below that officially 
mandated.  
From the semi-structured interviews, I found evidence of interference from the national and 
local political elite in matters pertaining to teacher deployment and utilisation. Additionally, 
several factors contributing to the perceived lack of hierarchy between headteachers, local/ 
district government officials and teachers led to the poor enforcement of official 
government policy. Poor inspection and monitoring by government officials was also found 
to be a contributory factor in the weak implementation of policies relating to effective 
teacher management. Lastly, absent, poorly defined or contradictory policies led to greater 
discretionary decision-making powers at the district and local levels of government. 
The findings illustrate ways in which formal accountability relationships between teachers 
and education officials responsible for managing them were weakened through the informal 
relationships supplanting them. While previous studies relating to teacher management in 
Malawi have broadly quantified the inequity and inefficiency of teacher deployment, 
allocation and utilisation, this thesis makes an important contribution in redressing what has 
overwhelmingly been an apolitical approach to understanding this long-standing problem 
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affecting Malawi’s education system. The combination of both quantitative and qualitative 
data allowed for a richer interrogation of the influence of politics and power in allowing the 
problem to persist. Additionally, through my engagement with multiple stakeholders from 
different levels of the education sector, the thesis brought together the distinct 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
Teachers are widely recognised as the most important investment into any education 
system. Where teachers are well-trained, the evidence shows that the quality of schooling 
improves with pupils more likely to achieve the necessary learning benchmarks (UNESCO, 
2014). Teachers also comprise the largest cost for most education systems. Across all 
developing countries, an estimated 63 percent of public expenditure on education is spent 
on teachers’ salaries (Crawfurd & Pugatch, 2020). Given their significance to the quality of 
schooling and its cost, the way teachers are distributed to schools and, within schools, to 
classes is important in influencing educational equity. As this thesis will show, this 
distribution of teachers is not only driven by technical decisions associated with education 
plans, but also very much influenced by political factors.  
1.1 Aim and research questions of this thesis 
1.1.1 Aim of this thesis 
The principal aim of this thesis is to explain why policy aspirations relating to certain aspects 
of teacher management have failed in their execution at the district, local and school-level 
in Malawi. It is primarily interested in investigating this through the ways in which formal 
relationships between different education stakeholders responsible for teacher 
deployment, allocation and utilisation are affected. These relationships are examined 
through the lens of politics and the distribution of power, and the extent to which these 
hinder set objectives. Through this approach, the thesis contributes to an emerging field in 
international education which explores the influence of politics on service delivery.  
1.1.2 Research questions this thesis will answer 
The research intends to address the over-arching theme encapsulated in the title of this 
thesis which is “A district level study on the deployment, allocation and utilisation of 
teachers between and within Malawi’s primary schools: an accountability and political 
settlement approach.” Malawi is a particularly interesting context for the topic of this thesis 
given there has been a chronic long-standing problem of teachers being distributed 
unequally between and within primary schools. The overall objective of this study is not only 
to assess the extent of the problem but, importantly, to explain what causes these trends. 
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As such, it adopts a mixed methods approach. Quantitative tools are used to measure the 
extent of the problem concerning teacher deployment and teacher allocation. The tools 
utilised to do this are government administrative data and school surveys I administered 
within the 26 primary schools sitting under the two education zones I conducted my 
fieldwork in. Qualitative data tools were used to explain the reasons for the emergent 
patterns identified in the quantitative data. This was through semi-structured interviews 
with officials at the central, district and zonal level of government together with 
headteachers and teachers in the four primary schools I selected for study. 
The thesis begins by responding to Research questions 1a and 1b, which address the 
overarching theme with respect to the deployment of teachers between schools. As the 
thesis will show, in Malawi, teachers are unevenly distributed between schools between 
different regions of the country, and seeks to understand why this is the case. The study 
considers the reasons for the uneven deployment of teachers between schools through an 
accountability and political settlement lens. Specifically, the questions seek to answer the 
following: 
Research question 1a: To what extent is the deployment of primary school teachers 
between schools equitable?  
Research question 1b: What are the reasons for the uneven deployment of primary school 
teachers between schools? 
Research questions 2a and 2b seek to explore the theme relating to the within-school 
allocation of teachers to the different classes with primary schools. There are eight different 
levels that pupils must progress through in order to complete a full cycle of primary 
education in Malawi. These levels are traditionally referred to as “standards.”1 A 
longstanding problem characterising Malawi’s primary school system is the dramatic 
difference in class sizes between infant and senior standards. The following questions seek 
to firstly measure the extent to which teacher allocation between classes is inequitable. 
Secondly, the purpose is to consider the reasons for the trends emerging by utilising an 
accountability and political settlement approach: 
 
1 Standard 1 and Standard 2 are traditionally referred to as infant classes. Standard 3 and Standard 4 are 
referred to as junior classes. Standards 5 to 8 are senior classes. 
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Research question 2a: To what extent are teachers allocated equitably to different classes 
within schools, and what are the consequences of this on the utilisation of teaching time?  
Research question 2b: What are the reasons for the uneven allocation of teachers within 
schools? 
1.2 Setting out the research problem 
A number of studies investigating what matters in facilitating more effective learning find 
that the number of pupils taught by a single teacher can affect this. According to Majgaard 
& Mingat (2012) the negative effects of class size on learning outcomes become evident 
once there are more than 60 students per class/teacher. This is supported by what Fehrler 
et al. (2009) found in relation to 14 African countries where a pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) 
higher than 60 to 1 was found to have detrimental effects on student learning. Other 
empirical studies, however, point to a weak or non-existent relationship between class size 
and improved learning when the PTR range is between 30 to 60 (Michaelowa 2003; 
Verspoor 2003).2  
Following the introduction of fee-free primary education in 1994, the Government of 
Malawi set a PTR target of 60 to 1 which was in line with the studies discussed above.3 The 
latest sector plan targeted the 60 to 1 PTR to be achieved by 2017/18. However, in reality 
the actual PTR has been in excess of this with the most recent data available for this study 
estimating that for the 2017/18 school year the national PTR was 71 to 1. One reason for 
this long-standing shortage in teachers was the way in which fee-free primary education 
was introduced in 1994/95. Within the space of one school year enrolment had increased by 
51 percent.  
While the high PTR in Malawi can be attributed to teacher shortages, it is not the only factor 
contributing to the shortfall. The extremely uneven deployment of teachers to schools and 
how they are allocated within specific standards within schools has also contributed to the 
teacher shortages. In the school year 2017/18, the national PTR of 71 to 1 disguised the 
wide variation of the PTR between schools which was reportedly as low as 5 to 1 in some 
schools to as high as 860 to 1 in others. Similarly, the average PTR was above 100 to 1 for 
 
2 While class sizes with a PTR of 30 or less do show improved learning outcomes, these are “financially 
unsustainable” in most resource poor settings like Malawi (Majgaard & Mingat, 2012; p. 135).  
3 Both the Policy Investment Framework (1995-2006) and the National Education Sector Plan (2008-2017) set a 
PTR target of 60 to 1. 
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Standard 1 while the equivalent for Standard 8 was 40 to 1 (Ravishankar et al., 2016). With 
teachers making up 84 percent of public expenditure on primary education (ibid.), this 
variation in the PTR has potentially serious equity implications in how public education 
resources are being distributed.  
While variations in PTR between schools and classes is not an unusual phenomenon for 
many countries in the Global South, in the case of Malawi they are extreme. Over the last 
decade a number of government strategies have been introduced to try and ameliorate this 
variation. However, in spite of their implementation high variation continues to exist. A 
number of studies indicate that issues of teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation are 
those the “Ministry of Education actually has control over” (DeStefano, 2013; p. 5). As was 
set out in Section 1.1.1 the purpose of this thesis is to unpack this assumption of “control” 
by investigating the extent to which power and politics negatively affect this.  
1.3 The interest and significance of this thesis 
1.3.1 Interest around thesis 
My own interest in pursuing this study stemmed from my experience of working in the field 
of international education prior to commencing the PhD. This involved working both at the 
national level for the Government of Malawi and the international level as part of the 
Education for All-Global Monitoring Report team at UNESCO. These institutions have 
emphasised the importance of equitably distributing public education resources in their 
policy recommendations to ensure that those who are the most disadvantaged are not left 
behind. However, despite this emphasis on equity little progress towards meeting these 
targets has been made. This deserves closer attention to determine what role, if any, 
politics has to do with directly affecting progress. For example, the politicisation over 
mechanisms which were working towards greater equity in distributing resources were 
evident when I worked at the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) in 
Malawi. Between 2005 and 2009 I was employed here first as a budget officer and then as a 
policy and planning officer within the Department of Planning. It was here that I witnessed 
first-hand the blurred lines between the bureaucratic and political involvement in the 
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budget process.4 As described by one study, the budget process was “a theatre mask[ing] 
the real distribution and spending” (Rakner et al., 2004; p. 4).  
Another reason for my interest in choosing to further interrogate this thesis’ theme was a 
wider understanding of the relationship between policy and practice. My personal 
experience of the formulation process during the drafting of the National Education Sector 
Plan (NESP) was the poor representation from sub-national government officials or school 
actors. I was motivated to better understand the challenges faced by education 
stakeholders required to implement government policies whose design they had largely 
been excluded from. This includes those aspects of teacher management that are of interest 
to this thesis which sub-national or school-level officials are responsible for implementing.  
1.3.2 Significance of thesis 
In recent years research in the field of comparative international education has begun to 
engage more critically with what impact the characteristics of different political states can 
have on educational quality (Kingdon et al., 2014; Hickey & Hossain, 2019). In 2018 the 
World Bank released its flagship World Development Report which focused on the “learning 
crisis” (World Bank, 2017). The removal of technical and political barriers to make education 
systems fit for learning came out strongly in its recommendations. Specifically relevant to 
this study is the emphasis on this emerging literature on teachers’ “bargaining power 
[which] stems from their ability to influence electoral outcomes” (Kingdon et al., 2014; p. 1). 
This ties in directly with the focus of thesis on the impact of power and politics on teacher 
management. 
The influence that different types of political states have on educational quality is still an 
emerging and relatively under-explored field globally. Comparatively more research 
however has been done on this in the South Asian context compared to the sub-Saharan 
African perspective (with extremely limited work in the Malawian context). Extensive 
research has been done on the characteristics which define Malawi’s political system and 
what this means for development (Booth et al., 2006; Cammack, 2011; Cammack & Kelsall, 
2010). However, few studies have linked this back to what the implications are for 
 
4 An example of this related to attempts to gain approval for a formula which would ensure the more equitable 
distribution of the recurrent budget between Community Day Secondary Schools and Conventional Secondary 
Schools. This was strongly resisted. 
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educational quality and more specifically teacher management. This thesis goes some way 
towards addressing this gap and adding to the scholarly literature in this emerging field. 
1.4 Structure of this thesis 
Including this chapter, this thesis is comprised of 11 chapters. Chapter 2 gives a background 
to Malawi’s political history, education system and policies relating to teacher deployment, 
allocation and utilisation. Chapter 3 discusses the current literature which problematises the 
issues relating to teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation in the Global South and 
Malawi more specifically. Chapter 4 presents the conceptual framework which helps guide 
this study. Chapter 5 discusses the methodology and research methods utilised for this 
study, and includes reflections on my own positionality as a researcher from the Global 
North working in Malawi. Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 present the key findings by answering each 
of the four research questions listed in Section 1.1.2. Chapter 10 discusses the main 
research findings in relation to the current literature and conceptual framework utilised for 
the study. Finally, Chapter 11 concludes this thesis by discussing its contribution and 














Chapter 2: The research context 
Chapter purpose and structure 
In Chapter 1 I introduced the purpose of the thesis together with a brief overview of what 
motivated this study. Chapter 2 introduces the context of this research, with a particular 
focus on Malawi’s political and education system. This is important both for giving readers 
unfamiliar with Malawi a brief overview of these aspects, and in helping to inform the 
discussion in subsequent chapters.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 gives a background to Malawi’s political 
history, focusing on the period from 1994, when Malawi transitioned to a multi-party 
democracy, to the present day. Section 2.2 focuses on the primary education sector and 
discusses some of the policy interventions concerning the teacher management issues of 
interest in this work. 
2.1 Malawi’s political history  
2.1.1 Background to Malawi’s multi-party system 
Following its independence from British colonial rule in 1964, Malawi was administered 
under the autocratic leadership of Hastings Kamuzu Banda for the next 30 years. 
Subsequent to a referendum held in 1993, Malawi voted to become a multi-party 
democracy. The following year it held its first multi-party national elections. Since the 
introduction of the multi-party political system in 1994 there have been seven national 
elections in Malawi, with each political cycle lasting five years. The three parties dominating 
Malawi’s political space have been the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Malawi 
Congress Party (MCP) and the United Democratic Front (UDF).  
Presidential and parliamentary candidates for the national assembly are selected on a First 
Past the Post (FPTP) voting system.5 In the re-run of the 2019 Presidential election in June 
2020,6 a Presidential nominee was required – for the first time – to secure an absolute 
majority of 50 percent or more of the electoral vote to be declared the winner. Since multi-
 
5 This means that a candidate is voted into power on the basis of receiving the most votes compared to his/ 
her rivals, even if this is not necessarily the majority of total votes, i.e. 50 percent or more. 
6 In February 2020, Malawi courts annulled the 2019 Presidential election result due to voting irregularities 
and called for a new ballot to be held. The new Presidential election was held in June 2020. 
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party democracy was introduced, all but one of Malawi’s Presidents have come from the 
Southern region.7 That is, Lazurus Chakwera, the winner of the 2020 Presidential election, 
has been the only Presidential winner who does not come from that region. Lazurus 
Chakwera comes from the Central region and ran on an MCP ticket. He won the largest 
share of votes amongst all nominees in districts in the Northern and Central region, while 
Peter Wa Mutharika retained majority of support in all districts in the Southern region. 
2.1.2 Patronage and clientelism within Malawi’s political system 
Political parties in Malawi appear not to be “strongly grounded in ideology”, with it being 
unclear what each of the parties “stand for and how they differ from each other” (Chinsinga, 
2013; p. 40). The low threshold for the formation of parties, a lack of clear ideological 
orientation among political parties and the highly personalised nature of the political system 
have all led to an increasingly fragmentary and unstable political system (Svåsand, 2014). 
Patronage, clientelism, ethnicity and tribalism have all been identified as reasons why 
political parties are formed (Tenthani & Chinsinga, 2016). This is further entrenched by the 
overlap between the major ethnic groups in the country, and their distribution across 
Malawi’s three geographic regions8 (Chirwa, 1998) (Figure. 2.1).  
Support for political parties along regional lines appears to be guided by the logic that the 
state is the major source of wealth, so any “chance of rapid wealth accumulation is 
enhanced, if ethnic groups or regions elect one of their own into State House” (Chinsinga, 
2012; p. 10). Regional identity is deeply rooted in Malawi’s colonial and authoritarian past, 
“when the administrative regions were played out against one another politically, 
economically, culturally and socially” (Gloppen et al., 2006; p. 5). The Central region was 
favoured under Hastings Kamuzu Banda, at the expense of the Northern and Southern 
regions. Since the introduction of the multi-party system, the MCP (the old party of Kamuzu 
Hastings Banda) has continued to enjoy support in the Central region in all national 
elections apart from that in 2009. The traditional strongholds for the UDF and Alliance for 
 
7 Bakili Muluzi’s (1994-2004) home village is in Machinga district, Bingu Wa Mutharika ‘s (2004-2012) home 
village was in Thyolo district, Joyce Banda’s (2012-2014) home village is in Zomba district and Peter Wa 
Mutharika’s (2014-2020) home village is in Thyolo district.  
8 The population of Malawi is of Bantu origin and is made up many different ethnic groups. The most populous 
ethnic groups are the Chewa, Lomwe, Yao, Ngoni and Tumbuka tribes. The Chewa tribe, who make up just 
over a third of the population, are predominantly situated in the Central region of the country. The Lomwe and 
Yao tribes are mainly situated in the Southern region. The Tumbuka tribe is concentrated in the Northern 
region (GoM, 2019). 
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Democracy (AFORD) have been in the Southern and Northern region, respectively. However, 
these parties have lost support to emerging parties or independent candidates (Gloppen et 
al., 2006).  
Only in 2009 did the national election results defy the ethno-regional patterns of voting that 
were so entrenched in previous national elections (Chinsinga, 2012). Buoyed by the positive 
economic performance of the first term of his presidency, the universal fertiliser subsidy 
and the regional inclusivity of his cabinet, Bingu Wa Mutharika received over 50 percent of 
the votes in all three regions (Ferree & Horowitz, 2010) (Figure 2.2). However, Chinsinga 
illustrates how post-election there was a “dramatic regression to the politics as usual 
mode….with a great deal of intensity that has never been seen before” (2012; p. 19). In 
respect to the subsidy fertiliser programme, for instance, most of the contracts for 
procurement were awarded to the President’s tribal grouping (ibid.). 
Figure 2.1: Administrative map of Malawi 
  




2.1.3 Malawi’s fragmented political landscape since multi-party democracy 
In the 1994 Parliamentary election the overwhelming majority of nominees appearing on 
the electoral ballot came from just three political parties (MCP, UDF and AFORD). By the 
time of the 2004 national elections there were a total of 29 registered parties (Gloppen, 
2006). The 2004 national election was a watershed moment in Malawi’s multi-party political 
system in that it initiated the fragmentation that is very much a characteristic of Malawi’s 
political system today. The number of political parties officially registered rose from seven 
in 1994 to 55 at the most recent count (Tenthani & Chinsinga, 2016). The majority are those 
that have splintered from the initial seven parties taking part in the 1994 national elections. 
This proliferation has been “shaped by competition for political office” (Gloppen, 2006; p. 
14) and occurs when a “new ‘big man’ contests for power….when (s)he is shoved aside” 
(Chinsinga, 2012; p. 10).9 The political elite have sometimes been referred to as 
“chameleons” due to their readiness to change their allegiances (Euglund, 2002). 
As a consequence of this fragmentation, the share of the vote in support of the Presidential 
winner has never exceeded 40 percent (apart from in 2009) in the 2004, 2014 and 2019 
national elections (Figure 2.2). The number of Presidential candidates running as potential 
candidates increased from four in 1994 to ten in 2019. During the 2020 Presidential 
election, the constitutional decree requiring the Presidential winner to secure more than 50 
percent of the electoral vote meant that just three candidates ran.10  
Similarly, Parliamentary election results suggest that the share of MPs who have won 50 
percent or more of the vote in their constituency has been declining. In 1994, 95 percent of 
MPs won their seat with 50 percent or more of the vote, whereas by 2019 the equivalent 
was 35 percent (Figure 2.3). Chapter 4 discusses the importance of this increased 
fragmentation in vote share in the context of nepotistic and clientelist tendencies, in 
particular, in terms of how this influences the way resources are used and distributed. 
 
9 During the 2004 national election Bingu Wa Mutharika ran on a UDF ticket. However, shortly after coming 
into power he split from the party by creating the DPP. Similarly, Joyce Banda, after she was expelled from the 
ruling DPP in 2011, created the People’s Party (PP) and ran on this ticket as President between 2012 and 2014. 
In the 2019 elections, Saulos Chilima, who had been the Vice-President between 2014 and 2019 under a DPP-
led government, launched his own political party called the United Transformation Movement (UTM) during 
the 2019 national elections. 
10 Due to the court ruling requiring any Presidential winner of the 2020 Presidential election to attain 50 
percent of the vote the “Tonse Alliance” was formed. This was an alliance of nine political parties forming a 
political block, with the sole aim of removing the DPP and Peter Wa Mutharika from power. 
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In Zomba Rural district, which is the geographical focus of this study, the share of MPs who 
won their seats coming from the same political party as the Presidential winner fell from 
100 percent in 1994 to 44 percent in 2019 (Figure 2.4). 
Figure 2.2: Total vote share for presidential winner by election by region 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on data from Malawi’s Electoral Commission for various years. 
Figure 2.3: Parliamentary seats won by more than 50 percent of total votes cast 
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Figure 2.4: Zomba Rural district parliamentary seats, by different political party 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on data from Malawi’s Electoral Commission for various years. 
2.2 Malawi’s education system 
2.2.1 Background to Malawi’s education system 
Education has featured as a high-profile electoral strategy in several of Malawi’s national 
elections. In the run-up to the first multi-party election, in 1994, the abolition of primary 
school fees featured as a dominant electoral strategy touted by both the MCP and UDF 
(Evans & Rose, 2006). More recently, in the months leading up to the 2019 national 
elections, the incumbent political party in power announced the abolition of secondary 
school tuition fees (Zubairi & Rose, 2019). Prior to the 2014 and 2019 national elections, the 
government announced that a large number of primary school teachers would be promoted 
(Dzimbiri, 2016). 
The formal education system in Malawi follows an 8-4-4 structure, comprising eight years of 
primary education (Standard 1 to Standard 8), four years of secondary education (Form 1 to 
Form 4) and four years of university education. The official starting age of formal primary 
schooling is six-years-old. The Primary School Leaving Certificate Examination (PSLCE), taken 
at the end of Standard 8, determines pupils’ eligibility to progress onto secondary 
education. The Malawi School Certificate Examination (MSCE), taken at the end of Form 4, 
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Following the first multi-party national election in 1994, the Government of Malawi fulfilled 
its manifesto pledge to abolish primary school fees for all eight standards.11 Almost 
overnight primary enrolment increased from 1.9 million in 1993/94 to 2.9 million the 
following year. The teacher shortage that ensued was met through recruiting 18,000 
untrained teachers in 1994, who were trained through the Malawi Integrated Inservice 
Teacher Education Programme (MIITEP), which ran from 1997 to 2003 (Kunje & Chimombo, 
1999). A further 3,000 untrained teachers were recruited annually between 1996 and 2000, 
meaning an additional 15,000 untrained teachers were introduced into the system (Kunje & 
Chimombo, 1999). MIITEP was discontinued in 2003 due to concerns over the low quality of 
teachers it was producing. In 2006, MoEST introduced the two-year Initial Primary Teachers 
Education Programme (IPTE). This involves teacher trainees spending the first year of the 
programme in-residence at one of Malawi’s Teacher Training Colleges (TTC’s), followed by 
one year of supervised teaching in one of Malawi’s primary schools (World Bank, 2010).  
Under MIITEP, teachers were recruited by the District Education Manager (DEM) and sent to 
TTCs for a short induction before returning to work in the same district or school from which 
they had been recruited. IPTE teacher trainees, on the other hand, are recruited centrally by 
the Department for Teacher Education and Development (DTED). Once teachers graduate 
from the IPTE programme, the Basic Education Directorate decides which district to deploy 
them to (Ndalama & Chidalengwa, 2010). It is then the responsibility of the DEM to decide 
which schools in their district these teachers will be sent to go and teach in. This is relevant 
in the context of what is later discussed in Chapter 7, where the decisions district officials 
make when deploying teachers are considered.  
The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) maintains overall responsibility 
for the formal sectors of education (primary, secondary and higher) as well as 
complementary basic education for out-of-school-youth. Following the 1998 
Decentralisation Act, a number of responsibilities concerning the implementation of primary 
education policies were officially transferred to local councils. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, decentralisation, whilst being promoted in policy documents, has not fully 
 
11 Primary school fees were waived for new Standard 1 entrants in 1991/92. In 1992/93 this was extended to 
girls who did not repeat the school year. In 1993/94, students in the first three standards did not pay any fees 
(Al-Samarrai & Zaman, 2007; Kadzamira & Rose, 2001). 
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translated into practice, with the centre retaining control of a number of teacher 
management functions 
2.2.2 Challenges relating to teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation 
A number of diagnostic studies of the education sector reveal that Malawi fares badly in the 
areas of teacher management that this thesis focuses on. For example, the extreme 
variation in the pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) between primary schools characterises a system 
where schools experiencing teacher shortages exist side-by-side with those with surpluses 
(Figure 2.5). This suggests structural problems concerning how teachers are deployed. A 
government report calculated that, in 2017, 27 percent of Malawi’s primary school teachers 
had been allocated for reasons other than enrolment12 and when disaggregated by district 
this figure is much higher (GoM, 2017). Chapter 6 looks more at this variation by district and 
compares how this has changed over time, specifically for Zomba Rural district. 
Figure 2.5: Distribution of schools by PTR, 2017/18 school year  
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS data. 
Similarly, Malawi’s primary school system is embodied by extreme variation in the PTR 
between infant (Standard 1 and Standard 2) and senior (Standard 7 and Standard 8) classes. 
The responsibility of allocating teachers to different classes is assumed by the headteacher 
of the school. Subject specialisation at senior grades has meant that “[t]eachers of 
 
12 This is referred to as the “degree of randomness” coefficient, which is defined as the unexplained variation 






































Standards 1 and 2 are generally overburdened with one teacher per over-crowded section; 
while subject teachers in upper primary grades have work schedules integrating 
considerable periods of spare time” (Ravishankar et al., 2016; p. 41). Chapter 8 and Chapter 
9 discuss this at length, including the reasons behind what drives teacher allocation 
decisions.  
2.2.3 The National Education Sector Plan (2008-2017) 
A ten-year sector plan setting out the vision for the education sector was embodied in the 
National Sector Education Plan (NESP), which covered the period 2008 to 2017 (GoM, 
2008a). The NESP was a response to the domestic development vision set out by the 
Malawian government (Malawi Growth and Development Strategy and Vision 2002), 
together with commitment to international education goals it pledged to achieve (Education 
For All Plan of Action and Millennium Development Goals).  
The NESP followed a series of long-term education plans. The first formal education plan 
(1973-1980) provided guidelines for primary, secondary and teacher education. Amongst 
the four objectives stated was a focus on equitably distributing education facilities and 
resources. The second education sector plan (1985-1995) considered all levels of formal 
education and listed as one of its four aims the “utiliz[ation] of the limited resources to the 
education sector” (GoM, 2008a; p. 2). This was followed by the Policy and Investment 
Framework (PIF), which ran between 1995 and 2006. The PIF sought to ensure that 
“Malawi’s education system [did not] intensify existing inequalities across social groups and 
regions” (ibid.; p. 3). 
Equity and inefficiency of resources were clearly identified in the priorities guiding pre-NESP 
sector priorities. The NESP covered all sub-sectors of the education system, reviewing both 
formal and non-formal schooling under three over-arching themes: 
1. Quality and relevance 
2. Access and equity 
3. Governance and management 
The NESP identified high PTR as one the most pressing challenges facing the primary 
education sector and committed to: 
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“Reduc[ing] class sizes to facilitate more effective learning through progressively recruiting: (a) 
increased numbers of trained teachers as they become available, and (b) teacher trainees recruited 
through an urgent programme, who will work as teachers while studying through distance learning. 
Particular efforts will be made to reduce class size for Standards 1 and 2” (GoM, 2008a; p. 10). 
The guiding principle to class sizes was “progressing to a 1:60 ratio by 2013/14 and below 
1:60 ratio by 2017/18” (GoM, 2008a; p. 11). Strategies drafted to achieve this target 
included policies to increase the number of teachers in the system. Given the focus of this 
thesis, in Subsection 2.2.4 those policies prioritising the more effective use of existing 
teachers to reach this target are discussed. 
2.2.4 Policies relating to teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation 
The NESP was operationalised through two interim implementation plans called Education 
Sector Implementation Plans (ESIPs). These detailed the activities and annual benchmarks 
needed to achieve the overall targets set out in the NESP. ESIP I covered the period 2009/10 
to 2012/13, while ESIP II covered the period 2013/14 to 2017/18. The following section 
looks at some of the main policies the ESIP I & II set targets for in relation to the teacher 
deployment, allocation and utilisation. 
Teacher deployment 
NESP policies on teacher deployment focused specifically on improving the PTR in rural 
schools. It set specific interim targets for rural areas such that the qualified teacher pupil 
ratio would be no more than “1:70 by 2012 and thereafter 1:60” (GoM, 2008a; p. 24). The 
main policies contained in the NESP to achieve this target are discussed below. 
Rural hardship allowance 
The NESP set the target that the “percentage of teachers eligible for hardship fund 
increas[ed] from 15% in 2008/09 to 30% by 2014/15 and staying at 30% thereafter” (GoM, 
2008a; p. 11). In 2010, the Ministry of Education introduced the rural hardship allowance to 
help attract and retain teachers to work in “poor” and “remote” schools.13 Teachers were to 
receive a hardship allowance of MK10,000 (US$13.7) per month. This was a flat rate and did 
not differentiate between different types of rural primary schools. In 2015, it was estimated 
 
13 In the original proposal, government officials planned for 15,000 primary and secondary school teachers to 
be compensated through the rural hardship allowance. However, at the level of implementation, i.e. the 
district, the list prepared by the District Education Managers applied a looser standard as to which teachers 




that some 80 percent of the primary teacher workforce were receiving the allowance (Asim 
et al., 2017; p. 11-12).  
The ESIP I document (GoM, 2009) does not provide any targets or a budget for the primary 
rural hardship allowance. However, ESIP II does refer to the hardship allowance and 
provides an annual breakdown of the budget required (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: Budget for rural hardship allowance for primary teachers (ESIP II) 
 2013-2014 2014-2015 2015-2016 2016-2017 2017-2018 
Rural teaching allowance 











Source: GoM (2013; p. 136). 
Teacher redeployment 
A cost-effective strategy in education systems characterised by both a shortage and 
inefficient distribution of teachers, is to compel them to relocate to rural areas 
(Göttelmann-Duret & Hogan, 1998). Mulkeen & Chen (2008) write about how forced 
deployment has been a strategy utilised in Malawi only in circumstances where the teacher 
has been “punished” for misbehaving. However, as a strategy it can also be extended to 
move teachers from surplus teacher schools to those with a shortage.  
While there was nothing specific set out in relation to redeployment in the NESP, it was 
included as a strategy in both ESIP I and ESIP II. Under ESIP I, a budget, together with 
accompanying targets for how many teachers would be redeployed was included (Table 
2.2a). While no targets were set out in ESIP II, assumptions around the unit cost and the 
total budget for the redeployment of teachers were detailed (Table 2.2b). The cost for 
redeploying teachers to a school outside of the district was MK80,000 (US$109.3), whilst the 
equivalent for within a district was MK15,000 (US$20.5). GoM (2015) indicated that this 
would be readjusted upward by 15 percent annually. 
Table 2.2a: Targets and budget for the redeployment of teachers (ESIP I) 
 2009-10 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 
Redeploy and transport teachers 









MK30 million MK30 million MK30 million MK30 million 





Table 2.2b: Budget for redeployment of teachers (ESIP II) 
 2013-2014 2014-2015 2015-2016 2016-2017 2017-2018 
Redeploy and transport 

















Source: GoM (2013; p. 134). 
Teacher allocation and utilisation 
During the ESIP II implementation period there was a notable shift towards prioritising 
learning in the early years. The main strategy to achieve this was increasing the number of 
hours pupils in the lower standards were taught from three to four hours (GoM, 2013). A 
further aspect was setting specific PTR targets for lower Standards, given these classes were 
significantly off-track towards achieving the NESP target of 60 to 1 (Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3: Pupil-teacher ratio targets for Standards 1, 2 and 3 (ESIP II) 
 2013-2014 2014-2015 2015-2016 2016-2017 
Ensure teachers are deployed in 
sufficient numbers in the early 
standards 
Std 1: 153:1 
Std 2: 114:1 
Std 3: 89:1 
Std 1: 110:1 
Std 2: 95:1 
Std 3: 70:1 
Std 1: 95:1 
Std 2: 85:1 
Std 3: 65:1 
Std 1: 75:1 
Std 2: 65:1 
Std 3: 60: 1 
Source: GoM (2013; p. 91). 
Double-shift system of teaching 
In resource-poor countries that experience a shortage of classroom infrastructures, 
“double-shift” teaching is a strategy designed to reduce pupil-classroom sizes. This is 
traditionally done by making more efficient use of limited classroom space by teaching 
separate classes in the morning and afternoon (Bray, 2000). As part of its strategy to reduce 
classroom sizes, the NESP proposed “increasing the number of classrooms operating as 
double shift from 15.2% of the total in 2007/08, peaking at 20% in 2012/13 and ending with 
15% in 2017/18” (GoM, 2008a; p. 11). 
Under the ESIP I Action Plan, a budget together with accompanying targets for how many 
teachers would undertake double-shift teaching was included (Table 2.4a). While there 
were no targets in ESIP II, assumptions around the unit cost (MK10,000 or US$13.7 per 
month per teacher) and the total budget were set out (Table 2.4b). 
Table 2.4a: Targets and budget for a double-shift system (ESIP I) 
 2009-10 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-20113 
Use budget allowance to provide 
incentives to 1,200 teachers with 
Standards 1-3 classes with a PTR 

















Source: GoM (2009; p. 52). 
 
 19 
Table 2.4b: Budget for double-shift system (ESIP II) 
 2013-2014 
 
2014-2015 2015-2016 2016-2017 2017-2018 












Source: GoM (2013; p. 139). 
Multi-grade teaching 
Multi-grade strategies are recommended by global policy-makers to “address the uneven 
grade distribution often found in primary schools in low-income countries” (Mulkeen & 
Higgins, 2009; p. 2). A core component of a multi-grade teaching strategy would be 
combining two or more classes where enrolment is low (typically in senior classes), thereby 
releasing teachers and infrastructure to become available for over-crowded infant classes 
(ibid.). As part of improving efficiency in the system, ESIP I promoted the idea of multi-grade 
teaching, specifically targeting Standards 5 to 8 (Table 2.5). However, nowhere in the NESP 
or ESIP II was there any mention of multi-grade teaching as a strategy. 
Table 2.5: Targets for multi-grade teaching (ESIP I) 
 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Implement multi-grade teaching  Multi-grade 
implemented 
in 100 schools 
Multi-grade 
implemented 
in 100 schools 
Multi-grade 
implemented 
in 100 schools 
Multi-grade 
implemented 
in 100 schools 
Source: GoM (2009; p. 59). 
Conclusion 
Since the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1994, a political system once dominated 
by a handful of parties has become increasingly fragmented, with multiple political parties 
vying for power. Within the context of a multi-party political system, fee-free primary 
education was rolled out nation-wide. This led to a surge in enrolment numbers and, 
consequently, large class sizes. In addition to the overall teacher shortage, the way teachers 
are distributed has contributed to the shortfall. NESP policies that have been presented in 
this chapter have been about promoting strategies to make the use of teachers more 
efficient. 
I next turn to Chapter 3, which contains a review of the current literature in the Global 



























Chapter 3: Review of the evidence 
Chapter purpose and structure 
Chapter 2 presented a brief overview of Malawi’s political system, and its primary education 
system in relation to the distribution of teachers between and within schools. Policy 
directives contained in successive government education sector plans have detailed how 
teachers should be deployed and utilised. However, despite this the inequitable distribution 
of teachers persists. 
Globally, the majority of public government spending on education continues to be on 
teachers’ salaries, which has consequences for both equity and efficiency. Across all 
developing countries, it is estimated that 63 percent of public education expenditure is 
spent on teachers’ salaries (Crawfurd & Pugatch, 2020). The equivalent for sub-Saharan 
Africa is 80 to 90 percent (Majgaard & Mingat, 2012). In Malawi, one recent study estimated 
that 84 percent of spending on primary education was on teachers’ salaries and when 
including teachers’ allowances the figure jumped to 92 percent (Ravishankar et al., 2016).  
The high inequitable distribution of teachers between and within schools combined with the 
majority of public spending being on teachers’ salaries, means expenditure per primary 
pupil is highly inequitable. One study calculated that the weak relationship between teacher 
distribution and school enrolment meant that for 80 percent of primary schools in Malawi 
per pupil spending could be anywhere between US$5 to US$20 per pupil per annum 
(Majgaard & Mingat, 2012). A number of studies have concluded that Malawi’s spending on 
primary education is pro-poor (Al-Samarrai & Zaman, 2007; Ilie & Rose, 2018). However, 
past research found that the unequal distribution of teachers in favour of upper primary 
levels meant resources were not being directed to the poorest children, who were least 
likely to progress to these levels from infant and junior levels (Al-Samarrai & Zaman, 2007; 
Croft, 2002).  
The above discussion on the unequal distribution of teachers in Malawi’s primary education 
system needs to be positioned within the global literature focusing on this phenomenon. 
Research on countries in the Global South that has found unequal patterns of teacher 
distribution considers the reasons why national policies on distributing teachers more 
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equitably have failed in their execution. These have largely been considered through 
political economy and governance discourses. This chapter focuses on this literature given 
the interest in understanding and explaining the phenomenon specifically in the context of 
Malawi. 
This chapter is arranged as follows. In Section 3.1, I summarise the approach I have utilised 
to identify and synthesise the extant literature. Section 3.2 presents an overview of the 
literature relating to the first part of my research inquiry, which pertains to the deployment 
and transfer of teachers between schools. Section 3.3 is concerned with synthesising 
literature on the second part of this thesis inquiry, which is the within-school allocation of 
teachers to classes and their utilisation. 
3.1 Methodology to conduct a review of existing literature 
Before moving on to a discussion around the literature sourced for this review, I discuss 
what a literature review is, its purpose and the methodology I employed for teacher 
deployment, allocation and utilisation.  
3.1.1 What is a literature review, and what is its purpose 
A literature review can be defined as “the selection of available  documents on the topic, 
which contains information, ideas, data and evidence written from a particular 
standpoint….and how it is to be investigated” (Hart, 1998; p. 13). A systematic approach is 
utilised to collect and synthesise the qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods research 
that is already in the public domain. Some of the key features of a literature review are 
briefly worth mentioning. 
It can be either part of a study or a standalone piece of research: It can either serve as a 
background for an empirical study or as a standalone piece, which can provide a valuable 
contribution to the topic of study in its own right (Jesson et al., 2011; Okoli & Schabram, 
2010). The purpose of this review is to serve as an introduction to the background to the 
issues that existing research relating to teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation in the 
Global South has documented.  
Explicit and transparent methods are used: Any review should be reproduceable, meaning 
that any researcher conducting one should leave an ‘audit trail’, which details what steps 
were taken from the start of the review to the end (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016). Subsection 
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3.1.2 outlines the particular parameters I have chosen in order to research, write and 
complete this particular review. 
The purpose is to provide the foundation of existing knowledge to the research area under 
investigation, which is an integral part in the development of a particular field or discipline. 
While individual studies incrementally contribute to the understanding of a phenomenon of 
interest, building scientific knowledge requires cooperation and interdependent research 
work, which is through a literature review of prior work (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016). 
3.1.2 Methodology for planning this literature review 
The methodology for selecting the literature for this chapter was an iterative process, which 
began prior to my fieldwork in Malawi commencing.14 During the fieldwork phase, the focus 
was narrowed from one that was concerned with public education resources more broadly 
to being primarily concerned with teachers. This, together with the number of relevant 
studies published after my fieldwork, led to the literature review being repurposed to 
reflect this narrower focus. Over the course of drafting this chapter, this was refined to 
include more specific themes that were emerging in the literature I was selecting. 
Given the thesis’ overall interest specified in Chapter 1, it is focused around a ‘problem-
driven’ approach. Such an approach diagnoses a specific development challenge. In the case 
of this thesis, the interest lies in the persistent inequitable distribution of teachers within 
Malawi’s primary education system, both between and within schools. Therefore, the first 
parameter involved delineating between the two problems that my research questions 
address (deployment of teachers between schools and the allocation and utilisation of 
teachers within schools). 
The second parameter that guided my literature selection was to seek an understanding as 
to what the main drivers were for these dysfunctional patterns to have occurred (Fritz & 
Levy, 2014). These dimensions were influenced by my conceptual framework, which 
contains a hybrid of themes relating to accountability and political settlement factors (see 
Chapter 4). The conceptual framework was important for the purposes of the literature 
review, given that, as stated by Lester, it provides “the concepts chosen for investigation 
 
14 This was literature collated for my first year upgrade report submitted in October 2017. 
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and….will be appropriate and useful given the research problem under investigation” (2005; 
p. 460).  
Thirdly, I linked the themes emanating from the conceptual framework (political settlement 
and accountability) more generally and merged them with those I was expecting to identify 
in my data (prior to fieldwork). This allowed me to identify a core list of concepts that 
determined how I would search for, and select, existing research. These steps, which are set 
out in Figure 3.1, acted as an over-arching guide as to what search terms I utilised when 
collecting literature through various search engines.15 







While I tried to follow the steps traditionally used when conducting a literature review,16 in 
practice, the search for literature proved to be a fluid and iterative process. As proposed by 
Bates, my literature search began with a broad topic allowing me to go through a number of 
sources and “[e]ach new piece of information encounter[ed] [gave me] new ideas and 
directions to follow” (1989; p. 23). At the preliminary stages of structuring this chapter I 
utilised the approach described above. This helped me identify an initial list of search terms 
I deemed suitable for this study. Following this, I identified a small number of studies 
prominent in the context of the focus of this thesis. This is in line with a recommendation by 
Guest et al. who, in their study on interview scripts, found that a close reading of six 
documents was “sufficient to enable development of meaningful themes and useful 
interpretation” (2006; p. 78). Having read the selected sample of literature carefully, I was 
 
15 These were Science Direct, Education Resources Information Centre (ERIC) and Google Scholar. 
16 Onwuegbuzie & Frels (2016), in their definition of a systematic review, indicate that this should be 
exhaustive, detached, address a wide population, relatively linear, have explicit inclusion/ exclusion criteria as 
well as being deductive, objective and aggregative.  
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able to review the suitability of the search terms I had initially identified, and amended this 
list as was deemed necessary.  
Reflexive thinking relating to any differences between what I was finding in the literature 
and what I was finding in my own data chapters also led to the search terms being 
amended. The process of collecting, selecting, reviewing and synthesising the literature for 
this review accords with what Bates recommends which is that it “begin[s] with just one 
feature of a broader topic…[and] at each stage, with each different conception of query the 
user may identify useful information and references” (1989; p. 23). Beyond the search terms, 
the research for this literature review also drew heavily upon the ‘snow-balling’ approach 
through which I was able to find existing research suitable for this study that had not come 
up immediately when using the search terms I employed. 
Once studies were identified, there were inclusion/ exclusion criteria that I utilised as 
follows. 
- Geographic location: Research relating to teacher deployment issues in the Global North 
is overwhelmingly focused on what accounts for teacher preferences on where they 
choose to work. This differs from the Global South context, where it is government actors 
who are officially in charge regarding decisions about placing teachers in schools. Given 
these differences and the nature of the study, the review of literature was limited to 
Global South studies. 
- Language: Understanding the issues contained within past research is often an important 
criteria for researchers’ choice in their selection of studies. With this in mind, the 
challenges relating to fluency or understanding in languages meant I was restricted to 
studies written in English. 
- Setting: The interest of this thesis is in comparing government policies with the problems 
relating to their implementation in government-managed schools. For this reason, the 
literature search is limited to teacher management issues, specifically in relation to public 
education systems.  
3.1.3 How the literature is reviewed and structured 
The following subsections are ordered using the approach identified in Figure 3.1. Firstly, 
the literature is arranged according to the research themes. These relate to the deployment 
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of teachers between schools (Section 3.2) and their allocation and utilisation within them 
(Section 3.3). Secondly, within each of these themes the subsection begins by reviewing the 
literature that problematises the issues of interest (Subsection 3.2.2 and Subsection 3.3.2). 
Thirdly, the subsections consider why the problems relating to these issues continue to 
persist from the perspective of accountability and political settlement factors (Subsection 
3.2.3 and Subsection 3.3.3). Within each of these subsections, the issues are discussed in 
relation to the Global South, in general, before moving on to specific consideration of the 
Malawian context. A focus on the Global South is justified on the grounds that a rich body of 
teacher distribution research exists in these contexts, which is currently absent from studies 
undertaken in Malawi. 
The studies that were eventually selected to be incorporated into this review were those 
primarily interested in why inequitable deployment and poor utilisation of teachers was 
occurring. While my search criteria did lead to the identification of studies that were 
oriented towards the sorts of policies that could be considered “problem-solving”, these 
were largely excluded from the literature review due to the focus of the research questions. 
3.2 Teacher deployment and transfers to and between schools 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Section 3.2 frames the first part of the problem this thesis seeks to explore, namely the 
inequitable deployment of teachers between schools. It is organised around two issues. In 
Subsection 3.2.2 the discussion considers the evidence in relation to the different demand-
side preferences regarding where teachers in the Global South wish to be deployed. This 
subsection is important in that it contextualises the main reasons why the problem exists 
(using the ‘problem driven’ approach illustrated in Figure 3.1). However, while this 
subsection provides an important overview in describing the inequity in teacher 
distribution, it does not inform why these problems continue to persist. Subsection 3.2.3 
strikes at the heart of this discussion by identifying common themes that emerged in the 
literature through the prism of accountability and political settlement factors.  
3.2.2 Demand-side issues affecting equitable teacher allocation 
Teacher preferences for schools they teach in  
Several studies on teacher mobility in the Global South reveal teachers’ preferences as to 
where they wish to be deployed. The predisposition to want to live and work close to large 
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urban settlements with better amenities often means that the understaffing of rural hard-
to-reach schools is a prevalent feature of many education systems in the Global South (Asim 
et al., 2017; Mulkeen, 2010; Mukeredzi & Mandrona, 2013; Pennefeather, 2011). The sparse 
population and harsh topography of rural areas is found to be an additional factor affecting 
teachers’ decision-making as to where they would prefer to teach (Tao, 2014).  
In the case of Ghana, teachers’ preference as to where they are deployed was found to be 
skewed in favour of the country’s most urban regions (Hedges, 2002). Akyeampong et al. 
(2000) concluded this was unsurprising given that most teachers come from urban 
backgrounds. In Nigeria, teachers resisted deployment to teach in rural and remote areas, 
because of the sparse population and harsh topography (Tao, 2014). In addition to 
geographical factors, studies reviewed also found teacher preferences to be influenced by 
the students they would be teaching. In Ghana and India, teachers’ resistance to being 
deployed to teach in a particular school or in rural areas stemmed from the background of 
the children attending the school. This background could relate to poorer socioeconomic 
status, or otherwise what teachers conceive of as “undesirable” communities (Hedges, 
2002; Ramachandran et al., 2005).  
In the context of Malawi, in a 2014 QSD Survey, 60 percent of teachers reported not being 
satisfied with their school placement (cited in Ravishankar et al., 2016). Of these teachers, 
50 percent indicated that this was due to long distances between their homes and place of 
work, whilst 26 percent cited that their place of work was far from tarmac roads or trading 
centres and 18 percent were dissatisfied due to an absence of available teacher housing 
(ibid.). Other studies cited the unavailability of suitable teacher housing with facilities, such 
as running water and electricity, as strong predictors for teachers’ unwillingness to be 
deployed to schools in rural areas (Kadzamira, 2006; Mulkeen, 2010). Asim et al. (2017) 
found that the facilities available at the school, the distance of a school from the nearest 
town centre and the level of amenities available were key variables affecting a teacher’s 
preferred school choice in Malawi. A longitudinal study by the World Bank concluded that 
schools with the fewest teachers per pupil tended to be located in the least developed areas 
of the country. This was where there was limited access to electricity, drinking water supply, 
roads and health facilities (World Bank, 2016).  
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Consequences of the variation in demand as to where teachers are deployed 
One consequence of teacher preferences as to where they teach has been the poor 
progress in the deployment and retention of teachers sent to work in remote schools, which 
often serve the most impoverished communities. In 19 out of 26 sub-Saharan African 
countries, 20 percent or more of teachers were being allocated to schools for reasons other 
than the school enrolment figures (UNICEF, 2016). This often led to wide variations between 
schools in relation to the pupil-teacher ratio (PTR). In Zambia, while the top 10 percent of 
schools had a PTR under 30:1, for the bottom 10 percent of schools it was above 101:1 
(Walter, 2018). In Indonesia, PTR ranged from less than 10:1 in some districts to more than 
30:1 in others (Chang et al., 2014). 
In Malawi, the average PTR was below 40:1 in 25 percent of schools, between 40:1 and 70:1 
in 40 percent of schools and above 70:1 in 35 percent of schools (Ravishankar et al., 2016). 
Teacher movement between schools after their initial assignment was also found to be 
significant. Those transferring to different schools were estimated to make up 
approximately 10 percent of the teaching force each year within any given district, with the 
majority of these transfers being initiated by the teachers themselves (Kadzamira, 2006; 
Mulkeen, 2010; Ndalama & Chidalengwa, 2010).  
Not only are schools in rural and remote areas likely to have a shortage of teachers, but 
also, those allocated there are likely to be teachers with lower levels of formal education, 
experience, and subject knowledge compared to urban schools (McEwan, 1999; Mulkeen, 
2010; Shibeshi, 2009). In studies reviewed that focused on Chile (Meckes & Bascopé, 2012), 
Mexico (Luschei, 2012) and Uruguay (Luschei & Carnoy, 2010), it was concluded that novice 
teachers with higher test scores or teachers with a greater number of years teaching 
experience were more likely to be placed in municipalities with lower levels of poverty 
and/or schools with higher socio-educational and achievement levels. The dynamics of 
teacher distribution in India, Mexico, Pakistan and Turkey reveals that after their first 
teaching assignment, teachers accumulated points based on experience and length of 
service. The greater the number of points, the higher the chance being transferred to a 




In Malawi, studies looking at teacher preferences reveal that poor and remote communities 
struggled to attract and retain teachers (Asim et al., 2017). Moreover, schools in urban 
areas had a higher proportion of teachers, who were either qualified or who had higher 
academic qualifications compared to their rural counterparts (World Bank, 2010). These 
findings reflect similar findings to studies carried out in a number of Global South countries, 
including India (Govinda & Bandyopadhyay, 2008), Mexico (Luschei, 2012) and Tanzania 
(Bennell & Akyeampong, 2007). 
3.2.3 Factors contributing to sustained inequity in how teachers are deployed 
between schools 
Introduction 
Within an ideal system of teacher deployment, formal policies relating to teacher postings 
are made along Weberian lines to reach the objective of equity (Hedges, 2000). This means 
that tasks involving the allocation and management of resources or the assignment of 
personnel is bureaucratic, rather than political in nature (Levy et al., 2018).17, 18 While formal 
institutions may be the basis for determining the objective needs-based criteria for how 
teacher deployment and transfers should occur, “it is the interplay with informal 
mechanisms which ultimately governs the effectiveness of these rules and procedures” 
(Béteille, 2009; p. 32).  
The following subsections synthesise studies reviewed that problematise what it is that 
allows for the rules set by formal institutions on teacher deployment and transfers to be 
negated.19  
Cultural-normative versus formal policies 
A number of studies highlight the disjuncture between policy formulation and the 
subsequent implementation of these policies20 (see Booth et al., 2006; Bridges & Woolcock, 
2017; Kadzamira & Rose, 2001). In the context of many low-income countries in the Global 
 
17 An underlying feature of Max Weber’s ideal bureaucracy differentiates between what the main role of a 
politician should be and that of a civil servant, administrator or bureaucrat. The foremost makes policies, while 
the remainder undertake technocratic duties involving policy implementation (Rosenbloom, 2008). 
18 Afrobarometer data, for instance, found that the majority of Malawians (76 percent) expect their MPs to 
fulfil delivering goods and services to their community. This role would be what Weber attributes to that of the 
apolitical technocrat. Just 4.4 percent understood the role of the MP to be that of introducing legislature for 
the good of the country (Chiweza, 2016). 
19 Chapter 4 provides a detailed discussion on formal versus informal institutions. 
20 Tostensen (2017) writes that between independence in July 1964 and February 2015, there were 80 
attempts at public sector reform, many of them donor led. 
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South, policy implementation is often heavily influenced by donors involved in the sector. 
Pritchett et al. (2014) considered this in the context of isomorphic mimicry. This refers to 
where attempts are made to transplant institutional reforms that have been successful 
elsewhere into a different context, where their success has been limited. Specifically in 
relation to teacher deployment or transfers, the literature reviewed discussed the 
importance of cultural factors which can often override formal criteria and this was found to 
be especially the case in the context of marriage customs. 
In Ghana, there was no official policy in place differentiating between how male and female 
teachers should be deployed. Despite this, female teachers tended not to be posted to rural 
areas, because of the prevailing cultural realities. These included losing their marriage value, 
being put in vulnerable situations or else meeting reluctance from their husbands, if placed 
in a rural area (Hedges, 2002). Similarly, in Niger, female teachers often had their transfer 
requests approved even though this was at odds with official policy, which is because 
Nigerien culture makes it obligatory for a woman to live where her husband does 
(Cummings & Tahirou, 2016).  
In the context of Malawi, the existence of traditional indigenous structures alongside 
western structures has meant that “[n]ew regulatory structures now sit on top of a difficult-
to-change set of norms and cultural-cognitive scripts” (Andrews, 2013; p. 56). Western 
imposed structures are often found to involve the transfer of structures and laws with very 
different contexts to that of Malawi (ibid.). Bridges & Woolcock (2017) found that there is a 
bias within externally influenced reforms, whereby they tend to focus on regulative 
institutions, with only a tiny percentage addressing informal institutions, i.e. normative or 
cultural-cognitive. Formal rules, for instance, do not permit teacher movement between 
schools on account of marriage. The 1991 Malawi Public Service Regulations stipulates that 
“a female civil servant, who is married must bear in mind that should domestic affairs arising 
out of her marriage conflict or interfere with her official duties, such as posting or transfer, 
the Minister reserves the right to terminate her appointment” (cited in Ndalama & 
Chidalengwa, 2010; p. 17). However, local customs dictate that the deployment or transfers 
of teachers should be permissible for this reason (Asim et al., 2017; Kadzamira, 2006; 
Moleni & Ndalama, 2004; Ndalama & Chidalengwa, 2010). A by-product of this has been 
forged marriage certificates as getting wed is seen as a successful mechanism through which 
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to get a placement to teach in a more desirable school (Asim et al., 2017; Kadzamira, 2006; 
Mulkeen, 2010).  
Absent or weak teacher deployment and transfer policies  
Another reason for discretionary teacher transfer practices relates to absent, broad or 
contradictory policies. The literature review identified ambiguity around the “declared rules 
of the game” in relation to teacher movement (Sharma, 2009; p. 143). In such contexts, the 
discretion available to government officials as to how they can proceed with any teacher 
requests concerning deployment or transfers has been a contributory factor in their unequal 
distribution.  
In India, for instance, there is an absence of teacher transfer policies in most states and 
where they do exist, their introduction has been relatively recent (Ramachandran et. al., 
2018; Sharma, 2009). In South Africa, the national norms governing teacher distribution at 
the provincial level were inconsistent, whereby different variations of post allocation policy 
were being applied across the country’s provinces (Kota et al., 2018). Prior to a 2013, 
regarding the transfer policy being implemented in Pakistan, Bari et al. (2016) found that 
incomplete and subjective policies afforded government clerks an inflated role in 
administering teacher transfers, which gave way to corrupt practices. 
In the case of Malawi, the teacher deployment system is reliant upon broad binary concepts 
(Asim et al., 2017). One of these is deploying teachers to work in schools according to 
whether they are overstaffed or understaffed. The Department for Basic Education instructs 
District Education Managers to deploy teachers to schools that are understaffed. However, 
with up to three quarters of all schools sitting in this category, District Education Managers 
have a great deal of discretion as to where teachers can be deployed (ibid.). In addition, 
since 2005, newly graduated teachers have been required to work in rural districts for a 
minimum of five years. However, with up to 90 percent of teachers working in what is 
defined as a rural district, there is a failure to account adequately for intra-district teacher 
allocation inequities, which dwarf inter-district allocation ones (ibid.).  
Political patronage and the teaching work-force  
An emerging literature on the issue of teacher deployment has discussed this in the context 
of the cultivation of patronage networks between politicians and the teaching force. 
Patronage networks can be defined as those where political leaders use public resources as 
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a mechanism through which support for them can be sustained (Kingdon et al., 2014; Levy, 
2018). An extension of patronage networks is clientelism, which refers to where political 
leaders provide personal favours (jobs, contracts, welfare support, money) in exchange for 
electoral support (Berenschot, 2018). Often, this may mean a drive towards the expansion 
of employing public sector workers (and thereby increasing the patronage networks) 
without necessarily demanding that these employees fulfil what is required of their role 
(Kingdon et al., 2014).  
In studies reviewed for this chapter, it was found that in Bangladesh (Hossain et al., 2017), 
India (Béteille, 2009; Fagernas & Pelkonen, 2016; Kingdon & Muzammil, 2009; Sharma, 
2009), Indonesia (Chang et al., 2014; Heyward et al., 2017; Rosser & Fahmi, 2016) and 
Pakistan (Bari et al., 2016) patronaged-based hiring of teachers has long been prevalent. In 
such systems, the state ends up employing too many unqualified teachers, “because they 
belong to politically powerful networks that capture rents through job creation” (Khan, 
2017; p. 651-652). When discussing the difference in the composition of spending between 
public and private schools,21 Corrales (2005) argues that this is in part fuelled by patronage 
networks.22  
In the cases of India (Béteille, 2009), Indonesia (Rosser & Fahmi, 2016) and Pakistan (Bari et 
al., 2016) there was widespread evidence of teachers being used as political agents during 
local and national elections. Teachers in these contexts were often looked up to as 
respected and knowledgeable figure-heads within their local communities. They were, 
therefore, considered instrumental in influencing members of their communities who to 
vote for, and were able to mobilise considerable political support for politicians, who 
supported their transfer to more desirable locations. In India, Béteille (2009) found that 
teachers with political connections successfully obtained a transfer within 3 months of 
applying for one versus the 2.3 years it normally took. Fagernas & Pelkonen (2016) 
corroborated these findings, concluding that the electoral cycle perpetuated the use of 
excessive transfers of primary school teachers in India’s government school system post-
 
21 While public schools typically spend more on wages and procurement, private schools invest a greater share 
in non-salary expenditure, such as instructional materials. 
22 For instance, Kingdon & Muzammil (2009) noted that in India there is almost no public expenditure on non-
salary items. While teachers have been able to negotiate for increased salary allocations through a number of 
different lobbies, the same is not true for parents regarding non-salary expenditure items. 
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election. Conversely, unfavourable reassignment was used by politicians in India to threaten 
uncooperative teachers (Sharma, 2009; Ramachandran et al., 2005). Teachers too, used the 
strength in their numbers to threaten electoral sabotage for politicians pushing for greater 
teacher accountability (Béteille, 2009; Béteille, 2015).  
Bennell & Akyeampong concluded that, whilst the South and South-East Asian countries’ 
examples above point to the politicisation of the teaching profession, this is less of a 
systemic problem in the sub-Saharan African region, as “teachers have not been heavily 
involved in party politics and patron-client relations are not as endemic” (2007; p. 31). That 
said, however, a number of studies looking at teacher deployment and transfers in the sub-
Saharan Africa systems found cronyism or nepotism was successful in securing favourable 
school placements. In Niger (Cummings & Tahirou, 2016) and Zambia (Walter, 2018), there 
was evidence to support that the approval of a political party in power or having personal 
relations with influential members of the elite, meant teachers wielded great influence over 
which school they were placed in or transferred to.  
Specifically in relation to Malawi, the literature points to political interference in the 
transfer of public servants (Dzimbiri, 2016). Insofar as teachers are concerned, there 
appears to be political interference at the national and local level affecting deployment 
(Ndalama & Chidalengwa, 2010). However, Asim et al. (2017) concluded that, rather than 
teacher deployment or discretionary transfers being due to clientelist vote-buying, they are 
instead owing to the personal connections a teacher may have to influential figures. Other 
types of resource allocation, on the other hand, appear to be guided by clientelism due to 
their capture by local politicians who wish to be seen to be visible (Chasukwa & Chinsinga, 
2013; Chiweza, 2010; Chiweza, 2016; OPM, 2013). For instance, guidelines on how teacher 
housing should be allocated stipulate that “it is expected that each Council will use the same 
criteria in allocating the projects within the district by computation of education zone data” 
(Chiweza, 2016; p. 107). While teachers themselves lack the “formal power in the system, 
[they] exercise considerable de facto influence through informal networks” (Asim et al., 
2017; p. 19). Other studies do consider how currying favour with the teaching force for 
political gain has impacted upon certain decisions traditionally left to government 
bureaucrats. Under Joyce Banda’s presidency, for instance, technocrats based at Ministry of 
 
 34 
Education were instructed to promote 20,000 teachers at PT4 grade.23 Not only did this 
create huge burdens on the budget, but it also left newly promoted teachers without their 
new salary for over two years (Dzimbiri, 2016). 
Absent or weak monitoring of where teachers are in the system 
Several studies have identified weak and fragmentary data systems as empowering 
discretionary decision-making around teacher deployment in that it weakens the teacher 
management system. The granularity of such information would typically be included in 
Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) or in budget data (Pritchett, 2014; 
Shah, 2013). The EMIS, for instance, may offer “data on the allocation of resources, curbing 
effects of bad decisions, and highlight areas in which resources are poorly applied” (Amin & 
Chaudhury, 2008; p. 76). One perspective of the literature reviewed did critically evaluate 
whether an increase in information necessarily improves accountability in education 
systems (Fox, 2007; Honig & Pritchett, 2019). Such information is “thin”, only providing a 
surface-level perspective into how resources are distributed. The effectiveness of education 
systems it is argued also depends on “thick” information, which is more contextual 
(Pritchett, 2014). This could be the day-to-day invisible pressures influencing decision-
making and the way these manifest themselves (Kelsall & Wales, 2017).  
Studies sourced for this study document the importance of information systems in ensuring 
that formal rules concerning teacher deployment are adhered to. In the Gambia, for 
instance, the EMIS system was able to track teachers according to a number of variables.24 It 
was credited with helping assign teachers to schools according to need and not through 
discretionary decision-making (Patrinos & Kagia, 2007). Similarly, in the Philippines, the 
Department of Education colour-coded areas by region according to their PTRs, thereby 
providing better information as to where teachers should be sent to work (Albert, 2012). 
Conversely, the poor state of the EMIS in being able to monitor where teachers are in the 
system was raised in studies focusing on Liberia (Ginsburg et al., 2015) and Tanzania (Luena, 
2012). While not directly mentioning the EMIS data, Hedges (2002) study on Ghana found 
that poor record-keeping within the system was a contributory factor to allowing teachers 
to change the region they were being posted to through the falsification of paperwork.  
 
23 The salary pay-scale of a newly recruited teacher.  
24 Seniority, language abilities and subject specialisation. 
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In the case of Malawi, discretionary decision-making surrounding teacher allocation was 
found to be aided partly due to the fragmentary and weak state of administrative data that 
documents where teachers are actually teaching in the system (Asim et al., 2017; Forinash 
et al., 2016). EMIS data from 2016 showed 16 percent of teachers were missing in the 
administrative data collected (Asim et al., 2017). Insofar as the budget process in Malawi 
goes, one study found that due to informal incentives circumventing formal rules, it was 
“theatre”, which failed to align with the objectives contained in its national policy 
commitments and “mask[ed] real distribution and spending” (Rakner, 2004; p. 4). Cammack 
& Kelsall for instance discuss how, in the political economy climate of Malawi’s multi-party 
system, President Muluzi made promises that had “no relationship to the budget” and that if 
the technocracy objected, he would become “enraged”, thus meaning that budget chaos 
ensued (2010; p. 30). 
Opportunities for corruption/ bribery in the teacher transfer system  
Another emerging theme that the literature found negatively affected the deployment of 
teachers related to rent-seeking and corrupt practices amongst government officials. Rent-
seeking is defined as an attempt to gain economic rent through the influence of policies or 
their implementation (Kingdon et al., 2014).  
In the context of teacher transfers, studies conducted in China (Han, 2012), India (Sharma, 
2009; Béteille, 2009; Béteille, 2015), Nigeria (Tao, 2014) and Pakistan (Bari et al., 2016) 
illustrate how teachers may use the means of a monetary bribe to secure a favourable 
placement. In India, teachers reported that having a powerful connection alone was not 
enough, and that payment of a bribe was a necessary guarantee to secure a favourable 
transfer. The amount was contingent upon the speed and type of placement (Béteille, 
2015).25 In Nigeria, bribery involving officials within the education system – known as 
“godfathers” or “godmothers” – was commonplace, and helped facilitate a favourable 
school transfer (Tao, 2014). Clerks working at education district offices in Pakistan were 
found to be the “most important gateways to….personal influence” (Bari et al., 2016; p. 90). 
Teachers could facilitate a favourable transfer or promotion through offering these officials 
 
25 One-third or more teachers in the Indian states of Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan agreed with 
the statement that even if a teacher had a contact, they would still have to pay some monetary bribe to get 
the posting they desired (Béteille, 2009). 
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bribes (ibid.). Almost all the studies sourced discussed teachers bribing officials to seek out a 
transfer. However, Kayunze et al. (2011), in their study on Tanzania, found that it was, in 
fact, headteachers bribing District Education Officers to allocate new government teachers 
to their school using funds from compulsory parental contributions pupils. 
Existing research in Malawi has not looked at the extent to which the system of teacher 
deployment and transfers involves corruptive practices and rent-seeking behaviour. 
However, extensive work has been carried out on Malawi’s political landscape, as it 
transitioned from a one-party state under Hastings Kamuzu Banda to a multi-party political 
system under President Bakili Muluzi. Under the latter, corrupt practices – largely through 
rent creation and distribution – “spread through the civil service as ministers were seen to 
be largely exempt from prosecution and rules were broken with impunity” (Cammack & 
Kelsall, 2010; p. 25). Corruption under Banda, where it existed, was highly centralised and 
those accused of it were imprisoned. Under Muluzi, however, corruption “with 
impunity….start[ed] at the top and reach[ed] down to the lowliest public servant” (Booth et 
al., 2006; p. 12). In this context, civil servants saw their position as a means of self-
enrichment and “succeeded in appropriating a significant share of [the state’s] resources 
and in redistributing part of [them through] their networks” (Anders, 2001; p. 48). Said & 
Singini’s (2017) study estimated the different parts of the system that captured rents in this 
way in Malawi in 2013.  
The role of teacher unions in resisting equitable teacher movement  
Education officials, it is argued, must have the authority to “strategically transfer teachers to 
different schools – even if the teacher does not wish to move – to achieve a mix of personnel 
across schools” (Grissom et al., 2013; p. 1). In the course of my literature search, the role of 
teacher unions and their potential to shape and implement education policies was a theme 
that regularly came up in a number of the studies (Grindle, 2004; Hoxby, 1996; Kingdon et 
al., 2014). 
While research on teacher unions and their influence in affecting equitable teacher 
distribution has been a lesser explored theme, it did emerge in some case studies. The 
contestation by the South African Democratic Teachers Union in regard to the 
redeployment of teachers from over-staffed schools to under-staffed schools in the Eastern 
Cape province of South Africa, for instance, was a critical factor as to why the transfer of 
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teachers from schools with a surplus to those schools with a shortage was unsuccessful 
(Kota et al., 2018; Zengele, 2013). Similarly in Indonesia, the Indonesian Teachers Union was 
an important vehicle obstructing the redeployment of teachers (Rosser & Fahmi, 2016). In 
India, a wealth of literature documents the role teachers’ unions have had in influencing 
education policies and their implementation, including that of deployment (Kingdon & 
Muzammil, 2003; Kingdon & Teal, 2010; Moe, 2006). Unions, according to Moe, can provide 
politicians with an “army of activists who make phone calls, ring doorbells, and otherwise 
campaign to see friends elected and enemies defeated" (Moe, 2006; p. 8).  
The role of the Teacher Union of Malawi [TUM] appears to be dormant as far as teacher 
transfers go.26 Unlike in India and Indonesia, the TUM does not appear to be an institution 
teachers would go to in order to seek help to move schools (Asim et al., 2017). Instead the 
TUM focuses on pressuring the government around teacher pay issues, particularly pay 
increases and reducing salary delays (Watkins & Ashforth, 2019). Additionally, Mulkeen & 
Chen (2008) found that rarely has the Ministry of Education initiated the redeployment of 
teachers. This is because there is a strong disincentive to do so owing to the District 
Education Office being required to compensate the teacher for travel costs in the event of a 
reallocation. Instead, where involuntary transfers do take place, it is often under 
circumstances where a teacher has seriously misbehaved and therefore, is forced to 
relocate to rural schools (VSO, 2002; Watkins & Ashforth, 2019). 
Ruling elite and the ‘distribution of spoils’ to supportive constituencies 
Subsection 3.2.3 has synthesised how the social and organisational capital of teachers 
influences their inequitable allocation, according to geographic preferences. Another strand 
of literature sourced for this review more explicitly emphasises how the “powerlessness” of 
remote regions stems “from their incorporation into such structures on terms that 
potentially underpin their poverty” (Abdulai, 2014; p. 2). Rothchild found that state 
resources in many African countries were skewed in favour of advantaged regions, because 
“certain dominant elites….have taken advantage of their positions of power.…to skew 
distributive patterns in favour of a relatively advantaged subregion” (1984; p. 167). The 
ruling political elite exhibits considerable influence over how public resources are allocated 
 
26 However, Watkins & Kaler (2016) found that the strength of the union means that it is difficult to terminate 
the contracts of under-performing teachers. 
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(Therkildsen, 2008). Within neo-patrimonial systems, patterns of resource allocation can 
emerge, which are implemented in ways that aim to attract greater voter support, rather 
than employing a needs-based approach (Abdulai & Hickey, 2014).  
Evidence from a number of studies has revealed how resources have been 
disproportionately targeted towards areas most loyal to dominant political parties.27 One 
study focusing on Southern India found that politicians used their power to allocate more 
resources to their own villages (Besley et  al., 2011). In Kenya, resource distribution 
appeared to show that, since the country’s independence, those ethnic sub-groups who 
have most strongly supported the patron group in power have benefitted the most from 
additional resources (Hassan, 2020). In Ghana, while budgetary allocations for the education 
budget were found to be closely aligned with equity considerations, actual expenditure 
illustrated considerable deviations in favour of the Greater Accra, Ashanti and Eastern 
regions at the expense of the Volta and Northern regions (Abdulai & Hickey, 2014). The 
regions to benefit over others corresponded to those with the largest distribution of 
politicians relative to population share size (ibid.).  
In other studies reviewed, it was found that political representation alone was not 
sufficient. In India, for instance, villages represented by politically dominant castes were 
able to capture additional government resources unlike those represented by politicians 
from the historically disadvantaged scheduled castes (Palaniswamy & Krishnan, 2008). In 
Ghana, political representation of the historically disadvantaged Northern region was not 
found, by itself, to increase their influence over resource allocation decisions owing to 
politicians from this region being “assigned relatively ‘light weight’ portfolios in 
government” (Abdulai, 2014; p. 16). While most studies emphasised the elites’ role in 
affecting resource distribution, Kjær & Muwanga (2016) found that schools in Uganda better 
connected to local council and district education officials were more successful in lobbying 
for additional teachers to be posted to their school. 
In the context of Malawi, there is comparatively less literature on whether resource 
distribution is contingent on allegiances to the political elite. Asim et al. (2017), in their 
 
27 Conversely, other studies have argued that politicians may favour targeting public resources towards areas 
that are opposition strongholds to increase their vote share in areas that are traditionally not supportive of 
them (see Banful, 2011; Briggs, 2012). 
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study, found that if a school’s local MP was from the ruling party at the time – the 
Democratic People’s Party (DPP) – then this was negatively associated with a high PTR at the 
district level.28 However, within the district the relationship was not significant, thus 
suggesting that when limited to a smaller geographic area, there is little relation between an 
MP’s affiliation and the PTR.  
3.2.4 Summary on teacher deployment and transfers to and between schools 
Much of what has been discussed in Section 3.2 relates to the different mechanisms by 
which formal policies regarding equitable teacher deployment between schools have been 
superseded. Specifically in relation to the thesis objectives, the literature pinpoints some 
areas upon which to build on. These include the importance of formal institutions and how 
these operate alongside informal structures, the influence that strong patronage networks 
can have and how (in)effective monitoring systems can affect teacher deployment. Many of 
these issues are subsumed within concepts relating to both accountability and political 
settlement factors (see Chapter 4). These shed light on why the enforceability of formal 
policies relating to teacher distribution has been challenging in Malawi (Chapter 7). 
3.3 Organisation and utilisation of teachers within schools 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Section 3.3 focuses on the second part of the problem that this thesis seeks to explore, 
namely the inequitable allocation of teachers within schools and their poor utilisation. It is 
organised in a similar way to Section 3.2. In Subsection 3.3.2, the discussion gives an 
overview of what the evidence says in relation to the allocation of teachers within schools, 
and the time they spend teaching. This subsection is important in that it sets out the main 
problem (using the ‘problem driven’ approach illustrated in Figure 3.1). However, while this 
section synthesises the literature that describes the problem, it fails to explain why it exists. 
Through a framework considering accountability and political factors, Subsection 3.3.3 
discusses the literature that identifies why the problem exists.  
3.3.2 Problems relating to teacher allocation and utilisation within schools 
Teaching workload  
Smyth (1985), through a multi-faceted model, delineates what official instructional time is 
against the time teachers and pupils are actually in the classroom together. In terms of the 
 
28 On average each of the 34 districts in Malawi is divided into three to four political constituencies. 
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latter, absences of children and teachers, school closures and other factors that prevent 
teaching from taking place are removed from official instructional time (Niang, 2017). 
Ndalama & Chidalengwa (2010) define a teacher’s workload as being instructional time set 
by the government together with the extra-curricular activities they are expected to 
undertake in addition to their teaching load. Between 2000 and 2010, instruction time in 
primary and lower secondary school decreased (UNESCO, 2015). On the other hand, 
supplementary responsibilities outside of the time teachers spent teaching was found to 
have increased in a number of countries (UNESCO, 2017).  
When specifically focusing on the teaching workload, official working hours for teachers 
averages 27 hours a week in low-income countries. This compares to 30 hours in lower-
middle income countries and 36 hours in upper-middle income ones (Crawfurd & Pugatch, 
2020). In their study of 12 countries, Bennell & Akyeampong (2007) found that teachers in 
rural schools teachers were required to work harder than their urban counterparts due to 
the former being more likely to experience teacher shortages. In South Africa the opposite 
was found to be true, with teachers in urban areas working a greater number of hours 
compared to their rural counterparts (Chisolm et al., 2005). Another factor affecting teacher 
workload is the rate of absenteeism. In Uganda, for instance, the official amount of teaching 
time per day was seven hours, yet absenteeism meant that actual teaching time was 
reduced to three hours (Bold et al., 2017). On average, across seven sub-Saharan African 
countries, 44 percent of teachers were absent from class, while 23 percent were absent 
from school (ibid.). Several studies have also found evidence where teacher absenteeism is 
higher in situations where there are more teachers or the PTR is lower (Duflo et al., 2011; 
Muralidharan et al., 2016). 
In Malawi, the official work hours are considerably lower than in neighbouring sub-Saharan 
African countries and well below the number of hours civil servants are expected to work. 
This is especially the case when considering the hours taught for infant standards (Mulkeen, 
2010; DeStefano, 2013) and the teaching workload across all standards is further diminished 
as a consequences of the inequitable teacher deployment in Malawi. Teachers in hard-to-
reach schools were found to have higher teaching load responsibilities compared to their 
counterparts in urban schools (Kadzamira, 2006; Ndalama & Chidalengwa, 2010). Ndalama 
& Chidalengwa (2010), on the other hand, also consider reasons why the hours taught by 
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teachers in rural schools may be less compared to urban schools. These include distances 
being greater to rural schools, meaning teachers arrive late or finish early, and the fact that 
school inspectors visit isolated schools less frequently. In less remote schools, team-
teaching was found to take place, where more than one teacher was allocated responsibility 
for the class (DeStefano, 2013; Mulkeen, 2010; Steiner-Khamsi & Kunje, 2011; Ndalama & 
Chidalengwa, 2010).29 Other studies have elicited that the under-utilisation of the teaching 
workload was further exacerbated by the low up-take of double-shift systems and 
implementation of multi-grade teaching at the higher standards (DeStefano, 2013; Steiner-
Khamsi & Kunje, 2011). “Teacher effort” – measured according to teacher presence in 
schools and time spent on tasks and activities during the average working day (Ravishankar 
et al., 2016) – is further affected by teacher absenteeism. A 2014 QSD survey found that, on 
average, 15-20 days of instruction per teacher per year were lost through teacher 
absenteeism (cited in Ravishankar et al., 2016).30 
Teacher allocation within schools 
Section 3.2 discussed teacher deployment across schools, while the section above briefly 
discussed teacher workload. Both of these issues are interlinked with how teachers are 
allocated within schools. Much of the literature on within school allocation focuses on high-
income countries, particularly the United States. In these contexts, it was found that more 
qualified and better experienced teachers are less likely to teach in classrooms with a large 
number of students from low-income backgrounds or those with special needs (Luschei & 
Jeong, 2018). Within many Global South contexts, the PTR appears to improve with each 
successive level of education, including between lower and upper basic education. One 
study found that in all 23 sub-Saharan African countries with data, the PTR was higher in the 
first standard of primary school compared with the last (UNICEF, 2016). This is further 
supported by evidence from diagnostic reports carried out on country education systems in 
the Gambia (World Bank, 2011a), Lesotho (World Bank, 2005) and Rwanda (World Bank, 
2011b). In Rwanda, the least qualified and experienced teachers were allocated to the lower 
primary classes (ibid.) and despite ministry guidance instructing that the most experienced 
 
29 Croft (2002) argues that it is necessary to make the distinction between team-teaching under these 
circumstances and those where team-teaching may be the best strategy to deal with very large classes.  
30 This is relatively low, because only 58 percent of schools observed in the 2014 QSD survey kept records on 
teacher absenteeism (cited in Ravishankar et al., 2016). 
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teachers should be assigned to the lower standards in Lesotho, these guidelines were not 
adhered to (Mulkeen & Chen, 2008).  
In Malawi, there is a prevalence of upper standards being taught by more than one teacher, 
each of whom specialises in a particular part of the curriculum (Croft, 2002; DeStefano, 
2013; Mulkeen & Chen, 2008; Ndalama & Chidalengwa, 2010; Ravishankar et al., 2016). In 
more than 70 percent of primary schools, for instance, the PTR is over 100 to 1 for Standard 
1, while in 75 percent of schools it is below 60 to 1 for Standard 8 (DeStefano, 2013). It 
should be noted that this is also influenced by the poor progression of students to the 
senior standards. As well as numbers, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is often either the 
most experienced or qualified teachers who are being allocated to the higher standards. 
One study found that Standard 8 pupils were almost always likely to be taught by a qualified 
teacher compared to Standard 1, where just 60 percent of teachers were qualified (Croft, 
2002). Croft (2002) and Kunje & Chimombo (1999) found this pattern to be repeated in the 
case of other resources, including classrooms, classroom furniture and other teaching and 
learning materials. 
3.3.3 Factors contributing to the under-utilisation and mis-allocation of 
teachers within schools 
Introduction 
Issues relating to how teachers are allocated and their utilisation within schools are largely 
subsumed within the literature on accountability. This, in turn, is framed through the prism 
of teacher absenteeism and its effect on service delivery (Bold et al., 2017). The following 
subsections synthesise those studies that problematise the relationships of accountability 
between school actors in the system, and what effect this may have on how teachers are 
allocated and utilised within schools. Each subsection focuses on a particular issue that 
specifically creates inequity and inefficiency in the allocation and utilisation of teachers. 
Poor inspection systems31  
School inspection is a means through which to evaluate schools in the context of greater 
calls for the sort of accountability mechanisms needed to improve the quality of education 
(De Grauwe & Naidoo, 2004). Inspectors’ responsibilities cover monitoring the efficiency in 
 
31 Much of the framing of this section was influenced by Eddy-Spicer et al. (2016). 
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the management and use of school resources, including that of teachers (Opoku-Asare, 
2006). Until quite recently, the role of inspection and its impact on student achievement 
results has been an under-researched area in the context of the Global South (Eddy-Spicer, 
2016). A number of studies, however, point to the positive impact inspector visits can have. 
In India, Indonesia and Peru teachers working in schools that were frequently supervised or 
inspected were less likely to be absent (ACDP, 2014; Alcázar et al., 2006; Kremer et al., 
2005). For this review, however, I synthesised the issues regarding inspection of interest in 
this thesis: teacher utilisation and distribution. 
A theme relating to several studies reviewed was the extent to which a lack of resources 
contributed to inspection visits to schools being infrequent and limited (De Grauwe, 2001; 
Herselman & Hay, 2002; Hossain, 2017; MacPherson, 2011, Mazibuko, 2007; Uwazi, 2009; 
Wanzare, 2002). In Tanzania, inadequate personnel, the lack of transport, office space and 
equipment were cited as reasons for why whole-school inspections could not be carried out 
annually as stipulated (Uwazi, 2009). Infrequent inspections were found to be more likely 
for schools in remote regions. In Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe the further 
the school was from the district office, the more infrequently it was inspected due to 
transportation costs (De Grauwe, 2001). In Indonesia, schools in remote rural areas had 
been inspected/ supervised 120 days before the study visit. In comparison, non-remote 
rural schools and urban schools had been supervised 68 and 83 days, respectively, prior to 
being visited (ACDP, 2014)  Studies in Indonesia, India, Peru and sub-Saharan African 
countries found that remote schools had higher rates of teacher absenteeism compared to 
their urban counterparts (ACDP, 2014; Alcázar et al., 2006; Kremer et al., 2005; Rogers & 
Vegas, 2009).  
Another issue emerging from the literature was the lack of consequences emanating from 
inspectorate visits. Firstly, this was attributed to the lack of authority that inspectors have 
amongst headteachers and teachers. In Pakistan, for instance, the inspectors’ status, their 
lack of seniority, credibility and authority, the absence of training and the fact that 
inspectors’ positions were the equivalent to that of a high school teacher all compounded 
the ineffective authority of the inspectorate (Jaffer, 2010). Secondly, the poor co-ordination 
between the inspectorate of education and other national education stakeholders was 
found to limit the impact of school inspections. Supervisors’ recommendations were found 
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to be rarely acted upon by higher authorities, meaning that nothing came out of the reports 
(ibid.). 
Lastly, evidence from the studies reviewed pointed to schools being informed of 
inspectorate visits in advance of when they were scheduled for. In Pakistan, ambiguity 
around the inspectors’ effectiveness was found to be due to their being friends and 
confidants of teachers in schools (Jaffer, 2010). In Ghana, teachers interviewed for one 
study indicated that they were normally given advance warning of an inspector’s visit by 
informants at the District Education Office, thus allowing them to alter their behaviour 
(Opoku-Asare, 2006).  
While little has been written on inspection services within Malawi’s education sector, of 
that which exists, the infrequent interaction between the inspectorate, the schools and the 
surrounding community have been cited (Watkins & Ashforth, 2019). Explanatory reasons 
for why this was the case was the poor funding for transport being available to visit schools 
as frequently as was required (ibid.). 
Accountability pressures emanating from high-stakes testing  
International and national testing programmes are common accountability mechanisms 
through which to judge the performance of schools, teachers and education systems 
(Ashadi & Rice, 2016). High-stakes testing is defined as that which has consequences for 
student graduation, teacher accountability, the reputation of the school, or the funding of 
the teacher or the school (Johnson et al., 2008). Alternatively, Au (2008) defines high-stakes 
testing as being linked to teachers or schools being either rewarded or punished. Many 
citizens judge educational quality on the basis of how well a school does in the national 
examinations, which determines admission to the next level of the education system (Sifuna 
& Sawamura, 2010). Given the stakes, this subsection explores the link between high-stakes 






While numerous studies have considered the impact of high-stakes testing on resource 
allocation policy, comparatively less is known about what its impact has been on teacher 
allocation decisions within schools in the Global South.32 Of the literature sourced, only one 
study investigated what impact high-stakes testing had had on decisions relating to teacher 
allocation to classes within schools. Ashadi & Rice’s (2016) study on Indonesia found that 
performing well in the national examinations directly impacted on teacher allocation 
decisions. This took the form of a disproportionate allocation of experienced and/ or 
qualified teachers to those classes with examinable content. In South Africa, following the 
publication of the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) results, 
an increase in the allocation of resources to mathematics and sciences was made at the 
school level (Reddy, 2010). Linked to high-stakes assessment is performance-related pay, 
which according to some advocates, can strengthen the relationships of accountability 
between the state and schools and between schools and parents (Bruns et al., 2011). While 
this review could not find any studies in the Global South linking performance-related pay to 
teacher allocation, the financial incentives created for schools and teachers to perform well 
in national assessment is evident. In Chile, for instance, additional resources to schools and 
teachers were found to be dependent on their performance in the national learning 
outcome assessment system (Meckes & Carrasco, 2010). 
Like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, national examinations in Malawi act as the 
primary way through which education systems are currently assessed (Kellaghan & Greaney, 
2004). The Primary School Leaving Certificate Examination (PSLCE) taken at the end of 
primary school, is used to assess both the learning that is taking place at school and who is 
eligible to enrol in secondary schools (Chulu, 2013; Sayed & Kanjee, 2013). With limited 
places available at secondary schools, how well pupils perform determines whether they are 
given a place at secondary level, and which type of secondary school they will transition to. 
The top performers will be selected for conventional secondary schools, which tend to be 
better resourced, but where places are few. All others selected are given places in the less 
desirable community day secondary schools (De Hoop, 2010). No study to date has 
 
32 While there has been little work done on this globally, there is extensive literature relating to how teachers 
are distributed in the context of the No Child Left Behind initiative in the United States. Within this, a body of 
literature has considered the effects upon the distribution of teachers amongst standards in the same school 
(Boyd et al., 2008; Fuller & Ladd, 2013; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010).  
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documented what effect, if any, the PSLCE has on teacher allocation within schools. 
However, at the community level it has been reported that the high regard given to the 
PSLCE is due it to being the minimum qualification required for employment opportunities 
guaranteeing a regular salary (Watkins & Ashforth, 2019). Similarly, Croft (2002) found that 
the community judged the reputation of a school to be contingent on the school’s 
performance in the national PSLCE.  
Micropolitics between education actors at the local level  
In the context of decentralised education systems, “school-based management” or “school-
self management” describes systems where the responsibility and decision-making for 
school operations is transferred from central government to the schools themselves (Bruns 
et al., 2011; De Grauwe & Naidoo, 2004). These can extend to matters relating to policies, 
the curriculum, standards, and accountability (Caldwell, 2005). Studies reviewed for this 
chapter reveal how micropolitics at the local level can negatively affect school-based 
management and teacher accountability to their clients (parents) and their managers 
(headteachers or district-level officials) (Bennell & Akyeampong, 2007). Micropolitics can be 
defined as organisational politics within a small organisation (Scherer, 2007). Alternatively, 
it can be considered in the context of formal and informal power in organisations in terms 
of how these interact and are utilised by individuals (Blase, 1991). It is also seen as 
influencing decisions around the allocation of scarce resources within the organisation 
(Johnson, 2001). Actors within the same organisation may have a “different view of who has 
the formal power (authority), who has informal power (influence), or who should have the 
power to make organizational decisions” (Brosky, 2011; p. 2). 
The importance of micro-politics and corresponding power dynamics in affecting 
relationships of accountability is useful to discuss in the context of how power is conceived 
of. VeneKlasen & Miller (2002) distinguish between four types of power that can either be 
empowering or disempowering (power ‘over’, ‘with’, ‘to’ or ‘within). Similarly, “power 
distance” is a useful construct to consider, especially regarding its importance in the 
literature in relation to accountability in the education sector. Hofstede’s (2001) high power 
distance refers to where there is a “deference to figures of authority and general 
accept[ance] [of] an unequal distribution of power” (Grimsby, 2016). The opposite pertains 
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to low power distance, where a subordinate would “question authority and expect to 
participate in decisions that affect them” (ibid.). 
A large strand of the literature focusing on the effect of micropolitics at the local level does 
so in regard to parent/ community relations with the school. Barquedano- López et al. 
(2013) found that parental participation was contingent on the perceptions that teachers 
and school administrators had regarding their background. Essuman & Akyeampong’s 
(2011) study of poor rural districts in Ghana found that local decision-making power was 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of the local elite and better educated community 
members. Schools were found to exhibit greater accountability to these structures of local 
power, rather than to parents. Moreover, poor rural communities did not demand higher 
standards from teachers for fear they would quit to go and teach elsewhere (ibid.). In India, 
teachers’ salaries were found to be many times greater than the income levels of members 
of school committees, which created an unequal balance of power such that school 
development committees were often unable to hold teachers to account (Rawal & Kingdon, 
2010).  
The headteacher is a pivotal figure in managing how teachers are allocated and ensuring 
their time is effectively utilised. However, a major problem identified in countries in the 
Global South is that they do not have effective authority over teachers (Bennell & 
Akyeampong, 2007). Some of the reviewed studies revealed how the “power distance” 
between teachers and headteachers affected issues relating to teacher utilisation and 
where they were allocated to work within the school. In India, for instance, Kremer et al. 
(2005) found that teacher absenteeism was likely to be higher among powerful teachers, 
which included those who were older and more educated. In Zimbabwe, teachers who had 
been in the system longer were more able to resist which class they were allocated to by 
the headteacher compared to newly qualified ones. The consequence was that newly 
qualified teachers were more likely to be allocated to difficult classes, either in terms of 
undisciplined pupils or where pupil performance was poor (Magudu & Gumbo, 2017). In 
Ghana, headteachers – often promoted without the relevant training needed for their roles 
– indicated that teachers in urban schools were more difficult to manage compared to those 
in rural schools (Akyeampong & Asante, 2006). The same study found that most primary 
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headteachers were unable to initiate disciplinary proceedings against teachers as they 
lacked the authority to do so (ibid.).  
In Malawi, several studies have reported how social relationships are characterised by 
inequality and a large power distance (Booth et al., 2006). Within the education sector, 
Watkins & Kaler discuss how educational credentials or evidence of schooling is an 
important mechanism by which to mark social distinction in terms of deciding who has “the 
right to speak first or to speak authoritatively, and who do[es] not” (2016; p. 5). In the case 
of one school, the headteacher’s academic qualifications were considered sub-standard 
compared to the other teachers working there. According to one parent whose child 
attended the school, this “ma[de] the other teachers not to work hard at school” and 
“end[ed] up affecting the performance of pupils” (ibid.). While Malawi’s community 
participation strategy aimed for communities to be more involved in school management 
(GoM, 2004), Watkins & Kaler (2016) found the asymmetric power dynamics between 
teachers and the surrounding communities meant an absence of accountability pressures 
upon the school from these actors. Conversely, a recent government administered report 
points to the low power distance within the civil service, which has resulted in a 
proliferation of unregulated absenteeism among junior staff. The Public Commission Service 
report found that “there is fear by Senior Government officials of their juniors as well as lack 
of respect by junior staff of their superiors” (cited in Dzimbiri, 2016; p. 89). 
3.3.4 Summary on the organisation and utilisation of teachers within schools 
Section 3.3 has identified some of the ways in which teacher utilisation, and their allocation, 
are negatively affected by drawing on pre-existing research from the Global South and 
Malawi. The main theme to emerge is the ineffectiveness of the principal-agent 
relationships of accountability between different stakeholders in the education system 
insofar as teacher management is concerned. The ineffectiveness is often due to the effects 
of hierarchical power differentials between teachers and those actors holding them 
accountable as well as the lack of resources and training available to these actors to monitor 
teachers. Like with Section 3.2, the concepts discussed relate to both accountability and 
political settlement factors as well as how the latter influence how accountability 




This literature review has revealed problematic issues regarding teacher deployment, 
allocation and utilisation in the context of countries in the Global South. I have considered a 
large part of this literature through the lens of accountability and political settlement 
factors. Accountability issues have been around in the field of education for a comparatively 
longer period than that of political settlement factors. Whilst the latter have come to the 
fore in recent years to explain how education systems are operating, it remains the case 
that “the literature on the political economy of education is under-developed in geographic 
scope, robustness of methods utilized, and theoretical richness” (Kingdon et al., 2014; p. 46). 
In the context of Malawi, there has been a wealth of research concerning the inequitable 
distribution of teachers between and within schools. However, these have overwhelmingly 
been technical and apolitical in nature. Similarly, in recent years more literature has become 
available discussing Malawi’s political settlement and its implications or reasoning, more 
widely, for (in)effective governance. However, there is a dearth of literature considering the 
two issues in tandem.33, 34 Given this current knowledge gap the focus of my thesis is to 
address these two aspects together. 
In the following chapter (Chapter 4), the conceptual framework selected to guide this 
research is discussed. It builds on the review of a number of studies and, in particular, 
Hickey & Hossain (2019) and Levy & Walton (2013) to consider specifically the problems of 






33 An exception to this is Asim et al. (2017). This study was published at the beginning of my fieldwork in 
Malawi in November 2017 and does address the two issues together and summarises some of the main issues 
arising.   
















































Chapter 4: Conceptual Framework  
Chapter purpose and structure 
Chapter 3 presented a review of the literature, which raised the problematic issue of 
management relating to teacher deployment between schools, and their allocation and 
utilisation within schools. The literature review was guided by my conceptual framework, 
which contains a hybrid of themes relating to accountability and political settlement factors. 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to consider the core features of the conceptual framework used 
for this study, its relevance to Malawi and its applicability to the aspects of teacher 
management that are of interest in this thesis 
This chapter is arranged as follows. In Section 4.1, I discuss the 2004 World Development 
Report (WDR) Accountability Framework and its relevance to this research. The section 
reflects on how it, alone, cannot provide sufficient explanatory power regarding the issues 
this study seeks to explore. Section 4.2 focuses on the Political Settlements Framework, 
which addresses many of the criticisms levelled at the 2004 WDR Accountability Framework. 
Section 4.3 concludes with the hybrid framework that I will be utilising for my study, for 
which both the Accountability and Political Settlements Framework are drawn upon (Levy & 
Walton, 2013). 
4.1 Accountability Framework  
4.1.1 The centrality of principal-agent relations  
The concept of accountability has a long tradition in the field of political science. It is 
premised on the idea that mechanisms are in place holding the agent to account for 
decisions made when decision-making is transferred from the principal (e.g. the citizen) to 
the agent (e.g. the state) (Lindberg, 2009). A central premise of accountability pertains to 
relationships between individuals and/or organisations. Paul defines accountability as 
“holding individuals and organisations responsible for performance measured as objectively 
as possible” (1992; p. 1047). Accountability may be interpreted in many different ways. It 
can relate to either “responsibility” or “answerability”, where individuals and/or 
organisations have to explain themselves (Bovens, 1998; Paul, 1992; UNESCO, 2017). This 
answerability may be in relation to the sort of behaviour or results that an individual and/or 
organisation is expected to meet based on certain set standards. Linked to this is where 
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individuals may be sanctioned (or rewarded), if they fall below (or exceed) set expectations. 
It is useful to differentiate between the definitions ascribed to horizontal and vertical forms 
of accountability. Horizontal accountability relates to formal relationships within the state, 
where “one state actor has the formal authority to demand explanations or impose 
penalties on another” (Transparency International, 2017). Vertical accountability, on the 
other hand, is where citizens can hold the powerful to account, i.e. through elections (ibid.).  
While there are different approaches as to what is meant by “accountability”, for this thesis 
I focus on the 2004 WDR Making Services Work for the Poor (World Bank, 2003). A central 
theme of the report’s framework – hereafter referred to as the “Accountability Framework” 
– advocates for a shift away from a “long route” to a “short route” of accountability. The 
latter simplifies relationships of accountability by removing multiple principal-agent 
relationships. For the purposes of this thesis I am interested in the principal-agent 
relationships of accountability between different individuals or organisations within the 
system (Figure 4.1). A principal is an individual or organisation with set objectives, who 
appoints an agent to perform a set task (Ferris, 1992). For this thesis, agents refer to 
teachers or sub-national government officials, while principals refer to the education actors 
officially mandated to manage them.  
A large focus of this thesis is understanding the principal-agent problem. This can occur 
when an agent shares the principal’s objectives to a degree, but possibly, “also ha[s] other 
(usually self-regarding) interests” (Bossert, 1998; p. 1516).35 It can also happen when there 
is information asymmetry, and where monitoring systems designed by principals to ensure 
agent compliancy are ineffective (Booth & Cammack, 2013). A further principal-agent 
challenge relates to the multiplicity of principals, which is relevant in the context of 
decentralised education systems (Besley & Ghatak, 2003). A specific example of this would 
appear to relate to how teachers are allocated. A principal (Ministry of Education official) 
may emphasise the importance of foundational skills, which requires teachers to be 
distributed across classes within a school more equitably. However, the agent (the 
 
35 Principal-agent relations may differ by sector, with principals in certain sectors having more control over 
agents based on whether the service is oriented towards production or consumption (Mcloughlin, 2012). 
Within the education sector principal-agent relationships traditionally exist between clients (parents, 
communities), the executive apparatus of the state, organisational providers of schooling and front-line 
providers (World Bank, 2003; Pritchett, 2015). 
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headteacher) may be incentivised to allocate more and/or experienced teachers in classes 
that are examinable in order to perform well in public examinations. This may be due to 
other principals in the system (e.g. the District Education Manager or parents) judging the 
headteacher’s performance on the basis of these results.  
Pritchett expanded upon the Accountability Framework36 by proposing that in high-quality 
education systems coherence must exist between and within relationships of accountability. 
The author defines coherence as “the pieces of the system [which] fit together towards a 
common purpose” (2018; p. 25). For instance, “’the state’ declares a large number of very 
lofty and desirable goals that it wants its education system to achieve but then makes 
insufficient resources available to the Ministry” (Pritchett, 2015; p. 22). As an example, 
Malawi’s Education Sector Implementation Plan II (ESIP) proposed district officials redeploy 
teachers to schools with a shortage (see Chapter 2); however, the cost involved made this 













36 Lant Pritchett was also one of the co-authors of the Accountability Framework. 
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37 The Accountability Framework has been slightly adapted to take into account the different levels of 


























































































































4.1.2 The accountability framework and its applicability to Malawi 
The discussion above has focused largely on the Accountability Framework in the context of 
the principal-agent problem. As part of the “short route” to accountability, decentralisation 
was core to what was proposed for improving the delivery of public services (World Bank, 
2003). In Malawi, decentralisation to local districts became cabinet policy in 1996 (Chikoko, 
2009), being seen as “a logical conclusion to the democratisation process” (Chiweza, 2016; 
p. 95). Global discussion on educational reform at this time was centred around 
decentralisation going hand-in-hand with the principles of good governance (Davies, 2003; 
McGinn & Welsh, 1999; World Bank, 2003). In 1998, the Decentralization Policy and Local 
Government Act was passed through Malawi’s parliament, with the first elections for 
District Assemblies being held in 2000 (Davies et al., 2003). However, Bakili Muluzi 
(President of Malawi between 1994 and 2004) delayed holding local elections until he could 
be sure his party had “gained a strong foothold in the villages” (Cammack et al., 2007; 
pg.13). After 2000, no local elections were held until 2014 (O’Neil & Cammack, 2014). This 
meant an absence of councillors until 2014, who are defined as “representatives of specific 
communities who are ideally placed to be the link between the people and the local 
government” (Chasukwa & Chinsinga, 2013; p. 354). As a consequence, district councils 
were left without a legitimate mandate and decentralisation processes were vulnerable to 
political interference at local levels of governance (Tostensen, 2017). Additionally, a number 
of studies found high bureaucratic resistance to fully devolving sectoral functions to the 
district level (Chinsinga, 2008; Cammack et al., 2009; Tambulasi, 2010). All of this was 
coupled with the inadequacy of the financial, technical and human capacities at district 
levels of governance (Chinsinga, 2008; Chiweza, 2010; Kutengule et al., 2014).  
This “pseudo” implementation is, according to Fullan (1993), partly due to normative and 
cultural-cognitive institutions failing to align with the changes demanded of formal 
structures in becoming more inclusionary. Consequently, stakeholders excluded in decision-
making processes prior to decentralisation continue to remain so. Several studies have 
indicated that the “pseudo” implementation of decentralisation in Malawi has allowed local 
elites to control a number of district government functions (Cammack et al., 2009; 
Chasukwa & Chinsinga, 2013; Chiweza, 2016; Forinash et al., 2016; O’Neil & Cammack, 
2014). Political interference has been cited as one reason for why district and local-level 
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government institutions have struggled to achieve sector targets set out under national 
frameworks (Chasukwa & Chinsinga, 2013; Chiweza, 2016).  
4.1.3 The relevance of the Accountability Framework for this thesis 
Of interest to this research is an understanding of the principal-agent problem (Subsection 
4.1.1) and how this has affected teacher management. One of these problems is the 
different interests driving principals and agents. Chapter 3 documented some of the ways 
this has manifested itself in terms of the equity/ efficiency concerns of principals versus the 
personal interests of where teachers are deployed to work.  
The literature on the decentralisation of the primary education system in Malawi also points 
to the principal-agent problem being exacerbated by multiple principals being responsible 
for teacher management (Chiweza, 2010; Kufaine, 2008; Thomas, 2017). Several crucial 
teacher management functions continue to remain centralised despite a commitment to 
decentralise these. For example, the 2001 Policy Investment Framework pledged to 
decentralise teacher recruitment functions (GoM, 2001). However, to date, this remains 
centralised. This has meant District Education Managers (DEM) lack control over teachers, 
thereby weakening relationships of accountability between the two parties (Chimombo, 
2008). Moreover, as well as appointing staff, the Local Government Act No. 42 of 1998 
mandates District Councils to promote and discipline staff (Davies et al., 2003). However, 
while district officials are able to issue a written warning to teachers for misconduct, more 
serious disciplinary measures – together with promoting staff – remain centralised (GoM, 
n.d.).  
Another principal-agent problem identified of relevance to this thesis relates to asymmetric 
information concerning where teachers are in the system. Chapter 3 discussed how 
effective education systems are dependent on both “thick” and “thin” information 
(Pritchett, 2014). Data-driven information monitoring teacher movement is an example of 
“thin” information. “Thick” information, on the other hand, is more contextual and involves 
the way day-to-day invisible pressures manifest themselves to influence decision-making 
(Kelsall & Wales, 2017). However, even the most rudimentary “thin” information relating to 
teachers in Malawi is absent (Asim et al., 2017).  
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4.1.4 Criticisms of the Accountability framework  
The discussion contained in the review of the literature in Chapter 3 illustrates how the 
Accountability Framework alone is insufficient in explaining teacher deployment or 
allocation and utilisation issues. A major criticism levelled at it is its lack of focus on what 
influences drivers of change, and how politics actually works in practice to affect service 
delivery (Devarajan et al., 2011; Levy & Walton, 2013). Additionally the Accountability 
Framework’s emphasis is on the top echelons of government where policy-making occurs, 
and the bottom where service provision takes place, i.e. the school.38 Missing, however, are 
the “in-between spaces as the place where much of the politics of service provision plays 
out” (Levy & Walton, 2013; p. 2) and where governance often falls short (ibid.). It is these in-
between spaces where normative or cultural-cognitive institutions are more likely to take 
hold, and dominate over regulative institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006). Mulkeen & Chen, 
for instance, discuss how district level administrators within decentralised education 
systems are more at risk of being “exposed to the pressure of influential personalities in local 
communities, and it is not unusual to see their decisions being biased” (2008; p. 21). These 
spaces remain poorly researched, with insufficient disaggregation of local government, local 
communities and schools and their inter-connections (Dunne et al., 2007). In the context of 
Malawi, district and local government officials, together with headteachers, are important 
insofar as formal responsibilities relating specifically to the deployment, allocation and 








38 The accountability framework focuses on public service provision in terms of two polar opposites. The first is 
a top-down hierarchy, with goals shaped by the political process, whilst the second, is participatory 
approaches linking clients and providers (Levy & Walton, 2013).  
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Figure 4.2: Official principals’ responsibilities concerning primary teacher education 
















relating to teachers 
Deployment of 
teachers to schools 
Advise teachers on 
curriculum issues 
Administer in-service 
training of teachers 
Monitor teacher 
attendance 
Setting establishment  
per school 
Transfer of teachers 
between schools 
Advise headteachers 
on managing teachers 
Allocate teachers to 
standards (classes) 
 
Selection of teacher 
trainees 






Hiring of teachers 
Collect data on 
teachers for EMIS 
   
Deployment of 
teachers to districts 
Payroll management    
Transfer of teachers 
between districts 
    
Firing of teachers     
Promotion/ demotion 
of teachers 
    
Source: Based on researcher’s interviews and government documents. 
A further criticism of the Accountability Framework is that it generally conceives of 
relationships of accountability being between formal institutions, which is to the detriment 
of informal institutions (Banik & Chinsinga, 2016). This Accountability Framework, for 
instance, leaves little room for discussing the role of principals who are “unofficial” but who 
act as principals nonetheless and affect service delivery. Institutions are those that “consist 
of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct), 
and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” (North, 1991; p. 9). Informal 
institutions are those that benefit certain individuals or organisations more compared to 
others due to rules not being formalised and being highly personalised (Khan, 2010). Scott 
(2013) discusses how institutions can be further broken down into those that are regulative 
(formal) or normative and cultural-cognitive (informal).  
Specifically in relation to Malawi, key policy reforms relating to issues of teacher 
deployment, allocation and utilisation, in the main, relate to formal institutions (see Chapter 
2). Yet, the failure of progress in these areas suggests an emphasis on formal institutions 
alone is insufficient. For instance, formal rules do not permit teacher movement between 
schools on account of marriage. However, Chapter 3 highlighted how local customs permit 
the deployment or transfer of teachers in Malawi for this reason. Previous research has also 
documented the greater effectiveness/ visibility of informal institutions compared to formal 
institutions in improving school effectiveness (Eggen, 2011; O’Neil & Cammack, 2014; Rose, 
2003; Watkins & Ashforth, 2019). For instance, the village chief is an important part of 
village life, but is conspicuously absent in any of the formal frameworks regarding the 
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education sector at the district or national level. Watkins & Ashforth (2019) point to the 
power that chiefs can wield in two crucial ways. The first is settling disputes between school 
and community actors and/or parents, whilst the second, is helping the school attract 
resources.  
A final criticism regarding the Accountability Framework is its lack of critical dialogue over 
how relationships of accountability are vulnerable to issues relating to power. In recent 
years there has been an extensive focus on social accountability mechanisms and how these 
can help strengthen relationships of accountability (Fox, 2015).39 One criticism of social 
accountability mechanisms is their weakness in incorporating the power dynamics between 
principals and agents (Fowler & Biekart, 2012). The importance of micro-politics and the 
corresponding power dynamics in adversely affecting relationships of accountability was 
discussed in Chapter 3. The discussion there on high and low power distance is useful for 
this thesis, when considering the strength of various principal-agent relationships in relation 
to teacher management. These gaps in the Accountability Framework lead me to discuss the 
Political Settlements Framework and its relevance for this research in the next section.  
4.2 Political Settlements Framework  
4.2.1 Bringing politics ‘back in’ for understanding the quality of service 
provision 
More recently, there has been a growing body of research calling for “a shift from the 
preoccupation with good governance to ‘political settlement’ as the basis for understanding 
contemporary challenges in developing countries” (Banik & Chinsinga, 2016; p. 2). The 
emerging interest in political settlement stems from its more critical stance towards the 
good governance literature, which assumes a positive correlation between democracy and 
good developmental outcomes (Banik & Chinsinga, 2016; Levy, 2014). To those championing 
a political settlement approach, this discourse provides a better understanding of the 
“negotiation and conflict in the use, production and distribution of resources through the 
interaction of formal and informal institutions and through the distribution of private and 
public power” (Leftwich, 2006; p. 3). Its advocates argue that the type of political settlement 
 
39 The literature in this field of accountability has considered the effectiveness of citizen monitoring, user-
centric public information access and citizen-participation in matters relating to decision-making (Fox, 2015). 
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can help to  explain policy processes, together with what gets prioritised (Banik & Chinsinga, 
2016).  
A political settlement has been described as a type of social order, which is the 
“combination of power and institutions that [are] mutually compatible and also sustainable 
in terms of economic and political viability” (Khan, 2010; p. 4); the “distribution of power 
between contending social groups and social classes” (Di John & Putzel, 2009; p. 4); and a 
“common understanding, usually forged between elites, about how power is organised and 
exercised” (DfID, 2010; p. 22). At a more complex level, a political settlement implies an 
institutional structure that “creates benefits for different classes and groups in line with their 
relative power” (Khan, 2010; p. 20).  
Political settlements are characterised by three broad variables: 
1. The extent to which there is elite cohesion. Where cohesion is high, institutional 
arrangements are organised around hierarchical relations between principals and agents. 
Where cohesion is low, horizontal principal-agent negotiated arrangements emerge. 
2. The strength of institutional arrangements and how capable they are of enforcing 
‘impersonal’ rules that apply to everyone versus ‘personalised’ rules, which only apply to 
specific individuals/ groups.  
3. The way non-elites are incorporated into the political settlement, which affects whether 
service provision is “programmatic” or “clientelist” (Levy et al., 2014). 
There have also been attempts to set out the different typologies of country-level political 
settlements by distinguishing between the alternating characteristics attributed to them 
(Khan, 2010; Levy, 2014; Wales et al., 2016). Figure 4.3 sets out the framework upon which 









Figure 4.3: Typology of different types of political settlements 
 
Source: Levy (2014). 
4.2.2 The political settlements framework and its applicability to Malawi 
Linking Figure 4.3 to Malawi, many studies have written about the effects of its political 
settlement (‘competitive clientelist’) on governance and service delivery (Booth et al., 2006; 
Cammack, 2011; Cammack, 2017; Said & Singini, 2017; Tenthani & Chinsinga, 2016). Malawi 
is a hybrid “neopatrimonial” state, meaning that while a framework for formal law and 
administration exists, the state is captured by informal networks. This, according to Booth et 
al., means that the “distribution of spoils of office takes precedence over formal functions of 
the state, severely limiting the ability of public officials to make policies in the general 
interest” (2006; p. 9). 
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As was discussed in Chapter 2, competition for electoral power is mainly organised along 
ethno-regional lines. Under such a system, an increasing number of political parties seek to 
build support through relationships of patronage. The period 1964 to 1978 – under a one-
party system – has been described as the only period in Malawi’s history where a long-term 
development agenda took hold (Said & Singini, 2017). The over-riding objective of 
(re)election comes at the expense of long-term development, meaning that public 
bureaucracy is often defined by personalised rather than programmatic characteristics 
(Cammack & Kelsall, 2010; Said & Singini, 2017).40 This arrangement allows elites to employ 
a number of discretionary practices that target resources to more politically useful groups 
(O’Neil & Cammack, 2014).  
As is typical of a competitive clientelist state, the delivery of public services in Malawi 
establishes “a social contract with the population that mostly maintains [just] enough 
services [needed] to sustain social conciliation” (Cammack, 2017; p. 661). Incumbent 
politicians, vulnerable to competition from rival political groups, push for delivering goods 
and services that are highly visible in order to increase their chances of re-election (Chiweza 
& Waldock, 2011). This complements what Kingdon et al. (2014) and Hickey & Hossain 
(2019) propose, which is that investments targeting educational access under such political 
settlements are preferable to those promoting educational quality. Access reforms involve 
tangible resources through which politicians can “be seen” to be delivering development to 
their constituencies. Quality-enhancing reforms, on the other hand, are investments 
targeting areas relating to accountability and cost-effectiveness. Harding & Stasavage (2013) 
argue that, in a number of African countries, policies seeking to improve school quality are 
less of a “vote winner” than, say, reducing school fees. In other words, voters are more 
likely to reward political leaders to whom they can directly attribute programmes to. The 
same cannot be said of quality-enhancing reforms, which not only have few tangible results 
in the short-term, but may also potentially threaten the personal interests of politicians in 
clientelist settings.   
 
40 Consideration as to whether competitive elections “reinforce” clientelism or otherwise, have a 
programmatic effect, is also worth taking account of. In the latter case, elections may induce the political elite 




4.2.3 The relevance of the Political Settlements Framework for this thesis 
Specifically in relation to this thesis, the usefulness of the Political Settlements Framework is 
its emphasis on what effect the distribution of organisational power has on institutions and 
policies (Khan, 2017). Chapter 3 illustrated how in many countries teacher deployment 
processes are heavily influenced by personalised norms relating to nepotism, patronage or 
clientelism. It is useful to define these terms again for the purposes of this chapter. 
Nepotism is where those with power or influence may favour relatives, friends or kin. 
Patronage refers to where support is provided to specific groups in exchange for their 
electoral support (Kingdon et al., 2014). Clientelism is where the distribution of resources is 
made in exchange for voter support, meaning that programmatic policies are rarely 
distinguishable between political parties (Andrews, 2015). These personalised norms are 
reflected within Malawi’s political settlement. 
Similarly, competition between multiple political parties in a system defined by clientelism 
potentially affects the way in which resources are distributed. In Malawi, Chiweza found 
evidence of finite resources for infrastructural development being spread thinly amongst 
constituents, such that “each MP has something to show his/her constituency for electing 
him/ her” or to increase their chances of re-election” (2016; p. 107). An example of this 
relates to teacher housing, where official guidelines stipulate that District Councils should 
allocate this according to a needs-based approach based upon education zone data. In 
practice, however, MPs dismiss these guidelines in favour of “sharing the cake equally 
among constituencies” (ibid.). This is relevant given how construction of classrooms or 
teacher housing is likely to affect both how teachers are allocated and whether they would 
want to be deployed to work at that school (see Chapter 9). 
Lastly, the Political Settlements Framework is useful to consider in the context of 
decentralisation. Political settlement analysis primarily concerns itself with the distribution 
of power in society, while decentralisation is about shifting power and decision-making 
functions to lower levels of government (Barnett, 2018). As discussed in Subsection 4.1.2, 
the Ministry of Education in Malawi has been reluctant to cede real power to local 
education authorities (Chimombo, 2008; Chiweza, 2010; Thomas, 2017). Abdulai argues that 
this is because decentralisation reduces the discretionary powers afforded to the national 
political elite, whereby it minimises “their capacity to resort to clientelist distribution of 
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resources as a political survival strategy” (2017; p. 83). Elsewhere, Levy argues that in 
competitive clientelist political states, decentralisation reforms are unlikely to take root, 
because such “reforms reduce opportunities for discretion in hiring decisions and 
because….leaders lack a consistent and long-term orientation towards change” (2015; p. 
245). In countries like Malawi, where politicians are increasingly vulnerable to losing power 
to other rival political factions, the commitment of the political elite to decentralisation 
remains weak.  
4.3 Levy-Walton Conceptual Framework 
The sections above have presented an overview of both the Accountability Framework and 
Political Settlements Framework, how they apply to Malawi and their relevance to this 
thesis. The approaches taken by both frameworks are useful in helping to understand the 
challenges relating to service provision. With this in mind, I turn to the conceptual 
framework utilised for this study, which incorporates elements of both these frameworks. 
The Levy-Walton framework broadly considers: 
1. A country’s particular political settlement and how this manifests itself in a particular 
sector across various levels of governance through the enforcement and monitoring of 
rules.  
2. A diagnosis of organisational behaviour within the overall system and across different 
sectors and different levels of governance. 
The framework attempts to “operationalize a political settlements approach in the domain 
of service provision” (Hickey & Hossain, 2019; p. 34) and focus on the “many layers within a 
specific sector in between the top levels of policy-making and the service provision front line” 
(Levy & Walton, 2013; p. 4). The Levy-Walton framework identifies the determinants of 
public organisation performance, as presented in the steps below (ibid.): 
a) The underlying political settlement of a country affects sector-level interest groups, 
coalitions and ideas. 
b) Sector-level interest groups, coalitions and ideas affect de jure/ de facto governance 
arrangements. 




d) Quality of performance management affects performance.  
These steps can conceivably be mapped onto the Accountability Framework, which 
attributes performance outcomes to a series of principal-agent relationships. However, the 
criticisms levelled at this framework (e.g. poor focus on middle levels of governance, 
informal institutions and the power and micropolitics and the effects of these on 
relationships of accountability) means that for the Levy-Walton framework the 
Accountability Framework acts as a starting point (Levy & Walton, 2013).  
Each level of the framework illustrated in Figure 4.4 is characterised by various actors and 
institutions (formal and informal). Also existing at each level, are the types of information 
flows that can underpin monitoring and the extent to which sanctions are available to 
support enforcement (Levy & Walton, 2013). In relation to this thesis, the Levy-Walton 
framework’s approach is about exploring the political drivers at the national level that affect 
teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation. Next, the multiple levels of governance 
within the education sector in Malawi (central, district and local) as well as at the school 
level are considered. Each level of government is characterised as an institution, which 
comprises “a set of rules, monitoring and enforcement arrangements” (Levy & Walton, 
2013; p. 11) which can be on the basis of de jure or de facto rules, or both. Crucially, the 
framework considers the involvement of stakeholders external to formalised relationships 
of accountability together with the level of discretion available to principals (Figure 4.4). 
These are relevant to the thesis’ research questions, which require exploration of the 
challenges faced by district, local and school level officials in enforcing and monitoring 








Figure 4.4: Mapping Levy-Walton framework to Malawi’s education sector41  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Levy & Walton (2013; p.10). 
Notes: The text in red specifically maps out what the objectives of this thesis in relation to teacher 
deployment, allocation and utilisation, according to the different aspects of the Levy-Walton Framework. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 4 has discussed the Accountability Framework and Political Settlement Frameworks 
and how they each add value to this thesis. However, as was supported by the review of the 
literature discussed in Chapter 3, complexities relating to the effective management of 
teachers mean that formal relationships of accountability alone are unable to address these. 
 
41 This has been adapted to reflect the different levels of governance in Malawi’s primary education system. 
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For this reason, a framework combining the two is deemed important for better 
understanding how informal institutions affect formal relationships of accountability 
relating to teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation in the Malawian context. 
The Levy-Walton Framework focuses on multi-levels of governance, with a particular 
emphasis on the “in-between spaces.” These levels are under-researched, whilst being 
where external interference and managerial discretion are most likely to occur. To address 
this gap, the research questions and design of this thesis, discussed in Chapter 5, 
incorporate the sub-national levels of governance alongside the top and bottom echelons of 










































Chapter 5: Methodology 
Chapter purpose and structure 
The previous four chapters have introduced the focal research topic this thesis set out to 
investigate (Chapter 1), provided background context to the issues of interest (Chapter 2), 
reviewed the relevant existing literature (Chapter 3) and discussed the conceptual 
framework that will be applied (Chapter 4). These chapters have all considered this in the 
context of the persistent inequity in deploying and allocating teachers, which is the focus of 
this work. In this chapter, I explain the methodological decisions I took before, during and 
after the fieldwork, which helped to establish rigour for addressing the research questions. I 
also discuss reflections around my positionality as a researcher working in Malawi.  
In Section 5.1, I start by presenting the research questions this thesis will address, which 
have been developed through identification of the gaps in the evidence. In Section 5.2, I 
describe the mixed methods methodological approach adopted for this study and explain its 
suitability. In Section 5.3, I detail the research design, the selection of sites and provide 
justification for the choices made. In Section 5.4, I discuss my positionality as a Global North 
researcher undertaking research in a Global South context. Finally, in Section 5.5 I discuss 
my data collection tools for addressing each of the four research questions, and the 
accompanying data analysis relating to these tools. 
5.1 Research questions 
In Chapter 4, I presented a conceptual framework that took as its starting point the effect of 
a country’s political settlement on enforcing and monitoring rules at different levels of 
sectoral government, including those relating to teacher management. It informed my data 
collection and analysis, whilst also helping to shape the overarching focus of this study, 
which is:  
A district level study on the deployment, allocation and utilisation of teachers between and 
within Malawi’s primary schools: an accountability and political settlement approach 
The following four questions break this down into specific parts of the overarching topic of 
enquiry. The research of enquiry is sub-grouped under Research Question (RQ) 1a and 
RQ1b, which relate to teacher deployment, and RQ2a and RQ2b, which focus on teacher 
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allocation and utilisation. I address both these themes, first, by measuring the scale of the 
problem and second, by explaining what the reasons for this are. Utilising the conceptual 
framework presented in Chapter 4, I centre the enquiry on the extent to which the 
characteristics of Malawi’s political settlement and formal relationships of accountability are 
appropriate for dealing with the problems identified. 
RQ1a: To what extent is the deployment of primary school teachers between schools 
equitable? (Quantitative) 
The justification of having RQ1a as the opening question, is that it measures the magnitude 
to which inequitable teacher deployment is a systemic problem, thereby signalling why this 
is an area worthy of study. The purpose of RQ1a is to measure the extent to which the 
deployment of teachers has been undertaken with equity in mind. The intention is to 
highlight the two issues which potentially affect this, these being the deployment of newly 
recruited teachers to schools and teacher transfers between schools.  
RQ1b: What are the reasons for the uneven deployment of primary school teachers 
between schools? (Qualitative) 
The purpose of RQ1b is to explain the trends identified in RQ1a and what accounts for the 
variation (and therefore inefficiency) in teacher distribution. Relating this back to the 
conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 4, the aim is to identify the enforcement and 
monitoring challenges concerning government rules around teacher deployment. More 
broadly, these challenges are considered through the lens of Malawi’s national political 
settlement, and what effect this has had on managing teacher deployment 
RQ2a: To what extent are primary school teachers allocated equitably to different classes 
within schools, and what are the consequences of this on the utilisation of teaching time? 
(Quantitative) 
RQ2a probes how headteachers allocate teachers in the event of a shortage or a surplus of 
teachers at school level. It serves as an extension of RQ1a and purposively looks at how 
teacher allocation (like deployment) affects (in)equity and (in)efficiency. The purpose of 
RQ2a is to measure what effect teacher allocation has on equity (pupil-teacher ratio [PTR] 
between different standards) and efficiency (teachers actual utilisation of teaching time) 
within schools.  
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RQ2b: What are the reasons for the uneven allocation of primary school teachers within 
schools? (Qualitative) 
As with RQ1b, the purpose of RQ2b is to explain what accounts for the trends identified in 
RQ2a. Relating this back to the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 4, the aim is to 
identify the enforcement and monitoring challenges concerning government rules around 
teacher allocation and utilisation. Again, I approach the challenges through Malawi’s 
national political settlement and what effect this has had on forms of accountability 
regarding the management of teacher allocation and utilisation. 
5.2 Methodological Approach 
5.2.1 Mixed methods research design 
Up until the turn of the 21st century, two contrasting paradigms dominated the field of 
academic research in international comparative education: quantitative and qualitative 
paradigms. A “third research paradigm” of mixed methods research is one that a growing 
number of researchers believe can bridge the divide between these two paradigms 
(Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2004). Supporters of the mixed methods approach point to the 
richer evidence that multiple sources of data can provide when studying a problem or 
phenomenon, thus allowing a more complete picture to emerge (Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2011).  
Before I justify why my research is best suited to a mixed methods approach, I briefly 
discuss the pragmatist worldview, which underpinned my methodological choices. 
Tashakkori & Teddie (2003) document the primacy of pragmatism within mixed methods 
design, arguing that the research question is of primary importance and that research 
design should not be forced into a choice of diametrically opposed worldviews. In relation 
to my own research, the appeal of the pragmatist worldview is that the ideas that it is based 
on are consistent with what is at the heart of what I am exploring. That is, an exploration of 
the ways in which stakeholders might promote or indeed prevent change within 
organisations (Baker & Schaltegger, 2015).  
5.2.2 Justification of a mixed methods approach for this thesis 
As the field of mixed methods has evolved so too have the number of reasons justifying its 
use as a methodological paradigm (White, 2002; Bryman, 2012; Johnson et al., 2007). 
Among those relevant to my study, are an “enhancement” or “building upon” quantitative 
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or qualitative findings; “completeness” where a more comprehensive account can be 
instigated, if both quantitative and qualitative findings are utilised; “explanation”, where 
one method helps to explain findings generated by another method; and “triangulation”, 
where qualitative and quantitative research can be combined so that they are mutually 
corroborated.  
These justifications for a mixed-methods research design very much reflect the problem-
driven approach adopted for this study. The first step of such an approach is to identify the 
problem (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2), whilst the second, involves quantifying the extent of the 
problem (Chapter 6 and Chapter 8). The third step investigates why the dysfunctional 
patterns observed in relation to teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation exist 
(Chapter 7 and Chapter 9). The qualitative data for this study serve to “explain” the 
quantitative trends. This explanation helps to “enhance” the quantitative findings relating to 
teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation trends. This will lead to fuller understanding 
of the “incentives, relationships, and distribution and contestation of power between 
different groups and individuals” (McLoughlin, 2014; p. 2). In sum, investigating the 
problems of interest using both quantitative and qualitative methods offers a more 
complete understanding of these issues concerning teacher distribution in Malawi rather 
than simply deploying one of these alone.  
5.2.3 Types of mixed methods research design 
The next matter is to consider the prototypes of mixed methods research design and how 
the “mixing” or “integration” of the two forms of data can be achieved. This can be through 
“combining them (or merging them), sequentially by having one build on the other, or 
embedding one within the other” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; p. 59). The level of 
interaction, priority of the quantitative and qualitative strands, timing and where and how 
to mix the two forms of data all inform the choice of mixed methods design (ibid.).  
Creswell & Plano Clark (2011) discuss several circumstances when convergent parallel 
design is appropriate to utilise, including when both types of data must be collected in one 
visit to the field and where the researcher feels there is value in collecting and analysing 
both quantitative and qualitative data. The dominant type of data is qualitative (RQ1b and 
RQ2b), whilst quantitative methods (RQ1a and RQ2a) play a secondary role (ibid.), insofar as 
these provide evidence of the trends that will subsequently be explored in further detail 
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through the former method. Timing wise, I collected my data concurrently before 
proceeding with the analysis. According to Johnson & Christensen’s (2012) definition, my 
research fell within the “dominant status/ concurrent” bottom left-hand quadrant of their 
design matrix (Figure 5.1).  
While I collected and analysed the strands of data separately, during the interpretative 
stage of analysis I mixed the data through a synthesis of the results in my final discussion 
(Chapter 10). The sequencing of how I carried out the interpretative stage was crucial. For 
each of the two themes I analysed and interpreted the quantitative data first. The patterns 
emerging from these findings then allowed me to anchor the interpretation of the 
qualitative data. 
Figure 5.1: Typology of mixed methods research design 
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Source: Johnson & Christensen, 2012. 
5.3 Methodological approach, research site and sample 
5.3.1 Research site of study, zone and school context 
Purposive sampling 
One core aspect of gathering data is for it to contribute to a better understanding of a 
theoretical or conceptual framework (Bernard, 2006). The selection process to determine 
where and from whom data will be collected is an imperative part of this process (ibid.). 
Sampling techniques in social and behaviour science can fall under probability, purposive or 
convenience sampling strategies (Teddie & Yu, 2007). The nature of the study determines 
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whether the form of sampling adopted is open (probability) or systematic and pre-
determined (purposive or convenience) (Cohen et al., 2017). While probability sampling 
tends to be used in quantitative studies, it is primarily purposive sampling that is used for 
qualitative studies (Teddie & Yu, 2007).  
Maxwell defines purposive sampling as that where, under particular settings, “persons, or 
events are deliberately selected for important information they can provide that cannot be 
gotten as well from other choices” (1997; p.87). One of the goals of purposive sampling 
techniques is to “achieve comparability across different types of cases on a dimension of 
interest” (Teddie & Yu 2007; p. 82). Teddie & Yu (2007) list six different types of purposive 
sampling techniques.  
Of these, extreme or deviant sampling would be an example of purposive sampling whereby 
extreme or deviant cases are selected to enable comparability across different cases (Teddie 
& Yu, 2007). This was the sampling technique that I used to select the zones and schools for 
this study in order to study cases experiencing either a teacher shortage or a surplus 
compared to requirements. This can be justified on the basis of teacher distribution being 
characterised by extreme variation in PTR across primary schools in Malawi (Chapter 2).  
The selection of the district, zone and schools for this study  
Administratively, Malawi is made up of three regions (North, Central and Southern). Within 
these three regions, the governance of the primary education system is further split by the 
different levels of sub-national government, which include six administrative education 
divisions, 34 districts and 443 education zones, under which 5,594 primary schools sit. The 
methodological choice of this study was driven by privileging depth of information rather 
than breadth, whilst also prioritising an approach focusing on all parts of the education 
system. For these reasons, I selected one district for the focus of study and the choice of 
district was contingent on one exhibiting a large variation in the deployment of teachers in 
relation to enrolment.  
I selected the district for the study using administrative data from the 2016 Education 
Management Information System (EMIS), which I was given access to by Ministry officials 
prior to departing for fieldwork. This data related to the 2015/16 school year. Using these 
data, I calculated the extent to which the distribution of teachers appeared due to factors 
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other than enrolment. The results confirmed Zomba Rural district faring amongst one of the 
worst districts when using this measure. While this was the primary reason for the district 
selection, other reasons included its close proximity to the Centre for Education Research 
Training (CERT) at the University of Malawi, where I was to be attached for the duration of 
my fieldwork. Another reason was the proximity of Zomba Rural district to an urban district 
(Zomba Urban). Given the study’s focus on teacher movement, proximity to an urban 
setting was important. 
A constituency map of Zomba (which includes Zomba City) indicates there are ten political 
constituencies of which nine are in Zomba Rural district (Figure 5.2). There are 13 primary 
education zones in Zomba Rural district meaning the following:  
i. schools falling under one political constituency are either spread out across 
several primary zones or 
ii. schools falling under one primary education zone are spread out across one or 
more political constituency 
Figure 5.2: Constituency map of Zomba district 
 
Source: Malawi Electoral Commission. 
Notes: Zomba Central constituency refers to Zomba Urban district, whilst the remaining nine constituencies 
fall within Zomba Rural district. 
Once the district had been selected, I then used extreme sampling techniques to select the 
two zones that would be the focus of this study. The variable used to select these zones was 
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their average PTR (Figure 5.3). For this, I utilised the 2017 EMIS data (relating to the 
2016/17 school year), which District EMIS (DEMIS) officials at Zomba Rural district granted 
me access to upon my arrival there in November 2017. Together with the EMIS data, I 
utilised the knowledge that district education officials had of the zones within Zomba Rural 
district. Criteria to help me narrow down the zones, included getting a sense from officials 
which zones were popular or unpopular with teachers, and which had a hard time retaining 
them.42   
Once I had selected each zone, I chose two schools within each. These were selected on the 
basis of extreme variation where a school had a low PTR or a high PTR. The sampling of 
schools was done on the basis of the first theme of this thesis, which was the overall PTR of 
schools. While the allocation of teachers – which relates to the second theme of the thesis – 
would have been a variable to factor in for school selection, there was no reliable 
government data on this. Similar to the zone selection this was undertaken using both EMIS 
data and the knowledge of the Primary Education Adviser (PEA) of their particular zone. 
Following discussions with the PEA, one to two days were spent in each zone to visit a 
sample of schools in order to get a general sense of how those in the zone compared with 
one another. In addition, this time allowed me to establish how long the school actors had 
been working at the school, and whether they would be willing and available for me to 
spend time collecting data at their school. The visits to these schools were also an 
opportunity for me to corroborate whether the EMIS data that I was basing my selection on 
was still valid given that this data was over a year old. Additionally, it provided an 





42 Due to part of my fieldwork taking place during the rainy season, questions to district and zonal officials also 
included asking how passable certain roads were by car during this period. 
43 Based on previous experience of working with the EMIS data during my time at MoEST, enrolment data can 
be subject to extreme variations. This is further corroborated by other studies (see Rakner et al., 2004; 
Pritchett, 2013), who discuss the problem of data reliability in official government documentation. 
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Table 5.1: Characteristics of the four schools 
 Enrolment No. of 
teachers 
M = Male 
F = Female 
PTR Infrastructure  
CR = Classroom 
TH = Teacher houses 
SR = Staff-room 
 
No. of classes 
taught 
Location44 
DEO = District Education 
Office 






M = 9 
F = 17 





Electrified = Y 
Water = Y (piped 
water) 
12 
Std. 1-4 = 2 
classes per 
standard 
Std. 5-8 = 1 class 
per standard 
Distance from:  
DEO = 5-9.9km 
TC = 4.4km 
 
Serves 7 villages (all less 




M = 12 
F = 2 




Electricity = N 
Water = Y 
(Borehole) 
8 
Std. 1-8 = 1 class 
per standard 
Distance from  
DEO = 10-19.9km 
TC = 3.8km 
 
Serves 7 villages (3 = <1km; 





M = 5 
F = 1 
106 6 CR (4 
permanent/ 2 
temporary) 
- St. 4 and St. 5 
taught outside 




- St.3, St. 6, St. 7 + 






Electricity = N 
Water = Y 
(Borehole) 
8 
Std. 1-8 = 1 class 
per standard 
Distance from  
DEO = 30 -39.9km 
TC = 13.7km 
 
Serves 7 villages (4 =<1km; 1 




M = 7 
F = 2 
68 8 CR (permanent) 






Electricity = N 
Water = Y 
(Borehole) 
8 
Std. 1-8 = 1 class 
per standard 
Distance from  
DEO = 40km and above 
TC = 9km 
 
Serves 7 villages (4 =<1km; 3 
= 1-1.9km) 
Source: Data collected by author during school visits. 
While the research design falls under the mixed methods dominant status/ concurrent 
status (Subsection 5.2.2), the selection of the four primary school to answer RQ1b and RQ2b 
have attributes to a multiple comparative case study approach (Yin, 2017). Such an 
approach is normally used when looking at social behaviour within specific settings (Barnett, 
2018). As McTavish & Loether state, case study research “provides a description of a setting, 
illustrates important concepts, fills in the dynamic details of how things influence each other, 
 
44 Information from this column was taken from the EMIS database. 
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uncovers reasons and meanings behind behaviours” (2002; p. 182). Moreover, in using a 
comparative case study of four schools, a more robust strategy is employed than with a 
single or two case analysis (Yin, 2003). Lastly, several studies that were reviewed during my 
own literature search utilised a similar approach when collecting qualitative data (Williams 
2016; Kjær & Muwanga, 2016; Kelsall & Heng, 2014).  
5.4 Issues relating to research ethics and positionality  
5.4.1 Permission to collect data  
Prior to starting my fieldwork in Malawi, I formally wrote to the Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology (MoEST) to ask for permission to conduct an investigation into the 
primary education sector in Malawi. I set out the broad parameters of what my research 
would focus on, together with the data I was aiming to collect. The Secretary for Education, 
Science and Technology (SEST) granted permission for me to carry out this research 
(Appendix Figure A.1). Prior to leaving Malawi at the end of fieldwork in August 2018, I 
compiled a short summary of my initial findings, which I submitted to the relevant Ministry 
of Education officials. Additionally, I sought (and secured) permission to be attached to CERT 
for the duration of my fieldwork (Appendix Figure A.2).  
5.4.2 Informed consent 
The 2018 British Educational Research Association (BERA) Ethical Guidelines for Educational 
Research expect the researcher to ensure that the participants involved in the study have 
“voluntarily informed consent to be involved in a study….and that researchers will remain 
sensitive and open to the possibility that participants may wish, for any reason and at any 
time, to withdraw their consent” (BERA, 2018; p. 9). For my own study, I formally sought the 
permission of all stakeholders involved to ensure that my research not only abided by what 
is stipulated in BERA guidelines, but also, to Malawi’s national laws and codes of practice. In 
terms of the latter, these are contained within “The Framework of Requirements and 
Guidelines for Research in the Social Sciences and Humanities in Malawi”, which is 
administered by the National Commission for Science and Technology. Before commencing 
with the data collection process, there were a series of steps I took that aligned with these 
guidelines. 
Firstly, I met with each of the participants involved in the study to discuss with them the 
aims of the research, what it would be used for, the procedures and methods that I, as a 
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researcher, would be employing to collect the data and my own background. This initial 
meeting was an opportunity for the participants to ask me any questions they had about the 
study. Secondly, I emphasised the right of the participant to refrain from responding to any 
question they were uncomfortable with answering, or withdrawing from the study at any 
time should they so wish (Cohen et al., 2017). Given the sensitive nature of some of the 
questions, I talked the participants through how the tape recorder worked. As part of the 
preliminary meeting, I sought assurance that they were comfortable with its use to collect 
data and made them aware of when they were being recorded so that they could request 
me to pause or stop the interview at any time, if they so wished. My experience of the 
interviews themselves taught me that participants who were more comfortable with sharing 
information would, if unwilling to go “on record”, either refuse to answer a certain question 
or ask me to pause the recorder, so they could speak about the issue “more freely.” 
However, with time I also learnt that the silences exhibited by some participants could 
mean either discomfort or reflection on the question being asked and given the “power 
distance” between the researcher and researched I needed to take special care in 
interpreting this action.  
Thirdly, all participants who took part in the study were assured at the beginning that their 
confidentiality would be maintained and that their identities would be protected through 
anonymity. Information I collected from each participant was logged as coded numbers, 
rather than names, to avoid anything that could lead to their inadvertent identification. The 
names of the zones and schools that I worked in were anonymised throughout this study. 
Instead of referring to them by their actual name, I referred to the two zones of study as 
Zone 9 and Zone 12 and schools as School B, School I, School S and School Z throughout the 
thesis. While the district I worked in – Zomba Rural district – has not been anonymised, I 
have protected the identity of officials working at the District Education Office (DEO) by 
refraining from citing which department they worked in.45  
Once these issues had been discussed, I asked each participant to read and sign a consent 
form which included all this information. These were available in both English and Chichewa 
(Appendix Figure A.3). One interaction with an ex-colleague who I interviewed at the 
 
45 The district name was difficult to anonymise due to the reference made in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 to ex-
President Joyce Banda and her home village.  
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Ministry level was particularly insightful for me in the use of administering these forms. 
While I viewed the confidentiality form as a conduit through which to formalise the rights 
and protection of all participants I interviewed, this formalised approach appeared as a 
source of tension when I introduced it to this ex-colleague. They responded with “Ah Asma, 
we know you. We’ve worked together! We are old colleagues. You should not be bringing 
this [the confidentiality form] to create mistrust between old friends.” While this was the 
only vocal opposition to the form, it did make me reflect whether some of the apathy to the 
formal administration of the form I had sensed with earlier participants at the school level 
had had the unintended effect of creating further distance between researcher and 
participant. 
5.4.3 Researcher positionality and reflexivity when doing research in the 
Global South 
Researcher positionality can be understood as “where one stands in relation to ‘the other’ in 
research” (Merriam et al., 2001; p. 411). Inevitably, depending on the researcher’s ontology 
(how reality is understood) and epistemology (how reality is investigated) the research 
process is going to be affected (Cohen et al., 2017). Another element regarding positionality 
is in relation to the background, culture and experience of the researcher, which can affect 
how data is interpreted (Creswell, 2014). Early discussion on researcher positionality 
assumed a simple dichotomy of “insider” versus “outsider” status to categorise whether or 
not the researcher is a member of the group being studied (Merton, 1972). However, it has 
been criticised for its inadequacy in taking into account the complexities of researcher and 
participant identities by critical and feminist theorists as well as those using post-
modernism, multi-culturalism and participatory research approaches. Instead, 
reconstructing the insider/outsider dichotomy “in terms of ones’ positionality vis-à-vis race, 
class, gender, culture and other factors, offer….better tools for understanding the dynamics 
of researching within and across one’s culture” (Merriam et al., 2001; p. 405) is preferred.  
When conducting fieldwork in the international context, it is necessary to be attentive to 
issues to do with colonisation, development and local realities (Sultana, 2007). Issues 
concerning the ethics, politics and power relations around knowledge production must be 
considered (Giwa, 2015). The power relations are laid bare by how Global Southern spaces 
can be viewed in Western academy as where “knowledge travels to rather than from” 
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(McFarlane, 2006; p. 1419). Within the field of international comparative education, the 
“insider-outsider” dilemma is at the fore as most of the research done on education systems 
in the Global South has been conducted by Global North researchers (Crossley & Tikly, 2004; 
Doiron & Asselin, 2015). Vulliamy (1990) and Stephens (1990) both make reference to the 
challenges of being an outsider in relation to context and language when carrying out 
qualitative educational research in Papua New Guinea and Nigeria, respectively. 
Reflexivity in the research process involves the researcher’s own reflection on her/his 
positionality and critically evaluating the power relations involved in the research process 
(Sultana, 2007). It has been defined as “an ongoing process that constantly returns to the 
question ‘What do I know?’ and ‘How do I know it?’ in order to maintain continual 
questioning as to where the information has been created” (Hertz, 1997; p. viii). Specifically 
in relation to research conducted in Global South, reflexivity requires engaging critically with 
issues of “class and educational differences (i.e. material, social and political power 
differences) [which] remain trenchant markers of difference, and often precondition 
exploitation in the research process” (Sultana, 2007; p 375).  
In the context of my own research, my ethnicity, education, dominant language, cultural 
upbringing and socioeconomic status were all factors I recognised were going to be 
important issues affecting how identifiable I was going be to the stakeholders I interviewed. 
My own perception of my positionality when working on issues relating to international 
education within institutions in the Global North has been very much framed around my 
ethnicity (British-Pakistani), class (lower-middle), type of education (state-school educated) 
and gender (female). However unsurprisingly, conducting research in Malawi revealed how 
markedly differently I was perceived by the participants of the study in the context of my 
ethnicity, class and education.  
I was frequently referred to as “Mzungu” rather than “M'mwenye” by sub-national 
government officials. In Chichewa, and in general East African countries, Mzungu is literally 
translated to mean “White Person” while “M’mwenye” is traditionally the label given to 
Malawians of Asian origin or Indian/ Pakistani people migrating to Malawi. Despite my 
appearance being outwardly South Asian, my visits to DEO would almost always be met with 
officials exclaiming “the white woman is here again!” or once, when an interview with an 
official was unexpectedly interrupted by a phone call, the interviewee explained “I am busy 
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doing an interview with a certain white woman.”46 During my search on literature relating to 
positionality and experiences of researchers working in the Global South I found an 
extensive literature problematising Global North researchers conducting fieldwork in Global 
South (Sultana, 2007; Vulliamy et al., 1990).47 However, within this literature I could find 
nothing substantive that appeared to have been written about the ethnicity of the 
researcher and hence would appear to have been white-washed from the discussion. 
The class and educational difference between me and participants were most pronounced 
at the school level when interviewing headteachers and teachers. In all cases, teachers were 
educated up to the end-of-secondary education. In the case of older headteachers and 
teachers the requirement to become a primary school teacher was to pass the end-of-
lower-secondary school examination – the Junior Certificate Examination (JCE). In addition, 
some teachers teaching the infant standards appeared less confident speaking to me in 
English. At these levels of the primary system, teachers taught all subjects, apart from 
English, in Chichewa. The nature of Malawi’s hierarchical structure means that people 
coming from rural areas are deferential to urban and educated English-speaking elites. 
Educational credentials or evidence of schooling are similarly an important mechanism by 
which to mark social distinction, as this decides who has “the right to speak first or to speak 
authoritatively, and who do[es] not” (Watkins & Kaler, 2016; p. 5). Methods I utilised to help 
mitigate the researcher-participant barriers were to work alongside a young Chichewa-
speaking research assistant from Zomba Rural district; spending a considerable amount of 
time at the schools I worked in even when I was not interviewing stakeholders; and wearing 
a chitenge48 as oppose to my western attire that I normally wore when interviewing district 
and central level government officials.49  
At the district office the barriers were broken down in other ways. Unlike Malawi’s other 
cities, such as Lilongwe and Blantyre, Zomba City is small and contained. Practically, this 
 
46 Another presumption is that most visitors to Malawi who are of South Asian origin are, like the Malawian-
Asian population, more commonly associated with the economic and commerce sector. 
47 Comparatively less literature was available on the experience of researchers from the Global South, and the 
production of knowledge in these locations (Giwa, 2015; Mwambari, 2019). 
48 This is an East African fabric traditionally worn by women and wrapped around the chest or the waist. 
49 In 1965, Hastings Banda enshrined into law a dress code which banned women from wearing trousers. While 




means that everyone knows one another and, more importantly, what is going on – 
especially when a new “Mzungu” has arrived in their midst. My visibility as a foreigner was 
enhanced by the fact that during the seven months I spent living in Zomba to conduct 
fieldwork, I travelled everywhere mostly on foot.50 Even in cities, Malawians tend to be 
friendly and curious towards outsiders. I was often asked where I was from, what I was 
doing in Zomba and where I was staying. This information it appeared fed back to some 
district officials, who, not long after I started my fieldwork, indicated they knew the person 
who I had rented a room from to stay at for the duration of my fieldwork. This, together 
with my friendship with a well-known and well-liked British-Malawian family from Zomba,51 
came to be known to officials at the district office. These personal connections helped 
“break the ice” and validate my credentials as a researcher from the University of 
Cambridge. Another way in which the “power-distance” was further diminished was that 
the District Education Manager (DEM) was studying for a masters degree at CERT, which 
aided the fieldwork in that he was familiar with the ethical processes relating to research, 
and also understood that I was not affiliated to MoEST. 
To date, the discussion has considered the unequal power relations between me as a 
researcher from the Global North and the participants of this study. However, Sultana in her 
study discusses how “power relations can work both ways, especially if one is a female 
researcher in an overtly patriarchal field context” (2007; p. 380). In the context of my own 
study, the interactions I had to navigate at the level of central, district and local government 
departments all involved male bureaucrats apart from one female ex-colleague who I had 
previously worked with in Malawi. Malawi is a deeply hierarchical and patriarchal society. 
Hence, in certain instances it was necessary to adopt elements of what Kandiyoti (1988) 
terms the “patriarchal bargain.”52 In the context of my own fieldwork this required me to, at 
times, take on “passive” character traits by not coming off as too self-assured or else only 
speak when spoken to. This was especially so because male bureaucrats were a necessary 
conduit in either giving me permission to carry out research, or else allowing me access to 
government data. Navigating these reverse power relations revealed to me the very 
 
50 This obviously excluded visiting schools and zonal offices, which were considerably further away. 
51 Now based in the U.K. 
52 This is defined as a measure women choose to adopt, which involves accommodating patriarchal norms in 
order to maximise their own power, safety and/ or options (Kandiyoti, 1988). 
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different experiences of collecting data as a lone female PhD researcher versus the 
protection from the “patriarchal bargain” seemingly offered to me when working for MoEST 
ten years earlier.  
By extension, this experience allowed me to observe how female teachers navigated the 
“patriarchal bargain” in other ways when dealing with government bureaucrats. On several 
occasions when these female teachers visited the district education office, I witnessed them 
almost always having to deal with male officials. More often than not I observed that it was 
mostly female teachers who were waiting in the corridors, mainly to see a human resources 
official about pay issues. On more than one occasion, the male official, who was based in an 
office I would often wait in before meeting other district officials, would comment on the 
female teachers visiting. On the selected days teachers were allowed to visit the district 
(Tuesdays and Thursdays), the official would comment to say “Asma, do you notice the 
beautiful flowers in this office?” or “Today there are many beautiful flowers coming to the 
office.” While these conversations left me feeling deeply uneasy, the meaning behind these 
words put into context some of what I was observing.    
The above has illustrated the ways in which I was located in the “outsider” space. My 
previous work in Malawi, which was discussed in Chapter 1, conversely placed me within 
the “insider” space. These past positions affected the fieldwork dynamic in several ways. 
First, and foremost, my specific positions back then helped me to navigate the process to 
attain the permission needed to conduct the fieldwork much more easily. While it had been 
almost ten years since working at MoEST, old colleagues from the Planning Division who still 
worked at the Ministry were able to speed up the normal bureaucratic protocols, which 
require permission from the SEST to carry out research in Malawi.  
Secondly, the insider knowledge of Malawi’s education system helped me navigate around 
what Paige refers to as “forbidden narratives” hidden beneath “peculiar silences and areas 
of tensions – forbidden zones that the interviewer had to approach with care” (1998; p. 9). 
The previous positions I had held meant being subsumed within power structures, where 
the bureaucratic arm of government carefully navigated the politicisation of tasks that 
technocrats were formally responsible for.  
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Thirdly, working mainly away from Lilongwe meant ex-colleagues in the capital were keen to 
ensure I had direct access to the correct people necessary to undertake the research. As an 
example, when I arrived for my fieldwork in Zomba Rural district in November 2017, the 
Budget Team from Ministry headquarters were there holding the mid-year review of the 
budget in Zomba. One of these officials, with whom I had worked when I was part of the 
same unit between 2005 and 2009, was at this meeting. Present at the meeting were also 
representatives from Malawi’s DEOs to whom I was informally introduced to by my ex-
colleague from the Ministry. Later, when visiting Zomba Rural district to begin formal 
preparations for data collection, the DEM remembering me from that meeting welcomed 
me to the district. The past association with MoEST appeared to break down some barriers 
with district officials. However, in other respects it created unanticipated hurdles, in that 
some officials remained wary as to whether the nature of my fieldwork was truly 
independent from MoEST. This was perhaps exacerbated by a joint MoEST-World Bank 
teacher audit, which had been carried out at the district level a few months before I 
commenced fieldwork for a study exploring issues similar to what I was researching. With 
this study still fresh in their minds, the automatic assumption by some officials of my 
affiliation to MoEST led me to believe was a reason why some officials refused to be 
interviewed.53 
Reflecting on the insider-outsider dichotomy above, I adopted the position of an outsider 
concerning the object of study. However, in order to build a rapport with some participants I 
did draw upon my existing networks and prior knowledge of Malawi’s education system 
both to collect data and contextualise the findings. 
5.5 Data collection and analysis methods 
5.5.1 Choice of research instruments for the research questions 
In total, three methods were utilised to address the four research questions. These were 
semi-structured interviews, secondary data collection of government administrative data 
and questionnaires administered at the school level (Table 5.2). 
 
 
53 While most officials were willing to be interviewed, this was not the case with those from the Human 
Resources department. I asked whether they would be comfortable in consenting to an interview without the 
use of the tape recorder. However, this was to no avail. 
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Table 5.2: Research questions and corresponding data collection methods 
Research Question Data collection methods 
RQ1a: To what extent is the 
deployment of primary school 
teachers between schools 
equitable? 
Secondary government administrative data (EMIS) 
• Given access to databases for EMIS 2008 to 2018 
RQ1b: What are the reasons 
for the uneven deployment of 
primary school teachers 
between schools? 
Semi-structured interviews 
• Central Ministry education officials 
• District education officials (Zomba Rural district) 
• Primary Education Advisers (Two case study zones) 
• Headteachers (Four case study schools) 
• Teachers (Two teachers each in four case study schools – 
infant and senior standard) 
RQ2a: To what extent are 
primary school teachers 
allocated equitably to different 
classes within schools, and 
what are the consequences of 
this on the utilisation of 
teaching time?  
School-level researcher-administered questionnaire 
• Administered to 371 teachers in 26 primary schools in two 
case study zones 
RQ2b: What are the reasons 
for the uneven allocation of 
primary school teachers within 
schools? 
Semi-structured interviews 
• Central Ministry education officials 
• District education officials (Zomba Rural district) 
• Primary Education Advisers (Two case study zones) 
• Headteachers (Four case study schools) 
• Teachers (Two teachers each in four case study schools – 
infant and senior standard) 
 
5.5.2 Data collection methods 
Secondary government administrative data (EMIS) 
Over the last century or so, there has been an expansion in the collection of large-scale 
educational data aimed at better understanding education systems (Davis-Kean & Jager, 
2017). The information contained within these datasets has allowed researchers and policy-
makers to monitor progress within and between countries. They have also facilitated 
researchers in overcoming the challenges often associated with primary data collection, 
especially the time it can take to collect this data. Government datasets, such as EMIS, offer 
data on students, teachers and schools and are also large enough to be statistically powered 
(ibid.).  
In the context of my own research, measuring the nature of teacher distribution (RQ1a) was 
achieved through EMIS data. I briefly discuss the disadvantages relating to the EMIS data. 
These concern the reliability of school administrative data due to either deliberate 
misreporting or inaccurate reporting. Linden & Shastry (2012) discuss the incentives for 
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schools to misreport data deliberately, especially in contexts where district officials rarely 
verify school reporting. One of these pertains to how administrative data often serves as a 
proxy for how public resources are allocated to schools. In Malawi, for instance, textbooks, 
teachers and school grants54 are distributed on the basis of enrolment. Then, there is the 
inaccurate reporting of data mainly due to the lack of effort on the part of the headteachers 
in completing questionnaires (Barnett, 2018). Ravishankar et al. report that in Malawi the 
“[o]fficial data on enrolment, repeaters and dropouts are mutually inconsistent, suggesting 
significant under-reporting by schools of the number of pupils who drop out of the system” 
(2016; p. xvii). 
Davis-Keen & Jager identify “the lack of control that a researcher has in the questions or 
assessments that are administered” (2015; p. 4) through secondary data collection. As an 
example, information collected on teachers in Malawi’s EMIS presently only report the 
current school that the teacher is working in and hence, there is an absence of electronic 
data concerning the school posts that a teacher may have previously held. Given the 
interest attached to this thesis, this was an area where the EMIS data was limited in its 
usefulness. Another challenge is the frequency of collection, compilation, cleaning, inputting 
and releasing of the information from this large dataset. EMIS data in Malawi, for instance, 
is normally collected in the first term of the school year (September-October) and is not 
released until the following school year. 
While the discussion on the EMIS data illustrates some of the problems, it also offered 
tremendous advantages in the context of this study. Without access to the EMIS data across 
a period of time, the extent to which teacher distribution was (in)equitable would have 
been challenging to quantify adequately in the way I wished to address it in this thesis. As 
an example, my experience of conducting a survey in each of the 26 schools in Zone 9 and 
Zone 12 took, on average, half a day (see proceeding section).55 These 26 schools, however, 
represent just 10 percent of all primary schools in Zomba Rural district. 
 
54 The formula for the School Improvement Grant (SIG) allocates a flat-rate of MK600,000 (US$820) per school. 
However, when enrolment exceeds 1,000 the school receives an extra MK100 (US$0.14) per child. 
55 This is in the context of a. the primary school day and b. returning back to the school to administer the 
survey questions to teachers who were absent during the first visit. 
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School-level researcher-administered questionnaire 
Questionnaires are a widely used instrument for collecting survey information and are 
comparatively straightforward to administer (Wilson & McLean, 1994). These can be self-
administered by the participant or take the format of a researcher-administered survey, 
which involves the researcher asking the participant questions (Menter, 2011). While a 
questionnaire can take many forms, the general rule is that the larger the size of the 
sample, the more structured, closed and numerical it has to be (Cohen et al., 2017). 
The purpose of Research Question 2a was to analyse the trends relating to teacher 
allocation and utilisation within primary schools. Prior to fieldwork commencing, the 
intention had been to use government administrative data to address this based on the 
information I was aware that the EMIS survey collected (Appendix Figure A.4).56 However, 
upon arriving in Malawi and accessing the EMIS databases in person it became clear that the 
question had been interpreted differently across schools, which made its use untenable. In 
some cases, headteachers were filling in the “periods taught” information, according to the 
number of lessons a teacher was required to teach on the time-table, while in other cases it 
was the number of classes a teacher appeared to actually take responsibility for. 
Furthermore, in the case of many schools this information had not been filled in by the 
school administrator. 
To mitigate these problems, I designed a questionnaire very similar to that which the EMIS 
administers (Appendix Figure A.5). However, one key difference was that, unlike the EMIS, I 
also gathered information on which subjects teachers were responsible for teaching.57 
Asking for subject-specific information was found to elicit more reliable data, especially in 
cases where a teacher was sharing a class with another or where they were teaching across 
more than one class. I administered this questionnaire to 371 teachers in the 26 schools 
located in Zone 9 and Zone 12. The survey took approximately 10-15 minutes per teacher to 
complete. 
 
56 The EMIS questionnaire collects data on the class a teacher has been allocated to teach, together with the 
number of periods she/he teaches a week. 
57 The EMIS only asks how many periods a week a teacher teaches in total. When piloting this questionnaire in 
a primary school close to CERT in Zomba Urban district, I immediately found that asking something along the 
lines of the EMIS questionnaire made it much more difficult to verify whether or not what the teacher was 




For the purposes of this thesis, I selected semi-structured interviews as the tool to help 
explain the trends that were emerging from the quantitative data. Kvale & Brinkmann 
describe the purpose of semi-structured interviews as a medium through which to “obtain 
descriptions of the life world of the interview in order to interpret the meaning of the 
described phenomena” (2009; p. 3). An important aspect of the data collected from the 
semi-structured interviews I administered was allowing me to gather the perspectives, 
insights and experiences of the individuals I questioned in relation to the phenomena of 
interest (Bryman, 2012).  
Within the field of qualitative research, interviews remain the most common form through 
which data is collected, with the major difference between them being their “degree of 
structure” (Cohen et al., 2017; p. 270). I was strongly influenced by Patton’s description of 
interviews, where he states that “we interview people to find out from them those things we 
cannot directly observe…We cannot observe feelings, thoughts and intentions…We cannot 
observe how people have organised the world and the meanings they attach to what goes 
on in the world. We have to ask people questions about those things” (1990; p.340). The 
intangible nature of the more contextual information I was seeking to collect, which was 
about exploring day-to-day invisible and non-discernible pressures, reflected this sentiment.  
The advantages of semi-structured interviews are that they help to instigate reciprocity 
between the researcher and the participant (Galletta, 2013). They also allow for the 
researcher to follow up with questions based on the participant responses (Rubin & Rubin, 
2005). Lastly, such interviews allow for a certain level of consistency between different 
stakeholders, which in the case of this thesis was vital given the aim of comparison across 
the four schools, and two education zones.  
Participants interviewed for the study were selected on the basis of collecting different 
experiences and perspectives of teacher distribution, allocation and utilisation within the 
primary education system. A full list of who was interviewed are contained within Appendix 
Table A.1.58 An interview guide allowed me to formulate pre-planned interview questions, 
 
58 During the fieldwork, the interview participants also included one Focus Group Discussion with members of 
the SMC and PTA for each of the four schools. However, the direction of the fieldwork changed from a broader 
focus on resources to one focused exclusively on teachers. Hence, these discussions with stakeholders – while 
providing useful background to school resources – were discounted in the final analysis. 
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which covered the main topics pertaining to the phenomena being studied (Taylor, 2005). 
This can be reviewed in Appendix Figure A.6. The objective was to collect the same types of 
information, but understanding it from the perspective of the different categories of 
participants I interviewed (e.g. district officials, zonal officials, headteachers, teachers).  
Interviews with all participants lasted between 45 to 60 minutes. Apart from the infant 
standard teacher in School B, all interviews were conducted by me in English. The research 
assistant that I had employed was present at all the school-level interviews in the case of 
School B, School S and School Z in the event participants were more comfortable conversing 
in Chichewa.59 Conducting interviews in English meant that teachers did sometimes switch 
to Chichewa in their responses before “catching themselves” and repeating what they 
wanted to say in English for my benefit.  
Interviews with local, district and central government officials were conducted only by me. 
All interviews apart from that with the infant standard teacher in School B were audio-
recorded and transcribed verbatim. In the case of the one exception, the responses were 
translated into English and transcribed by a professional transcriber from Malawi. Both 
during and after each interview I took notes, which not only helped me to begin to identify 
the themes that were emerging, but also, helped identify areas to question participants on 
in subsequent interviews. While the topic guide was used for interviews I conducted with 
participants at the zonal and district levels of government and with school actors, my 
interviews with central government officials were more informal and largely relied on 
interrogating for information around themes I had collected at the other levels of 
government and at school level. 
With all the interviews I undertook, I tried to ensure my presence was as non-intrusive as 
possible. My interviews with school officials were carried out to ensure, as much as 
possible, minimum disruption to their teaching schedule. To that end, interviews I carried 
out with headteachers and teachers in School S and School Z took place before the start of 
the school day at 7am or after teaching had ended due to the shortage of teachers during 
teaching hours. In the case of all interviews, if the stakeholder was not available on the day I 
visited, I would reschedule the interview for another time or day. 
 
59 The research assistant had a sudden family emergency when I was carrying out the interviews in School I.  
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A reliance on interview data poses a number of methodological problems that it is useful to 
discuss briefly. First, the reliability of interview data can be called into question where 
informants fail to remember key events relating to the topic at hand, or else there may be 
an element of bias contained within their responses (Bryman, 2012). This was especially 
important, such that during my interviews with stakeholders, I prompted respondents for 
empirical examples where appropriate so as to not over-rely on “boiler-plate” responses 
(Pherali et al., 2014). While achieving a valid interpretation of qualitative data is challenging, 
there were various methods I utilised to achieve a certain level of robustness. Firstly, I 
sought to double-check that the information that I had collected was correct through 
interrogating the issue at hand with other interviewees where possible, while protecting the 
earlier interviewed participant’s anonymity. A second method was to corroborate 
information with secondary data sources where this was available. As an example, where 
stakeholders cited specific examples of teachers transferring to other schools during a given 
period, I cross-checked this with government administrative data I had access to. 
Secondly, findings from qualitative studies where the population is small and the 
participants have been purposively selected present a challenge concerning the 
generalisability of findings (Bryman, 2012). Flyvbjerg (2006), however, lists a common set of 
misunderstandings relating to generalisability when considering qualitative case study 
research, arguing that “[p]redictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of 
human affairs. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is therefore more valuable than the 
vain search for predictive theories and universals” (2006; p. 7). Moreover, qualitative 
findings may support the development of theoretical generalisations concerning social 
processes, which can be applied to achieve a better understanding of the situation in other 
settings (Barnett, 2018; Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
5.5.3 Data analysis methods 
Secondary government administrative data (EMIS) 
School categorisation according to teacher need 
The purpose of Research Question 1a (see Section 5.1) was to judge the extent to which the 
deployment of teachers was carried out on the basis of need, or being geared towards 
reaching the 60 to 1 PTR. In order to ascertain what was the case, the data analysis in 
Chapter 6 relies on a categorisation of “need” against which to judge this against. For this I 
utilised an approach used by DeStefano (2013) in categorising schools. This is based on 
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whether a school exhibits an excess or shortage of teachers, according to government policy 
that stipulates a pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) of 60 to 1 (DeStefano, 2013). These categories are 
listed in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Categorisation of schools 
Category Definition Formula 
High need A school with a shortfall of more than five teachers 
needed to achieve the 60 to 1 PTR 
(	#! − #") < −	5 
 
Some need A school with a shortfall of between two and five 
teachers needed to achieve the 60 to 1 PTR 
−2 > (	#! − #") ≥ −	5 
 
No need A school with an adequate number of teachers needed 
to achieve or be close to achieving the 60 to 1 PTR 
−1 > (#! − #") > 1 
 
Surplus A school with an excess of between two and five 
teachers needed to achieve the 60 to 1 PTR 
2 > (	#! − #") ≥ 	5 
 
High surplus A school with an excess of more than five teachers 
needed to achieve the 60 to 1 PTR 
(#! − #") > 5 
Source: Category and definition taken from DeStefano (2013). 
Note: The formula was derived using the following steps: 
[1] Let En be the total enrolment in a hypothetical school 
[2] Let the subscript a denote actual and subscript r denote required  
[3] I assumed 60 pupils per teacher (PTR), which is the required threshold by the government  
[4] So, the required [r] and actual [a] number of teachers are: 
 
#" = -.60 
 
#! = -.1#2! 
 
[5] Hence (#! − #"), denotes either a shortfall (negative) or excess (positive) for the government PTR of 60 
threshold.  
Teacher shortage: inefficiency versus shortfall in numbers 
An extension of RQ1a is the distribution of the teacher shortfall between the shortage of 
teacher numbers versus the inefficient way in which teachers are distributed. The problem 
statement in Chapter 1 identified how the teacher distribution system in Malawi leaves a 
huge variation in the PTRs experienced by many schools. In some schools this is well above 
60 to 1 and leaves a shortage of teachers (schools falling under the category of “high need” 
or “some need” in Table 5.3 above). Whilst in other schools the PTR is well below 60 to 1 
and leaves teachers superfluous to requirements (schools falling under the category of 
“surplus” or “high surplus” in Table 5.3 above). With a system characterised by 
“inefficiency”, the analysis in Chapter 6 was focused on ascertaining the extent to which the 
shortage in the system was due to the inefficiency versus a “real” shortfall in teachers. 
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This was done by applying the following formula which calculated the “inefficiency” (I) in the 






“Teacher shortfall” (TS), on the other hand, was represented as follows: 
  





Assume K schools in the system (k = 1,…, K)  
Let teacher excess for school k be -# – that is, when (	#! − #") > 0 
Let teacher shortage for school k be 4# – that is, when (	#! − #") < 0 
Teacher movement database 
A final part of addressing RQ1 involved creating a database to determine where in the 
system a teacher may transfer to. I created this database in Excel and did this through 
utilising all of the EMIS databases I had access to. This was achieved by following a number 
of steps: 
1. Extracting the teacher names and corresponding employment numbers for those 
teachers who were reported be working in each of the 26 primary schools in Zone 9 and 
Zone 12.  
2. Next, I identified all cases of a teacher “leaving” a school in Zone 9 or Zone 12. This was 
where a teacher who had appeared as working at a school in a previous year was no 
longer doing so in the following year. 
3. The EMIS database was then searched using the teacher’s name and employment 
number. This allowed me to identify the new school the teacher was now teaching at.60 
4. Based on Table 5.3, I compared the category of the school the teacher had left to that of 
the new school s/he was working in. This category was based on the year the teacher 
was no longer appearing as working in the original school. 
 
60 In a number of cases the teacher’s details could not be found on the system, which could be attributed to 
retirement. However, to mitigate the likelihood that this could be a case of EMIS misreporting, I also searched 
those teacher details in subsequent EMIS databases. If the teacher still could not be found, the assumption 
was made that the teacher had left the teaching profession. 
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5. Next, I identified all cases of a teacher “joining” a school in Zone 9 or Zone 12. This was 
where a teacher who appeared on the staff list of a school, but did not do so the year 
before. 
6. The EMIS database for previous years was then searched, using the teacher’s name and 
employment number. This allowed me to identify the old school the teacher had been 
teaching at before joining the school in Zone 9 or Zone 12.61 
7. Based on Table 5.3, I compared the category of the school the teacher had left to that of 
the new school s/he was working in. This category was based on the year the teacher 
was no longer appearing as working in the original school.   
School-level researcher-administered questionnaire 
The survey data collected from the 371 teachers the 26 primary schools in Zone 9 and Zone 
12 was organised and the data was inputted into two Microsoft Excel documents, according 
to the zone. Within each zonal document, the raw data was organised by school and by 
teacher. The following information was extracted from the raw data. 
1. Type of teaching arrangement by class and by teacher 
The type of teaching arrangement for each of the 371 teachers I administered the survey to 
was based on the following categories: 
a. Teacher teaching standard/ class alone 
b. Teacher teaching one standard/ class with another teacher 
c. Teacher teaching more than one standard/ class 
2. Theoretical versus actual pupil-teacher ratio 
Given the impact that the type of teaching arrangement potentially has on the number of 
teachers physically being in a classroom and being involved in face-to-face teaching, the 
analysis involved isolating the difference between a “theoretical” PTR versus an “actual” 
PTR. Theoretically, PTR assumes that all teachers assigned to a class are physically in the 
classroom and teaching. Actual PTR, on the other hand, has to distinguish whether the 
 
61 In a number of cases the teacher’s details could not be found on the system. This could be due to this being 
a new teacher. However, to mitigate the likelihood that this could be a case of EMIS misreporting, I also 
searched for those teacher details in previous EMIS databases. If the teacher still could not be found, the 
assumption was made that the teacher was new to the profession. 
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arrangement meant the teacher is in class either teaching or assisting the other teacher 
teaching, or outside of the classroom. 
The theoretical (t) and actual (a) PTR are: 
1#2$ = -.#$  
 
1#2! = -.#!  
 
[1] Let En be the total enrolment in a hypothetical class 
[2] Let the subscript t denote theoretical and subscript a refer to the actual number of teachers in classroom 
according to the teaching arrangement.  
3. Actual teaching time as a share of official teaching time 
Semi-structured interviews 
The combination of interviews with 19 officials at district, zonal and school level using the 
interview guide, together with informal discussions with informal interviews with four 
officials at central headquarters, produced a wealth of very rich data relating to the issues of 
teacher distribution, allocation and utilisation in Malawi. Familiarity with the data was 
achieved in the following ways. Travelling to conduct interviews with participants at district 
and local government or with school actors generally occurred from early morning up until 
early afternoon.62 Thereafter, I would travel to the office that CERT had allocated to me at 
the University of Malawi. Here, I would spend the rest of the day listening to the recording 
of the interview(s) I had conducted that day and make a note of any follow-up questions I 
needed to pursue with those participant(s) at our next meeting. Upon completing the 
transcripts of these recordings,63 I read each transcript two or three times to get a clearer 
sense of some of the themes and complexities emerging and noted these down. 
The next step involved a more systematic approach to organising my themes, which 
involved a thematic analysis of the interview data. I utilised the thematic network analysis 
approach taken by Attride-Stirling (2001), which looks at three levels: 
 
 
62 Interviews with actors at School S and School Z largely took place early morning before school started or in 
the afternoon to avoid the disruption of teaching during official teaching hours. This was due to the shortage 
of staff at these schools. 
63 During the fieldwork, an ongoing crisis of the supply of electricity meant that completing all the transcripts 
on my laptop took a lot longer than expected. Most of these were completed in the first three months after I 
had returned to the University of Cambridge (September to November 2018). 
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1. Global Theme: These are the super-ordinate themes 
2. Organising Theme: These group together basic themes into a cluster of similar 
issues. They also enhance the meaning of the broader theme 
3. Basic Theme: These are the lowest order themes. By themselves they say little about 
the text and hence, they need to be considered within the context of other basic 
themes. 
The global themes for this research piece relate to two pre-set themes linking directly back 
to the research enquiry of this piece, which relate to:  
1. Management of teacher deployment (RQ1a and RQ1b) 
2. Management of teacher allocation and utilisation (RQ2a and RQ2b)  
Thereafter, I utilised a hybrid approach of deductive and inductive coding (Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006). Utilising this approach meant there were two data phases to organise and 
analyse the data. The first phase identified four organising themes used to create the 
deductive framing code, which provided an initial structure regarding how the data should 
be organised. These themes were identified from both the interview guides (Appendix 
Figure A.6) and the conceptual framework (Chapter 4). During this first phase of the 
analysis, where I had identified these broad apriori themes, I used NVivo for my data 
organisation and analysis. These organising themes were as follows: 
1. Formal rule-based policies 
2. Enforcement challenges 
3. Monitoring challenges 
The second phase of the data analysis phase was when I undertook a more inductive 
approach, which allowed me to identify emerging basic themes from the transcripts. These 
themes were mapped to the organising themes listed above. These basic themes were 
acquired by an iterative process. They were categorised through a close reading of the 
interview transcripts as detailed above as well as drawing on the review of the literature 
(Chapter 3) and the conceptual framework (Chapter 4) to offer important insights and 




Table 5.4: Global, organising and basic themes 
Global Theme Organising 
‘Deductive’ Theme 






Teacher deployment policy 
Teacher transfer policy 
 
Enforceability Engagement by external stakeholders 




Monitoring ‘Delegation-resourcing’ incoherence 









Teacher allocation policy 
Teacher utilisation policy 
 
Enforceability Engagement by external stakeholders 









In Chapter 5, I have explained why a mixed methods approach, adopting a concurrent-
dominant status approach, was deemed suitable for this study. In utilising such an approach 
for my thesis, Chapter 5 identified the purpose of semi-structured interviews in helping 
uncover trends identified in the quantitative data relating to teacher deployment, allocation 
and utilisation. Beyond the research design, my reflections in this chapter focused on my 
positionality as a researcher from the Global North conducting fieldwork in Malawi. This 
discussion considered the “insider-outsider” dichotomy and how this could and did, at 
times, affect my research when in the field. This discussion revealed that, whilst I was 
largely perceived as an outsider by participants, my previous work in Malawi had brought 
me, to some extent, into the sphere of the insider space.  
The next chapter, Chapter 6, presents the findings from the analysis of the EMIS data, 
thereby addressing RQ1a, which is focused on the issue of teacher deployment.
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Chapter 6: How are teachers deployed 
between schools and districts? 
Chapter purpose and structure 
Chapters 6 and 7 address the first theme of this thesis which relates to teacher deployment 
between schools. The purpose is to consider the inequity in the deployment and movement 
of teachers between schools and the extent to which it has contributed to Malawi’s teacher 
shortage crisis. The aim is also to investigate why these trends persist. The importance of 
this is in respect to providing a detailed “diagnostic” assessment as to where the system is 
at in terms of teacher deployment. The inequitable deployment of teachers between 
schools is considered both in terms of assessing the government pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) 
between schools, and also, the extent to which their deployment (and movement) helps or 
hinders this objective. More specifically, it allows for ascertaining why different parts of the 
system experience the teacher shortage very differently. This sheds light on where further 
enquiry should be oriented in the qualitative data collection in order to provide 
comprehensive understanding of the research interest.    
Specifically, the purpose of Chapter 6 is to address the first research question of this thesis: 
“To what extent is the deployment of primary school teachers between schools equitable?” 
The majority of this chapter draws upon secondary data using government administrative 
data that I was given access to. These were the Education Management Information System 
(EMIS) databases for school years 2007/08 to 2017/18,64 together with the monthly staff 
returns data which is administered at the district level.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.1, I briefly refer to the current government 
directives and policies relating to how teachers should be equitably deployed to schools. In 
Section 6.2, I consider the patterns of teacher deployment at the national, district (Zomba 
Rural) and zonal levels. I specifically consider this in the context of Malawi’s education 
system, where schools with teacher shortages exist side-by-side with schools that have 
 
64 The EMIS data is collected at the beginning of the school year and released for publication the following 
year. In relation to the EMIS 2008, this refers to data collected between October and November 2007, which 
was published in 2008. This in turn refers to the school year 2007/08. 
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teacher surpluses. Accordingly, the chapter discussion considers the extent to which the 
primary teacher shortage is due to the unequal way in which teachers are distributed across 
the system. Section 6.3 moves on to considering how initial teacher deployment and 
teacher transfers are related to their inequitable distribution in the system. While I 
introduce this section with an overview of Zomba Rural district as a whole, the focus of this 
section is micro-level tracking of the movement of teachers in and out of the two zones and 
the four primary schools I selected for this study. By doing so, I refocus attention beyond 
initial deployment to the transfer of teachers between schools and how this may affect the 
equitable distribution of teachers. 
6.1 Policies relating to the distribution and allocation of teachers 
6.1.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 gave a brief overview of government policies relating to the distribution of 
teachers to schools contained within the National Education Sector Plan (NESP) and the 
corresponding Education Sector Implementation Plans (ESIP). These provided the 
parameters to guide how teachers should be distributed between schools and what the 
government intended to do to achieve a more equitable distribution. While the NESP set an 
overall PTR target of 60 to 1, a specific target of 70 to 1 was set for rural areas to be reached 
by 2017/18 (GoM, 2008a). Policies relating to both increasing the number of teachers in the 
system and more effectively distributing them are strategies for reaching this target. Given 
the focus of this research, next, there is a brief discussion on some of the policy 
interventions relating to distribution. 
6.1.2 Targeting rural districts 
The Initial Primary Teacher Education (IPTE) system was introduced in 2005. As part of the 
terms and conditions of being enrolled onto this course, teachers are, upon graduation, 
required to commit to working in a rural district for at least five-years. They are forbidden 
from being sent to work in any of the urban education districts (Blantyre Urban, Lilongwe 
Urban, Mzuzu City and Zomba Urban). However, schools in these four districts accounted 
for just 3 percent of all primary schools in the 2017/18 school year. Therefore, the impact of 
this policy is likely to be modest, especially because this exemption is not extended to the 
urban areas within the remaining 30 “rural” education districts.  
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6.1.3 Teacher relocation 
A global policy to address the issue of inequitable teacher deployment has been through 
forced or involuntary relocation of teachers in surplus schools to those in remote or rural 
areas where there is a shortage (Mulkeen & Chen, 2008). While this has not appeared in 
earlier policy statements, one of the targets set out in the 2015 ESIP II Action Plan was to 
redeploy teachers already teaching in the system. This was either to schools within the 
district that they were already teaching in (5,971 teachers) or to schools in another district 
(2,851 teachers) (GoM, 2015a).  
6.1.4 Demand-led interventions to teach in remote hard-to-reach areas  
In many countries in the Global South, a popular strategy employed by governments to 
attract teachers to work in rural areas has been to introduce a hardship allowance 
(Mulkeen, 2010). In Malawi, the Government of Malawi rolled out a hardship allowance in 
2010, which was intended to compensate 20 percent of teachers working in remote primary 
and secondary schools. Initially, this was capped at MK5,000 (US$6.8) per teacher per 
month, before rising to MK10,000 (US$13.7) in 2014. A critical evaluation of the 
implementation of the hardship allowance is set out in Asim et al.’s 2017 study.  
Other incentives to strengthen the demand to work in rural and remote areas include 
investment in the sorts of services and amenities that would attract teachers to work in 
these areas. In the context of Malawi, the shortage of adequate teacher housing in rural 
areas is one of the main disincentives identified by previous studies (Kadzamira, 2006; 
Mulkeen, 2010). To address this, the NESP pledged to build 1,000 primary school teacher 
houses annually over the 10-year NESP period (GoM, 2015a).  
6.2 An overview of the (in)equity and (in)efficiency in teacher 
deployment  
6.2.1 Introduction 
This section presents the data trends relating to how teachers are deployed to work in 
primary schools across Malawi, with a specific focus on both equity and inefficiency of how 
this distribution has been undertaken. It begins with an overview of national teacher 
deployment trends. This is both useful to understand the problem more broadly and to 
contextualise where Zomba Rural districts sits within these national trends. The remainder 
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of the section presents the analysis concerning deployment from a district and zonal level 
perspective. 
For the analysis, the categorisation of schools according to whether they have a high need, 
some need, no need, surplus or high surplus of teachers is utilised to shed light on the 
extent to which inequity and inefficiency defines Malawi’s teacher deployment system. 
These were discussed in Chapter 5, along with a full definition of what these categories refer 
to.  
6.2.2 Degree of randomness in teacher distribution  
To begin with, the aim is to quantify the extent to which teacher distribution is contingent 
on school enrolment patterns and one way of doing this is the randomness coefficient (1-
R2). This allows for understanding how systemic unexplained variation is in relation to the 
deployment of teachers in an education system. Just prior to the publication of the NESP, 
the randomness coefficient relating to primary teacher distribution was estimated at 42 
percent (World Bank, 2010). In other words, 42 percent of teachers were being deployed to 
schools for reasons other than the enrolment. By 2017/18 the randomness coefficient had 
fallen to 27 percent, suggesting an improvement in teachers being distributed according to 
enrolment figures. The improvement coincides with the period where policies intended to 
improve teacher deployment were introduced.  
While the national figures appear to indicate an improvement over time, when 
disaggregated by district the randomness coefficient is markedly worse in many districts. 
Table 6.1 shows that only 11 out of the 34 districts highlighted in green had a more 
equitable distribution of teachers compared to the national average. The remaining 23 
districts, which are highlighted in orange, had considerably more inequitable distribution of 
teachers compared to the national average. One of these 23 districts was Zomba Rural 
district, which ranked as one of the worst districts. This greater randomness at district level 
provides yet another justification for focusing more specifically on the district level of 
government in a context where despite a number of different policies being introduced 





Table 6.1: Degree of randomness in teacher distribution, 2017/18 school year 
District R2 Randomness 
coefficient 
Average PTR Highest PTR Lowest PTR 
Mzuzu City  0.90 0.10 62 114 8 
Chikwawa 0.87 0.13 80 186 42 
Lilongwe Urban 0.87 0.13 77 133 18 
Blantyre Urban 0.86 0.14 83 165 24 
Zomba Urban 0.83 0.17 48 63 26 
Lilongwe Rural East 0.83 0.17 68 208 32 
Lilongwe Rural West 0.81 0.19 67 219 26 
Mangochi 0.78 0.22 81 405 24 
Kasungu 0.77 0.23 70 182 8 
Blantyre Rural 0.76 0.24 60 194 8 
Mwanza 0.76 0.24 70 128 29 
Thyolo 0.74 0.26 74 206 10 
Neno 0.73 0.27 73 173 25 
Likoma  0.73 0.27 64 93 24 
Nkhotakota 0.73 0.27 73 178 21 
Phalombe 0.71 0.29 76 148 43 
Nsanje 0.70 0.30 80 162 31 
Mzimba South 0.69 0.31 67 257 13 
Balaka 0.68 0.32 71 197 20 
Mulanje 0.67 0.33 73 162 31 
Ntcheu 0.67 0.33 66 162 21 
Chitipa 0.67 0.33 55 109 16 
Rumphi 0.64 0.36 52 178 14 
Karonga 0.64 0.36 65 142 5 
Dedza 0.61 0.39 71 196 9 
Machinga 0.61 0.39 85 212 15 
Salima 0.60 0.40 72 187 15 
Nkhata Bay 0.58 0.42 64 192 11 
Mchinji 0.55 0.45 71 181 7 
Nchisi 0.51 0.49 63 188 14 
Zomba Rural 0.51 0.49 76 254 12 
Chiradzulu 0.50 0.50 69 185 13 
Dowa 0.49 0.51 68 860 21 
Mzimba North 0.46 0.54 62 241 11 
National 0.75 0.25 71 860 5 
Intra-district average 0.69 0.31    
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on 2018 EMIS database. 
For Zomba Rural district, when comparing the R2 measure over a 10-year period, the data 
indicates there was only a slight improvement in reducing the randomness in teacher 
distribution. This fell from 54 percent in 2007/08 (Figure 6.1A) to 49 percent in 2017/18 
(Figure 6.1B), thus suggesting that the policies listed above in Section 6.1 largely failed in 
their objective. To illustrate the point, a school in Zomba Rural district with an enrolment of 
1,500 students had as few as 10 teachers or as many as 34. Similarly, schools with 10 
teachers had a school population as low as 149 or high as 2,039 students (Figure 6.1B). 
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Figure 6.1: Degree of randomness in teacher distribution in Zomba Rural district 
A. 2007/08 school year 
                             
B. 2017/18 school year 
                       
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on 2008 and 2018 EMIS databases.    
6.2.3 Schools with a surplus versus schools with a shortage of teachers 
National level perspective 
Nationally, the average PTR fell from 78 to 70 over the period corresponding to the 
implementation of the NESP period (2008-2017). However, these figures disguise the huge 
variation in PTRs across schools, which ranged from between five to 860 pupils for every 
teacher. My analysis started by evaluating the extent to which teachers were inefficiently 
distributed when taking the government target that distribution should be on the basis of a 
60 to 1 ratio. To do this, I used the categorisation of schools presented in Chapter 5, which 
involved drawing on the categories DeStefano (2013) developed in his study. 
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Figure 6.2 shows that in the school year 2017/18 over half of all the 5,594 public primary 
schools in Malawi appeared to be falling short of the number of teachers needed to meet 
the 60 to 1 target against their enrolment levels. In 21 out of 34 education districts in 
Malawi, more than half of the schools either had a high need or some need of teachers. At 
the other extreme were those primary schools with an excess of teachers compared to what 
they needed to achieve the 60 to 1 PTR. In 2017/18, close to one-fifth of public primary 
schools fell under this category.  
The district level breakdown indicates that regardless of whether one was experiencing an 
overall shortfall of teachers or not, all 34 districts had schools under their jurisdiction that 
had surplus teachers to requirements. Moreover, all districts, apart from Zomba Urban 
district, had primary schools with a shortage of teachers. This suggests the inefficient 















Figure 6.2: Share of primary schools with s surplus or shortage of teachers by district for 
the 2017/18 school year 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on 2018 EMIS database. 
Note:  
[1] Districts marked with an asterix (*) have achieved the PTR of 60 pupils to one teacher.  
[2] Districts are ranked from highest to lowest according to the combined share of total schools with high 
surplus or a surplus of teachers in schools.  
For the school year 2017/18, the primary education sector had 72,613 teachers compared 
to the 85,479 teachers that it needed were it to meet the government-set PTR target of 60 
to 1 (an overall shortage of 12,866 teachers). The shortage of teachers appears to have 
been exacerbated by the share of schools with a surplus of teachers. When factoring in the 
inefficiency of how teachers were being distributed, the teacher shortage rose to 18,354. 
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at the national and district levels. I achieved this by isolating whether the teacher shortage 
by district was due to the shortfall in overall numbers needed to reach the 60 to 1 PTR 
target, or if it was owing to the inefficient distribution of teachers to schools that had 
surplus teachers (Figure 6.3). The formula setting out how this was calculated was provided 
in Chapter 5. 
Using this approach, 70 percent of the teacher shortage was attributed to a shortfall in 
teachers, with the remainder being due to their inefficient distribution. This was the 
equivalent of 5,475 teachers, or 8 percent of the total primary teaching force in school year 
2017/18. Put another way, the teacher shortage was 43 percent higher than it needed to be 
owing to the inefficient distribution of teachers. Great variation existed between individual 
districts as to whether the reason behind the teacher shortage was due to the shortfall in 
overall numbers or because of inefficient deployment. Inefficient allocation of teachers as a 
reason for the overall shortage of teachers ranged from 95 percent in Blantyre Rural to 4 
percent in Chikwawa in 2018. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the data shows an inverse correlation 
between the overall PTR and the share of the teacher shortage attributed to inefficient 
allocation. In other words, the closer a district was to reaching the 60 to 1 PTR, the greater 
the overall shortage of teachers was attributable to their inefficient deployment. 
The data reveals two things. Firstly, for each of the 31 districts where a teacher shortage 
existed, this was larger than necessary given the overall teacher numbers available to reach 
the 60 to 1 PTR target. Secondly, a district close to achieving the 60 to 1 PTR target was not 
necessarily going to see its teacher shortage problem disappear. The data supports the 
perspective that there was a systemic country-wide problem of district officials failing to 
deploy teachers to work in schools where there was a shortage, or otherwise reallocating 







Figure 6.3: Reason for teacher shortage by district and corresponding PTR for the 2017/18 
school year 
  
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on 2018 EMIS database.  
Note:  
[1] Districts marked with an asterix (*) have achieved a PTR of 60 to 1.  
[2] Figure ranks districts from highest to lowest, according to where the share of the shortage of teachers is 
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District level perspective 
The sections above have provided a brief snapshot concerning the problem of inefficient 
distribution of teachers that all districts, to varying degrees, have been facing. For the 
remainder of this chapter, the analysis discusses the inefficient deployment of teachers 
within the context of Zomba Rural district. The purpose is to consider the progress made 
towards meeting the overall NESP target, with a specific focus on whether teacher 
deployment has been carried out equitably and in a way that has come closer to achieving 
the 60 to 1 PTR for all schools. While the national level analysis discussion in the previous 
section largely focused on a standalone period of school year 2017/18, the discussion in 
relation to Zomba Rural district considers this in the context of the last decade.65 
Zomba Rural district is the home district of the ex-President of Malawi, Joyce Banda (2012-
2014).66 While the district still experienced an overall shortfall in teachers during this period, 
the total number of teachers rose significantly during her presidency. Zomba Rural district 
experienced the sharpest increase in teacher numbers between 2011/12 and 2012/13, 
which corresponded to the first year of Joyce Banda’s presidency. Compared to the national 
average of 15 percent, the growth in teacher numbers was 26.8 percent in Zomba Rural 
district. This large increase caused the district’s PTR to fall from 85 to 1 to 70 to 1 in the 
space of one year. In fact, of the total increase in teacher numbers between 2011/12 and 
2012/13, seven percent went to Zomba Rural district alone (see Appendix Table A.2). 
Alongside this growth in teachers, the share of schools experiencing a shortage in declined 
from 69 in 2011/12 (the year before Joyce Banda became president) to 54 percent in 
2014/15 (the last year of her presidency). Moreover, over the same period the share of 
schools with teachers surplus to requirements rose from 16 to 26 percent. While the 
inefficient distribution of teachers accounted for 12 percent of the district’s teacher 




65 This also corresponds to the operational period relating to the NESP. 
66 The period of Joyce Banda’s presidency corresponds to EMIS years 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15. 
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Figure 6.4: Reasons for a shortfall in teachers in Zomba Rural District: 2007/08 to 2017/18 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS databases, various years. 
Table 6.2: Teachers needed versus numbers teaching in Zomba Rural district  



















2007/08 95 165,101  1,736  1,010 1,065 72 4.2 
2008/09 98 164,374  1,684 -3.0% 1,063 1,135 99 5.7 
2009/10 93 170,729  1,845 9.6% 1,001 1,001 127 6.9 
2010/11 84 179,100  2,140 16.0% 836 966 146 6.8 
2011/12 85 189,987  2,229 4.2% 897 986 118 5.3 
2012/13 70 199,128  2,827 26.8% 496 683 211 7.5 
2013/14 75 208,077  2,783 -1.6% 687 885 212 7.6 
2014/15 71 214,068  3,025 8.7% 469 793 341 11.3 
2015/16 79 209,356  2,653 -12.3% 799 1,033 220 8.1 
2016/17 79 222,635  2,828 6.6% 883 1,022 151 5.3 
2017/18 75 226,444  3,036 7.4% 812 1,008 208 6.9 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS databases, various years. 
Notes:  
[1] Teacher shortfall (overall) refers to the shortfall in the number of teachers needed for Zomba Rural district 
to reach 60 to 1 PTR. 
[2] Teacher shortfall (actual) refers to the shortfall in the number of teachers when selecting those schools 
falling under the categories where there is a shortfall in teachers, and summing up exactly how many teachers 
the schools fall short of reaching 60 to 1 PTR.  
[3] Teacher surplus refers to the sum of teachers in schools where there is a surplus of teachers who are not 
needed to reach the 60 to 1 ratio.  
[4] Share of Zomba teacher workforce refers to what share surplus teachers falling under [3] make up of the 
total teacher workforce in Zomba Rural district. 
 
A comparison of the status of 186 schools that had data for both 2007/8 and 2017/18 
indicates that when comparing the categories that school falls under (high need, some 
need, no need, surplus, high surplus), the majority (53 percent) stayed in the same category 
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that they were in ten years earlier, whilst for 19 percent the categorisation had worsened, 
and for 28 percent it had improved. When comparing against the 60 to 1 PTR target, the 
situation had worsened for 39 percent of schools, and improved for 52 percent (Table 6.3). 










 High surplus Surplus No need Some need High need 
High surplus 2 schools  (1%) 
2 = larger surplus 
1 school (1%) 1 school  (1%)   
Surplus 5 schools (3%) 7 schools (4%) 
3 = larger surplus 
2 = no change 
2 = smaller surplus 
   
No need 3 schools (2%) 2 schools (1%) 7 schools (4%) 
3 = larger surplus 
2 = no change 
2 = larger deficit 
6 schools (3%) 8 schools (4%) 
Some need 3 schools (2%) 5 schools (3%) 10 schools (5%) 29 schools (16%) 
15 = larger deficit 
3 = no change 
11 = smaller deficit 
19 schools (10%) 
High need  5 schools (3%) 6 schools (3%) 14 schools (8%) 53 schools (28%) 
18 = larger deficit 
10 = no change 
25 = smaller deficit 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on 2008 and 2018 EMIS databases.   
Note: Percentages in the parenthesis are the share of all primary schools in Zomba Rural district appearing in 
that particular quadrant.  
Zonal level perspective 
In the previous section, the data revealed that the number of surplus teachers in the district 
had increased under the Presidency of Joyce Banda. When considering this in relation to the 
17 education zones in Zomba Rural district, the data trends illustrate that over a ten-year 
period, the share of schools with either a critical need or some need for additional teachers 
had declined in nine zones. One of these nine zones was Zone 6, which is the home area 
Joyce Banda. Over the entire 10-year period, Figure 6.5 shows that the first year of Joyce 
Banda’s presidency (school year 2012/13) was when the share of schools in Zone 6 with a 





Figure 6.5:  Schools distributed by category in Zone 6, 2007/08 to 2017/18 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS databases, various years. 
Figure 6.4 considered whether the teacher shortage in Zomba Rural district was attributable 
to a shortfall in overall numbers of teachers, or due to inefficiency in how teachers were 
being deployed. Extending the same concept to 17 education zones in Zomba Rural district 
demonstrates the very different challenges facing zones insofar as teacher shortages were 
concerned. At one extreme were Zones 2, 4, 5, 10 and 12, where 100 percent of the teacher 
shortage was attributable to the shortfall in overall teacher numbers. Whilst at the other 
extreme were Zones 6 and 13 where 100 percent of the teacher shortage the zone faced 
overall was attributable to the inefficient way in which teachers were being distributed 
(Figure 6.6). What the data clearly illustrates is that the ESIP policy of redeploying teachers 
from where there is a surplus to where there is need appears to have been ineffectively 
enforced. 
Another aspect that is worth noting is regarding the gender composition of teachers in 
zones that experienced a shortfall in teacher numbers versus those zones where the 
shortage was attributed to the inefficient distribution of teachers. In Zone 6 and Zone 13, 
where 100 percent of the shortage of teachers was attributable to inefficient distribution, 
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where 100 percent of the teacher shortage was due to teacher numbers, and where just 
one-third of teachers were female.  
Figure 6.6: Reasons for a shortfall in teachers by education zone in Zomba Rural district for 
the 2017/18 school year 
         
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on 2018 EMIS database.   
The selection of the two education primary zones, which were the focus of my fieldwork, 
offered two contrasting experiences of what accounted for the teacher shortage in Malawi. 
Zone 9 had a PTR of 63 to 1, according to the 2017/18 EMIS data.67 As Figure 6.6 shows, 70 
percent of the teacher shortage in the zone was attributable to the inefficient way in which 
teachers were being distributed. Of the 13 primary schools in Zone 9, two had a high surplus 
of teachers; four had a surplus of teachers; one had no need for additional ones; four had 
some need for additional ones; and two schools had a high need for additional teachers 
(Figure 6.7A). Since 2011/12 the inefficient distribution of teachers has constituted a greater 
reason contributing to the overall shortage of teachers rather than teacher shortages. 
In Zone 12, on the other hand, 100 percent of the teacher shortage was attributable to a 
shortfall in their number. The average PTR in the zone stood at 92 to 1 according to the 
 
67 This section uses the EMIS data, which is based on data collected in October 2017. When I conducted my 
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2017/18 EMIS data.68 While this represented an improvement from earlier on in the NESP 
period, when the PTR exceeded 100, only one of the 13 schools in Zone 12 reported a 
sufficient number of teachers needed to reach 60 to 1 PTR in the school year 2017/18 
(Figure 6.7B). 
Figure 6.7: Reasons for shortfall in teachers over time for 2007/08-2017/18 
A. Zone 9 
 
 
B. Zone 12 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS databases, various years. 
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6.2.4 Summary of Section 6.2 
Utilising consecutive years of EMIS data, the aim of this section has been to understand the 
deployment of teachers, and what effect this has had on equity and efficiency. The data 
trends illustrate the extremities of how teachers appear to have been deployed across 
Malawi’s primary schools. These trends corroborate what previous literature on Malawi’s 
teacher deployment system has also concluded, which was reviewed in Chapter 3. However, 
the data trends also expand upon these extremities to distinguish the extent to which 
Malawi’s teacher shortage has been caused by a shortfall, or the inefficient way in which 
teachers have been distributed. 
6.3 Tracking teacher movement after they have been deployed  
6.3.1 Introduction 
Section 6.2 provided a discussion around the deployment of teachers, and the extent to 
which the teacher shortage crisis is due to shortfall in their numbers or their inefficient 
distribution. The purpose of this section is to understand better whether the deployment of 
teachers has been executed on the basis of need. To do this, I utilise the five categories of 
schools presented in Chapter 5 as a measure of a school’s need for additional teachers. The 
section then moves on to discussing teacher movement across the education system, with a 
specific focus on Zone 9 and Zone 12. 
I take as the starting point district-level teacher allocation data of newly deployed IPTE 
teachers to determine whether the distribution of such teachers was undertaken according 
to need. I then go on to compare whether teachers actually went to the school to which 
they were deployed. In the absence of a centralised system tracking the movement of 
teachers in the system, I have utilised the annual EMIS data available up until school year 
2017/18, together with the April staff returns data from 2019. Chapter 5 has discussed the 
method behind this. 
6.3.2 Deployment and movement of newly recruited teachers (a district 
perspective)  
As a starting point, this subsection maps out how teachers who graduated from the IPTE 
programme, and who were deployed to work in Zomba Rural district were distributed to 
schools. The specific interest of this analysis is to consider whether deployment decisions 
took into account which schools had the greatest need. At first glance, it would appear that 
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the initial deployment for IPTE teachers in 2016, 2017 and 2018 was largely undertaken on 
the basis of need (Figure 6.8). In 2016, the share of teachers deployed to schools with either 
a high need or some need of additional teachers to reach 60 to 1 PTR was 90 percent. The 
equivalent in 2017 and 2018 was 90 percent and 80 percent, respectively. 
However, a closer look at the data requires critical appraisal of this statement. This is 
because, while a number of schools with high need were receiving teachers, a significant 
share of schools falling under this category were not. And yet, at the same time a proportion 
of schools with some need or no need for additional teachers were receiving new teachers. 
In 2016, for instance, 40 schools experiencing a high need for teachers received additional 
ones. However, in that same year 31 schools did not any new teachers even though they 
had a high need. Similarly in 2017, the number of schools with a high need of teachers not 
receiving any was 23, while for 2018 it was 21 (or 25 percent) (see Figure 6.9). 
The deployment of teachers according to the rules set by government officials require that 
schools with a PTR of more than 60 to 1 should be prioritised when allocating newly 
teachers. However, a critical appraisal of this policy when set out against the data in Figure 
6.9 questions the extent to which this has encouraged district officials to target the “low-
hanging fruit.” In other words, a question for further consideration is whether or not 
teacher deployment at the district level is done on the basis of where it is easier to send 
teachers to work in certain schools or zones. As the data here does not reveal this, it is a 
question explored further in Chapter 7. 
Figure 6.8: Distribution of new graduate teachers according to category of schools for 
Zomba Rural district 
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Figure 6.9: Share of schools by category receiving new teachers versus those that did not 
in 2017/2018  
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on teacher deployment data and EMIS databases, various years. 
The next part of my analysis tracks whether teachers were actually going to schools that 
they had been deployed to go and teach in. This was achieved by matching the employment 
number and name of the teacher graduates from the deployment lists and matching these 
to schools that they appeared as teaching under in the EMIS data. Time-series data for 
teacher graduates from the 2016 cohort extended over three years, whilst the equivalent 
for 2017 was two years. Teacher graduates who could be traced in the EMIS systems69 were 
linked to the school they were reported to be teaching at and I divided them into five 
separate categories:  
(i) teaching at the same primary school they were deployed to; 
(ii) teaching at a different primary school, but in the same zone as their primary 
school of deployment; 
(iii) teaching at a different primary school and in a different zone to that of their 
primary school of deployment;  
(iv) teaching at a different primary school in a different district; and  
(v) teaching at a secondary school.  
 
69 In the case of graduates from the cohorts I have focused on, there were instances where the teacher 
graduate did not appear in the EMIS database in any of the years for which the data is available. I cross-
checked these teacher names, and their employment numbers against the staff returns available to me and if 






















































While the majority of teachers did stay in their school of deployment, a significant 
proportion in both the 2016 and 2017 cohort were found to transfer to teach in other 
schools. Of the 2016 teacher graduate cohort, 31 percent were found to be teaching in 
schools other than their school of deployment two years after their initial posting (Figure 
6.10A). For the 2017 teacher cohort, the equivalent was 41 percent the year following 
where teachers were initially deployed to (Figure 6.10B). 
Figure 6.10: Newly recruited teachers by year 
A. 2016 teacher graduates 
 
 
B. 2017 teacher graduates 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS databases, various years. 
6.3.3 Teacher deployment and movement (a zonal perspective) 
Background to Zone 9 and 12 
In this subsection, a more micro-level analysis is  deployed, with consideration of the 
movement of Zone 9 and Zone 12 teachers in the education system. Currently, a major 
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national dataset that tracks the movement of where teachers are deployed to teach, and 
their consequent movement to work in other primary schools. For the purposes of this 
subsection and the proceeding one, the analysis relies on a dataset I constructed that is 
specifically focused on all schools in Zone 9 and Zone 12, using EMIS datasets for the school 
years 2007/08 to 2017/18. See Chapter 5 for an overview of this dataset. 
The dataset’s purpose was two-fold. Firstly, it tracked where teachers who were appearing 
under any of the schools in Zones 9 or Zone 12 in a given year had taught prior to arriving at 
that school. For the dataset, the assumption was made that any teacher not appearing in 
previous years of EMIS was a new teacher. Secondly, the dataset tracked where Zone 9 and 
Zone 12 teachers who had been reported as teaching in a school in those zones at some 
point, were now teaching even though they no longer appeared as doing so at that school. 
I then disaggregated the type of teacher movement according the following categories: 
1. Between two schools in the same zone; 
2. Between a school in either Zone 9 or 12 and a school in another primary education 
zone in Zomba Rural district; 
3. Between a school in either Zone 9 or 12 and a school in another district outside of 
Zomba Rural district. 
Finally, I considered whether the change between where a teacher had previously taught 
compared to their current location had led to a worsening or an improvement in the 
allocation of teachers, according to the categorisation of the school in that year. Through 
this micro-level analysis of two contrasting zones, whether the movement of teachers 
helped or hindered the objective of equitably distributing teachers was addressed. 
Movement of teachers into schools in Zone 9 and Zone 12 
The first part of the analysis considered the movement of teachers coming to teach in a 
school within Zone 9 or Zone 12. For both zones, teachers for whom this was their first 
teaching appointment made up the largest component of incoming teachers between 
school year 2007/08 and 2017/18. However, Zone 12 schools appeared to depend much 
more upon the deployment of this category of teachers than Zone 9 (62 percent and 33 
percent, respectively). In two-thirds of all cases where a teacher had been deployed to work 
in a school in Zone 9, they appeared to be established teachers transferring from another 
school. The equivalent figure for Zone 12 was two-fifths of all cases.  
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Micro-analysis suggests that the vast number of cases which involved teachers transferring 
to come and teach in a school in Zone 9 from other schools outside of Zomba Rural district 
(20 percent of cases) were from neighbouring districts (Machinga, Mangochi and 
Phalombe). Not only do these districts have some of the highest PTRs in the country, but 
they also have the highest proportion of schools where there is either a high need or some 
need for additional teachers. Similarly, teachers who were coming to work in Zone 9 from 
other zones in Zomba Rural district (23 percent of cases) were overwhelmingly coming from 
schools/ zones where a shortage of teachers existed. In 45 percent of cases where a teacher 
was transferring to come and work in Zone 9 from another zone in Zomba Rural, it was from 
a school with either a high need or some need for additional teachers to a school in Zone 9 
with a high surplus/ surplus or no need for teachers70 (Figure 6.11A).  
In Zone 12, on the other hand, teacher transfers from other zones in Zomba Rural district 
made up a very small proportion of all teacher movement into Zone 12 (8 percent). These 
results are perhaps not surprising given the remoteness of Zone 12, and thus, teachers in 
Zomba Rural district were more likely to have greater knowledge of the zone compared to 
those coming from outside of the district (see Chapter 7 for discussion on this). Almost one-
in-five teachers who transferred to work in a school in Zone 12 were from other schools in 
the same zone (Figure 6.11B). 
Teachers transferring from another school, who came to teach at a school in either Zone 9 
or Zone 12, had very different effects regarding how their redistribution affected equity. In 
the case of Zone 9, these transfers appeared to have redistributed more teachers from 
schools with a high need or some need for teachers to schools where there was already a 
high surplus or surplus of teachers (Figure 6.12A). In the case of Zone 12, there appeared to 
be a slight improvement in the distribution towards schools with a high need for teachers. 






70 In the majority of cases, this appears to have benefited School F and School G. 
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Figure 6.11: Type of movement into schools in Zone 9 and Zone 12 
A. Zone 9 (n = 377)     B. Zone 12 (n = 279) 
  
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS databases, various years. 
Figure 6.12: Effect of teacher transfers into schools on equitable distribution by category 
of school 
A. Zone 9 (n = 253)     B. Zone 12 (n = 106) 
  
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS databases, various years. 
Movement of teachers out of schools in Zone 9 and Zone 12 
Regarding Zone 9 and Zone 12, teachers who left the teaching profession made up 32 
percent of cases in Zone 9 and 41 percent in Zone 12. The remainder were teachers 
transferring out of a school to go and work elsewhere in the primary education system. 
In Zone 9, teachers transferring out of schools to other districts made up 16 percent of 
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Zomba Urban district, which borders Zone 9 and where all schools in the district have a 
surplus or sufficient teachers (Figure 6.13A). While government policy prevents teachers 
from being deployed to work in Malawi’s four urban education zones (see Section 6.1), 
these figures would suggest that the enforceability of this policy was weakened through the 
teacher transfer process. In a further 29 percent of cases, a teacher who had been working 
in a school in Zone 9 with surplus teachers continued his or her teaching career in a school 
in another district where there were surplus of teachers.  
Teachers transferring to work in another zone in Zomba Rural district made up 21 percent of 
the cases of those moving out of a school in Zone 9. However, the zones these teachers 
transfer to appear to have perpetuated the problem of the inefficiency in teacher 
distribution, even if the school that they had been directed to go and teach in suffered from 
a shortage of teachers. For instance, in 63 percent of cases where a teacher transferred 
from Zone 9 to another education zone in Zomba Rural district, these were to schools in 
Zones 1, 6 and 13. However, the overwhelming reason for the teacher shortage in these 
zones is linked to inefficient allocation, rather than a shortage of teachers overall (Figure 
6.6). 
Teachers moving out of schools in Zone 9 to work in other schools in Zone 9 represented 31 
percent of all cases of a teacher leaving a school. These appear to be more indicative of 
progress towards moving teachers from high surplus/ surplus schools to those with high 
need or some need. While this was limited, it had more of an equalising effect compared to 
the inter-zonal and inter-district movements discussed above. 
Teacher transfers out of schools in Zone 12, however, tell another story (Figure 6.13B). In 
the majority of cases, transfers appear to have either been intra-zonal (21 percent of cases) 
or to other zones in Zomba Rural district (26 percent of cases). Intra-zonal teacher 
movement in Zone 12 appear to show teachers either transferring from schools with a high 
need for teachers to schools with either some need or no need for additional ones. In other 
words, a significant proportion of teachers transferring between schools in Zone 12 
appeared to be moving to schools with a less critical shortage. As with Zone 9, a large share 
of total inter-zonal transfers from Zone 12 involved moving to teach in Zone 6 and 13 (33 
percent), albeit a lower share. Teacher shortages in these zones, as discussed, were due to 
inefficient distribution rather than an overall shortfall. 
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Figure 6.13: Type of movement out of schools in Zone 9 and Zone 12 
A. Zone 9 (n=240)     B. Zone 12 (n=196) 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS databases, various years. 
Figure 6.14: Effect of teacher transfers out of schools on equitable distribution by category 
of school 
A. Zone 9 (n = 163)     B. Zone 12 (n = 116) 
  
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS databases, various years. 
6.3.4 Movement of teachers into and out of the four case study schools  
In this final subsection, I extend the analysis specifically in relation to the four schools that 
were selected as case study schools for this thesis. To recapitulate, School B had a surplus of 
teachers, School I and School S had a shortage of teachers and School Z had no need for 
additional teachers. Insofar as new incoming teachers to the school is concerned, the 
variation as to whether they gained these additional teachers mainly through newly 
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School B, which had a high surplus of teachers, seems to have received the overwhelming 
majority of its new teachers (79 percent) from those transferring in from other schools. The 
majority of these were either from schools in other education zones in Zomba Rural or 
schools in neighbouring districts suffering from a high need for teachers (33 percent). Of all 
the four schools, School B appears to have had, by far, the greatest volume of new teachers 
through teacher transfers. 
School I and School S, both of which had a need for additional teachers to reach 60 to 1 PTR, 
received the majority of their new teachers as newly deployed ones (55 and 80 percent 
respectively). While the remainder of new teachers transferring to come to work at School I 
were from within the zone and outside of the zone, in the cases of School S and School Z all 
of teachers transferred over from schools in Zone 12 (Figure 6.15). 
Figure 6.15: Where new teachers have come from to join the respective four case study 
schools 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS databases, various years. 
Insofar as outgoing teachers to the school are concerned, once again there is a great deal of 
variation between schools. In the case of School B, the majority of instances where a 
teacher had left the school involved their going on to teach at other schools (77 percent). A 
large proportion of these cases were to schools that already had a surplus (17 percent) or a 
high surplus of teachers (20 percent). 
At the other extreme are School S and School Z, where 53 percent and 47 percent of cases, 
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involving teachers moving to another school, these were mainly to other schools with a high 
need or need within Zone 12 (Figure 6.16). 
Figure 6.16: Where teachers have gone to after leaving the respective four case study 
schools 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS databases, various years. 
6.3.5 Summary of Section 6.3 
In this section, how the deployment of newly recruited teachers was determined other than 
by factors concerning the critical need for new teachers has been discussed. While 
deployment appears to have targeted schools where there was a need for additional 
teachers, these were often not those with the highest need. Similarly, teacher transfers 
based on a micro-level analysis appeared to show how this worked against the principles of 
equity when based on teacher need.  
Conclusion 
Chapter 6 has presented a number of trends relating to the between school deployment of 
teachers, which has led to large variations in the PTR between different schools. A number 
of these trends link back to the Levy-Walton framework, which was presented in Chapter 4. 
These are as follows. 
A first set of findings relating to the national policy instructing how teacher deployment 
should be undertaken appears to have been weakly enforced at district level to the 
detriment of equity considerations. The data indicates that several strategies, including 
limiting the deployment of newly graduated IPTE teachers to the four urban districts and 
redeploying teachers to schools with need, appear not to have been implemented at the 
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A second set of findings relates to how the deployment of new teachers to schools with the 
most critical need may be failing due to the very broad instructions in place regarding how 
they should be distributed. The majority of teachers did appear to be deployed to schools 
where there was at least some additional need for them. However, given that the vast 
majority of schools in Zomba Rural district fall in the high need category, this raises the 
question of how effective the strategy in place is in ensuring teachers do get deployed to 
schools with the most critical shortages. 
A third set of findings was the absence of accurate data to monitor effectively whether the 
deployment and transfers of teachers was being done with equity considerations in mind. 
This related more to my own experience as a researcher of collecting and analysing data for 
this chapter which was made challenging due to the absence of an established teacher 
tracking database in place.  
Finally, the data appears to suggest that Zomba Rural district benefited from the largest 
increases in teacher numbers during the Presidency of Joyce Banda, whose home village is 
in the district. This period also coincided with when the inefficient distribution of teachers 
accounted for the largest share of the teacher shortage for the period considered for this 
study. 
Chapter 7 continues the discussion on the first theme of this thesis, this being teacher 
deployment between schools. It presents the themes emerging from the qualitative 
stakeholder interviews with government and school actors on this issue. The reasons 
pertaining to the trends and patterns identified in this chapter in relation to teacher 









Chapter 7: What are the main challenges 
in managing equitable teacher 
deployment to schools? 
Chapter purpose and structure 
Chapter 6 presented my findings of the administrative data analysed to understand how 
inequitable the deployment of teachers was. The purpose of Chapter 7 is to address the 
second research question of this thesis, which asks “What are the reasons for the uneven 
deployment of primary school teachers between schools?” It builds on Chapter 6 by 
synthesising what education stakeholders identified as the main reasons for the continued 
inequitable deployment of teachers. The data for this chapter comes from my field notes 
and transcribed interviews that I administered with key informants at ministry, district, 
zonal and school levels.  
Chapter 7 is structured as three main subsections. Section 7.1 discusses the processes 
relating to teacher deployment and transfers. This prefaces the interrogation later on in the 
chapter that considers how the system deviates from these processes. Section 7.2 discusses 
both the mechanisms teachers utilise to help get deployed/ transferred to a favourable 
school, and what makes the enforceability of equitable teacher deployment challenging. 
Finally, Section 7.3 discusses the ineffective monitoring systems relating to where teachers 
are teaching in the system.  
7.1 Processes regarding the deployment and transfers of teachers  
7.1.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 identified the wide variations in pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) between primary 
schools. Like most districts in Malawi, Zomba Rural district is characterised by schools with 
critical shortages of teachers existing alongside those with surplus numbers. In this section, 
the policies around teacher deployment and transfers in the context of Malawi’s primary 
education system are analysed. The purpose is to understand how stakeholders interpret 
these policies in their day-to-day decision-making and how compatible these are with the 
objective of equitable teacher deployment. Transcribed responses in this chapter have been 
colour coordinated according to the type of actor interviewed. Central level government 
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official responses are in red; district level government official responses are in orange; zonal 
level government official responses are in yellow; headteacher/ deputy headteacher 
responses are in green; and teacher responses are in blue. 
7.1.2 Deployment of teachers to districts 
Up until 2017, the Basic Education Directorate at central headquarters allocated recently 
graduated Initial Primary Teacher Education (IPTE)71 teachers to enable all districts to reach 
an average PTR of 60 to 1. However, from 2017 onwards the formula was adjusted and 
based on the following variables: (1) 60 to 1 PTR,72  (2) whether it is a Malawi Education 
Sector Improvement Project (MESIP) district and (3) the number of classes/ streams per 
school.73 The districts chosen for the MESIP project were intended to be those with the 
worst Primary School Leaving Certificate Examination (PSLCE) results in terms of 
performance. Districts selected for MESIP were Chikwawa, Dedza, Kasungu, Lilongwe Rural 
West, Machinga, Mangochi, Mzimba South and Thyolo. Officials I interviewed privately, 
however, indicated that the selection of Thyolo district was due to it being the then 
President Peter Wa Mutharika’s home district.  
Currently government policy requires IPTE teachers to work in Malawi’s 30 rural districts. 
The remaining four urban education districts (Blantyre Urban, Lilongwe Urban, Mzuzu City 
and Zomba Urban) are not meant to receive any teachers who have been newly recruited 
(Asim et al., 2017). IPTE graduates can indicate a first, second or third preference as to 
which district they want to teach in. A ministry official indicated how this was problematic in 
practice:  
“I would really wish that everybody goes to at least their first choice or second choice 
district. But with all these numbers choosing districts near Lilongwe, Blantyre, Mzuzu, 
Zomba cities it’s very difficult.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
 
71 ODL graduates, on the other hand, are sent to teach in the schools they were assigned to when carrying out 
their teaching practice. 
72 Enrolment and staffing data is taken from the most recent EMIS data available when coming up with the 
formula. 
73 The Basic Education Directorate formula came under pressure to adjust the formula to ensure at least one 
teacher per class, which, in the case of small schools, would require more than one teacher for every 60 pupils. 
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Another official discussed the problem regarding the background of the teachers who end 
up applying and enrolling on the IPTE course. The great majority do not come from rural 
districts where there is the greatest need for teachers: 
“Unfortunately those other districts – when we advertise for them to go to the Teacher 
Training Colleges – not many apply. The Mangochi one, the Nsanje one74….Obviously the 
more we continue to choose teachers from these urban centres, the more challenges we 
have in deploying them in the other districts.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
A further problem identified by school and zonal level interviewees was the conditions 
under which teacher trainees carry out their training practice.75 According to school 
respondents at School B, which has had student teachers in the past, student teachers are 
allocated to classes that cannot exceed more than 60 pupils:  
“For student teachers, we cannot let the other learners to go in that class, because 
sometimes...the supervisor for that students they do come. So, they just want 60 learners in 
that class.” 
(Deputy headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
“So, those student teachers are supposed to have their own class and the number of 
learners to be in that class should be not more than 60.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
Housing provision for teacher trainees was a further condition stakeholders raised, which 
determined whether schools received teacher trainees or not:  
“The lecturers from Phalombe TTC – they came to each and every school in the zone. Now, 
if they find that there is a house for the student teachers, it means you were allowed to be 
given student teachers. But those schools which had no houses, there are no student 
teachers.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
The Primary Education Advisers (PEAs) also indicated that the Teacher Training Colleges 
(TTCs) often preferred schools within easy reach to enable supervisors to monitor their 
student teachers effectively: 
“You know those college tutors they want their students to be in schools where there can 
be easy monitoring for them. More especially, where there are very good roads and very 
good accommodation for the students.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
74 These two districts would be considered rural in nature, and currently have some of the worst teacher 
shortages.  
75 There is no paperwork that references the requirements. A spokesperson for the Department for Teacher 
Education and Development (DTED) however confirmed that teacher trainees must be given housing and be 
teaching 60 pupils or less. 
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“So because it’s coming from their colleges saying ‘We want you to go to the schools where 
we should reach you easily’” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
These requirements all remain at odds with the reality of the teaching conditions the 
average primary school teacher in Malawi experiences, particularly in rural remote areas 
and regarding the infant standards.  
7.1.3 Deployment of teachers to schools and zones 
Once the Basic Education Directorate finalises which districts teachers should be deployed 
to, details of those they should receive are communicated to the District Education Manager 
(DEM). The DEM is expected to utilise the latest enrolment and staffing data to allocate IPTE 
teachers to schools. However, there appeared to be an absence of specificity in directing 
DEMs on exactly how teachers were to be allocated. Instead, government advice was to 
allocate teachers to “remote” schools where there was a “shortage”:  
“We tell the DEMs to allocate these teachers to remote areas where the shortage of 
teachers is very critical. But no clear guidelines to DEMs to say go for PTR, go for this, go 
for that.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
District and zonal officials when questioned how new teachers should be allocated, 
indicated that it should be based on rural schools or those with a PTR of more than 60 to 1:  
“And we must make sure that when allocating teachers those schools should get priority. 
That is looking at the enrolment and staffing levels; their pupil teacher ratio is above 60.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“But in the rural areas where there is critical shortage of teachers, they usually say these 
teachers are for these schools” 
(District Education Office, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“And then he [the DEM] asks us ‘where are the shortfalls – which schools?’ And we 
normally give him which schools have shortfalls of teachers. And then he sends those [new] 
teachers to the schools.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
A challenge with these guiding principles is reflected in a point made by Asim et al., who 
state that “Malawi’s system relies on broad rules, based around binary concepts of rural 
versus urban and overstaffed versus understaffed” (2017; p. 7). A good example of this are 
the conditions applicants have to adhere to in order to be accepted onto the IPTE course, 
one of which is agreeing to work in a rural district for a minimum of five years. However, this 
criterion is somewhat redundant given 30 out the 34 education districts are considered rural 
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(Asim et al., 2017). Moreover, the “understaffed” versus “overstaffed” category is too 
broad. In Zomba Rural district, which is categorised as understaffed, 70 percent of primary 
schools have a PTR of over 60 to 1 (see Chapter 6).  
When questioned about the deployment decisions taken to prioritise where new teachers 
should be distributed, district officials indicated that those schools with the highest PTR 
should come first:  
“It would be those schools where the PTR is 100, 200, 300. Really the most critical schools” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“Schools with the worst shortages. And by this I mean where a teacher is handling up to 
100 plus children all by herself” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
However, these responses appear to contradict the data in Chapter 6. Here I showed that 
while the deployment of teachers was largely targeting schools with a need for additional 
teachers, the schools receiving new ones were not necessarily always those with the most 
critical need. In later responses to follow-up questions, district respondents did intimate 
there being difficulties in keeping teachers in schools with critical shortages:  
“These schools whereby teachers have called me to go to see the house they are putting 
[up] in….When it rains, it leaks a lot…. it is very difficult to convince teachers to continue 
living there.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“Zone 5 – and the zones on that side of the lake – our experience is if we send teachers 
there we know they will not stay long. So, we must think of alternative solutions.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
When I asked for clarification on what these “alternative solutions” were, the official 
responded: 
“We will send them there….but we expect them to not stay long. So, we look at other 
schools, where the number of teachers is short of the 60 [to 1] target.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
The suggestion that a teacher will “not stay long”, if sent to certain areas was further 
elaborated upon by the PEA: 
“You know the DEM has to think carefully when sending teachers to these remote schools in 
the middle of nowhere, so the district don’t [sic] lose them completely as we have if we are 
too forceful.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
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In 22 out of the 34 education districts the majority of schools were experiencing teacher 
shortages (see Chapter 6). The strategic decisions taken by officials to ensure they did not 
lose any teachers is, therefore, an important dynamic to bear in mind.  
Another challenge was the absence of a formal government definition regarding what 
constituted a rural school. This not only affects the deployment of teachers, but also, the 
allocation of the hardship allowance, which has been made available to teachers working in 
rural schools since 2010. The responsibility for selecting eligible schools was left up to the 
DEM of each district. An audit carried out in 2010 found that DEMs had failed consistently to 
follow the weak rules formulated at the centre concerning eligibility for schools (Asim et al., 
2017). Amongst the problems relating to the scheme has been the inconsistency as to which 
schools are eligible for the rural allowance. In practice, schools that should have been 
eligible were excluded from the scheme, while those that should have been excluded 
received the allowance (Asim et al., 2017). This was corroborated by one central 
government official:  
“Because....you have Sikwere76 Primary School teachers benefiting from the rural allowance 
scheme. But you have Sikwere77 Community Day Secondary School close by – they are not 
benefiting.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
One district official further pointed to the incompatibility of how the rural hardship 
allowance operates in practice in the context of a system characterised by shortages in 
teacher housing:  
“The teachers themselves….are saying ‘OK, we are at this school, but where we live is a 
rural area. The school, itself, doesn’t have enough teachers’ houses.’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
More recently, the Ministry of Education, in partnership with the World Bank, attempted to 
move away from the binary categorisation of schools according to “rural” and “urban” (Asim 
et al., 2017). Schools were grouped according to four separate categories to differentiate 
the hardship allowance a teacher should receive (ibid.) These were Category A (most 
remote), Category B (somewhat remote), Category C (not remote) and Category D (urban 
and/ or adequately staffed). See Appendix Table A.3.  
 
76 Name of school changed for anonymity. 
77 Name of school changed for anonymity. 
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At the time of the fieldwork, this policy recommendation was still in the discussion phase 
and had not yet been operationalised.78 However, government officials with background 
knowledge to the proposals expressed scepticism regarding its enforceability. According to 
these officials, differentiating the hardship allowance in the way that was being proposed 
was unlikely to come to immediate fruition due to the negative political ramifications:79  
“That one has not yet come into effect – the categorisation of A, B, C, D.  Actually, that one 
may take some time to be effective, because politically there are some negative effects.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
 
“With the current system a lot of teachers are benefiting from the rural allowance 
arrangement. But with the categorisation we are likely to lose out a lot of schools, because 
they have basic social amenities. Doing that now, for a political party, would be suicidal.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
The discussion later in this chapter primarily focuses on nepotism, whereby the personal 
relationships politicians have with teachers has been negatively affecting the enforcement 
of their equitable deployment. The responses from the questions relating to the rural 
allowance above suggest that politicians’ interference is also motivated by avoiding policies 
that may be unpopular with teachers. Relationships of patronage to secure vote buying is a 
common feature of clientelist political systems, such as Malawi’s (see Chapter 4). 
7.1.4 Current government policy on teacher transfers 
Subsection 7.1.2 and Subsection 7.1.3 have both discussed policies relating to the 
deployment of newly qualified teachers. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, existing 
literature also illustrated how teacher deployment is affected by the high proportion of 
teachers in the system transferring between schools (Kadzamira, 2006; Mulkeen, 2010; 
Ndalama & Chidalengwa, 2010). While clauses relating to civil service transfers do exist in 
the Public Service Act, ambiguity amongst stakeholders remained around whether this 
extended to teachers. According to one district official, the absence of a specific policy 
relating to teacher transfers gave the district greater discretionary powers regarding these: 
 
 
78 The draft of the Ministry’s Teacher Management Strategy states “Deployment of newly recruited teachers 
will be prioritized towards remote Category A and B to rationalize teacher distribution in Malawi” (GoM, 2018; 
p. 132). 
79 My fieldwork took place in year before Malawi’s 2019 national elections. 
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“Initially those ones are not spelt out clearly, which is why we use our discretionary powers 
within ourselves to move teachers from one point to another. And, mostly, the requests I 
normally get from teachers range from following husbands.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Official responsibility and jurisdiction for teacher movement within a particular district lies 
with the DEM. PEAs do not officially have jurisdiction over moving teachers between schools 
and require the formal permission of that person when transferring teachers between 
schools in their zone. They do, however, play an advisory role to the DEM. Nevertheless, 
interview responses from various interviewees indicated either a misunderstanding of the 
policy:  
“According to local postings, as I did from School L to School I, the PEA is responsible for 
that. He can manage to transfer you in his zone within the zone. But district posting, you 
must write a letter through that PEA to the DEM.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
Or PEAs moving teachers around without seeking the permission of the district: 
“The PEA would issue postings to teachers without the knowledge of this office. We would 
get some complaints from the schools or from other stakeholders, be it the church. We 
called the PEA and said, ‘This is an anomaly, we are not supposed to do this.’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
While the DEM has jurisdiction over the movement of teachers in his own district, the 
movement of teachers between two districts officially requires formal approval from central 
headquarters. However, the DEMs appear to work informally with one another to arrange 
transfers between themselves: 
“We work with our colleagues in other districts to make sure no [sic] one of us is losing too 
many teachers. It requires cooperation. The District [Education] Managers of both places 
work together” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
A central ministry person also confirmed that transfers between districts are arranged 
between district officials themselves: 
“How it should be is that the Ministry make[s] sure that the balance of teachers is not 
changed between districts. But those powers of moving teachers….if districts are not losing 
teachers, we normally say to the DEMs ‘Go ahead’” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
This absence of Ministry involvement is coupled with the failure of mandating DEMs to 
report the names of teachers who have reported for duty at the district to officials at central 
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headquarters (see Subsection 7.3.2). This potentially allows for greater discretionary 
oversight by DEMs.  
7.1.5 Summary of Section 7.1 
This section has presented an overview of official government policy relating to the 
deployment and transfer of teachers in the primary education system. The section has 
illustrated how either the broad-based definition or absence of policies leaves officials with 
a great deal of discretion concerning how teacher deployment and transfer matters should 
be interpreted.  
7.2 Factors contributing to the poor enforcement of equitable 
teacher deployment 
7.2.1 Introduction 
This section discusses some of the key factors that have contributed to government officials 
in Zomba Rural district being unable to enforce an equitable deployment of teachers in the 
district. The central focus is on exploring the mechanisms teachers have been able to utilise 
effectively either to resist a deployment to an “undesirable” work-station or succeed in 
being deployed to a “desirable” school.  
7.2.2 Sanctioning a favourable school placement on marriage grounds 
Studies reviewed in Chapter 3 found that local customs influence how female teachers are 
deployed and transferred due to traditional norms concerning marriage customs (Asim et 
al., 2017; Kadzamira, 2006; Moleni & Ndalama, 2004; Ndalama & Chidalengwa; 2010). This 
is despite the Malawi Public Services Regulations stating that “a married Civil Servant cannot 
expect to receive preferential treatment in relation to his posting or otherwise” (cited in 
Ndalama & Chidalengwa, 2010; p. 17). Specifically in relation to a female civil servant the 
Regulations state that “should domestic affairs arising out of her marriage conflict or 
interfere with her official duties, such as posting or transfer, the Minister reserves the right 
to terminate her appointment” (ibid.).  
However, district-level teacher transfer data that I accessed indicated that, of the 309 cases 
where a teacher had transferred to another school in 2017 and the first quarter of 2018, 40 
percent were due to “marriage” or “following husband.” This was followed by wanting to 
be closer to home village or relatives (24 percent of cases) and health reasons (16 percent 
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of cases).80 When asked why teachers were still granted transfers on account of their 
marriage status despite official regulations directing against this, stakeholders discussed 
the importance of local customs:  
“In our culture marriage is respected so much….So, the woman can go to the DEM and say 
‘I want to follow my husband’ and the DEM can give her a transfer. It is following our local 
customs.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School S, Zone 12) 
 
“The system is the same and the people working in the offices are the same. They are used 
to this tradition….You know, they say, ‘If you deny a wife from following a husband, then 
you are abusing that one.’” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
Another government official explained how formal regulations risked perpetuating harm 
and disrupting the fabric of social cohesion:  
“That lady becomes prone to prostitution and things like those. And by denying her 
following her husband, you are assisting in the multiplication of HIV and all that.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
This disjuncture between formal and informal institutions is a key feature of how 
personalised political settlements, like those Malawi sits under, operate. District and zonal 
officials, of whom the overwhelmingly majority were male, discussed how marriage was 
problematic in implementing formal policy as it allowed female teachers to resist being 
deployed to work in schools with a shortage of teachers: 
“We will face much more resistance in placing teachers to schools which need 
them…because they [female teachers] might be married and would like to live along the 
roads.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“So, when these lady teachers have been posted to, maybe, areas like Zone 14, Zone 2 they 
say, ‘But my husband is in town so do you want to break our family?’ So, the DEM has got 
no choice, so he says, ‘OK where can I post you?’” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
The consequence of such practices mean that education zones in Zomba Rural district closer 
to urban centres are far more likely to have a higher proportion of female teachers (see 
Chapter 6). Government officials indicated that this often meant that schools with no official 
vacancies had a surplus of mainly female teachers: 
 
80 This is when discounting for transfer cases where no reason was given as to why the transfer took place in 
Zomba Rural District. 
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“You go to a school, you find 90 percent, 99 percent are female teachers. No male teachers. 
Although it’s not because there is an existing vacancy for the female teacher, but because 
of this humanitarian situation.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
 
“For example, in Zomba Rural, schools like Lokwere, Kadziki, Chokwera81….um School 
B….these schools their PTR is below 50. The number of teachers who go to work there – 
lady teachers mainly – far exceed[s] the establishment.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
In Zone 9, the PEA indicated that those schools in his zone that were closer to town had a 
surplus of female teachers, who were there due to their husbands’ occupations: 
“Because we have got schools like School G, School B, School F, School M, School L. Those 
schools they receive teachers – more especially lady teachers – the husbands are working in 
town.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
Previous studies have speculated how acquiring a transfer on the basis of marriage has led 
to teachers sourcing fake marriage certificates in order to secure a favourable one (Asim et 
al., 2017; Kadzamira, 2006). During my own fieldwork, the discussion with stakeholders 
corroborated this. However, upon further clarification it appeared it was the marriages 
themselves which were not genuine and only officiated for transfer purposes:  
“A lady teacher transferred from I don’t know which district. She said ‘I just find a man and 
we officiated a wedding at the DC’s [District Commissioner’s] office and I presented the 
letter to the DEM and I am transferred now.’ But the lady was single.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
“A person have a brother….Then go to district assemble and say ‘This is my husband his 
name is so so.’ And they do register, but in the real sense they are not married.” 
(Headteacher, School , Zone 12) 
When questioned about how common this was, district officials did not appear to think it a 
widespread problem. However, they did cite examples of how it had allowed a teacher to 
transfer from a less desirable area to a more desirable one:  
“You know we have discovered by chance that a teacher we allowed to transfer from Zone 
2 to Zone 1382 was in fact not married. But only because the headteacher of her school in 
Zone 2 alerted us.” 
(District Education Office officer, Zomba Rural district) 
A similar case was recounted by the headteacher of School I in Zone 9: 
 
81 Name of schools changed for anonymity. 
82 Zone 2 is a very remote area of Zomba Rural district, while Zone 13 borders Zomba Urban and is considered 
peri-urban in nature. 
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“I ask a certain teacher….to produce a marriage certificate. And after a time, she brought 
the document and says ‘This is my marriage certificate.’ But after further investigations 
from other sources, we found that she was not married, but because she has documents we 
couldn’t do otherwise [sic].” 
(Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
My follow-up question to the district official was what action, in circumstances such as the 
one he had described, was typically taken: 
“It is difficult to plant that accusation. Here, the lady teacher has a signed certificate from 
the DC [District Commissioner]. We are not detectives. We must – have to – take things on 
the face of it. Even if we are disbelieving of what the teacher is presenting to us.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
The challenge of monitoring the authenticity of marriages is further exacerbated due to the 
types of marriage deemed permissible under Malawi’s Marriage Act. Legislation passed in 
2015 recognised four different types of marriage: civil (licensed), customary (traditional), 
religious and permanent cohabitation. While the 2018 Teacher Management Strategy 
stipulates that a request for reposting due to marriage or following spouse would require “a 
legally acceptable marriage certificate” (GoM, 2018), this measure appears difficult to 
reconcile with the different types of marriages currently admissible under Malawi law. In 
addition, while the 2018 Teacher Management Strategy appears to indicate that teacher 
transfers following a spouse are permissible, this is in direct contradiction with the Malawi 
Public Services Regulations. Moreover, Cammack et al. write about customary marriages 
and the recognised role of traditional chiefs in Malawi society in “fulfil[ing] their mandate 
through various overlapping socio-cultural and political-economic functions that have 
emerged historically, including overseeing initiation rituals; keeping track of sicknesses, 
deaths, marriages and births” (2009; p. 22). However, paper-based marriage certificates for 
customary marriages are absent.  
7.2.3 Sanctioning a favourable school placement on health grounds  
Beyond marriage, the health status of teachers was another justifiable reason through 
which teachers were granted a transfer:  
“If a teacher is sick. We have sent a teacher to Zone 5 for example. But the teacher – for her 
to access her services for example Central Hospital or District Hospital – is a problem as 
regards to his or her illness.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Currently, Malawi has four central hospitals in the entire country, all of which are situated in 
the four main cities of Malawi. These are Kamuzu Central Hospital (in Lilongwe), Queen 
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Elizabeth Central Hospital (in Blantyre), Zomba Central Hospital (in Zomba) and Mzuzu 
Central Hospital (in Mzuzu). Beyond central hospitals, each district has a hospital that serves 
as a referral unit for health centres in that particular district. In the context of Zomba Rural 
district, primary education zones in Zomba Rural district, which are in close proximity to 
Zomba Central Hospital are also those zones closest to the boundary of the city. One district 
official pointed out that many of the requests for transfers on the grounds of health were 
for schools close to the Central Hospital: 
“Most of the teachers would like to be posted near to the Central Hospital so as to access 
medical attention very easily. If somebody is ill and is working in Zone 12 or Zone 3, he says 
‘I find problems when I am ill to move from that far to hospital.’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Despite some of the schools in the zones I conducted my fieldwork in being a considerable 
distance away from any type of medical facility, those that were available were closer than 
Zomba Central Hospital. According to one district official however, the services offered at 
these medical facilities were often rudimentary: 
“These medical centres you find in the trading centres are not really for if you are very sick. 
That is mainly only at the larger hospitals with better equipment.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
On the other hand, even when specialist treatment was not required interviewees spoke 
about teacher resistance against seeking treatment at these hospitals:  
“You know some others can even say ‘I need to be very close to the hospital.’ But, if you go 
to Zone 2 there is also a health centre down there. But they will say ‘No I don’t want this 
health centre. I want a hospital like Central Hospital.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
Government officials went on to indicate that medical letters brought in by teachers 
requesting a transfer on health grounds would have the backing of medical professionals:  
“The [medical] letter will normally recommend that a teacher who is seriously sick be close 
to [Zomba] Central Hospital for adequate treatment.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“What the hospital people do, they write a report saying ‘This one cannot stay at that 
particular school, because it is a remote area. He or she needs to be near a hospital.’” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
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However, similar to the issue of false marriages, false health certificates instructing that 
teachers should work in schools in close proximity to large centres were discussed by 
stakeholders: 
“They can just tell the doctor ‘Can you process a medical report for me and say that I have a 
kidney problem,’ for example. So, that doctor is going to prescribe something and he is 
going to give that person and in return for maybe money.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
“They are not genuine, but they become to be genuine, because the one [sic] written those 
documents are professionals. So, if they stamp those letters now they become genuine to 
the official.” 
(Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
“Because you know corruption is everywhere. One can consult a doctor, give him something 
‘Do this for me so I cannot be at that place [remote school].’ That happens.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
There was some ambiguity as to what constitutes a valid medical certificate. Some 
respondents indicated that a medical report only from the four central hospitals was 
recognised by the district of the proof of an illness necessitating a transfer. However, other 
responses from key informant interviews contradicted this, indicating that certificates from 
district medical centres were also permissible as evidence to district officials. According to 
the 2018 draft teacher management strategy, the policy going forward more clearly states 
that “DEMs should accept medical certificates only from DHOs [District Health Office] or 
DMOs [District Medical Office] in that district where the teachers are serving” (GoM, 2018; 
p. 8). However, this fails to address adequately the circumstances around the issuance of 
bogus certificates. 
In all cases where the issue of forged certificates was discussed, interview respondents 
could not ascertain how prolific this was throughout the system. However, many 
corroborated both their existence and the form they took.  
7.2.4 Political pressure and personal connections 
Chapter 3 synthesised global studies which found that, in certain contexts, political 
patronage or clientelist vote-buying was influential in matters pertaining to teacher 
deployment. In the case of Malawi, Asim et al. (2017) found that it was largely nepotism 
that negatively affected decisions taken around equitably deploying teachers due to the 
personal connections they had with political figures.  
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One of the areas that I explored was the extent to which outside interference adversely 
affected the enforcement of equitable teacher deployment. When asked what prevented 
teachers from being deployed to schools based on need, interviewees from all levels of the 
education system attributed this to teachers’ personal connections: 
“So, these people are the ones that don’t want to work in the rural, because they have 
backing, they will say ‘My so so so so is working at the Ministry. When the postings come 
out I will be working in the city.’” 
(Infant standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
“The only problem is that relationships breaks everything. Somebody can say ‘My son has 
been posted to Zone 5. Can you please assist me?’ So, you find that that person who is 
saying that is at Headquarters. So, the DEM pulls that teacher back.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
 
“Where maybe you are asked by the Minister or by the SEST [Secretary for Education, 
Science and Technology] or by the Chief Director ‘I have a friend’s daughter somewhere – 
you posted him in Chitipa, but the daughter is in Lilongwe.’” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
My questions sought a better understanding of who the individuals were that were able to 
apply pressure to those formally responsible for how teachers should be deployed. District 
officials predominantly discussed this in the context of political actors:  
“We get political pressures, which are something which determines the flow of teachers 
from one point to another.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“We get requests from the politicians, who might wish individuals who they favour to be 
closer to where they might access to facilities easily. Where the politician is powerful 
enough the individual is moved.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
At the start of my interview schedule with one district official it was implied that the district 
could withstand the political pressures faced in relation to teacher deployment: 
“Yes, I can say that [the district] was able to withstand the pressure. When these influential 
people wanted their thing to be done….you tell them the facts about it.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Later on in the interview, however, the same official indicated that the district had to 
acquiesce indirectly to the demands of politicians in more powerful positions.83 This was 
 
83 For clarification I asked respondents to indicate what they meant by “powerful politician.” This referred to a 
Member of Parliament from the ruling party, which at the time of my fieldwork was the Democratic 




through politicians taking up the issue with government officials further up the system to try 
and over-turn the decision of the district office: 
“But the way the person [politician] may receive that, perhaps it may annoy him or her. 
Therefore, he will decide to take the issue further. They have taken issues further to the 
Ministry.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
District and local officials also discussed the pressure central headquarters officials put on 
district officials concerning how teachers should be deployed: 
“We normally get requests that are coming from the central office. There will be some 
individuals who have got their relatives that are working at our districts and they would like 
them to be placed where there are good amenities.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“Some, they are related to other people from the Ministry…. Now that person up there can 
decide ‘No, this one I want him to be in maybe this district.’ And after some time as well you 
find such a teacher instead of reporting to Zone 2 will be reporting here at Zone 9.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
The personal ramifications of a bad relationship with Central Ministry officials was discussed 
by district officials, when I questioned what would happen if their instructions were ignored: 
“We also look at our relationships with them in Lilongwe. We also need to bear in mind that 
our promotions….are being done through the Ministry itself.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“So, if we are not in the good books with the people out there, who can be in a position to 
assist you in making good appraisals of your own record. So, we try our best to be in good 
books again with these officials.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“The Minister may react by giving you an immediate posting [elsewhere] or they will 
instruct officials under them to implement [it].” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
One district official spoke of his own experience of being transferred from Thyolo district due 
to resisting the requests of local politicians. According to his version of events, these 
politicians eventually went through political officials at the Central Ministry to demand his 
transfer away from the district: 
“Eventually, I was posted out. It persisted and persisted. And the Director [of Basic 
Education at Central Head-quarters] said ‘Would you move and go to Zomba.’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
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Of the sitting elected politicians in Thyolo district, 86 percent members had been elected on 
a Democratic People’s Party (DPP) ticket, which was the ruling party at the time of my 
fieldwork,84 whilst the proportion for Zomba Rural district was 33 percent (MEC, 2014). 
Specifically in relation to teacher deployment, the responses above imply that despite 
functions relating to teacher deployment being decentralised to the district level, these 
decisions can and are overruled by the Central Ministry. This reflects the discussion in 
Chapter 4 around the decentralisation experience in Malawi, where the Central Ministry still 
retains significant power over sub-national functions (Thomas, 2017).  
The discussion, up until now, has focused on the impact personal relationships politicians 
have with teachers has had on teacher deployment decisions. When selecting my two zones 
for study I discovered that Zone 6 was the home area of ex-President Joyce Banda (2012-
2014). Upon learning this, I wished to understand whether deployment decisions were also 
affected by political pressure on district officials to deploy teachers in a way that favoured 
the home areas of important political officials. District official responses appeared to reject 
this as being the case for Zomba Rural district. However, one official, with experience of 
working in other districts, answered this in relation to Thyolo district,85 which is the home 
district of two recent ex-presidents – Bingu Wa Mutharika (2004-2012) and Peter Wa 
Mutharika (2014-2020):  
“You know in Thyolo….sometimes it was about officials pressuring the [district] office for 
more teachers to go to the President’s home village, because of his strong support there. 
And also MPs close to the President doing the same for their areas.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Unfortunately, no district official who I interviewed was working at Zomba Rural district 
office during Joyce Banda’s presidency, or else was not directly involved in matters relating 
to teacher deployment to schools. However, the PEA of Zone 9, who at the time was 
working in another zone in Zomba Rural district, was able to recall this period when 
questioned:  
 
84 This was based on the 2014 Parliamentary Elections for the National Assembly, as it was this period that 
corresponded with my fieldwork. It is important to note that this data does not take into account politicians 
who may “cross the floor” to another party after the elections take place. 
85 While the study focuses on Zomba Rural District, the district of the President came up numerous times in 
discussion. Officials familiar with this district who I interviewed indicated that in the case of Thyolo, the 
interference of politicians as to how teachers should be deployed in the district extended beyond nepotistic 
reasons and was also related to political patronage. 
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“During her [Joyce Banda’s] presidency, definitely the way it was done [teacher distribution] 
was that her area benefitted more.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
While the PEA’s response was the only one of my interviewees who discussed Joyce Banda’s 
presidency as a factor affecting teacher deployment, his claim is supported by the data 
presented in Chapter 6. This appears to lend support to the idea that deployment of 
teachers was carried out in a way that benefitted Zomba Rural district more generally and 
over time benefited many of the schools in supportive home constituencies. 
Given the nature of the study, the majority of the discussion has considered the impact of 
political interference of teacher allocation at the district level. However, I also sought to 
understand how these same issues affected the deployment of teachers to districts by the 
Central government. I began by questioning the extent to which officials believed that the 
teacher deployment to districts was informally captured by political influence:  
“This is a political office! And it’s not an office where you would say ‘I will do this 
independent of external interference.’” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
While the official indicated he “would not talk about teachers” specifically, he did discuss 
how his office was subjected to pressure when allocating other resources:  
“Somebody up, up, up there. He comes and says ‘My school needs desks as well.’ What do 
you do? You get maybe 20, 25, 10, 15 from one school and give it to the school that already 
has the resources.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
These other resources – unlike school grants and teachers – are not distributed according to 
a nation-wide funding formula. Interference relating to the distribution of desks was 
similarly corroborated by officials at the district level, one of whom specifically highlighted it 
as a “political” issue: 
“So sometimes, there is some – I feel –political issues creeping in. It could be it is the home 
of one of the ministers asking for desks, where desks are already present in the school.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“Desks have been donated by UNICEF to the Ministry. And the Ministry may look at which 
districts are to be given the desks…. Somebody influential has known that the Ministry has 
received this donation and goes to ask about that donation. ‘Would you please consider my 
district?’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
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The same central government official, who appeared reluctant specifically to discuss 
interference of his office’s role in deploying teachers to districts, later brought up MESIP, 
which provides funding to eight of Malawi’s 34 education districts. Among the eight MESIP 
districts is Thyolo district (the home district of ex-President Peter Wa Mutharika) and 
Machinga (the home district of ex-Minister of Education Bright Masaka).86 According to this 
official, however, not all MESIP districts that were selected met the criteria for selection: 
“MESIP districts were those worst-performing districts. Those who did [the] worst on [the] 
PSLCE. But Thyolo – the President’s district – was by then doing better. It did not meet the 
requirement for a MESIP district.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
Media reports at the time of my fieldwork also discussed how the districts of Machinga  and 
Thyolo benefited more from MESIP funds compared to the remaining six MESIP districts. 
Why MESIP is important in the context of teacher deployment is two-fold. Firstly the 
teacher allocation formula to districts has recently changed. Being a MESIP district now 
carries more weight within the teacher allocation formula and ensures additional teachers 
are disbursed there (see Subsection 7.1.2). Secondly, MESIP districts also benefit from the 
sort of investments that attract teachers to go and work at certain schools, e.g. provision of 
more teacher housing.  
To date, the discussion has focused largely on the connections that teachers (or regions) 
have with politicians or government officials. Another example identified in the interviews 
of interference by individuals not formally responsible for the deployment of teachers was 
soldiers. Zomba Rural district is home to three army barracks. One district official discussed 
the provisions made for the spouses of soldiers to be placed to work in schools near to the 
army bases: 
“We have got soldiers, for example, who are resident in Salima. And then they are posted to 
Zomba. Therefore, the man who has come to work in Zomba in Cobbe Barracks or Airway, 
and the wife wants to follow. So, we have to make arrangements for that.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
However, two of the three army barracks are situated close to Zomba’s town boundary. 
Schools that are based near to this boundary already have a large surplus of teachers. The 
 
86 These officials were in office at the time that the MESIP districts were being selected and when funds were 
being disbursed in the first phase. 
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PEA of Zone 9 gave a practical example as to how the location of the barracks meant him 
losing a teacher from School M to a school in Zomba Urban district: 
“So, those people [soldiers] always claim very strongly that ‘We want our wives to be very 
close to us.’ I remember I had one teacher at School M. Her husband is a soldier. So the 
DEM had to say ‘Okay I will negotiate with the DEM Urban.’ So, she went to Zomba Urban” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
The PEA of Zone 12 talked about the coercive pressure the DEM faced when deploying 
soldiers’ spouses to schools: 
“If the DEM tries to remove those teachers to go to another school far from the barracks, 
sometimes the DEM receives threats from the soldiers….you can find teachers – more than 
40 teachers – in one school.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
The PEA went onto problematise the behaviour of soldiers by discussing how official 
relationships of accountability are compromised by their intervention: 
“They [the soldiers] will sometimes go to the DEMs office and demand their wives be close 
to them not knowing that they are employed by different people. They are working in 
different departments. Their wives have their own bosses and then again they have their 
own bosses.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
The PEA’s responses summarises one of the key findings relating to the effective 
enforceability of teacher deployment. This is that formal principal-agent accountability 
relationships are severely weakened by non-education actors. These include not just the 
politicians and soldiers, which has been discussed in this subsection, but also health officials 
administering false medical letters (see Subsection 7.2.3).  
So far, Subsection 7.2.4 has been focused on the negative effects of the interference of 
influential stakeholders on the equitable deployment of teachers at the district level. At the 
zonal level of the education system, the importance of personal connections has revealed 
the differences between Zone 9 and Zone 12 concerning how these connections were 
utilised. Part of Zone 9 borders the city’s boundaries. Schools in this part of the zone (School 
B, School F, School G and School M) are considered more desirable by teachers to work in. 
According to interviewees, some teachers in these schools appeared closely connected to 
certain persons of influence: 
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“[Teachers in] School M and School G [in Zone 9] are well connected and others, just 
because their husbands are working in town. So, you can see most of the policemen`s 
wives are working at School M who are living in town.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
“These are from influential families. For example, the one I know is the deputy 
headteacher from School B and her husband is a retired army officer and now is the 
accountant at a certain NGO.” 
(Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
During my own visits to schools in Zone 9, teachers working in two of the schools (School B 
and School F) travelled to school using their own motor vehicles. Given that this is incredibly 
rare, I enquired who these belonged to. School actors indicated that they belonged to 
female teachers married to persons of high importance:  
“Most of them are lady teachers coming from town. They drive their husband’s cars. Their 
husbands – some of them are working in non-governmental organisations some of them 
are working at Chancellor College and whatever.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
As was discussed in Chapter 6, teacher shortages in Zone 9 were largely due to the 
inefficient deployment of teachers among the 13 schools in the zone. Responses to 
questions relating to personal connections frequently mentioned teachers successfully 
resisting redeployment to schools in the zone with a critical shortage. The headteacher of 
School I (an undesirable school in the context of Zone 9) discussed  the recent failure in 
redeploying three teachers from School B, School F and School H to go and work at School 
I:87 
“Three teachers…. after seeing that they had been posted here they talked to the PEA. The 
PEA did not accept and said [to] them ‘I sent you where there is work’…. [so they] went to 
the DEM…. and were sympathised and were given another posting letter to other schools.” 
(Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
Upon further questioning, it was revealed that two of these teachers were redeployed to 
schools with a surplus of teachers within Zone 9, while the remaining teacher was 
redeployed to another zone in Zomba Rural district with a surplus of teachers. A further 
example of resistance to forced redeployment was cited by a teacher at School I: 
 
 
87 School B and School F had a surplus of teachers and while School H had a shortage, this was not as acute as 
for School I. 
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“He was given a transfer command to go to School K [a remote school]. So, he go straight 
to the [district] office to complain to his relative there. So, he was sent back to say ‘I have 
spoken to the PEA. The PEA will assist you.’ When he came back he was sent to School B.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
The PEA of Zone 9 similarly corroborated the connections teachers in the schools closer to 
the town boundary had, and the difficulty he faced in being able to transfer them to schools 
with a greater need: 
“When you look at School M, School F, School B, the teachers there, they are difficult to 
move to schools in my zone, who really are in need of teachers. They are related to the 
policemen, to the army, to people up there at the District Commission.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“If we move them [teachers with personal connections] from those schools to other 
schools….in most cases it always proves [to be] a failure.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
The responses above indicate that intra-zonal transfers from schools with a greater surplus 
of teachers to schools with a shortage were difficult in Zone 9. However, this contradicts the 
data presented in Chapter 6, which appears to show that intra-zonal transfers were the only 
types of transfers in Zone 9 that were equity enhancing. It is important to note, however, 
that the responses above concern well-connected teachers, while the data analysed in 
Chapter 6 related to all teachers.  
School actors who I interviewed in School I also confirmed the existence of teacher 
connections regarding the same schools that the PEA mentioned. This was often discussed 
in terms of what they to perceived to be their own lack of power: 
“Yeah so teachers here – teachers whose villages are not from here – they plan, they want 
to move eventually. But without the friends….family our friends [fellow teachers] in School 
M or School B have? No the PEA cannot help us immediately.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
This was further elaborated upon by another teacher at the same school, who indicated that 
as a “poor” teacher there was less choice concerning where they could be placed: 
“But for a poor teacher, [they] will say ‘Eeeh! If I will not go there, I won’t have anything to 
eat’ So, you say ‘OK, I will just go there.’” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
In Subsection 7.1.2, how current teacher deployment policy requires newly recruited 
teachers to work in a rural district for a minimum of five years was discussed, with it being 
explained that the four urban districts were excluded. However, as I showed with the data 
 
 149 
in Chapter 6, teachers were able to eventually transfer to one of these districts. The 
headteacher of School B (who had previously worked in School M) discussed how it was 
teachers working in the most desirable schools in Zone 9, who managed to transfer to 
schools in Zomba Urban district.88 This was despite no school in the district experiencing a 
shortage of teachers: 
“My fellow teachers are being posted to those schools [in Zomba Urban district] near the 
city. At the end of the school session maybe we can lose about 3 or 5 teachers going to 
urban, so creating another gap in the rural area.” 
(Headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
“A lot of teachers were moving from our zone, in particular, from School M and School F 
were joining our sister district, which is Zomba Urban.” 
(Headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
Unlike in Zone 9, teacher shortages in Zone 12 were almost completely due to the shortfall 
in overall numbers. Since he started working in the zone in 2014, the PEA indicated that a 
significant proportion of the new teachers promised to his zone did not report for duty.  
“Teachers could be posted [to Zone 12]. Then you find they are not reporting. Maybe a 
quarter, a half of teachers, they do not come. When time goes you hear that the same 
name is, maybe, very close to town.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12)  
Following up on what accounted for this high leakage, even when it was apparent where 
these teachers were now working, the PEA attributed this to personal relations: 
 “Just because of relationships. Some other education officers they tend to break the rules 
to say, ‘I don’t want my neighbour, my relative to go all that far.’” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
Similarly, a teacher working in School S spoke about how personal connections meant 
that a teacher he knew, who was meant to be deployed to work at School S, was 
instead, reallocated to work elsewhere: 
“We have some teachers who were posted at School S. But he managed to reject this 
place, because he is related with some people in the DEMs office.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School S, Zone 12) 
Like in Zone 9, however, teachers in Zone 12 appeared to indicate that resistance was only 
possible for teachers with ties to persons of influence:  
 
88 These schools are also close in proximity to the Zomba Urban district border. 
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“You are able to resist, if you have a backing. You are able to resist to say ‘I am not going to  
this school, to this district.’ But if you have nobody to back you, like us here, then you 
cannot resist.’” 
(Infant standard teacher, School S, Zone 12) 
Unlike the interviews with teachers in Zone 9, none of the teachers interviewed in Zone 12 
indicated particular schools or teachers in the zone being linked to persons of influence. 
However, the PEA did indicate the pressures he often experienced from teachers whose 
home area was not within Zone 12. Even within such a remote zone like Zone 12, there was 
a hierarchy in teacher preference as to which school they would prefer to be placed in:  
“Those teachers who are not from the Zone 12 area can often want to be placed in School 
Y, because of the amenities. We do plead with these teachers to be patient. Sometimes we 
do move them when we do receive new recruits.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
The last point in the statement appears to tie in with an earlier point made by the PEA in 
Subsection 7.1.3, where he discussed how teachers needed to be placed “carefully”, so that 
the district did not end up losing them. In practical terms, the response above would appear 
to suggest that the least desirable schools in the district “lose” teachers to other more 
desirable schools in the zone when it receives new teachers. 
To date, much of the discussion of this subsection has centred on how personal connections 
have weakened the enforceability of equitable teacher deployment by district or zonal 
officials. While these include teacher connections to personnel working at Zomba Rural 
district, none of the interviewees directly mentioned the DEM. However, in the case of Zone 
12, the PEA transferring teachers between schools due to personal connections was 
discussed by school actors. According to what was discussed, Standard 8 teachers who had 
performed well in the Primary School Leaving Certificate Examination (PSLCE) had been 
transferred to School Y due to the headteacher of this school being married to the PEA: 
“Last year, almost four teachers were transferred from other schools to School Y in order to 
boost up the performance of the school, and one of them is the one who was teaching with 
me in Standard 8.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
“One of the schools which was affected last year was this one, because two individuals 
were removed within a very short period of time, but these teachers were from Standard 
8….they were removing these [because] we were able to come up with good grades.” 
(Headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
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In another example cited by one school actor who had worked in Zone 12 for a number of 
years, it was explained how the previous PEA of the zone had favoured a certain school in 
the Zone 12 due to it falling under the same religious denomination89 as him: 
“The PEA….who was at this zone before the one now working….was also under that 
particular church. When it came to distribution of resources, it depended on his 
denomination….the number of teachers was much higher than other schools.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
This was corroborated by another school actor who, in addition, reported how the current 
PEA was also favouring schools based on his own religious denomination:90 
“The person [PEA] who was working there was so much supporting School X, so School X 
had a lot of teachers compared to the coming in of this boss [the PEA]. Now, he is also 
ensuring that these schools especially the Catholic [schools]….has to have more resources.” 
(Headteacher, School S, Zone 12) 
In these examples, it would appear that, rather than teachers’ personal connections, it was 
the affiliations a school had with government officials that were important. While it reflects 
a more localised example of nepotism, it nonetheless, presents an example of teachers 
being redirected in a way that contributes to their inequitable deployment. Although the 
interviewees in Zone 9 did not reflect on such a phenomenon, the locality of School B 
appeared to privilege it in receiving resources and other amenities that traditionally attract 
teachers to work at certain schools. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9.  
7.2.5 Colluding with education officials in the system 
Chapter 3 compared the transition of the form of corruption from one that was highly 
centralised under Kamuzu Banda’s one-party political system, to one that permeated 
through all levels of governance after the introduction of a multi-party political system 
(Booth et al., 2006). The discretionary allocation of rents discussed in the context of 
competitive clientelist political systems is often in relation accessing high-level rents, such as 
natural resources, public jobs or procurement contracts (Levy, 2014). In this subsection, 
teacher deployment is discussed in terms of how this has been negatively impacted upon by 
low-level corruption at sub-national levels of governance.  
 
89 Church of Central Africa Presbyterian (CCAP) denomination. 
90 Catholic denomination. 
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Fairly early on in my interviews respondents reported how teachers and district education 
officials from the human resources unit bypassed the DEM without his knowledge or 
consent to officiate teacher transfers. Both of the PEAs discussed the role of these officials 
in negatively affecting where a teacher could be stationed:  
“And again, some other teachers are even bypassing the DEM. They go, maybe, to Human 
Resource Officers [and] then they process their movement. So then, we discover that this 
teacher has moved from this school to another school without our knowledge.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“Once the DEM has directed someone to go somewhere and that person finds that place 
not conducive for him or her to stay, he goes back to the office and….he goes to the Human 
Resource people and they twist the posting without the knowledge of the DEM.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
Similarly, one district official who I interviewed discussed the practical implications of what 
this collaboration meant: 
“Sometimes they connive with the human resources officers….these are teachers that you 
are expecting at Zingangwe School.91 The headteacher has got the names. Perhaps out of 
five he only receives three.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
It became clear in the course of the interviews that this was a problem permeating to 
districts beyond Zomba Rural district. Beyond personal relations, the responses appeared to 
indicate that what incentivised human resource officials to assist teachers was monetary 
bribes:  
“They make relationship, they agree that ‘I will do such a thing’, or they pay something, like 
‘I will give you MK5,000, please try to assist me’.…so that one also may think of the money, 
instead of thinking of the job, that I am here in this office in order to do this and this.” 
(Headteacher, School S, Zone 12) 
 
“They do that because of corruption. They discuss with some officials in the DEM’s office 
and they agree the amount of money this teacher can pay the man. So, the man would be 
the one to transfer, to process the transfer.” 
(Headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
Elsewhere the incentives appeared to fall under the category of sexual bribery:92 
 
 
91 Name of school changed for anonymity. 
92 In the case of the sexual bribery, my own observations during my visits to the DEO were that most often it 
was female teachers waiting to speak to an official from Human Resources. All but one of the six clerks 
working in this office were male.  
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“Even some female teachers allow sexual intercourse just to have [a] posting to another 
school. It happens in most of the offices.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“I had a friend in Phalombe [district]. She slept with an HR [Human Resources] official. After 
having sex with that one she was offered a transfer [to Blantyre Rural].” 
(Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
Such incentives, according to one district official, created further problems for the DEM. 
This was because teachers arriving to report for duty not familiar with Zomba Rural district 
were often told about the conditions of their prospective duty station before starting work 
there: 
“Information gets to the teacher concerned that that particular school that you are being 
deployed is in the remotest part of the district. And there are hard conditions that you are 
going to go through, if you accept this particular posting.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
A follow-up question to this statement revealed that it was not persons responsible for 
deployment decisions who disclosed this information: 
“That particular information is sometimes disseminated by individuals in the DEMs office 
itself, who are not the individuals who are involved in making the deployment process.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
The same official indicated that such information had led to teachers, in the past, publicly 
refusing to go to schools deemed as undesirable to work in: 
“I can even share with you a photograph….of lady teachers refusing to go to a school that 
they have been deployed and choosing to have a vigil at the DEMs office.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
In the majority of cases, teachers who I interviewed were either reluctant to discuss the 
issue of bribing officials or else professed ignorance regarding the issue. In the few cases 
where the issue was openly discussed, teachers would draw upon examples of their fellow 
teachers having utilised such a mechanism. One exception to this, however, was that of the 
senior standard teacher stationed at School I, who discussed his own experience of 
transferring out of Mangochi district using this mechanism: 
“So, when I was applying for the posting, my options were Blantyre [Rural] and Thyolo. But 
the government posted me to Mangochi, the district which I don’t like.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
According to the latest data available, Mangochi district has one of the highest PTRs (81 to 
1), while Blantyre Rural has one of the lowest (55 to 1). However, in spite of this the teacher 
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was successful in facilitating a cross-district transfer. That is, for a fee of MK10,000 
(US$13.7), the teacher explained how a Human Resource Official at Mangochi district 
provided him with a transfer posting letter: 
“He had his own stamp like a stamp for Mangochi DEM. So, he could process all the 
required letters and stamp them in the absence of the DEM. The most interesting thing was 
that he processed it on a Saturday – not on a working day.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
In this case, because the transfer was to another district, as the teacher reported, officials 
across different districts were working with one another in this corrupt practice: 
“But this man had connections of his work, so that he should receive the bribes. So, he could 
have someone in Blantyre and say ‘I have sent a person there. Assist him in this way.’” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
I asked the teacher whether he was aware of other teachers in Mangochi district using a 
similar mechanism for securing a transfer, to which he responded in the affirmative: 
“Some people were going to Lilongwe, Blantyre, Zomba….now some people can come here 
– a district of their choice.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
In spite of an education system that is producing a larger number of teachers, the teacher 
explained how low-level corruption was failing to assist areas with large teacher shortfalls: 
“The government could send….500 teachers to Mangochi. But the teachers do not want to 
work in Mangochi. So, they would transfer through this way maybe….So, the DEM will 
realise that ‘Ah out of the 500 teachers, I am remaining with 300.’” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
The interview questions next sought to understand what created the opportunities for such 
a process to continue despite such practice being widely known. The difficulty in proving 
such malpractice existed was discussed:  
“Though we cannot have concrete evidence that this is really what they are doing.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“Most of the time they have no proof. But you cannot proof [sic] them directly. No. 
Someone cannot do bribery. Bribery is done in private most of the time. Even the 
agreement of the sexual intercourse, it’s always in private.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
Current practices also allowed for any malpractice to go undetected, according to one 
district official:  
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“The Human Resources Officer can issue an alternative posting letter and not put it in the 
[teacher] file. You think everything is alright, because you don’t see anything which is 
amiss. Without knowing there is another letter, which has not been filed, which they have 
kept.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
The senior standard teacher working at School I indicated that such processes may go 
undetected because of the number of individuals involved in the process: 
“It cannot be discovered because the one who is receiving the money – the one who is 
helping you – is not only the person who is going to eat the money. He will take some, eat, 
and bribe his top official. So nobody can discover because all officials are doing the same.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
The absence of an electronic system of teacher transfers appears to have compounded the 
problem of being able to monitor teacher transfers more effectively. This was based both on 
my experience when collecting data and the opinion of one district official who spoke about 
this issue when discussing the issue of bribery:  
“The reporting of transfers leaves much to be desired. We have requested the HRM 
department should be reporting more systematically, but up until now it is not being done.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Besides such processes going undetected, another reason for their continuation was the 
absence or weak punitive measures taken against the individuals involved. This is despite 
bribery being listed as one of 26 reasons for misconduct under the Malawi Public Service 
Regulations (GoM, n.d.). The senior standard teacher working at School I relayed what had 
happened to a human resources official in Mangochi involved in such malpractice once his 
actions were discovered: 
“At first he was interdicted. Meaning he was receiving half his salary while he was under 
investigation….and he is now transferred to Lilongwe [district].” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
Teachers who partook in such practice were simply moved back to the original school they 
were meant to be posted to and “counselled: 
“They are just like counselled. After that, because of the shortage of teachers, they cannot 
remove that teacher from the system. They just counsel that person, guide him and send 
him back to the school they want him to be.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
As is discussed elsewhere in the thesis, this response appears to indicate that the measures 
taken by government officials are influenced by the teacher shortages characterising the 
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system. Additionally, district officials appeared to have limited power to mete out 
disciplinary procedures where misconduct occurred. The strongest action the district could 
take once collusion had been discovered, was for a warning to be issued: 
“For the teachers who changed using tippex we gave them a warning a letter. They were 
warned on that one. And for the Human Resources, they do not accept that they did it. But 
all the officers were warned verbally.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
This corroborates what is set out under the misconduct and disciplinary procedures, which 
illustrate how the most serious disciplinary proceedings are still controlled by the Secretary 
for Education (GoM, n.d.). See Chapter 4 for a further discussion of this.  
When asked what other factors that contributed to teachers being able to by-pass the DEM 
in favour of human resource officials, some respondents were of the opinion that this was 
due to the DEM’s absence:  
“Because one time we had no DEM. The one we had was transferred and we were waiting 
for a new DEM to come. And there were some people who were entrusted to run the 
district. Those people were the ones who granted that boy a transfer.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
“It seemed like the DEM was not around, so….the Human Resources and other officers have 
that mechanism of moving those teachers from the rural to urban.” 
 (Headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
Further questioning revealed that the example cited by the PEA related to a cross-district 
transfer from Zomba Rural district to Thyolo district. Regarding the example cited by the 
headteacher, it related to transfers from schools in Zone 9 to schools in Zomba Urban 
district. The issue of DEM absence was corroborated by the DEM himself, who recounted 
examples of such abuse taking place during a period when he was on extended sick leave: 
“That time, I think I was on sick leave They [teachers] would be allocated a school….The 
teacher would get that note and go to the Human Resources to get a letter of posting to 
the school. But we discovered that some two or three teachers changed their destination.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
The discussion concerning the DEM being bypassed by human resource officials led me to 
question whether other actors in the education system also engaged in low-level corruption 




“The PEAs are able to report that ‘That teacher was not on my list and he is at School X.’ So, 
it is very difficult for the PEAs to connive with the teachers. But the main culprits are the 
Human Resources.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“A PEA can favour a teacher. Even in our zone, the PEA favours some teachers….But in 
terms of transfers, I have never come across a PEA doing bribes.” 
(Infant Standard Teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
One respondent speculated that collaboration with the PEA would only be possible within 
the PEA’s own zone: 
“Maybe bribery of the PEA can involve a local posting in his zone. So, the PEA will deal with 
his own zone. But outside of the zone? No. Because most of the time a PEA has less power. 
So, most of the inter-district posting does not involve the PEA.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
However, practical examples of the PEA being bribed was something none of the 
interviewees were concretely able to cite. Moreover, processes utilising bribery as a 
mechanism did not appear to be utiliised at the central level to influence which district 
teachers were deployed to go and work in:  
“Sometimes they may come here, but not many. Because I think out there they do not know 
which office does the deployment.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
One of the reasons for this is that human resource officials appeared to be the initial and 
primary contact point for teachers once they had graduated or visited the district office.93 
This gave these officials a special vantage point that was not available to central ministry 
officials, who, to the teachers, represented a “faceless bureaucracy” (Bari et al., 2016) and 
who they did not have the opportunity to cultivate a personal relationship with. This 
appears to corroborate the discussion in Chapter 4, where it was explained how normative 
or cultural-cognitive institutions are more likely to dominate over regulative institutions at 
lower levels of government (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006). 
7.2.6 Teacher cross-postings board 
Cross-posting is a mechanism that can be utilised by teachers seeking a transfer. It typically 
involves two teachers in two different schools requesting permission to exchange with one 
another. The mechanism is intended to ensure that no school loses teaching staff in the 
process of a transfer. In most districts a cross-postings board exists. Teachers who are 
 
93 The latter was based on my own observations during the fieldwork. 
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seeking a transfer post information of where they are teaching, and where they would like 
to teach in the hope of finding a teacher they can cross-post with (Figure 7.1).  
The majority of the notices I observed on the Zomba Rural district’s cross-postings board 
were requests from teachers working in the neighbouring districts of Mangochi and 
Machinga. These also happen to be districts with the country’s worst PTR and overall 
shortage of teachers (see Chapter 6). A smaller number of notices were also posted by 
teachers working in Zomba Rural district wanting to move within the district to another 
school to where they were currently working (Figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1: Teacher cross-postings board at Zomba Rural District Education office 
 
Note: Personal information which could identify the teacher posting any notice has been obscured. 
District officials indicated that the purpose of cross-postings boards had developed 
organically as an approach through which district offices could prevent the loss of teachers: 
“This is an administrative mechanism that we [district officials] have initiated to ensure 
that no district should lose teachers. The only possible way to still maintain the number of 
teachers in our districts is arrange for cross-posting.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
 159 
Having seen the cross-postings board I was interested to learn more about what teachers 
thought of it in the context of transfers. Some expressed positive sentiments about its 
purpose: 
“I think if you really try and, maybe you can be more flexible, then it [the transfer] can 
happen.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
“You know if you want to move and you have no one speaking to help you then, yes, the 
transfer board can be effective.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
One teacher respondent, however, who had direct personal experience of the cross-posting 
mechanism, expressed scepticism about its usefulness:  
“Cross-posting is only possible if you are lucky. If you find someone. Because in real life it is 
very difficult to find someone to go to Mangochi.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
The teacher had previously sought a transfer from Mangochi district – where he was 
deployed after completing his teacher training – to Blantyre Rural district. Eventually, he 
arranged a cross-transfer from Mangochi to Zomba Rural district through the use of the 
cross-postings board. While Zomba Rural district was not the teacher’s original choice of 
district, he was of the view that this was a more favourable choice compared to Mangochi 
district.  Similarly, another teacher from School S, situated in a very remote part of the 
district, was doubtful regarding the workability of the cross-postings board:  
“You know most of these teachers this side. Maybe they are wanting to go to Police, 
Mponda, Zone 13, Zone 1 that side.94 But no teacher from that side would dream to come 
here.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School S, Zone 12) 
One teacher also expressed her opinion of it being a less effective strategy than those 
mentioned above in helping to secure a transfer: 
“The problem with cross-posting to get a transfer – unlike other ways like when a lady 
teacher talks about marriage or health or important people – is that [the district] officials 
forget you. It is up to the teachers to find the solution between them if they can.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 




A core feature of the cross-postings board was the specificity behind how it was meant to 
function.95 However, to some of the stakeholders questioned this was not how the cross-
posting mechanism worked in practice, especially for those coming from outside of the 
district. One district official complained about the ill-preparedness amongst some teachers 
coming to Zomba Rural district:  
“Some of them will say ‘I would like to be in Zomba City.’ But Zomba City – they has no 
place to absorb them….So, unfortunately they will meet someone from Zone 296 who says 
‘We can cross-post.’ The one coming from Mangochi has the mentality ‘Once I am posted in 
Zomba, that’s all.’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
This raises an important point relating to the perception that a teacher coming from outside 
of Zomba Rural district may have the idea of it being more urbanised than it actually is.97 
This led me to follow up with a question as to whether teachers actually end up working in 
the school they cross-posted with the other teacher for. The same district official indicated 
that in the scenario described above, the teacher would still have to report for duty at the 
school in Zone 2. Other respondents at the zonal and school level, however, contradicted 
this. Speaking from their own experience they explained how the cross-posting mechanism 
meant remote schools had lost teachers: 
“When that teacher coming from Mangochi hears that he is going to School I – very far 
from the town – he just discuss with people at the DEMs office. The Human Resource 
Management. So, they try to bribe them ‘Ah just give me a school which is near.’” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
“There was a teacher here who wanted to cross-post with her friend in Phalombe 
(District). And the teacher teaching here went to Phalombe, but the teacher from 
Phalombe did not report here. Unfortunately, that teacher was posted to School 1.98” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
There was ambiguity as to how widespread the abuse of the cross-posting system is prone 
to. However, with that said even in the best scenario the current way that the cross-posting 
system operates means it is only able to sustain the status quo of a currently inequitable 
system.  
 
95 It worked by assuming, for example, that Teacher A from School 1 in Zone X in Mangochi district would 
directly transfer with Teacher B from School 2 in Zone Y in Zomba Rural district. 
96 A remote zone in Zomba Rural district. 
97 During my own fieldwork I observed how the differences in the urbanisation between different parts of the 
district were acute.  
98 Name of school changed for anonymity. 
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7.2.7 Poor resource availability for involuntary teacher transfers  
Discussion in earlier subsections on involuntary transfers has focused on the effectiveness of 
either marriage, ill health or personal connections in allowing a teacher to resist being 
transferred to remote schools or else allow them to be deployed to a school of their choice. 
While most interviewees discussed the difficulty in moving teachers to schools against their 
will, a number of respondents spoke of circumstances where teachers had been moved to 
schools in more remote areas: 
“You know he was one sent out of the zone and then demoted from a headteacher to a 
mere teacher and in addition to this, he was transferred to the very remotest area, a place 
he did not want to go.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
“I have transferred some other teachers, because they were playing around with a girl 
child.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“Here is a teacher who is always absent from work. The reason is he always comes to town. 
And you say ‘OK, this one should be moved away from town. This one should go to Zone 5 
or across the lake.99’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
While involuntary redeployment of primary school teachers appeared to be utilised in cases 
of teacher wrong-doing, scaling it up more widely to address systemic inequity appeared to 
be less widespread. This was addressed by stakeholders interviewed in relation to resource 
constraints, which Mulkeen & Chen (2008) also addressed in their study. While not as 
commonly cited as a reason for why informal transfers were rarely instigated compared to 
other factors discussed elsewhere in this chapter, it was mentioned by some stakeholders: 
“I think the first challenge is also lack of transportation. You find that when a teacher has to 
be transferred from one school to another, she/he has to be provided with transport.” 
(Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
“Another problem we face is the fuel for sending that one [the teacher] from here to 
elsewhere in the zone or district….if the funds are not available for that from the DEM, then 
the teacher stays.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
Under the Education Sector Implementation Plan Action Plan, one target was to redeploy 
teachers. The vehicle, fuel and allowance administered to redeploy a single teacher was 
budgeted for MK80,000 (US$109.3), if a teacher was redeployed to work in another district, 
 
99 These areas of Zomba Rural district, together with Zone 5, are very remote areas of the district. 
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and MK10,000 (US$13.7), if s/he was redeployed to work in another school in the same 
district (GoM, 2015). Based on budget information I was able to retrieve, Zomba Rural had 
budgeted MK957,000 (US$1,307) for organising the deployment and redeployment of 
teachers for financial year 2017/18. These resources were intended both to deploy new 
teachers to their work duty stations and to organise involuntary teacher transfers. However, 
according to the unit cost the amount budgeted would have targeted just 96 teachers, 
which resonates with what Pritchett (2015) terms the “delegation-finance failure”, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
7.2.8 Summary of Section 7.2 
This section has discussed some of the main ways in which stakeholders at all levels of the 
education system have explained the poor enforceability of teachers being deployed to 
schools on an equitable basis. A number of factors were identified, including normative and 
cultural-cognitive norms superseding regulative ones; political/ outside interference over 
bureaucratic issues; low-level corruptive practices; and resource constraints hindering the 
effective enforcement of an equitable deployment of teachers. It could be argued that many 
of these aspects were made possible due to the absence or weak rules-based criteria 
concerning deployment or transfers, as was found in Section 7.1. 
7.3 Monitoring where teachers are teaching in the system  
7.3.1 Introduction 
In the final section of this chapter, I discuss the challenges identified by stakeholders in 
effectively monitoring where in the system teachers are working. The focus is on the 
absence of a nation-wide monitoring tool that is able to track the deployment and 
movement of teachers. The discussion then moves on to consideration of the monitoring 
tools that district officials use to track which duty stations teachers are based at and the 
shortcomings of these tools.  
7.3.2 Absence of a national-wide system to track where teachers work 
When collecting data for this thesis one of the challenges I faced was the data gap in 
tracking teachers movement in the system (see Chapter 5 for further discussion). At the 
district level, the District Education Office (DEO) maintains responsibility for monitoring 
where in the system teachers are teaching. However, beyond the district the Basic 
Education Directorate at Central Headquarters has “overall responsibility for the 
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management and monitoring of primary education” (Asim et al., 2017; p. 7). In addition, the 
Education Sector Implementation Plan (ESIP) II Action Plan, which set a target of two visits 
per year to monitor the deployment of teachers in primary schools, apportioned 
responsibility for this to a number of other central government actors (GoM, 2015a).100 
However, once the Basic Education Directorate had transferred to districts the names and 
numbers of teachers it was expected to receive Central Headquarters stopped tracking 
where teachers were in the system. No process appeared to be in place requiring districts to 
report back to Central Headquarters information confirming whether they had received 
these teachers, or reporting which schools they send newly deployed teachers to go and 
teach in:  
“They [District Education Office] don’t normally come back to Basic Education. They report 
to another department, which is HR [Human Resources]. They are the custodians of the 
data for teachers who have been registered into the system.” 
(MoEST official, Central headquarters) 
This was similarly corroborated by the DEM:  
“I haven’t heard or seen anybody sending a report either on the WhatsApp group for DEMs 
or the Google DEMs group for emails.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
An official from the Basic Education Directorate explained that this was due to teachers 
being more tied to the Directorate for Human Resources and Management once they had 
graduated: 
“For us, once we deploy them to schools we are not strongly tied to them. Instead, they are 
tied to Human Resource. Generally, there is not much interest in where they are and what 
they are doing.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
This appears to contradict the roles and responsibilities of the Basic Education Directorate. 
It also suggests a major underlying weakness, which is the absence of a centralised function 
monitoring where teachers are in the system.101 While more of the recent literature 
 
100 These include the Monitoring & Evaluation Unit housed in the Department of Planning, the Department for 
Human Resources, Teacher’s Union for Malawi and the Teaching Service Commission. 
101 In 2018 and 2019, the Ministry of Education and World Bank – as part of the data collection component for 
the Malawi Education Sector Improvement Plan (MESIP) – collected information from each of the DEOs to 
compare the names of teachers who arrived at the district and the school to which they were being deployed 




discusses how strong accountability systems can only be achieved through both thick and 
thin information (Pritchett, 2014), in the context of Malawi even the most rudimentary 
“thin” information is absent. Moreover, with no central oversight holding them to account, 
district officials may be more susceptible to the types of political pressures identified in 
Subsection 7.2.4. 
Information or feed-back processes also appear weak when considering the district-zonal-
school levels. Typically, once teachers have arrived at a given district, they are given their 
posting letters with information on the name of the school they have been deployed to 
teach at. While district officials indicated that they gave the names of the teachers the 
zones/ schools should expect to receive, this was not always corroborated by PEA and 
school officials:  
“They just give us figures. ‘In Zone 12 we are going to allocate so many teachers.’” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
 
“We are told you will get such and such new teachers who will be reporting to your school.” 
(Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
Elsewhere, district and zonal responses appeared also to contradict whether teachers were 
officially required to report via PEA first or else go directly to the school which they had 
been posted to: 
“It was supposed to be they were supposed to report to this office first and then, you give 
them a map of the school….But sometimes they just go straight to the school.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
 
“They come and report for duty, and are given their posting letter and then, we tell them 
‘Go and report for duty’ to the schools they have been allocated.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
The lack of clarity discussed in these responses created potential loopholes such that 
teachers reported for duty elsewhere. This was illustrated by zonal and government 
responses, where examples of teachers, who in the past, had deviated to a school of their 
choice were reported: 
“I can give you one example where I discovered, after going on my visits to the school, that 
the teacher had reported for duty at School B near to town, but in fact his posting was to 
School D.” 




“There was a scenario whereby they [the teacher] went to a headteacher and said ‘I have 
come, they posted me to this school, but I would love to be at this school.’ And the 
headteacher blindly said ‘Ah you can stay. I am also having a shortfall of staff here.’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
When district officials were asked how teachers deviating from their official duty stations 
were discovered, the response was that they were typically found either when the matter 
was reported to the district: 
“Some of the headteachers they keep quiet. They don’t report. Until someone questions 
‘You gave us a teacher by the name so and so, but that teacher is not there. Where is the 
teacher?’ We find out the teacher is placed in another school.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Or when a member of the Inspectorate and Advisory team happened, by chance, to come 
across them during inspections:  
“We only come to realise, perhaps, when the PEAs or the – mainly the Inspectors – are 
going out to in the field…. And they say ‘But how did you come to this school?’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
However, as will be explained in Chapter 9, inspection of primary schools, for a host of 
reasons, did not occur frequently. This means that without data as a tool by which to 
monitor where teachers were in the system, where teachers were working could lie 
undetected for a long period of time 
A final problem relating to both my own observations on my visits to the DEO and 
interviews with district officials was that teacher records were all entirely paper-based: 
“Yeah, having an electronic system is quite very important….That would assist us in keeping 
information very easily and even to trace the information.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
This was  due to: 
“I think the problem may be human capacity – it’s not readily available. Even the computers 
– we don’t have relevant servers whereby you can save these information.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
The paper-based system made the movement particularly difficult to track. This was 
especially so for districts where the teacher was moving out of a district, after which 
that district had no record that the teacher had ever worked there, given that the 
teacher file has been moved to the district where the teacher now worked.  
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7.3.3 Absent and incorrect information data on teacher location 
During the period I was conducting my fieldwork, Asim et. al (2017) released a report with 
their own findings on comparing the different government information systems for teacher 
tracking. The study’s forensic examination of the sector’s three existing databases’ potential 
in being able to track where teachers were in the system, “confirmed the existence of severe 
problems of fragmentation and inconsistency in teacher management administrative data in 
Malawi” (2017;14). The three sources of data the study focused on were staff returns 
data,102 EMIS data103 and the payroll database.104  
While staff returns data and EMIS data were, in principle, able to pinpoint which school a 
teacher was working at, the payroll database at the time I was conducting my fieldwork 
could only state which district a teacher was teaching in. Similarly payroll data is meant to 
capture which districts a teacher is actually teaching in. However, the Establishment 
Warrant per district is based on the 2004 Functional Review of the sector. Practically, this 
means that when an Establishment for a district a teacher is teaching in becomes “full” this 
teacher will have to appear under the payroll of another district where there is a vacancy. 
Asim et al.’s (2017) main focus was comparing the discrepancies in information within these 
databases. My own objective was to gauge the suitability of Malawi’s current data systems 
in providing accurate information on where teachers were in the system. I focused 
specifically on staff returns, which Asim et al. found in their study to be “the most accurate 
and up-to-date record of teacher postings” (2017; p. 14). While the interviews I conducted 
did also focus on the challenges looking at the payroll database, for the purposes of brevity, 
I, for this section, focused on interview responses relating to data that were specifically able 
to track which schools teachers taught at. The furthest level of disaggregation the payroll 
goes to is the district level. 
 
102 Each month schools manually fill in a form (see Figure 7.2), which lists the details of all members of staff 
working at the school. These are delivered to the PEA who, in turn, delivers them to the district office for the 
DEMIS team to input electronically.  
103 The information collected by the EMIS is similar to what is collected by the monthly staff returns data. It is 
collected once a year in the first term of the school cycle (September-December), typically being published the 
following year (August-October). 
104 Payroll data typically indicates a teacher’s pay-grade and the district payroll the teacher appears under. The 
responsibility for payment of teachers and the management of the payroll was officially handed over to 
Districts in January 2017. 
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As an opening to this section, Figure 7.2 provides an example of the sort of information a 
school would have to fill in once a month as part of the staff returns process. 





Note: Personal information which could identify school or teacher information has been obscured. 
Staff returns were a mechanism that allowed for the movement of teachers to be tracked 
within the primary education system, as stated by district officials: 
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“The returns should come regularly. So that we should be able to know how many teachers 
are present in the school. Either a teacher has died or a teacher has transferred to another 
school.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
“Because ideally when the staff returns come, they should take time to go through them. 
‘Last month we had this officer. This month this officer is not here – where has he gone?’ 
That is what is supposed to be done.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Staff returns were meant to be filled out, collated, submitted and electronically inputted on 
a monthly basis. However, when trying to access this data it quickly became apparent this 
was not the case. Instead data was available, at most, once every school term. A number of 
challenges as to why this was the case presented themselves, with the first relating to staff 
shortages. During the period I undertook my fieldwork, Zomba Rural district had two 
personnel employed as District EMIS (DEMIS) officials, together with four Zonal EMIS 
(ZEMIS) officials attached to 17 education zones in the district.105 This was well below the 
required capacity needed:  
“From the DEMIS section, I can say we don’t have enough, because if anything, each zone, 
we are supposed to have a ZEMIS officer, but the resources are not permitting us to do 
this.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
The shortage of staff was something reflected district-wide. Just half of the total 
established posts had been filled at Zomba Rural district based on the 2017/18 budget. 
This can be linked back to the discussion had in Chapter 4 on Malawi’s “pseudo” 
decentralisation, and the wider point relating to how its political settlement may have 
more to gain from not providing the districts with personnel. 
The shortage of ZEMIS officers meant that in many cases it was the PEA who had to take on 
the responsibility of collecting the monthly staff returns from schools:  
“In the absence of the zone officer as DEMIS, we rely on the PEA. And sometimes the PEA is 
busy with some other activities. There is a delay in having that information.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Of the two education zones I worked in, the PEA in Zone 12 was responsible for collating, 
verifying and submitting the staff returns to the DEMIS office located at Zomba Rural district 
 
105 This reflects national level data, which shows that compared to the 500 education zones, there were only 
167 ZEMIS officials. 
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in the absence of a ZEMIS officer. Together with shortages of personnel, zonal offices also 
faced a shortage of equipment:  
“But the resources are not permitting us to do this. Besides having a ZEMIS officer we need 
to have a computer, so they can work on that. We don’t have that.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
The requirement to submit paper-based copies in a timely and regular manner was also 
affected by the physical distance constraints involved in submitting staff returns:  
“The PEAs do not always manage to submit to us on time and we do have to be 
sympathetic to why. Some of them they have to come from very far.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
  
“You know, for some of our PEAs, it means having to come too far, like from Lake Chilwa 
and the transportation costs are high from that side. So, they do not always manage to 
submit the information.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Twelve out of the 17 education zones in Zomba Rural district are situated 25 kilometres 
away from the DEO, with the furthest zone located 52 kilometres away. Similarly, long 
distances were a reason attributed by both PEAs as to why staff returns were submitted to 
them late by the headteacher:   
“Some of the schools – they are very far from the TDC [Teacher Development Centre]. 
And in the rainy season….eh! The roads are impassable! So, with these schools, yes I 
experience some problems to getting these [staff returns].” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
 
“Some of the headteachers fail to meet the responsibilities. So we have got to, in most 
cases, to call for them. When we ask them they fail to do that.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
The problem did not stop after the DEO received the staff returns, as they were then 
required to input the data from the paper-based return for 200+ schools. My own 
interaction with district officials responsible for inputting this data was the perceived sense 
of the futility of doing so once a month. While this was partly related to staff shortages, the 
discussion invariably turned to the time spent on maintaining this data versus its actual use. 
Staff returns did not appear to be institutionalised in any other particular way, as confirmed 
by officials at the Central Ministry:   
“Every term, in the districts, they collect staff returns. We get information, but we don’t put 
it in the report. But our plan was that staff turnover and other data, which we can be 
collecting at the middle of the school year, should be in our statistical release calendar.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
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While the staff returns served the purpose of potentially tracing absconding teachers, 
fundamental challenges relating to their functionality remained. For instance, there 
appeared to be no formal or informal mechanism through which districts were sharing their 
staff returns with other districts. This absence was especially important in the context of 
districts that were losing many teachers through inter-district movement.106  
Another potential challenge related to the accuracy of the staff returns data. The majority of 
responses discussed this in the context of enrolment figures. The PEAs of both zones 
indicated these as being regularly inflated, with the incentive for doing so being based on 
the schools receiving additional government resources: 
“We ask them [the headteachers] ‘Why do you have these differences?’ They don’t give 
concrete answers. So maybe they look forward to receiving more supplies.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“Sometimes the headteachers do inflate the figures of the learners. To their thinking, they 
think that if they have a lot of learners, they will be receiving adequate resources.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
Discussion with stakeholders at all levels of the system confirmed that the distribution of all 
major government resources was contingent on enrolment figures, either from the EMIS or 
the staff returns.107 For instance, teachers and textbooks are contingent on enrolment 
figures. For the School Improvement Grant, when enrolment exceeds 1,000 a school starts 
to receive an extra MK100 (US$0.14) per child. The justification to inflate enrolment figures, 
was given by a real-life example reported by the deputy headteacher of School Z regarding 
how one school in Zone 12:  
“I will give a fake report where I will give…maybe I will say we have 6,000, instead of 4,000 
learners to get extra books.” 
(Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
“Some cartons of exercise books they sold them to shops around the trading 
centre….people identified that these exercise books were the ones that learners were 
receiving.” 
(Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
106 While this may not be relevant for Zomba Rural district, for more rural districts like Mangochi or Machinga 
districts this is important. 
107 While Central Ministry officials use EMIS data to deploy teachers to districts, the DEM will mostly use the 
recent staff returns data to decide on how teachers should be deployed to schools in his district as this has the 
most up-to-date enrolment figures.  
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The discussion around the falsification or incorrect submission of data related mainly to 
enrolment. However, earlier district responses had indicated that headteachers might be 
complicit in allowing teachers to teach in their school even when they were intended for 
another (see Subsection 7.3.2). When I raised the possibility of teacher data being 
intentionally falsified, however, the PEAs thought it unlikely to be problematic, because of 
other checks and balances in the system:  
“In every headteacher’s office, we do insist that names of the teachers, and details – like 
which classes they teach, which pay grade they are and so on and so forth – all this is 
clearly visible on the board.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“And sometimes, when we are on supervisions to schools we may attend the roll call of the 
teachers and learners. This is done in our presence.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
The district office too felt that teacher data was unlikely to be deliberately falsified. 
However, they did indicate examples of where it had been inaccurately reported by 
headteachers on the staff returns sheet: 
“Because some headteachers don’t know that. Once the teacher has gone for studies, they 
scrape out from the staff return. Whilst the name is supposed to be there. Those are some 
of the issues that we meet.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
On a concluding note on the issue of staff returns, one part of an interview with an official at 
central headquarters struck me as being important in relation to data bias:  
“DEMIS and ZEMIS officers were supposed to be coming from the National Statistical Office 
to avoid bias. Because if you send a teacher to collect data from a teacher automatically 
there is an element of bias in it, because that is his or her profession.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
At the time I was conducting my fieldwork, all individuals collecting and verifying 
school-level information (whether it be the PEA, or DEMIS and ZEMIS officers) were 
recruited from a cadre of primary school teachers. As far as data collection was 
concerned, this, according to the same official, was different to data collection in other 
sectors, such as agriculture and health. In the case of these sectors, the ZEMIS officer 
equivalents would come from outside. The point raised about bias108 raises a potential 
 
108 Unfortunately, this was the only reference to potential bias, which was discussed towards the end of my 
fieldwork with Central Ministry officials. 
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weakness concerning the strength around the accuracy of data systems in accurately 
reflecting the state of the education system.  
7.3.4 Summary of Section 7.3 
This section has analysed the poor monitoring of where teachers are teaching. At the time I 
undertook my fieldwork, there appeared to be no central oversight to ensure districts were 
deploying teachers to work in schools with critical shortages. The disjointedness between 
the national level and district level systems was a major weakness emanating both from my 
experience of collecting data and what stakeholder interviews revealed. Regarding the data 
sources district officials relied on to inform them where teachers were teaching, these 
revealed a number of weaknesses. These mainly stemmed from the financial and capacity 
constraints identified in regularly collecting, verifying and inputting data. 
Conclusion 
The main data trends discussed in Chapter 6 relating to the way in which teachers were 
deployed and transferred between schools, found these to be to the detriment of equity 
and efficiency. The purpose of Chapter 7 was to explain the main underlying reasons behind 
these deployment trends. Poorly defined or absent policies, political interference over 
bureaucratic issues, low-level corruptive practices and resource constraints were all factors 
that have been identified in explaining why the enforceability and monitoring of an 
equitable deployment of teachers between schools was challenging. In respect to how the 
poor management of teacher deployment between schools specifically relate to the Levy-
Walton conceptual framework, the findings from this chapter reveal a number of things.  
Firstly, the characteristics of Malawi’s competitive clientelist political settlement appear to 
have had a direct negative effect on the equitable deployment of teachers at local (and 
central) levels of government. Political interference, either through the personal 
connections the local and national political elite have with teachers or through resources 
being directed to the home areas of the political elite, is at odds with needs-based 
considerations. This is similarly the case for other external stakeholders, who have been 
able to coerce district or local government officials into deploying teachers in a way that is 
contrary to equity considerations. These include soldiers and government officials at higher 
levels of government. 
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A second finding of the chapter is that absent or weak policies relating to teacher 
deployment have led to greater discretionary decision-making powers at the district and 
local levels of government. These levels of government are “spaces….where much of the 
politics of service provision plays out” (Levy & Walton, 2013; p. 2). This is important insofar 
as it means that resistance against external pressures as to where teachers should be 
deployed may be harder for the DEM to withstand where there are absent or weak formal 
rules. In addition, it has also meant normative-cultural reasons influencing teacher 
deployment decisions in the place of absent or weak policies. Relating this back to Malawi’s 
competitive clientelist political settlement, a defining feature of such a system are the weak 
incentives for a rules-based approach to governance. That is, the systems are, instead, 
premised upon personalised norms. 
The third set of findings relates to the poor monitoring of government policies concerning 
the deployment of teachers. These appear to mainly be due to the shortage of resources 
and capacity in regularly and effectively collecting, verifying and inputting data. The 
shortage of resources align with what other studies have reflected upon when considering 
the sorts of investments the political elite would like to see prioritised under a competitive 
clientelist system. Investment in areas that can improve quality, e.g. EMIS, is less desirable 
compared to funding areas where visible results are more readily achievable (Hickey & 
Hossain, 2019; Kingdon et al., 2014). 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 have addressed the first theme this thesis concerning the 
inequitable deployment of teachers between schools. Chapter 8 moves on to discussing the 
























































Chapter 8: How are teachers allocated 
and utilised within schools? 
Chapter purpose and structure 
Through an analysis of government administrative data and stakeholder perspectives, 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 discussed the first theme of this thesis, which was the inequitable 
deployment of teachers to primary schools. Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 move on to the second 
theme of this thesis, which relates to teacher allocation and utilisation within schools. The 
purpose of this is to consider the extent to which the inequitable deployment of teachers 
manifests itself at the school level in the way teachers are being allocated, thus contributing 
to Malawi’s teacher shortage crisis. This is considered both in relation to achieving 
government pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) targets and utilising teaching time effectively.   
The purpose of this chapter is to present to the reader how the current allocation of 
teachers within schools is undertaken, how this affects teacher shortages, and what effect 
this has on teaching practices within schools. It seeks to address the third research question 
of this thesis, which is: “To what extent are primary school teachers allocated equitably to 
different classes within schools, and what are the consequences of this on the utilisation of 
teaching time?” To this end, I utilise the data collected from a survey I designed and 
administered in the 26 schools situated in Zones 9 and 12 in Zomba Rural district during my 
fieldwork (see Appendix Figure A.5).  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.1 starts by comparing the distribution of 
enrolled pupils versus the distribution of teachers across the eight levels of primary. This 
serves as a useful starting point to understanding better how teachers are currently being 
allocated within schools according to standard, and the extent to which this takes into 
account the enrolment levels. Section 8.2 expands the analysis of Section 8.1 to consider the 
specific ways in which teachers are being arranged to teach within primary schools, and 
what these practices mean at the school level. The chapter concludes with Section 8.3, 
which primarily focuses on what impact the way teachers are arranged within a school has 
on the actual PTR levels and the implications for the utilisation of teachers’ teaching time. 
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8.1 Allocation of teachers by standard and effect on pupil-teacher 
ratio 
8.1.1 Introduction 
This section starts with consideration of the different policies concerning teacher allocation 
in Malawi’s primary schools. Then, the teacher allocation data in relation to how teachers 
appear to be distributed between schools is presented and what the consequences of these 
allocation decisions are in relation to the PTR is discussed. The presented data is both from 
a zonal perspective and in relation to the four schools I undertook my fieldwork in. In this 
chapter and elsewhere in the thesis, infant standards refer to Standard 1 and Standard 2; 
junior standards refer to Standard 3 and Standard 4; and senior standards refer to Standard 
5 to Standard 8.  
8.1.2 Policies concerning the allocation of teachers by standard 
As of the time I was conducting my fieldwork, responsibility for allocating teachers to 
different standards was tasked to the headteacher of a school. Unlike how teachers should 
be deployed to schools, there appeared to be no official guidance offered to headteachers 
as to how they should be allocated within schools. Earlier studies on within-school 
allocation of teachers in Malawi have found that headteachers allocated fewer teachers to 
infant standards, relative to the number of students in these standards (Wolf et al., 1999; 
Croft, 2002; DeStefano, 2013). While the differences in class sizes can be attributed to the 
poor progression of pupils from infant to senior standards, large class sizes were also found 
to be exacerbated by the allocation decisions taken by headteachers. Recognising the large 
PTRs in infant standards as being significantly higher than the desired 60 to 1 PTR, the 
National Education Sector Plan (NESP) set specific interim PTR targets for Standards 1 to 
Standard 3, which were presented in detail in Chapter 2.  
8.1.3 The distribution of teachers and enrolment per standard 
The purpose of this subsection is to consider the allocation of teachers by standard versus 
the enrolment distribution within schools. Before I present the data, it is necessary to 
describe the parameters under which headteachers are making their within-school teacher 
allocation decisions. Double-shift and multi-grade teaching are strategies recommended in 
the NESP and/ or the Education Sector Implementation Plan (ESIP). However, at the time of 
my fieldwork all schools in Zone 9 and Zone 12 were operating under a single-shift teaching 
system. In a practical sense, this meant teachers being allocated in a way that was not 
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making more efficient use of the existing infrastructure. Subsection 8.2.2 sets these policies 
out in more detail given that this is where the discussion around the utilisation of teachers is 
presented. 
Zonal level analysis 
In Malawi’s primary schools, the timetable for infant, junior and senior standards starts at 
the same time. This, together with teaching operating on a single-shift system, meant that 
headteachers allocation decisions appeared to be on the basis of ensuring there was at least 
one teacher present per class. The number of classes/ streams per standard was, in turn, 
dependent on how many classrooms were available in a school.109 The teacher allocation 
decisions made by headteachers were further affected by how the district practically 
appeared to make teacher deployment decisions to schools. These were on the basis of the 
average PTR of the school, rather than being governed by infant, junior or senior 
requirements. The Establishment Warrant per school – which was based on the 2004 
Functional Review – calculates the vacancies per school on the basis of a PTR of 60 to 1 
overall. However, given that the bulk of pupils enrolled at primary school were concentrated 
in infant and junior standards, the main headteacher allocation decisions appear to indicate 
that enrolment was not necessarily a determinant of how teachers were allocated.  
Data to support this showed that in Zone 9, 64 percent of primary school pupils were 
enrolled in the first four standards of primary school. However, these standards received 49 
percent of teachers. This was similarly reflected in Zone 12, where 68 of total enrolment 
was concentrated in the first four standards, with 50 percent of teachers being allocated to 
these standards (Figure 8.1A and Figure 8.1B). 
The skew in the distribution of teachers was the most extreme when comparing Standard 1 
and Standard 8. Standard 1 enrolled the majority of pupils in both Zone 9 (19 percent) and 
Zone 12 (21 percent). Yet, the distribution of teachers to Standard 1 was significantly less 
than the share of total primary school children enrolled in Zone 9 (13 percent) and Zone 12 
(12 percent).  
 
109 In the case of School S there were more classes than either teachers or classrooms. While it had eight 
separate classes for each of the standards, it only had six teachers and six classrooms. 
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Conversely, Standard 8 had the lowest share of pupils overall in both Zone 9 (6 percent) and 
Zone 12 (5 percent). However, the distribution of teachers to Standard 8 was far greater 
than its share of total primary school children enrolled in Zone 9 (15 percent) and Zone 12 
(12 percent) (Figure 8.1A and Figure 8.1B).  
Figure 8.1: Distribution of teachers and pupils between the different standards of the 
primary education system 
A. Zone 9 
 
B. Zone 12 
 


























































Of the four case study schools, the enrolment patterns at School I and School S reflects the 
national patterns, where enrolment numbers are highest in the infant standards and lowest 
in the senior ones. In School B, the distribution of students is roughly evenly distributed 
between the first seven standards, before a large drop in share of enrolment for Standard 
8.110 The enrolment distribution in School Z gradually falls until reaching the senior 
standards, where it evens out between Standards 5 to 8. In all four schools, Standard 8 
receives a larger proportion of teachers compared to its share of enrolment.  Conversely, 
the share of teachers allocated to Standard 1 is lower than its total share of enrolment in 
School I, School S and School Z, whilst in School B the share is roughly even (Figure 8.2).  
Figure 8.2: Distribution of teachers and pupils between the different standards of the 
primary education system 
A. School B      B. School I 
 
 
110 The large drop in enrolment between Standard 7 and 8 was explained to me during discussions with 
interviewees. The first reason was largely due to pupils dropping out of the system given the additional school 
fees incurred in Standard 8 to do examinations. Another reason cited was parents transferring their child to a 
better school nearer to the city boundaries, where they were more confident of their children performing 

























































C. School S      D. School Z
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on school survey data. 
8.1.4 Pupil-teacher ratios by standard 
Next, I turn to what the implications were of equally distributing teachers across standards 
as described in Subsection 8.1.3 on the PTR.111 The data, as one would expect, illustrates 
that such an approach is to the detriment of the infant and junior standards given they have 
a higher share of the enrolment population compared to the senior ones.  
Zonal level analysis 
In both Zone 9 and Zone 12, what was immediately apparent was the vast disparity in the 
PTR between infant and senior standards, particularly between Standard 1 and Standard 8. 
Six out of the 13 schools in Zone 9 (or 46 percent of schools) had a PTR of more than 100 in 
Standard 1. By contrast, 12 out of the 13 schools (or 92 percent of schools) had a PTR of less 
than 40 to 1 in Standard 8. For Zone 12, ten out of the 13 schools had a PTR of more than 
100 in Standard 1 (77 percent) and in contrast, 8 schools had a PTR of less than 40 to 1 in 
Standard 8 (67 percent) (See Figure 8.3A and Figure 8.3B).  
Part of the reason for a large proportion of schools in both Zones 9 and 12 having a PTR of 
less than the recommended 60 to 1 in the senior standards was the low enrolment in these 
classes. In Zone 9, in ten out of 14 Standard 8 classes enrolment was less than 60 pupils. The 
equivalent for Zone 12 was ten out of 13 Standard 8 classes. While low enrolment in senior 
standards was a factor for low PTRs in these standards, this was further exacerbated by 
schools’ decision-making around teacher allocation favouring Standard 8. In 20 out of 27 
Standard 8 classes in Zone 9 and Zone 12, two or more teachers were assigned to the class. 
 

























































In 13 of these 20 Standard 8 classes, however, the enrolment was less than 60.112 This 
distribution was often in circumstances where the PTR in infant standards exceeded the 60 
to 1 PTR target (Appendix Table A.4A and Appendix Table A.4B). 
To understand the reasons for why more than one teacher was allocated to Standard 8, 
even in circumstances of overall teacher shortages, I remind the reader of the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3. The Primary School Leaving Certificate Examination (PSLCE) is the 
only high-stakes test taken in Malawi’s primary schools, with the results determining a 
pupil’s eligibility to transition on to secondary school. High-stakes tests similar to the PSLCE 
were found to influence decisions made by school administrators on how resources were 
distributed in contexts similar to Malawi (Ashadi & Rice, 2016; Reddy, 2010). Moreover, 
while a teacher’s pay is not related to students’ performance in the PSLCE in Malawi 
(“performance-related pay”), a question to explore is whether PSLCE performance affects 
teacher allocation decisions. This is explored further in Chapter 9. 
Figure 8.3: Distribution of schools according to pupil-teacher ratio by standard 
























































Share of schools (%)
Less than 40 students 41 to 60 students 61 to 80 students
81 to 100 students 101 to 120 students 121 to 140 students
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B. Zone 12 (Based on allocation by standard) 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on school survey data. 
School-level analysis 
In relation to the four case study schools, the PTR for Standards 1 to 3 is significantly above 
60 to 1. Only in the case of School B is the PTR for Standard 1 significantly lower at 40 to 1. 
Even when taking the specific PTR targets for Standards 1 to 3 as set out in the NESP – which 
were slightly higher than 60:1 – these schools are significantly off track. Conversely, in 
almost all cases the PTR for the senior standards is below 60 to 1, which is particularly the 
case for Standard 8, where the PTR is significantly lower (Figure. 8.4).  
Figure 8.4: Pupil-Teacher Ratio by standard based on allocation  
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on school survey data. 
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8.1.5 Summary of Section 8.1 
Section 8.1 has provided an overview of the allocation of pupils and teachers according to 
the different standards. The data has illustrated the significantly large differences in the PTR 
between infant and senior standards. Of the data that was available, it emerged that the 
majority of Standard 8 classes had more than one teacher allocated to them, which 
appeared to be the case even in schools with an overall teacher shortage. Section 8.2 moves 
on to extending this discussion to consider the different teaching arrangements in place 
across all standards, and how these differ across the schools.  
8.2 Teaching arrangement 
8.2.1 Introduction 
Section 8.1 provided a broad overview of the current distribution of teachers and how the 
senior standards have, by and large, been favoured at the expense of the infant classes. 
Taking this as a point of departure, the purpose of this section is to consider the sort of 
teaching arrangements teachers engage in. This arrangement, in the context of this chapter, 
is concerned with whether a teacher delivers a single class by themselves, shares teaching 
responsibilities for a class with another teacher or teaches across multiple standards or 
classes. These practices are central to teacher utilisation and can have consequences for the 
actual PTR, which shall be discussed in Section 8.3. I start this section by looking at policies 
relating to the organisation of classes, before presenting findings from both the zonal and 
school perspectives. 
8.2.2 Policies concerning teaching arrangement in terms of how classes are 
taught 
Given the purpose of this section, I focus on three policies that the Government of Malawi 
has specifically categorised in relation to teaching arrangements: multi-grade, double-shift 
and team-teaching. 
Multi-grade teaching 
Multi-grade strategies “address the uneven grade distribution often found in primary schools 
in low-income countries” (Mulkeen & Higgins, 2009; p. 2). A core component would be to 
combine two or more senior classes where enrolment is low in order to release teachers 
and infrastructure to become available for over-crowded infant classes. Senior classes, it is 
argued, are also more amenable to these teaching arrangements given that children in 
these standards are older and more likely to be able to engage in independent learning 
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(ibid.). Ravishankar et al.’s (2016) study on the primary education sector in Malawi 
estimated that many senior classes were operating below capacity even though classrooms 
in many primary schools have been constructed to accommodate at least 100 pupils. ESIP I 
recommended the use of multi-grade teaching, and was specifically designed to target 
Standards 5 to 8 (GoM, 2013). However, multi-grade teaching does not appear in either the 
NESP or ESIP II documents (Chapter 2). 
Double-shift teaching 
Double-shift teaching involves teaching two separate groups of students at a school at 
different times of the day (morning and afternoon) due to the shortage of classroom space. 
In circumstances where there is a teacher shortage, the same teacher would teach both 
these classes. Where there is a shortage of infrastructure, but adequate numbers of 
teachers, different teachers would teach the morning and afternoon shifts. A number of 
studies have recommended the suitability of double-shift teaching in Malawi given the 
shortages in infrastructure and also, because the short number of teaching hours at infant 
grades lends its suitability to such an arrangement. Potentially half the children in lower 
standards could be taught in the mornings, while half would come to school in the 
afternoons, thereby reducing the PTR (DeStefano, 2013; Steiner-Khamsi, 2011). However, 
based on the 2018 EMIS handbook just 0.8 percent of schools are operating on a double-
shift system with the majority (98.3 percent) still working according to a single-shift system. 
This is despite NESP as well as ESIP I & II prioritising it as a strategy (Chapter 2). 
Team-teaching 
Team-teaching is where two or more teachers are responsible for a class or standard, and 
they divide the teaching amongst themselves (Steiner-Khamsi & Kunje, 2011). Several 
studies reviewed for this thesis are highly critical of the practice of team-teaching in Malawi 
(DeStefano, 2013; Steiner-Khamsi & Kunje, 2011). They find that teachers are either idle or 
absent when their partner is teaching, meaning that actual teaching time for many teachers 
is much lower than the official hours of teaching mandated under the government 
timetable. Team-teaching practices also mean that “teacher working hours become 
independent of student contact time” (Mulkeen, 2010; 61) 
DeStefano notes that the lower teaching hours are contrary to what would be expected in a 
primary education system like Malawi’s, where, given the overall teacher shortage, one 
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“would expect that teachers would be over worked” (2013; 17). DeStefano goes on to note 
how this practice is “especially possible in….schools that have surplus staff” (2013; p. 15). 
Alternative discussions on team-teaching practices are more nuanced and consider its 
usefulness for infant standards, where enrolment is traditionally much higher. Rather than 
seeing team-teaching as a mechanism to lighten a teacher’s workload, Croft considers it as a 
possible strategy to keep large groups of children in these infant standards “interested and 
motivated in lessons” (2002; p. 108).  
Government of Malawi policy appears to strictly forbid the use of team-teaching practices. 
During the period I was conducting my fieldwork this was stated in a high-level 2016 
government circular I was given access to, as well as a directive to zonal officials, which I 
noticed at the PEA’s office in Zone 9 (see Table 8.1 and Figure 8.5). However, when referring 
to the National Education Standards – which were finalised in 2015 – ambiguity around this 
policy creeps in. National Education Standard 21 states that “[w]here teachers work 
together to support classes, they both take active roles in helping students learn” (GoM, 
2015b; p. 7). What is stated in this document appears more in line with Croft’s (2002) 
recommendation of what team-teaching could entail. 
Table 8.1: Excerpt from 2016 National Reading Programme circular regarding teacher 
utilisation 
Team Teaching, Inter-Shifting, and Learning Shelters 
 
• Headteachers must ensure that each Standard 1 teacher teaches his or her own set of students 
every day. Team teaching should be discouraged and large classes should be broken into smaller 
classes. Smaller classes will enable teachers to better manage students and provide them with more 
attention as well as offer them more opportunities to practice during Chichewa and English lessons. 
 
• Headteachers should consider inter-shifting (or using existing infrastructure more efficiently by 
extending the learning day into the late afternoon when possible) to ensure that existing classroom 
infrastructure is used productively throughout the academic day beyond 14.30.  
 
• Headteachers should consider ways to work with School Management Committees and parents to 
support the construction of affordable learning shelters in schools where there are insufficient 
classroom blocks. Learning shelters are considerably less expensive than standard classrooms but 
when constructed properly are still structurally sound and may be used to keep learners out of the 
sun or rain while they learn. 








Figure 8.5: Instructions on notice-board of Primary Education Adviser’s office in Zone 9 
 
 
8.2.2 Teacher arrangement decisions per standard 
I start this section by considering how classes are arranged in all schools in Zone 9 and Zone 
12. As mentioned in Section 8.1, all of the schools I collected data from in these two zones 
were operating on a “single” shift system. To that end, therefore, I collected information on 
whether teachers were responsible for teaching one class alone, shared teaching 
responsibilities for that class with another teacher or were responsible for teaching in more 
than one class. I deploy similar categories used by De Stefano (2013) in his study on teacher 
deployment in Malawi, these being: 
i. Teacher teaching a standard/ class alone: Situation where a teacher teaches all 
subjects in that standard/ class alone. 
ii. Teacher teaching one standard/ class with another teacher: Situation where a 
teacher is sharing the teaching requirements of a particular standard/ class with 
another teacher. In this scenario the said teacher is only teaching that standard/ class. 
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iii. Teacher teaching more than one standard: Situation where a teacher is teaching in 
more than one standard/ class 
Multi-grade teaching, which was discussed in the previous section, traditionally relates to a 
situation where a teacher combines and teaches two or more classes in a single classroom. 
However, in the context of Category iii. listed above, it refers to a situation where a teacher 
is teaching two or more separate classes where s/he is either the sole teacher of those 
classes or else sharing teaching responsibilities with another teacher. While the teacher 
maintains responsibility for teaching two or more separate classes, these are taught in 
separate classrooms. These different categorisations act as a useful starting point to 
understanding whether beyond allocation (Section 8.1), the way that teachers are being 
arranged has been contributing further to the teacher shortage crisis.  
Zonal level analysis 
The majority of the 225 teachers teaching across schools in Zone 9 (79 percent) were 
engaging in teaching arrangements that fall under the category of “team-teaching.” Just 12 
percent of teachers in the zone were teaching all of the accompanying subjects in a 
particular standard alone. These largely fell under schools where there was either a 
shortage of teachers (Schools E, H, I, J and K) or in School G, where there was adequate 
infrastructure for teachers to take a class of their own (Figure 8.6A). The distribution of 
teachers team-teaching in Zone 9 was evenly disbursed between infant, junior and senior 
standards. However, when looking at the distribution of teachers who were handling a class 
by themselves, these were overwhelmingly concentrated in the infant and junior standards 
(69 percent) (Figure 8.6B). 
In Zone 12, the majority of teachers (45 percent) were teaching a standard alone. However, 
two in every five teachers (or 40 percent) were engaged in a team-teaching arrangement 
(Figure 8.7A). What was particularly striking about the arrangement of team-teaching in 
Zone 12 was where in the primary school cycle it was taking place. Two-thirds (67 percent) 
of teachers team-teaching were based in the senior standards, of which, 22 percent were in 
Standard 8 alone. Just three percent of those team-teaching were based in Standard 1. In 
stark contrast, more than two-thirds (67 percent) of cases where a teacher was teaching a 
class alone were in the infant or junior standards (Figure 8.7B).  
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The data throw up a number of issues which one can feasibly argue will have adverse 
implications for the system being able to reach the 60 to 1 PTR goal. Firstly, despite 
government policy forbidding the practice of team-teaching, 23 out of the 26 schools in 
Zones 9 and 12 were engaging in it. Croft (2002) has argued that the practice of team-
teaching could be justified on the basis of it helping to reduce the PTR of the larger classes 
for infant standards. This is if it was team-teaching in the true sense of the word, i.e. if both 
teachers were in the classroom. However, the data suggests that team-teaching mainly was 
taking place at the senior standards, where PTR was already low.  
Secondly, government policy clearly states making better use of existing structures beyond 
14:30pm, so that classes can be broken into smaller classes, which would be through 
overlapping or double-shifting (see Chapter 2). Despite most schools experiencing a 
shortage in infrastructure, all schools in Zone 9 and Zone 12 were operating on the basis of a 
single-shift system. 
Thirdly, while multi-grade teaching was recommended as a strategy under ESIP I at the 
senior standards to make more effective use of the infrastructure and teachers (see Chapter 
2 and Subsection 8.2.2), no school was utilising this strategy at the time of the fieldwork. 
Instead, 16 out of 26 schools in Zone 9 and Zone 12 had cases of teachers teaching across 
different classes/ standards. In a few of the schools in Zone 12, where teachers were 
teaching more than one class, Standards 7 or 8 had more than one teacher assigned to 
teach there. However, these teachers also appear to have been the sole teacher for infant 
and junior standards. This contravenes both what ESIP I proposed, and what multi-grade 
strategy was described as in Subsection 8.2.2. An example of what such a teaching practice 
across infant and senior standards means in practice is discussed in relation to School S later 








Figure 8.6: Distribution by type of teaching arrangement in Zone 9 
A. Distribution by type of teaching arrangement by school 
 
 
B. Distribution by type of teaching arrangement by standard 
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Figure 8.7: Distribution by type of teaching arrangement in Zone 12 
A. Distribution by type of teaching arrangement by school 
 
 
B. Distribution by type of teaching arrangement by standard 
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Regarding each of the four case study schools, the arrangement of how teachers were 
organised was somewhat different. The majority of classes in School B were being taught 
using a team-teaching arrangement. Most of the teachers in School I were engaging in 
team-teaching; however, for the infant classes, teachers were teaching alone. Infant and 
junior classes in School S shared the sole teacher responsible for these classes with the 
senior standard ones. Finally, in all standards at School Z, apart from in Standard 8, teachers 
had to manage the class alone (Table 8.2). 
Team-teaching took place in all four of these schools, yet the degree to which it was 
prevalent differed across the schools. While team-teaching took place in infant, junior and 
senior standards in School B and junior and senior standards in School I, it only took place in 
Standard 8 in School S and School Z (Table 8.1). In all four cases, therefore, Standard 8 had 
more than one teacher specialising in different subjects of the curriculum. 
The practice of what team-teaching entailed was something remarkably similar in School B 
and School I for the classes where this was taking place, together with Standard 8 in School 
Z. Teachers engaging in team-teaching would normally divide teaching responsibilities 
according to subject, with the other teacher(s) responsible for the same class as them. 
When it came to a lesson for which the teacher was responsible for teaching, the other 
teacher/ teachers assigned to that particular class would typically either congregate in the 
school court-yard with other teachers also waiting to teach a lesson, or else they would 
leave the school premises, if their teaching responsibilities had finished for the day.  
The team-teaching in Standard 8 in School S, in practice, meant something very different to 
that described above for School B, School I and School Z. The three teachers who were 
engaging in team-teaching in Standard 8 in School S were, in addition, the sole teachers 
responsible for other standards. Hence, when not teaching their designated Standard 8 
subjects these teachers were teaching in these classes.113  
 
 
113 This arrangement describes the scenario before Standard 2, 3 and 4 finished for the day. In the afternoon, 
the team-teaching arrangement resembled something more like what was described in relation to School B 
and School I and Standard 8 in School Z. 
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Table 8.2: The practice of team-teaching according to the four case study schools and by 
standard 
 School B School I School S School Z 
 14 classrooms 8 classrooms 6 classrooms 8 classrooms 
 26 teachers 14  teachers 6 teachers 9 teachers 
Standard 1 Class 1A: 2 teachers 1 teacher 1 teacher (St. 7) 1 teacher 
Class 1B: 2 teachers 
Standard 2 Class 2A: 1 teacher 1 teacher 1 teacher (St. 8) 1 teacher 
Class 2B: 2 teachers 
Standard 3 Class 3A: 1 teacher 2 teachers 1 teacher (St. 8) 1 teacher 
Class 3B: 2 teachers 
Standard 4 Class 4A: 1 teacher 3 teachers 1 teacher (St. 8) 1 teacher 
Class 4B: 2 teachers 
Standard 5 3 teachers 2 teachers 1 teacher 1 teacher 
Standard 6 3 teachers 1 teacher 1 teacher 1 teacher 
Standard 7 4 teachers 2 teachers 1 teacher (Std. 1) 1 teacher 
Standard 8 3 teachers 2 teachers 3 teachers (Std. 2, 
3, 4) 
2 teachers 
Teacher teaches class alone Team-teaching Teaching more than one 
standard114 
 
Case Study 1: School B and team-teaching 
Much of the literature alludes to team-teaching being a symptom of a shortage of 
classrooms (Croft, 2002; DeStefano, 2013) and to a degree, this was true based on my 
fieldwork observations. School B, School I and School Z each had more teachers than 
classrooms, with excess teachers to classrooms in these schools being arranged such that 
they team-taught with other teachers. However, during my fieldwork in School B the 
hypothesis that team-teaching was only a symptom of infrastructural shortages was 
rejected. This is one of the few schools I visited in both Zones 9 and 12 where there were 
more than eight classrooms. With 14 classrooms in total,115 infant and junior standards 
(Standards 1 to 4) in School B each had two classrooms allocated to their standard. 
However, in spite of the adequate infrastructure facilities Standard 2 classes were being 
combined, as were the two Standard 4 classes. On paper, Class 2A had one teacher assigned 
to it while Class 2B had two. Similarly, Class 4A had one teacher allocated to it, while two 
teachers were responsible for teaching Class 4B. 
 
114 Multi-grade teaching traditionally means one teacher teaching two different standards together in one 
classroom. In the case of School S, however, this involved one teacher teaching two different standards in two 
separate classrooms. 
115 This included a double classroom block that was part of the old school structure and despite appearing to 
be in good condition, had long stopped being used. 
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In the case of Standard 2, the combination of the two classes began when one of the 
teachers responsible for Class B (Teacher 2) was absent for an extended period of time. This 
was to recover from injuries sustained in a motor accident she had been involved in at the 
start of the 2017/18 school year. With Teacher 2’s absence, Teacher 1 and Teacher 3 
combined both their two classes, with Teacher 1 taking responsibility for subjects that 
Teacher 2 had previously been teaching. Upon Teacher 2’s return midway through Term 1 of 
the academic year 2017/18, the classes remained combined with Teacher 1 and Teacher 2 
sharing three of the subject areas, and Teacher 3 continuing to teach the three subjects she 
was initially responsible for. A consequence of combining the classes together, was that it 
was no longer possible to accommodate the desks and chairs that had been previously used 
in both Classes 2A and 2B. These were stored in the now empty Classroom 2A, which stood 
empty and was no longer being used as a teaching facility. Another consequence, as one 
would expect following the combining of classes, was a rise in both the PTR and pupil-
classroom ratio (PCR) (Table 8.3). 
In the case of Standard, 4 the combining of classes started at the beginning of the second 
term of the academic year 2017/18. This was due to part of the structure of Class 4A being 
damaged by heavy rain and wind that had occurred in the district. Due to these unforeseen 
circumstances, Class 4A (taught by Teacher 1) and Class 4B (taught by Teacher 2 and 
Teacher 3) were combined. Teacher 1 took responsibility for one of the subjects that had 
been the responsibility of Teacher 2 and two of the subjects that had been taught by 
Teacher 3 prior to the classes combining. As in the case of Standard 2, the combination of 
classes led to a dramatic rise in PTR and PCR (Table 8.4). Additionally, desks and chairs from 
Class 4A were stored in Classroom 2A as the use of these could no longer be accommodated 
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Case study 2: School S and teaching more than one standard 
At the other extreme to team-teaching was the scenario where a single teacher was 
teaching two separate classes. The following focuses on School S, which arranged the six 
teachers teaching there to be spread out over eight classes, two of which took place outside 
in the open air (Standard 4 and Standard 5) due to a shortage of classrooms. Given that the 
school was not implementing an overlapping or double-shifting system, this meant that all 
teaching was taking place between 07:30am and 14:30pm, as stipulated under the official 
timetable (Table 8.5). Standard 5 and Standard 6 each had one teacher teaching all the 
subjects alone, whilst the four remaining teachers were teaching across more than one 
standard. The teacher responsible for teaching Standard 1 was also the sole teacher 
responsible for Standard 7. The three teachers each taking sole responsibility for teaching 
Standard 2, 3 and 4 were also sharing amongst themselves the nine Standard 8 subjects 
amongst themselves (Appendix Table A.5 and Appendix Table A.6).  
School S is fairly typical of a school with high enrolment levels in the infant standards and 
fairly low enrolment at the senior standards. Under the traditional multi-grade 
arrangement, as discussed by Mulkeen & Higgins (2009), its enrolment distribution made it 
feasible to combine Standard 7 and Standard 8 to free up more teachers for the infant 
standards. Similarly, by combining these senior standards, it could make available one 
classroom to either Standard 4 or Standard 5, which were being taught outside. Instead, the 
class-sharing arrangements that were in place targeted the infant and junior standards 
(Standards 1 to 4), where class sizes were already high in the first three standards (see 
Figure 8.8).  
Figure 8.8: Pupil-classroom ratio for per standard, School S 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on school survey data. 
Note: Standard 4 and Standard 5 are taught outside in the open-air. 
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Each Standard was taught separately, meaning that teachers who were teaching two 
different classes would have to leave pupils in one class, mainly unaccompanied, while going 
to administer to the other class that he or she was responsible for. This arrangement it is 
worth noting, is different to what is more conventionally understood as a multi-grade 
arrangement, where a teacher would be teaching more than one age group in the same 
classroom. 
The arrangement for the teachers teaching both Standard 8 and Standards 2, 3 and 4 was 
administered in such a way that it ensured that the Standard 8 timetable was organised to 
minimise the number of lessons that clashed with one another (Appendix Table A.5). This 
was administered by the headteacher in the following ways: 
• Standards 2, 3 and 4 teachers taught their respective subjects for Standard 8 when 
Tikwere (radio instruction) appeared on the timetable for Standards 2, 3 and 4, 
respectively. Tikwere did not take place at this school due to the absence of working 
equipment. These classes mainly took place in the morning periods.116  
• The teachers solely responsible for Standards 2, 3 and 4 would teach these classes 
when one of the teachers they shared teaching responsibilities with in Standard 8 
was teaching there. 
• In circumstances where lessons overlapped between the standard the teacher was 
solely responsible for (Standards 2, 3 or 4) and the lessons that teacher was meant 
to teach in Standard 8, the teacher divided his or her time between the two classes. 
• When Standards 2, 3 and 4 were dismissed for the day, the afternoon Standard 8 
timetable was arranged in a way that reverted to a more typical team-teaching 
arrangement, i.e. the teacher not responsible for that subject would either wait 
outside the classroom or go home. 
The teaching arrangement for Standards 1 and 7 was slightly different. Here, the sole 
teacher responsible for both classes divided her time between Standard 1 and Standard 7 
classes, until Standard 1 was dismissed for the day, after which she taught only Standard 7 
(Appendix Table A.6). 
I went through the timetable of the standards with the headteacher and teachers where 
classes were being shared by one teacher, and documented the time that the teacher was 
physically present in the standards he or she was responsible for. This allowed me to 
 
116 This was also similar to the time-tabling arrangement for the teacher responsible for Standard 1 and 7 as 
Tikwere was officially part of the Standard 1 timetable. 
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compare how much teacher contact time pupils in each standard had compared to what 
was listed in the official timetable (Table 8.4).  
As one would expect with such an arrangement, student contact time was less than the 
official school timetable in standards where teachers were responsible for two classes. 
However, the data shows that infant and junior standards were more adversely affected by 
the arrangement. In all cases, the teacher responsible for an infant/junior standard and a 
senior standard spent a lower percentage of the total recommended teaching time in the 
former compared with the latter. The most extreme case was Standard 1, where the 
students’ contact time with the teacher was just 40 percent of the time the government had 
allocated for this standard. This compared to 79 percent for Standard 7 – the other class the 
teacher was responsible for (Figure 8.9).  
Figure 8.9: Share of actual student contact time versus official contact time for standards 
sharing teachers in School S 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on school survey data. 
8.2.3 Summary of Section 8.2 
Section 8.2 has provided an overview of how teachers were arranged within schools 
according to whether they took responsibility for teaching one or more class/ standard, and 
whether they shared these teaching responsibilities. The data illustrated how, in Zone 9, 
which had a surplus of teachers, the overwhelming majority of teachers were engaging in 
team-teaching. In Zone 12, which was characterised by a teacher shortage, most teachers 
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considering what effect the different ways teachers were arranged had on the PTR, and 
ultimately the utilisation of teaching time. 
Section 8.3 Actual pupil-teacher ratios based on how teachers are 
arranged to teach 
8.3.1 Introduction 
Section 8.2 provided an overview of the different ways in which teachers were arranged to 
teach within a school, including those relating to team-teaching. This has added further 
nuance to what this may mean for the actual PTR, given the teacher could be absent from 
the classroom. Section 8.3 specifically considers how the way teachers were arranged to 
work within schools affected the actual PTR, thereby building on Section 8.1. It also probes 
what impact this had on the teaching hours, and how this deviated from official teaching 
time. I start this section by looking at policies relating to the official number of hours a 
teacher is expected to work versus that they are required to teach. 
8.3.2 Policies concerning working time and teaching hours 
Working time 
According to the 1991 Malawi Public Services Regulation, the working hours per day for a 
civil servant total 8.4 hours per day. The Teaching Service Commission, on the other hand, 
indicates that work hours refer to the minimum number of hours that the Government “lays 
down” periodically (Ndalama &Chidalengwa, 2010). In 2014, the Office of the President and 
the Cabinet stated that the “official working hours for Public Service have been amended so 
that officers work from 7.30am to 4.30pm, with the provision of a one hour lunch break” 
(GoM, 2014). 
Teaching time 
Malawi’s 2017/18 academic calendar for publicly financed primary schools set a total of 41 
weeks of teaching. The teaching time for a Standard 1 translates into 820 hours of teaching 
time annually, or 20 hours per week. The equivalent for senior standards is a total of 1,312 
hours of teaching time annually, or 32 hours per week (Table 8.5). In spite of the official 
differences in teaching hours between the infant, junior and senior standards, all teachers 





Table 8.5: Official teaching time per standard  











Infant Standard 1 40 30 07.30am 12.00pm 20 1,200 
Standard 2 45 30 07.30am 12.30pm 23 1,350 
Junior Standard 3 45 35 07.30am 13.15pm 26 1,575 
Standard 4 50 35 07.30am 13.50pm 29 1,750 
Senior Standard 5 55 35 07.30am 14.30pm 32 1,925 
Standard 6 55 35 07.30am 14.30pm 32 1,925 
Standard 7 55 35 07.30am 14.30pm 32 1,925 
Standard 8 55 35 07.30am 14.30pm 32 1,925 
Source: Information collected from MoEST officials. 
8.3.3 Pupil-teacher ratio when factoring in how teachers are arranged within 
schools 
Figure 8.3A and Figure 8.3B illustrate the distribution of schools according to PTR by 
standard based on the data I collected from schools in Zone 9 and Zone 12. Given the 
prevalence of team-teaching in the system, as shown in Figure 8.6A and Figure 8.7A, and 
how it is operationalised in practice, I next consider what its impact on the PTR is to 
illustrate better the realities of the primary education system.  
Zonal level analysis 
I start with a discussion regarding Zone 9. As was illustrated in Figure 8.6A, the majority of 
teachers in this zone were team-teaching and those who were doing so were spread across 
all standards. The effect of team-teaching on the PTR is dramatic, particularly when looking 
at the infant standards. As can be seen in Figure 8.3A, close to 40 percent of Standard 1 and 
Standard 2 classes had a PTR of less than 60 to 1. However, when factoring in how team-
teaching works in practice, no Standard 1 or Standard 2 class in any of the schools in Zone 9 
had a PTR of less than 60 to 1, with the majority having one above 100 to 1. At the other 
extreme are the senior standards which illustrate great variation. Prior to factoring in the 
impact of team-teaching, the majority of schools had a PTR of less than 60 to 1 for 
Standards 5, 6, 7 and 8. However, when accounting for how team-teaching works, the 
majority of schools had a PTR of more than 60 to 1 in Standards 5, 6 and 7. Standard 8 
stands out as the only standard where the majority of schools – 69 percent – continued to 
have a PTR of less than 60 to 1 (Figure 8.10A). However, before factoring in the effect of 
team-teaching it had been 100 percent (Figure 8.3A).  
What the data reveals is that when taking into account the effects of team-teaching, class 
sizes in Zone 9 and Zone 12 were remarkably similar across the different standards. This is 
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despite Zone 9 being characterised as a zone where the majority of schools had an excess of 
teachers, whereas the majority of schools in Zone 12 were suffering from a shortage. These 
findings are not dissimilar to what Duflo et al. (2012) found in their study of Western Kenya. 
Here, the authors found that adding new teachers to classes in order to lower class sizes led 






















Figure 8.10: Distribution of schools according to pupil-teacher ratio by standard 
A. Zone 9 (Based on allocation and time taught by standard) 
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Source: Researcher’s calculations based on school survey data. 
School-level analysis 
When looking specifically at the four case study schools, the effect of team-teaching 
appears to have affected the PTR for School B radically, where this practice was most 
prevalent, and also, in Standards 3, 4 and 5 in School I (compare Figure 8.4 with Figure 8.11). 
Strikingly, the practice of team-teaching actually means that the PTRs for Standards 5, 6 and 
7 in School B – a school with the highest surplus of teachers – were worse than for any of 
the other schools. The PTRs for School S and School Z remained almost exactly the same as 
in Figure 8.4 given the almost complete absence of team-teaching in these schools. 
Figure 8.11: Pupil-Teacher Ratio by standard – based on allocation and time taught 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on school survey data. 
Note: The ordering of schools from left to right is School B, School I, School S and School Z. 
8.3.4 Time taught by teacher as a share of time they should be teaching 
A practical consequence of how team-teaching works is that the hours that a teacher should 
be teaching are significantly lower compared to if she or he is teaching a class alone (Figure 
8.12A and Figure 8.12B). On average, for teachers in Zone 9 engaged in team-teaching, 
teaching time was anywhere between 39 and 47 percent of what the timetable stipulated. 
The equivalent for Zone 12 was slightly higher at between 47 and 68 percent. However, 
when looking at the average time taught by all teachers compared to the time they should 














































appear to have scored better compared to teachers in Zone 9 (38 to 57 percent depending 
on standard).  
In Zone 12, there appears to have been an inverse relationship between the standard and 
the time spent teaching as a percentage of what teachers should have been teaching. In 
other words, Standard 1 teachers’ actual teaching time as a share of what they should have 
been was greater than for those teaching Standard 8. The variation within Zone 12 and 
between Zone 9 and Zone 12 appears to have been almost entirely due to what extent 
team-teaching was prevalent. Where it was prevalent, the time spent teaching as a 
percentage of what teachers should have been teaching was much lower than that 
stipulated. 
Enforcing the government-led rules on team-teaching practices appears problematic due to 
the mismatch between these rules and the reality facing schools. How classes – and by 
extension teachers – are arranged in most cases appears to be contingent on infrastructure 
availability.  
Figure 8.12: Time taught by teacher as a share of time they should be teaching 
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B. Zone 12 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on school survey data. 
8.3.5 Summary of Section 8.3 
When factoring into the equation how teachers are arranged, Section 8.3 has shown how 
schools with surplus teachers actually fared much worse in terms of the PTR compared to 
what was presented in Section 8.1. By extension, the practices at school-level also means 
that even before factoring in authorised and unauthorised teacher absences away from the 
school, the time teachers actually spent teaching was significantly below what they are 
required to. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 8 has raised a number of issues relating to the within school distribution of teachers 
in schools, which has led to large variation in the PTR between standards.  The first is that 
the teaching arrangements appear to have been carried out on the basis of single-shift 
teaching, even though the circumstances for some of the schools would have deemed them 
suitable for adopting a double-shift or overlapping system to organise the teachers and 
infrastructure that were in place better.  
The second issue relates to the way that teachers within this single shift system were being 

























































Teacher teaching a standard/ class alone
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per standard. However, the distribution of enrolment meant this was inadvertently 
favouring the senior standards at the expense of the infant and junior standards. The 
inequitable way in which teachers were found to be allocated between standards has bigger 
negative implications regarding the equity of public expenditure on education. This is 
because a large proportion of the most disadvantaged pupils do not reach senior standards 
to complete primary school. Household data sourced from the Malawi Demographic 
Household Survey 2015/16 shows that just one-in-three poor rural girls complete primary 
school, which compares unfavourably with over three-quarters of rich urban boys (UNESCO-
UIS, 2019).   
Lastly, the practice of team-teaching was found to be a widespread phenomenon, 
irrespective of whether a school had a shortage of teachers or a surplus. This severely 
impacted upon PTR targets and the effective utilisation of the time teachers should have 
been spending teaching. Studies in other Global South contexts have tended to focus on a 
comparison between the official instructional time a student should receive versus what 
they actually received due to teacher absenteeism (Bold et al., 2017). However, the analysis 
for this chapter has presented teacher absenteeism from a different perspective. It has 
shown that even before authorised or unauthorised absenteeism is taken into account, the 
official number of hours a teacher spends teaching is significantly lower than what it should 
be due to the teaching arrangements in place.   
Chapter 9 continues the discussion on the second theme of this thesis, which is teacher 
allocation and utilisation within schools. It presents the themes emerging from the 
qualitative stakeholder interviews with government and school actors on this issue. Its 
purpose is to provide explanations for the trends and patterns identified in this chapter in 
















































Chapter 9: Understanding what 
challenges the equitable allocation and 
utilisation of teachers in schools  
Chapter purpose and structure 
In Chapter 8, I presented my data findings relating to how teachers in primary schools in 
Zone 9 and Zone 12 were being allocated, and what impact this had on the utilisation of 
their teaching time. The purpose of Chapter 9 is to address the fourth, and final, research 
question of this research piece, which is: “What are the reasons for the uneven allocation of 
primary school teachers within schools?” I build on the findings presented in Chapter 8 by 
synthesising what the education stakeholders interviewed believed were for the reasons for 
the inequity in the allocation of teachers. The majority of the data from this chapter draws 
upon my field notes and transcriptions from the interviews that I administered with key 
informants at ministry, district, zonal and school level. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 9.1, I begin by discussing how issues relating 
to the shortage of classroom infrastructure impact upon teacher allocation and utilisation. 
This helps in understanding the current mismatch between what government policies 
instruct in terms of teacher allocation and utilisation versus the realities on the ground that 
influence the decisions schools take. Section 9.2 moves on to considering how subject and 
standard specialisation are defining characteristics of Malawi’s primary education system. 
This, similarly, helps in providing insights into the decisions headteachers take when 
allocating teachers. The chapter concludes with Section 9.3, which considers the weakness 
in management as being a cause as to why certain practices persist. The value of this section 
is that it identifies the challenges for those managing teachers in implementing policies 
relating to teacher allocation and utilisation.  
9.1 Classroom infrastructure and its impact on how teachers are 
allocated and utilised 
9.1.1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 identified the wide variations in pupil-teacher ratios (PTRs) across different 
standards in primary schools. This was found to be partly due to the mismatch between the 
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number of teachers and number of classrooms per school, which in many instances led to 
more than one teacher being allocated per class. A number of national policies contained in 
the National Education Sector Plan (NESP) are aimed at achieving a lower PTR or a greater 
utilisation of teachers’ teaching time through more effective use of infrastructure (see 
Chapter 2).  
This section is focused on the relationship between classroom infrastructure shortages in 
Malawi’s education system, and the ways in which this has affected teacher allocation and 
utilisation. Transcribed responses presented for the remainder of this chapter have been 
colour coordinated according to the type of actor interviewed. Central level government 
official responses are in red; district level government official responses are in orange; zonal 
level government official responses are in yellow; headteacher/ deputy headteacher 
responses are in green; and teacher responses are in blue. 
9.1.2 Shortage of classroom infrastructure 
In Chapter 8 Subsection 8.2 showed how in the four case study schools the number of 
classrooms appeared to be a contributory factor as to how teachers were allocated. The 
shortage of classrooms and how they were allocated amongst the different standards 
appeared to contribute to the prevalence of what was known as “team-teaching” (see 
Subsection 9.1.4). Stakeholders attributed the continued practice of combining classes, 
which is forbidden by official government policy, to the insufficient number of classrooms:  
“A school having enough classrooms! Eh it is very rare! Even if you can enter into the city 
the classrooms are scarce. This is why most teachers we share.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School S, Zone 12) 
 
“The government is saying teachers should not share classes…. that will not work because 
of a lack of classrooms and we are forced to put a lot of learners in one class.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
District officials indicated that the directive issued to schools was that in the event of 
inadequate infrastructure teachers should deliver lessons outdoors under shaded areas. 
This discouraged numerous classes being combined together to make one class. However, 
teachers regularly cited weather conditions for why classes could not be split as instructed:  
“During the rainy season, we cannot teach outside, so we just put the learners together. We 
combine the class.” 




“Well the disadvantage of teaching these learners under the shade, it is seasonal. Now this 
is rainy season, you cannot teach the learners under the shade.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School S, Zone 12) 
District officials expressed sympathy for the plight of schools who were unable to split 
classes during the rainy season, which normally runs from December through to March each 
year. However, the expectation from the District Education Office (DEO) was that during the 
dry season classes should be split:  
“We understand that time because it was raining. But on a very good day, as it were, we 
know we have got that problem of shortage of classrooms they can find the shelter 
elsewhere.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Based on the case study schools I undertook my research in, my own observation was that 
teachers in the schools in Zone 9 were combining classes even during the non-rainy season. 
I asked teachers why this was taking place. Their responses indicated that the lack of shade 
and the space available made separate classes impractical to implement:  
“Because outside, there are two harsh conditions; rain and sun. So, you see that at 12 
o’clock, a learner cannot be outside learning, because we have few trees there.” 
 (Infant standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
“If we can divide the class into two, then School I everywhere there will be children. So, we 
do that [combine classes] because of shortage of classes.” 
 (Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
Aside from double-shift and overlapping systems (see Subsection 9.1.3), the other 
government strategy to ameliorate the big class sizes and the inefficient use of teachers was 
the adequate provision of classrooms or learning shelters. Watkins & Ashforth in their study 
assert that, “local actors are on their own, invisible to the education officials and donors in 
Lilongwe, the capital, who make policy and develop programs” (2019; p. 6). Interviews with 
stakeholders corroborated the absence of these actors at the school level.117  
Without a benefactor to assist them in constructing classrooms, three of the four schools 
where my research took place and where there was an infrastructure shortage, cited the 
School Improvement Grant (SIG) or the School Development Fund (SDF) as the main sources 
of financing for their construction needs. The SIG is a government grant disbursed on an 
 
117 In addition, while the Focus Group Discussions that I undertook with the School Management Committee 
(SMC) and Parent Teacher Association (PTA) were eventually not used for this study, they appear to have 
corroborated the absence at these levels of these benefactors. 
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annual basis, while the SDF are resources collected from parents at the start of every school 
year. One district official pointed out the importance of these funds in helping schools to 
construct additional shelters: 
“Some of the schools have good shade, iron sheet shelters, which they have managed to 
construct under the School Improvement Grant.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
However, financial data I acquired from the DEO together with the interview responses 
from local and school-level actors illustrated the inadequacy of the SIG in assisting schools 
with infrastructural development. Budget data from the financial year 2017/18 suggested 
that the average SIG grant allocated to a primary school in Zomba Rural district was in the 
region of MK800,000 (US$1,093). These ceilings continued to be set by a formula controlled 
by central ministry officials, with no input from district officials.  
Furthermore, strict earmarking from central government on SIG use further diminished its 
efficacy for school actors. At the time I was undertaking my fieldwork, 40 percent of SIG 
funds were earmarked under ‘Access and Equity’, which included activities for the 
construction and maintenance of school buildings. The problem relating to the inadequacies 
of SIG resources for capital investment frequently arose when discussing resources for 
construction purposes:  
“Because they [the SIG funds] are not enough, they [the schools] build a temporary block 
using mud instead of cement for the building. So, when heavy rains come, they blow off 
that construction making the funds useless.” 
 (Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“The SIG grants are not enough. That is why the schools are not improving. They cannot 
construct a school block in a year.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
UNICEF, for instance, has estimated that a double classroom block can cost anywhere 
between MK2 to MK3 million (US$1,366 to US$2,732), if funding is provided directly to 
schools (UNICEF, 2019). Based on my calculations, this would take between six and nine 
years to complete if the school were depending on SIG resources alone. 
Similarly the SDF was another resource cited by respondents as important for construction. 
While fee-free primary education was officially rolled out across the country in 1994, the 
SDF remains an annual sum parents are obliged to contribute to the School Management 
Committee (SMC) at the beginning of the school year. In the four schools I undertook my 
 
 211 
research in, contributions per child ranged from between MK300 (US$0.41) to MK1,000 
(US$1.37) per school year. Non-payment of the SDF risked children being “chased” from 
schools, according to the discussions had with various stakeholders. In additional to the SDF 
contribution from parents, in three schools118 parental/ community members contributed 
their labour towards moulding bricks and helping with the construction of school 
infrastructure.  
During interviews with district officials, discussants emphasised the importance of the 
community taking an active lead in increasing the supply of school shelters: 
“We also encourage the community to come up with shelters, whereby they can be learning 
when it is raining and when perhaps it is a sunny day, they can be learning under the 
shelter somewhere.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural District) 
As with the SIG funds, however, school actors reported how the parental and community 
contributions remained insufficient for building durable classroom structures:  
“The classroom block demands a lot of materials and is very expensive. So, those 
stakeholders [school communities], they cannot manage, but they can do that by 
constructing a temporary shelter [which] cannot stay a long time. It can stay maybe a few 
years and then it falls off.” 
 (Headteacher, School S, Zone 12) 
 
“We need more infrastructure at this school. But really, without a generous benefactor, we 
are in trouble. The resources from SIG, what we get from parents, it cannot build a 
[classroom] block.” 
 (Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
Community-built classroom structures, moreover, often fail to meet the minimum 
government standards of construction required. The Primary Education Advisers (PEA) in 
both zones cited the problem of community-built structures within their respective zones: 
“Because of poor resources they may use grass thatch….of which the grass on the roof is 
not all that complete. When it rains, it leaks a lot. Most of the items….are soaked.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“People are hungry over having school blocks [and] they say ‘Let’s buy iron sheets and the 
walls will be constructed by us, the community.’ Which is not good, because the walls will 
be temporary walls” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
 
118 School I, School S and School Z. 
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With the poor inspection of schools by government officials (discussed in Subsection 9.3.2), 
the low quality of community-built structures can sometimes lead to tragic consequences. 
During my fieldwork in Malawi a community-built classroom structure at Nantchengwa 
School – a remote and rural school situated in Zomba Rural district – was struck down by 
heavy winds during school hours. This proved fatal with the structure collapsing on pupils, 
immediately killing four children and injuring a number of others. 
Besides the SIG and SDF resources, responses from stakeholders raised the importance of 
the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) as a resource that could help with infrastructural 
development. During my fieldwork, the CDF fund amounted to MK23 million (US$31,421) 
per MP per annum. This represented a major increase from the MK7 million (US$9,563) 
when it was first introduced in 2006 (Chiweza, 2016). 
Formal rules around the use of the CDF dictate that it is the District Commissioner who is 
the controlling officer. However, in practice, these formal procedures are bypassed by 
Members of Parliament (MPs) who regulate these funds and use coercive behaviour to 
sanction district officials who try to dictate how these resources should be used (Chiweza, 
2016). Under the multi-party political apparatus the appointment of District Commissioners 
has become a highly politicised process (Booth & Cammack, 2013). The problem appears to 
be further compounded by the fact that between 2005 and 2014, there were no local 
elections to vote in councillors at the district level. According to interview responses, this 
meant politicians capturing and retaining full control over CDF resources, with little 
oversight from the District Council or affiliated sector institutions, such as the District 
Education Office: 
“Those people [politicians], when it comes to CDF, really guard that money….they take that 
money as personal. So, it is very difficult even if you advise them in a meeting that ‘We 
need your assistance with CDF.’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural District) 
One of the motivations for retaining control over CDF resources has been the sheer volumes 
channelled to the CDF compared to other local public funds. Chiweza (2016) estimated that 
by 2014 the CDF had become the largest discretionary central government transfer, making 
up 90 percent of district council’s capital expenditure. According to one official, the 
consequences of MPs taking control over CDF resources mean that it deviates from the 
District Development Plan:  
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“They [MPs] really are not consulting the plan as it were. Because, if they were seriously 
consulting the plan, they would see these are the projects that have been laid out in the 
District Development Plan as far as my [the MPs] area is concerned.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural District) 
The PEA at Zone 12 claimed that the allocation of CDF and Local Development Fund (LDF) 
resources had been “politicised”: 
“The problem is that the LDF and the CDF have been politicised, because MPs – they are not 
there for development. They are failing to use the CDF and the LDF properly.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
While the importance of CDF resources was acknowledged by stakeholders, respondents 
from all levels of the education system reported that infrastructural funding from the CDF 
was either dormant:119  
“Yeah, what they do normally is when they have been elected is they sit down, they are 
comfortable. Now when it comes to times like this – times when we are approaching 
elections – they start now moving around.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“In those days [in the past] they [the resources] were coming from CDF, but currently I don’t 
know what CDF is doing. It’s a long time where teachers houses were built within the zone. I 
don’t know what they are doing” 
(Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
Or else misused:   
“MK 12 million can finish a school block….can’t they finish a school block? Now….they are 
constructing that school block for three, four years. Is it on? Four years constructing one 
school block!”  
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
 
“The [CDF] funds – when they [the politicians] receive it – they may try to split it into so 
many projects, which eventually they may not be able to finish due to the rising cost.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural District) 
These statements reflect what Chiweza (2016) discusses in relation to the mismanagement 
of the CDF by MPs who have siphoned off the funds for personal use120 or allocated these 
funds thinly across all constituents (Chiweza & Waldock, 2011). The latter is so that each MP 
 
119 My fieldwork took place the year before Malawi’s 2019 political elections were due to take place. Many 
local level interviewees speculated that in the run-up to the election these actors would start to become more 
visible to the schools and the surrounding community.  
120 The abuse of the CDF is well-documented, with a large percentage of CDF resources unaccounted for. One 
of the forms of abuse involves MPs reporting CDF resources being spent on completed infrastructural project 




is visible and “has something to show his/her constituency for electing him/ her” (Chiweza, 
2016; p. 107). It also means that the type of investment aligns with that where political elite 
can be seen to be “delivering development” (O’Neil & Cammack, 2014; p. 67). 
With public funds for infrastructure appearing dormant, a school’s success in attracting 
additional resources for infrastructure appears to be judged on the headteacher or 
community’s ability to source these from elsewhere (Watkins & Ashforth, 2019). District and 
zonal officials discussed the role of the headteacher in sourcing funds by applying pressure 
on those controlling CDF resources:   
“If a headteacher does not mount a lot of pressure on the politician, his or her school will 
not be in a position to get it.”  
 (District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“Only if the school is pro-active. This will depend on the leadership of the schools, be it the 
headteacher or the School Management Committee.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
 “If they are in good books with the politician they’ll get the resources. So automatically, 
who gets the CDF resources also depends on the relationship between the headteacher and 
the one in control of those particular resources.” 
 (Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
The responses above appear to suggest that, in practice, securing CDF funding was 
contingent on a number of things. Firstly, school actors had to make themselves visible to 
the MP. Secondly, they had to be able to cultivate relationships with politicians. These 
responses appear to go against the official rules governing the use of the CDF, which are 
that it should be guided by the District Development Plan informed by inputs from the Area 
Development Committee (ADC).121 As one response from a district official intimated, the 
flow of CDF funds to schools was politically expedient for the politician, as the catchment 
area around the school contained many “individuals”:  
“But to a politician who is sensitive enough, it’s easy for the schools to get resources from 
the CDF, because they know that a school normally serves a lot of individuals.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Further questioning on what the official meant when talking about “individuals” revealed 
this as meaning voters. Of the four schools I undertook my research in, however, only in the 
 
121 The ADC operates just below the District Assembly as a Traditional Authority. It is headed by a chief and 
consists of many villages (Samuels et al., 2009). The ADC is meant to compile all the requirements of villages 
that he presides over and submit these needs to the District Assembly.  
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case of School B was there evidence of a past MP actively assisting the school with 
infrastructural development. According to the PEA of Zone 9, this was due to the MP being 
from the same village as the school:  
“This is her village. She is just coming from down…..after that forest there. So, she initiated 
some other projects, like construction of a Community Day Secondary School in her village, 
electricity there.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
A number of other schools fell under the MP’s constituency boundaries, including School I. 
However, an infant grade teacher working at this school whose home district was next to it 
recounted how resources for developing schools in the zone appeared to favour School B: 
“You know [the MP] was able to get many funds from benefactors from [the] U.K.122 At that 
time, School I, we are crying for desks, classrooms. But only School B get [sic] these. Why? 
Because those attending School B are her people.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School I, Zone 9)  
Beyond the MP, the social capital of School B was enhanced by the personal connection it 
had with well-connected individuals, including a reverend and a high-ranking government 
official, who was also from the village School B was situated in. The reverend had brought in 
outside resources for the development of School B and other areas:  
“He has got friends in the U.K. and he has been in U.K. So, he tried to source donors to bring 
resources to School B, to construct that secondary school….now his team [is] developing the 
area –  a clinic that’s very close to the school.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
While the high-ranking government official also brought resources to the school: 
“So, these people wherever they are they say ‘This is our home, then we need our 
community to be like this.’ So, they try to hunt for what, such type of assistance.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
During the discussion about School B’s social capital the PEA recounted how the school’s 
association with the MP had seen public funds diverted to it. He recalled the school 
benefitting from the significant and transformative donor-funded infrastructural 
development almost a decade earlier. According to the PEA, however, these construction 
funds had been diverted away from schools where there was a real need for infrastructural 
development, to instead, come to School B:  
 
122 According to several of the interviewees, after serving as an MP this individual moved to the U.K. 
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“Someone else was working in Lilongwe and was connected to this MP for this project to 
come here….Basically, these projects were going to where there was a complete need. But 
looking at School B, by then it was okay.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
The majority of stakeholder responses collected and analysed for this thesis refer to 
nepotism in the context of teachers’ own personal connections with the elite scuppering 
government policies relating to teacher distribution, allocation and utilisation. However, 
School B’s association with persons of influence reflect how nepotistic relationships with the 
local/ national elite also appears to favour certain schools or areas when it comes to the 
distribution of public resources. 
This subsection has revealed some of the resourcing challenges that impede progress being 
made on classroom infrastructural development, namely sufficient resources needed to 
increase the supply of classrooms and teacher housing. The following subsection moves on 
to the challenges in utilising existing classroom space more effectively.  
9.1.3 Failure to roll out double-shift infrastructural policies  
As outlined in Chapter 8, one of the measures promoted by the Government of Malawi to 
overcome the challenge of a shortage of classrooms and teachers has been the policy of 
double-shifting (see Chapter 2). To recapitulate, the Education Sector Implementation Plan 
(ESIP) II Action Plan proposed double-shift as a policy, and budgeted for those teachers who 
took part in such a teaching arrangement to receive an additional supplement of MK 10,000 
(US$13.7) per month (GoM, 2015a). In this subsection, the reasons why a double-shift 
system has failed to be operationalised in the way it was set out in government policy are 
explored. 
During the period I undertook my fieldwork in Zone 9 and Zone 12 all schools were 
operating on a single-shift arrangement. After ascertaining what double-shifting 
arrangements had occurred in the past,123 I sought to understand why it was no longer 
being operationalised. The PEA pinpointed the failure of double-shift policy to government 
officials failing to remunerate teachers either on time, or at all:  
 
123 Schools confirmed that a double-shift arrangement had been implemented in schools in Zomba Rural 
district either during the third term of school year 2016/17 or the first term of the school year 2017/18 in 
School B, School I, School S and School Z.  
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“Because the district was saying, ‘All those teachers who are going to follow the double-
shift, they will be paid something else.’ But to our surprise the District failed to even make 
those payments or they paid them very late.”  
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
This failure was also corroborated by the headteachers and teachers:124 
“Now we have been doing that [double-shifting] and they [the government] promised that 
they will boost up the salary. But to our surprise, we have been doing that, but no other 
extra money was added on top of our salaries.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
“Yes, and also the double shifting policy failed, because teachers have to work double, so 
the government were saying we are going to pay you something on that. But the 
government did not. So the government has failed.” 
(Headteacher, School S, Zone 12) 
Zonal officials appeared sympathetic to the plight of teachers over the circumstances 
surrounding the discontinuation of double-shift policy. District officials, on the other hand, 
were of the opinion that the failure was due to the money teachers were renumerated 
failing to act as enough of an incentive:125 
“But then some of these teachers say ‘We cannot work twice and only get MK10,000.’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
The perception of “double-shift” equating with “double-time”, which, therefore, should 
have meant “double pay”, was something also corroborated by school actors:  
“So, people were complaining to say ‘if it is double shifting, it should be a double salary.’ So, 
I think had it been that it was a double salary, we could have been happy.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
 “Even the teachers themselves were not happy with the money that they were receiving, 
because whenever you are in a double shift, teachers were given ten thousand [kwacha].” 
(Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
The MK10,000 (US$13.7) monthly subvention awarded to teachers to undertake 
double-shift teaching was the equivalent of an 11 percent increase in the annual salary 
of a junior primary school teacher (Appendix Table A.7). Double-shift policy is important 
to consider in the context of working hours. Analysis in Chapter 8 considered teacher 
utilisation from the perspective of the number of hours spent teaching based on the 
 
124 While the focus of my fieldwork was on the more recent roll-out of double-shift policy over the 2017/18 
period, an internet based search also found numerous reports of teachers going on strike due to the failure of 
the government to pay them an additional supplement for double-shift work. 
125 I was able to confirm later with the account clerks that payments had indeed been delayed. 
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official school time-table. However, teacher workload responsibilities can extend to 
those activities outside of teaching time (Chughati & Perveen, 2013). Discussion in 
Chapter 8 focused on the number of hours a civil servant is expected to work, which as 
of 2014 was from 07:30 to 16:30. 
Understanding what stakeholders perceived the official policy to be around working hours 
was important in relation to the double-shift policy. District officials made a clear distinction 
between what teachers were expected to work versus what happened on the ground in 
practice: 
“In most cases our teachers will only knock off when the class ends. They do not prepare 
their lessons. They will come tomorrow without preparations….So, we are trying to remind 
them that ‘You are civil servants. Remember, we are supposed to work from 7.30 to 4.30.’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“We are saying a teacher is supposed to be at school by 7.00. And the latest one should 
knock [off] at 2.30. That’s teaching hours. And government policy is saying those ones that 
are working as civil servants, they are supposed to knock off at 4.00.” 
 (District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
However, only one teacher I interviewed corroborated the response from the DEO when 
asked what they thought their official working hours were:  
“When we were signing the GP1 forms,126 we were told that we are government workers 
just the same as other offices and we are supposed to knock off at 4.30, if not 4.00.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
Many of the other teacher responses, however, interpreted their working hours as their 
teaching hours according to the standard and subjects they were responsible for teaching: 
“Working hours for me are shared between me and my [teaching] partner. When we have 
finished our lessons for the day, only then, can we leave the school premises.” 
 (Infant standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
“Our working hours depend on where we are teaching. Standard 1, Standard 2 teachers 
they knock off earlier than those of us teaching the senior standards We knock off at two.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
Where double-shifting and over-lapping had once taken place, this was mainly in infant or 
junior classes. This was due to the shorter hours of their curriculum making them more 
suitable to this type of arrangement. In circumstances where double-shifting took place in 
 
126 This is the form that teachers are required to fill out once they have been recruited as teachers within the 
public education system. 
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schools with a shortage of classrooms and teachers,127 those taking the morning shift would 
be required to continue immediately with teaching the afternoon classes. This left them 
with no time to take a lunch-break:  
“We were very tired. It is like you are double working there.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
“You find that the number of lessons that were covered meant those [learners] who are 
benefitting are those who were coming in the morning not the afternoon ones. Why? 
Maybe you find that the teacher was already tired.” 
(Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
One teacher expressed how children attending afternoon lessons were also disadvantaged, 
because the time the lessons were taking place was not conducive to learning: 
“You know the brain does not work properly when the sun is overhead….so you find that 
the learners coming in the afternoon will not concentrate well and the rate of failures 
increased.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
Beyond their scope for learning in afternoon hours, the safety of children attending these 
sessions was also cited as a reason for the unfeasibility of double-shift arrangements. 
Children attending school from the furthest catchment villages would often have to walk 
considerable distances to return home, heightening fears that they would arrive there as 
the day approached dusk:128  
“We tried even implemented here that one [double-shift] and after looking at it I say ‘No 
no, no.’ We are facing a lot of challenges, like learners were being frightened when coming 
to school. Some learners reported to their parents at very late at night.” 
 (Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
“The main problem was people of this area are not friendly to the learners. When the 
learners knock off a bit late in the afternoon, they were harassed as they were going 
home.” 
(Headteacher, School S, Zone 12) 
The route home for children leaving schools that had implemented the double-shift policy in 
Zone 12 was particularly perilous during rainy season. This, according to respondents, was 
due to them having to walk back home via routes that took them through fields now 
overgrown with maize: 
 
127 This set of circumstances is mainly applicable to rural schools in Malawi. In more urban settings, it may be 
feasible for different teachers to teach morning and afternoon classes given the larger numbers of surplus 
teachers teaching at these schools. 
128 Depending on the time of year, the sun in Malawi can set anywhere between 5 and 6pm. 
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“We lost three children, one during this when people…when the crops are in the 
garden….we had such issues, we lost a child. He was in Standard 4 and he was killed.” 
 (Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
“They did it [double-shifting] for at least three months. They did it when there were no 
shrubs in the garden. But once they planted maize, it was difficult for the learners to go to 
their own home.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
Subsection 9.1.2 and Subsection 9.1.3 have reported how government policies that commit 
to more school infrastructure and the better utilisation of existing classrooms have failed to 
be effectively implemented. The consequences of these failures meant that the teachers in 
the zones that I carried out my research in were operating within a single-shift teaching 
system where there was a shortage of classrooms. Subsection 9.1.4 explores how this led to 
team-teaching being widespread under such conditions.  
9.1.4 Infrastructure availability and “team-teaching” 
Several studies on Malawi have criticised team-teaching as hugely inefficient, with it  largely 
being seen through the prism of one teacher handling large class sizes, while his or her 
partner sits outside of the classroom, often idle (DeStefano, 2013; Steiner-Khamsi & Kunje, 
2011). A few studies have considered it as a strategy with the potential to keep large groups 
of children “interested and motivated in lessons” (Croft, 2002; p. 108).  
Chapter 8 discussed how the combining of classes worked in practice in three out of the 
four schools129 that I undertook my research in. The practice, according to my own 
observations, was more in line with where team-teaching is a mechanism through which to 
“lighten the planning load” (Croft, 2002; p. 108). Teachers articulated how the combining of 
classes invariably meant that during the time one teacher was teaching inside the 
classroom, the other would be outside: 
“So, I will teach my two subjects then I knock off, sit down and chat. I will be doing 
whatever I want, maybe stay here in class on my phone or whatever. My colleague will 
continue teaching. I can be outside. I am done or I may wait for one of my subjects.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
“After my period, instead of going in the class to assist my friend to control the class, I 
collect all the exercise books and start marking to see how the leaners have performed.” 
(Infant standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
 
129 School B, School I and School Z. 
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“For example myself and my partner we are dividing the class, the other one teaching here 
8A and the other one teaching there 8B. But you know, we teachers, we need sometimes to 
rest.”  
 (Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
The implication was that such practices led to larger class sizes, as summarised by one 
district official: 
“Because when they are combining….the class becomes like 300 and there is just one 
teacher teaching. The others, they are just chatting or doing other things, which should not 
be the case.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
In Subsection 9.1.2 and Subsection 9.1.3 the discussion considered reasons as to why 
teachers may be compelled to combine classes in the context of infrastructure shortages. Of 
the three schools where combining of classes was occurring, this appeared to be true in the 
context of School I and School Z. However, in School B the practice of combining classes 
occurred even where infrastructure was available and which allowed for classes to be split.  
While the 26 teachers at School B still exceeded the 14 classrooms available, each class130 
had two, three or four teachers per class. This arrangement meant that four classrooms 
remained unused for teaching purposes. Among these four vacant classrooms was a double 
classroom block that had long sat disused (see Figure 9.1), which had existed as part of the 
old school structure of School B:  
“We have got that infrastructure….a very good structure. I have been advising even the 
members of the SMC, I said ‘This structure is a very strong one, even compared to these 
ones. We need to utilise it.’” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
Together with this disused double classroom block, two classrooms that had previously 
been used to teach Standard 2 and Standard 4 classes were not being used. In each of these 
standards the two streams had been combined. While the Standard 2 and Standard 4 
teachers were reluctant to talk to me about the circumstances concerning why classes were 
being combined, other school actors discussed why this was the case: 
“There you see the roof structure [of Standard 4] was blown away by the bad weather we 
were having in the district at that time, but we are raising funds to fix this problem. Then, 
these teachers will be back to teaching their own classes again.” 
 (Headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
130 Apart from one class in Standard 3. 
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“The teacher [in Standard 2] says ‘I was once involved in a car accident, so I could not teach 
for a long time.’ So I said, ‘OK, the only thing to do is leave you to take certain subjects, but 
the learners need to be separated.’ You find that she is not doing that.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
While these statements offered a justification for the arrangements, other school actors 
were more critical of this reasoning:  
“Some teachers they just want to maybe to just write not enough lesson plans. So when 
they have combined, it’s like they have reduced their work, because it’s like ‘We have 
shared now.’” 
(Deputy headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
“Some of us teachers….are just difficult. The PEA has mentioned this several times. It only 
works for a while, but then it gets forgotten. People are just lazy, ‘let’s just combine the 
classes, teach them and then go rest.’” 
(Infant standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
The infant standard teacher’s response that recommendations only worked for a short time 
was also corroborated by local and district officials:  
“Whenever the inspectors go out to a school and they find such a situation, they tell them 
to dismantle….they do that in the presence of the inspectors and when they leave they [the 
teachers] know tomorrow they are not coming back, they will combine them again.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“I know about what is happening in School B. So, I always talk to the headteacher and the 
deputy headteacher about this. But the splitting of classes only lasts a short while. The 
teachers go back to combining.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
The circumstances surrounding combination of classes in Standard 2 was a situation 
reflected in Croft’s study, who noted that “classes frequently continued to be combined, 
even when the situation which had caused the class amalgamation, improved” (2002; p. 
102). In addition, while the safety issues concerning the Standard 4 classroom were of valid 
concern, combination of classes seemed to be the default solution. The use of the vacant 
Standard 2 or the old disused classroom block were not seen as alternative resolutions.131 
 
131 The headteacher, who would make decisions relating to allocation of classrooms to teachers, seemed 
reluctant to discuss this point. 
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Figure 9.1: Disused double classroom block, School B, Zone 9 
 
 
Beyond the shortage of infrastructure, absenteeism was cited as a reason for why classes 
may be combined, at least in the case of School B and School I.132 An attempt at School B to 
split Standard 2 into two separate classes at the beginning of Term 2 in January 2018 was 
unsuccessful due to frequent absenteeism by one or more of the teachers: 
“So, we found that maybe the class has to be split and you find that the other teacher is 
absent, so we say, ‘OK, what are we going to do?’ We just need to combine these learners.” 
(Deputy headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
In School I, absenteeism was a reason justifying the combination of classes when teachers 
had to travel from afar to get to the school.133 One of the ways this was done was changing 
the official Standard 4 timetable, thus allowing teachers not have to come physically to 
school five days a week (see Appendix Table A.8). Three teachers were responsible for 
teaching Standard 4 in School I. The actual teaching timetable had been arranged so that 
subject areas were compressed over certain days or hours, according to which of the three 
teachers was responsible for the subject in question. This type of arrangement was the only 
 
132 Teacher absenteeism in the context of School B and School I in Zone I would often mean that the teacher’s 
partner would teach the subjects s/he was responsible for during a teacher’s absence. While the effect of this 
may mean that the government timetable is not adhered to, children were getting teacher contact time. This 
was especially true if arrangements between the teachers had been made in advance. However, in the case of 
School S and School Z the scarcity of teachers would mean that absenteeism affected the learners differently. 
During my time conducting research in these schools, teacher absenteeism would often mean children being 
sent home. Alternatively, classes ended up being combined so that one teacher was managing two classes 
together. 
133 School I did not have any teachers’ housing for school staff. The distance it took for teachers travelling from 




one I observed across all classes in my four case study schools. However, CERT officials 
reported that they had come across similar arrangements in instances where a teacher was 
having to travel great distances to arrive at the school. When questioned about the current 
arrangement, the headteacher off School I said that the long distances teachers had to 
travel was the cause: 
“Teachers have to walk very far to arrive here [at this school]. So, teacher absenteeism is a 
big problem for me!” 
(Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
As well as how under these circumstances, the current arrangement of combining classes at 
least benefitted the learners: 
“If teachers can combine the learners, at least are not losing out, as their friend [partner 
teacher] can lend a hand in the teaching in their absence.” 
 (Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
This aligned with the response of one Standard 4 teacher, who justified the arrangement as 
it meant learners did not lose out when a teacher was absent: 
“A teacher can say ‘Tomorrow I am not coming. So please, you should teach the children 
these lessons’, but sometimes I will just teach my own subjects. I will use her periods to 
cover the lessons that I did not cover when I was absent.” 
 (Standard 4 Teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
In Chapter 7, interview responses with officials indicated that the more remote nature of 
School I compared to other schools in Zone 9 meant that teachers either wished to be 
transferred away from this school or were resistant to be sent to it. This characteristic of the 
school was important in linking it to the practice described above. When I questioned 
whether the headteacher reported frequent absenteeism to the PEA, his response raised 
the negative repercussions this could elicit for the school: 
 “If we are complaining and complaining to our boss [the PEA], the community simply it 
loses the teacher to another school. There is no help from the [district] office to send one [a 
teacher] who is committed.” 
 (Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
The shortage and poor distribution of teachers appeared to have increased the relative 
bargaining power teachers had in matters pertaining to their management at the school 
level. As shall be discussed in Section 9.3, this bargaining power manifested itself differently 
for teachers teaching at schools considered desirable versus remote schools where there 
were teacher shortages.  
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9.1.5 Summary on classroom infrastructure and its’ utilisation on how 
teachers are allocated and utilised 
Infrastructural issues have been one of the underlying reasons for explaining how teachers 
have been allocated between different standards. As Section 9.1 has shown, the shortage of 
infrastructure together with the prevalence of single-shift systems has been found to be one 
of the reasons for why the practice of “team-teaching” has been an endemic feature of 
Malawi’s primary schools. This, in turn, has ultimately had consequences for the utilisation 
of teaching time.  
9.2 Specialisation in the primary school system 
9.2.1 Introduction 
Primary school teachers, unlike their secondary school counterparts, are trained to be able 
to handle teaching any subject in any standard in the primary system (GoM, 2018). When 
headteachers are allocating teachers within schools, the decision must be independent of 
gender, qualification, type of teacher training or past teaching experience. In practice, 
however, the survey data I analysed in Chapter 8 revealed that the majority of teachers 
were not teaching all primary school subjects. Instead, subjects taught were shared through 
the practice of team-teaching.  
This section is focused on stakeholder perspectives regarding the practice of subject and 
standard specialisation. It is specifically considered in the context of understanding what 
impact this has on the allocation of teachers, and the utilisation of their teaching time. 
9.2.2 Subject and standard specialisation  
Subject specialisation is something that teachers appeared to be exposed to while 
undergoing teaching training. School B was the only school in my four case study schools 
which met the criteria to be eligible to receive student teachers.134 The arrangement for 
teacher trainees was to divide the subjects amongst themselves:  
“Normally what they do, they do share. Like, for example, I will just take English and 
Chichewa. So, if you are taking English, I’m taking Chichewa, the next term, then they are 
going to swap those subjects between them.” 
(Deputy headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
134 While it was eligible for teacher trainees, School B did not have any trainee teachers during the academic 
year 2017/18 when I was doing my fieldwork. 
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Whilst Initial Primary Teacher Education (IPTE) teacher trainees did teach all subjects during 
the year spent in a primary school, they did so under conditions of team-teaching, which led 
to them teaching only a fraction of the subjects on the curriculum over the course of the 
day. Similar challenges were presented in Chapter 7, when discussing which schools trainee 
teachers are sent to go and work in. As well as for teacher trainees, subject specialisation 
was prevalent among teachers employed in the system. To school stakeholders, 
government policy strictly prohibiting specialisation in the primary education sector was 
unfeasible:   
“The directive is not realistic, really. In other countries teachers are taking subjects they are 
a specialist in. And even here in Malawi, our friends in secondary [education] are sharing 
their subjects.” 
 (Infant standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
“Also, we can say even if we tried to implement it for one teacher to teach 60, it’s very 
tiresome. And also in Malawi [we] have nine subjects. So, for nine subjects to be taught by 
one person and to prepare resources for that it’s very tiresome.” 
(Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
In School Z, where there was one teacher per standard in Standard 1 to Standard 7, the 
Standard 7 teacher was visibly frustrated when discussing having to teach the entire 
curriculum for this standard alone to the class: 
“There is a reason which make[s] me annoyed. I am not familiar with other subjects. 
Someone cannot master all the nine subjects to be an expert. But out of nine, he or she can 
maybe be an expert in teaching maybe five subjects.” 
 (Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
This frustration was similarly reflected in an interview with a Standard 8 teacher, who had 
been transferred to work from School B to School I.135 The teacher shared the subjects 
taught with another teacher. Yet, the transfer had resulted in the number of subjects the 
teacher was responsible for teaching having increased:  
“I remember when I was at School B primary school, there were many teachers. There were 
almost 32 teachers at that time, while when I came here there were only 16, which meant 
that the [work] load became bigger.” 
 (Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
135 Later interviews with the PEA indicated that this teacher had been transferred by the DEM as a form of 
punishment for wrong-doing. 
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In spite of total enrolment in this teacher’s Standard 8 class totalling 49 pupils, and being 
under the government recommended PTR of 60 to 1, the teacher believed more teachers 
were needed to allow for greater subject specialisation: 
“Even though they say that they give one teacher to 60 learners, Standard 8 it is 
exceptional. It must be Standard 8 teachers should be maybe three or four even though 
there are 60 learners.” 
 (Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
School responses also justified subject specialisation on account of some teachers’ 
discomfort with certain subjects: 
“And very old teachers hate Life Skills, because they think it’s full of erotic words. And some 
teachers who are prominent members of the church they may say, ‘This is a sin, so I don’t 
want to teach this.’” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
“The other subject is Life Skills…[it] is neglected because of our culture. Because Life Skills 
demands teachers teach things which are, in our society, somehow not to be told to young 
ones.” 
(Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
While subject specialisation appears to be against official government policy, when 
interviewed on their thoughts on this, district officials supported the practice: 
“There is no person who is a master of all the subjects.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“So, I do agree when those teachers are saying, ‘No this is not my area of’ and  ‘Where I can 
do better?’ I think we have to understand them and say ‘What can we do to solve the 
situation?’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Ministry officials, similarly, expressed sympathy regarding specialisation, believing it led to 
teacher professionalism: 
“But personally I feel that specialisation is good, because it allows teachers to focus on a 
particular number of subjects. And [by] teaching the same subjects for some time, they 
become very good professionals.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
As discussed in Chapter 8, subject specialisation has appeared largely to favour the senior 
standards, even in schools where there appear to have been teacher shortages. Interviews 
with government officials revealed that team-teaching was more pervasive at the senior 
standards due to the poor rates of primary-to-secondary school progression in the district. 
This had led to a district-wide strategy that actively encouraged subject specialisation for 
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teachers at the senior primary standards. However, a crucial addendum to this arrangement 
was that senior standard teachers were required to teach subjects they specialised in to 
more than one class or standard:  
“From Standard 6, 7 and 8 we should give chances to the teachers to say, ‘Which subjects 
can you teach much better.’ So, if they decide to say ‘I am good in English.’ ‘OK, fine so you 
should be teaching English throughout these three classes.’” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“There is that practice [of subject specialisation], but it is only for upper sections. Maybe we 
feel it’s OK because there is more content. So, in the upper sections you have a teacher 
teaching only mathematics. So, if there are, like, three Standard 8 [classes] he will be taking 
them for mathematics.” 
 (District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
However, as was reflected in the data in Chapter 8, rarely did teachers operate around the 
system described by these respondents.136 I sought to clarify whether such a system had 
been initiated in any of the schools in my study in the past. Only in School B did the deputy 
headteacher indicate that the school administration had once tried to introduce such a 
system, but it had failed:  
“No….we had that …that we had to organise at this school that the one who is teaching 
English in the upper classes that one should also continue with English in other upper 
classes…but [teachers] refused.” 
(Deputy headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
Elsewhere, headteachers talked about such systems being used in the past or in other 
geographical contexts: 
“The PEA also sometimes introduced to us this system and also, when he visited me at 
School C he also introduced it to me and I started implementing that. I was using the 
teachers from Standard 5, Standard 6 and Standard 7 to go in Standard 8.” 
(Headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
“So in my home district137 what they did is – or what they are doing – is if someone knows 
best on maybe English, he can teach English from Standard 5 up to Standard 8 going in all 
those....so what they do is one teacher on one subject, one examining subject.” 
(Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
However, when discussing such a system with teachers, the level of opposition to it was 
clear. Prior to the Primary School Leaving Certificate Examination (PSLCE) being 
 
136 This system should be distinguished from a “multi-grade” teaching system, which typically relates to a 
teacher teaching all subjects across more than one standard or class when there is an inadequate number of 
teachers for the number of classes. 
137 Rumphi district in Northern Malawi. 
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administered, Standard 8 teachers who I interviewed spoke of how the system I was 
describing would be unfair due to their current workload:  
“So, you can’t just go to a certain lower senior class[es], because there must be thorough 
preparation. You know, we teach during holidays as the other classes are closing, but we in 
Standard 8, we do continue, so it may be unfair for Standard 8 teachers to be also teaching 
in other grades.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
 “So, Standard 8, mainly you need to start earlier in the morning. For example, here we 
start at 6 o’clock with learners and knocking off daily is 5 o’clock.”138 
(Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12)  
An arrangement of subject specialisation at the senior standards seems to have unofficially 
been sanctioned and put into place by district and zonal authorities. However, this appeared 
to be largely absent when discussing the infant and junior standards. While the number of 
subjects being taught in these classes was smaller, class sizes were significantly larger than 
senior standard classes. One district official did seem amenable to the idea of subject 
specialisation at infant standards, with the proviso that the same teacher taught these 
subjects across all infant and junior classes: 
“You will find that this Standard 1 teacher is good in English. Why can’t we say that ‘You 
are good in English and the way you teach the learners are really grasping the subject. Will 
you teach in Standard 1, Standard 2, Standard 3 and Standard 4.’”  
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
However, this was a lone voice amongst the government stakeholders I interviewed. As an 
example, excess teachers in Zone 9 meant a number of schools were initiating subject 
specialisation at infant and junior standards. However, the PEA was actively against the 
practice of subject specialisation at these levels:  
“So, if a Primary Education Adviser arrives to find this happening we say ‘No don’t do that.’ 
When you turn your back, you find they are doing the same thing again. In Standard 1 they 
have only got six learning areas. Why should teachers teach three subjects?” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
In both School I and School Z the infant standards had one teacher allocated to them. The 
headteachers of both these schools held the opinion that the small number of subjects in 
these standards meant that these classes could be easily managed by one teacher alone:139 
 
138 These timings relate specifically to the Easter term when teachers prepare Standard 8 pupils for the PSLCE 
examination in May. 
139 This was despite the large differences in enrolment when comparing Standard 1 and Standard 8. 
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“But with the number of teachers there are at this time at this school…one teacher can 
manage to teach a [infant] class, because the content is not too much comparing to.…these 
senior classes.” 
 (Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
“Ah no, maybe because you know the content in those classes is very small and even one 
teacher can manage to teach that class alone.” 
(Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
In schools where teacher shortages existed, senior standard teachers expressed a similar 
position to the headteacher:  
“Just because we know in the lower classes there are three or four subjects, now, whereby 
in upper classes we have got so many subjects that are examinable.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
“Their [infant grade teacher] workload is not so high, not like what we have here in our 
classes. They can knock off [at] 11 or 12. But now us – [we] have longer hours and more to 
get through. So yes, more teachers to Standard 6 to 8, it should be better.” 
 (Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
The responses illustrates how the perception of infant standards being somewhat less 
demanding would appear to justify the way teacher allocation was being carried out. 
However, as Croft (2002) argues in her study, the lack of adequate classroom space or 
teaching and learning resources in the infant classes means that teachers must utilise 
greater levels of energy to engage the class, compared to teachers in senior classes, which 
are more likely to be adequately equipped with resources. The perspectives of infant 
standard teachers were that the allocation of teachers failed to take into account the large 
number of learners they had to manage by themselves:  
“One teacher – me! – to manage 250 plus students! Eeeh you can get tired. It becomes a 
problem to keep them engaged alone. And as you saw yourself, I cannot get through all of 
them in the class.”140 
 (Infant standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
“Just imagine in this class there are 105 [pupils]. In that class there is, like, 100 plus learners 
against one teacher. Can the learners learn? It cannot happen, they cannot learn.” 
 (Infant standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
So far in this subsection, I have discussed the practice of subject specialisation. I now move 
on to another form of specialisation – that of standard specialisation. In response to the 
question asking what decisions headteachers took into account when allocating teachers at 
 
140 This referred to the teacher checking the exercise books of all children to determine whether an exercise 
set in class had been correctly answered. 
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the school level, many discussed the National Reading Programme (NRP) 141 and 
Empowering Girls Through Education and Health (ASPIRE).142 These programmes have been 
rolled out across all primary schools in Malawi and are standard specific. According to 
district and local government officials, training in ASPIRE and NRP is undertaken according 
to where teachers are currently teaching in the primary school system: 
“As of now, we have the National Reading Programme, which is targeting Standards 1 to 4. 
The motive behind that is, if we train that teacher to be in Standard 1, the teacher maybe 
focuses much on that class and on the content.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“Because for example in this class, Standards 1, 2, 3, 4 – all the teachers we have trained 
them fully in this NRP programme.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
Headteachers, too, spoke about the importance of the ASPIRE and NRP programme in their 
decision-making: 
 “But nowadays….they have been taught the other methodologies [on] how to assist those 
learners to start reading while they are still in Standard 1. So, the PEA insist that those 
teacher[s] – they should not move to the other class.” 
(Deputy Headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
“First, when a teacher arrives, we have to interview him or her to see the past experiences, 
whether he or she has received training in NRP or what what [sic]. And see his or her 
documents and from there we have some of the little knowledge of that teacher.” 
(Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
Similarly, teachers discussed the importance of NRP and ASPIRE in the context of how they 
were allocated: 
 “Because what happens now with things like ASPIRE it’s like we are specialist. Specialist in 
senior class, specialist in infant class and so on and so forth.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
“Even the headteacher will ask ‘What class were you teaching there?’ Or they will 
communicate to another headteacher ‘Ah this one was teaching in the senior.’ So, that one 
will be senior forever.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
141 The NRP, which was rolled out nation-wide in 2016, aims to improve literacy skills in the infant and junior 
standards (Standards 1 to 4). It is led by MoEST with support from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Department for International Development (DfID). 
142 The ASPIRE project aims to improve the reading skills of girls in the senior standards (Standards 5 to 8) 
together with reducing the structural barriers to girls aged 10-19 years. It is a four-year USAID project that is 
being implemented by Save the Children. 
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However, specialisation was recognised as potentially creating further teacher shortages in 
the system: 
“Specialisation would create more challenges, because some schools may not have 
teachers of a particular subject and other schools, maybe, would only have teachers for the 
upper levels; no teachers for the lower level and all that.” 
 (District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Chapter 6 discussed the high numbers of teachers transferring between schools. This, 
together with how specialisation works in practice, has the potential to exacerbate the 
teacher shortage in primary education further.  Moreover, the responses reflect a huge 
disconnect between what government policy appears to instruct, and how it has been 
interpreted at the lower levels. 
9.2.3 The special status of Standard 8 
Data I analysed for Chapter 8 showed that even in schools where teacher shortages existed, 
the majority of Standard  8 classes appeared to have more than one teacher allocated to it. 
In the four schools I conducted my research in, these classes all had more than one teacher 
allocated to them. In School S and School Z, Standard 8 was the only class with more than 
one teacher allocated to it. 
Perhaps nowhere was this arrangement more notable than in School S, which had six 
teachers allocated across eight standards. The three teachers who were allocated to 
Standard 8 were also concurrently managing an infant or junior standard completely by 
themselves. The low enrolment of Standard 7 and Standard 8 in School S (38 pupils and 20 
pupils respectively) could have conceivably lent itself to allowing these classes to be 
combined and taught by one teacher. Instead, however, the arrangement appeared to 
affect the infant and junior standards negatively, whereby not only had one teacher been 
left to manage large numbers of pupils, but they also had to share their class teacher with 
Standard 7 and Standard 8.  
When I asked the headteacher of School S why teachers were allocated as they were, I was 




“These older students need more support from their teachers as we do have the zonal 
mocks to prepare them for.143 There is much more content to get through than there is for 
the younger ones.” 
(Headteacher, School S, Zone 12) 
When directly asked why, given the low enrolment numbers, Standard 7 and 8 could 
not be a multi-grade class, the headteacher bemusedly exclaimed: 
“One teacher for both these classes! For all the nine subjects! This would not be fair to the 
teacher neither for these learners.” 
(Headteacher, School S, Zone 12) 
When questioned why Standard 8 was allocated more teachers compared to other 
standards, the responses almost all related this back to the PSLCE pupils had to sit at the 
end of this particular standard:  
“It’s the exams! I think everybody just want[s] to concentrate [and] make sure their class do 
well in the MANEB144 exams.” 
 (District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“I think to some of these leaders [headteachers], what they look at is they say ‘These 
classes are examinable subjects.’ So, they need teachers to maybe to take few learning 
areas and then concentrate on those few learning areas so that they can teach easily.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
School stakeholders discussed the PSLCE grades, and type of secondary school pupils were 
selected for as being what the school’s performance was judged upon: 
“So, if the learners in Standard 8 perform poorly during the MANEB examinations, the 
school is regarded as if you are doing nothing at the school.” 
 (Senior standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
“Most of the time you find that Standard 8 or in the senior classes they will need more 
teachers to at least to teach more effectively, so that the learner should at least gain 
selection [to secondary school].” 
 (Headteacher, School S, Zone 12) 
 
 “OK, the school performance is judged according to how many learners have passed PSLCE. 
Those schools are judged according to….say, learners who were selected for national 
secondary school.” 
 (Senior standard teacher, School S, Zone 12) 
 
143 Zonal mocks refer to assessments done at the school level for Standard 5, Standard 6, Standard 7 and 
Standard 8, where the district prepares an exam for each of these standards and administers them at the 
school level. 
144 Malawi National Examinations Board. 
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The responses above appear to corroborate Watkins & Ashforth study on the political 
economy of schooling in rural Malawi, where “success [of a school] is measured by a single 
metric: passing the Standard 8 exam at the end of primary school” (2019; p. 23). Chapter 3 
synthesised examples in the Global South of performance-related pay relating to how well 
schools perform on national assessments. While such a system does not exist in Malawi, in 
at least two schools I undertook my research in good PSLCE performance reaped financial 
rewards for either the school or the teacher:145, 146  
 “Whenever learners have performed well in class, the school management committee, the 
headteacher, the PEA could arrange and present gifts to schools that have done well.” 
 (Senior standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
“If their child get[s] selected [for secondary school], the teacher is like a hero to the 
community. They [the community] do thank the teacher and the school, if their learners do 
well….Normally, through money or some other presents, like that.”  
 (Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
The responses reveal, how to many school stakeholders, the PSLCE results are indicative of a 
school’s performance and according to Barnett (2018), the quality of education. 
Conspicuously absent in any of the school stakeholder responses was any discussion of a 
school’s performance being judged on mastery of basic skills. Watkins & Ashworth found 
that among parents, there was no indication that the “mastery of basic skills, such as 
reading, writing or arithmetic, were valued for their own sake (2019; p. 23). In relation to my 
own study, the PEAs for both Zone 9 and Zone 12 commented upon this in relation to the 
headteachers:  
“I think to some of these leaders [headteachers] forget that they need to mould the 
learning from a young age. Instead, [they are] looking at the classes where they write the 
national examinations.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“Headteachers need to be sensitised about the first years [infant standards]. Indeed, it is a 
big challenge. Because, if learners are being cared for in the lower classes, I think they will 
move up.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
The prioritisation of Standard 8 by headteachers over other standards needs to be 
contextualised in terms of how education actors higher up in the system conceived of 
 
145 The PSLCE was also cited as a reason by school actors in School S and School Z in Chapter 7 for why the PEA 
distributed teaches between schools in the way that they were in Zone 12.  
146 Further clarification revealed that these were normally resources collected at the community level. 
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schools’ performance. When questioning district officials on the criteria used in deciding 
which schools should be inspected, they stressed the importance of the PSLCE result in 
influencing this: 
“When the National Examination Results are out we look at the performance of the schools 
and we will say ‘We have got problems in these schools. Will you please make sure that at 
any cost, we manage to visit these schools.’” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural District) 
This was corroborated by central level government officials, who, when discussing what 
criteria were used to select Malawi Education Sector Improvement Project (MESIP) districts, 
reported that this was largely based on districts with poor PSLCE results. 
As a concluding point to this subsection, monitoring tools within Malawi’s primary schooling 
system currently collect information on how well schools perform in the PSLCE assessment. 
The headteachers’ offices in all four schools contained chart information documenting the 
pass and selection rate of Standard 8 students. Omitted, however, was information 
regarding the number of children in other standards who progress throughout the system 
after taking end-of-year tests.  
9.2.4 Summary on specialisation in the primary school system  
In Section 9.2, the reasons why stakeholders believe subject and standard specialisation has 
permeated throughout Malawi’s primary education system has been discussed. While 
official government policy discourages specialisation, many of the stakeholders managing 
teachers in the system were sympathetic to this practice especially at the senior 
standards.147 
9.3 Weak monitoring and management of teachers  
9.3.1 Introduction 
Section 9.1 and Section 9.2 have discussed how the allocation and utilisation of teachers at 
the school level is often at odds with official government policy. The failure of double-shift 
teaching policies and the prevalence of team-teaching and subject specialisation have been 
important in explaining the trends identified in Chapter 8. The purpose of Section 9.3 is to 
 
147 While this is a point implicitly raised in this chapter and in Chapter 7, it should be noted that the main 
stakeholders responsible for the monitoring and management of teachers are ex-teachers themselves. This 
includes the DEM, Inspectors, the PEA and DEMIS/ ZEMIS officials. 
 
 236 
examine more specifically what accounts for the very weak relationships of accountability 
when managing teachers. 
9.3.2 Absent or weak advisory and inspection in the education system 
In this subsection, I focus specifically on the role of the inspectorate and advisory, who are 
“brokers connecting the Ministry with the schools” (Watkins & Ashforth, 2019; p. 43). 
Inspection has been “crucial in the management of education throughout its history” 
(Matola, 2005; p. 2). The changing nature of the Inspectorate and Advisory in relation to 
Malawi’s transition from a one-party to a multi-party political system is deemed useful to 
summarise briefly here.148 Under the one-party rule of ex-President Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda, school inspections were a process of fault-finding. According to one respondent, 
they were “something to be greatly feared” (Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9). The 
inspectorate, during this period, “lacked a human face,” was “extremely arrogant and 
threatening”, but ultimately ensured that teachers “conform[ed] and [taught] as was 
required by the Ministry” (Matola, 2005; p. 3). 
Under the multi-party system, however, the inspectorate was disbanded in a concerted 
effort to move it away from its authoritarian past. In its place came an advisory role, which 
was more concerned with teachers’ continued professional development.149 PEAs were 
managed by the Education Methods and Advisory Services (EMAS)150 at central head-
quarters to reflect these principles. However, one of the repercussions of this was that the 
“fear” teachers had of going against government policies gradually began to weaken:151 
“We always try to bring teachers in terms of democracy ‘Let’s share. Tell me what are your 
problems….Never be afraid of me, because if you are going to be afraid of me, you’ll not be 
able to work.’ Now, when it comes in terms of inspection, teachers are not afraid of that.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
The concern over the deteriorating quality of education services meant that EMAS 
reinstated the inspectorate in 2005. In 2010, it became the Department for Inspectorate 
 
148 This subsection on the history of the inspectorate was aided greatly by my discussions with Esme Kadzamira 
and Ken Longden, who imparted a great deal of knowledge for which I am grateful. 
149 While the roles changed, the same personnel who had once been inspectors were now primary education 
advisers. 
150 This department was created in 1995. 
151 The history of the inspectorate was not something that was addressed in in the interview guide. However, 
some participants did reflect on the changes in the primary education system, from when they were primary 
teachers themselves under the one-party system to the present.  
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and Advisory Services (DIAS) (GoM, 2015c). DIAS has two distinct functions: that of advisory 
and that of inspectorate. The responsibilities assigned to advisers were to “judge the extent 
to which schools [were] making progress.…[in] implementing the policies of central 
government” (GoM, 2015c; p. 18). Responsibilities assigned to inspectors, on the other 
hand, were to “evaluate the impact of MoEST policies, programmes and initiatives….on the 
quality of education provided by schools and colleges across the country” (ibid.).152  
Government regulations stipulate that a PEA is responsible for visiting each of the schools in 
their zone (typically numbering between 10-15 schools) between three and six times a year 
(GoM, 2015c). Inspectors, on the other hand, are meant to inspect a primary school at least 
once every two years.153 Unlike the PEA, who can visit the school in an advisory role by 
himself, a school being formally inspected must follow certain procedures. This includes a 
minimum number of inspectors being part of the inspection team: 
“So, a district should have about six [inspectors] and when they are doing the inspections, 
we recommend that they go in threes. So, basically it’s like two teams.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
 
“We are supposed to almost be 11 or 10, but we are only three [inspectors]….it’s been like 
that for three years now, because we started our work in 2015.”                                                                                                 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
One of the immediate problems identified was the shortage of inspection personnel needed 
to fulfil this stipulation. At the time I was conducting my fieldwork in Zomba Rural district, 
there were three inspectors based there. However, local and district officials highlighted 
how inspector numbers were expected to diminish further:  
“As of now there are only three inspectors. As I am talking now there are two – one has 
gone on retirement and maybe in two months’ time there will be only one. So, one or two 
cannot even inspect schools, according to the rules.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“We don’t have enough personnel to inspect. We have got two. One has retired and 
another one will be going soon.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural District) 
When asked what this would mean practically insofar as inspections go, government 
officials explained that inspectors would have to liaise with other inspectors from nearby 
 
152 Inspections are largely modelled on the OFSTED model in England  (Roebuck & Roebuck, 2010). 
153 Harrison (2002) estimates that a hypothetical district with 13 zones and 200 primary schools would require 
1,178 inspector days in order to inspect all 200 schools. 
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districts. This was to fulfil the requirement that inspections take place as part of a three-
person team. With inspector numbers also stretched in other districts, however, the 
consequence was an ever-shrinking inspector pool needed to inspect a greater number of 
schools. My conversation with the inspection team at Zomba Rural district indicated that 
the inspectorate is often required to go and inspect schools in other districts as part of their 
duties. This has meant schools in Zomba Rural going for years without being physically 
inspected: 
“We have had some schools that have gone three [or] four years without an inspector 
physically going there. And this is particularly important because, we do not have enough 
inspectors in the schools, in the districts.” 
(MoEST official, Central headquarters) 
 
“So, schools are going five, six years without anybody visiting them and consequently, now 
there is laxity on the part of teachers….in trying to make sure that things – like standards 
are being maintained in the schools.” 
 (District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
The nation-wide shortage of inspectors was contextualised in relation to decentralisation by 
one official. While inspection functions have formally been devolved to the district level, 
targets set to inspect schools in Zomba Rural district were difficult to implement due to 
orders from officials higher up in the system:  
“At district level we say ‘We plan to visit so many schools this month’, but suddenly, you 
receive a call to say ‘Can you come to Lilongwe? We want you to inspect schools in Salima 
or in Nsanje [district].’ So, that disturbs us.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
This example of “pseudo” decentralisation reflects some of the findings from previous 
studies that were discussed in detail in Chapter 4. These have reported the reluctance of the 
Ministry of Education to cede power to local education authorities (Chimombo, 2008; 
Chiweza, 2010; Thomas, 2017). This sentiment was reflected in district responses in matters 
pertaining to inspection priorities: 
“I just feel the officers at the Ministry level do not want to release their powers and 
responsibilities to say maybe this can be devolved to the districts. They still want to hold 
onto the system.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Aside from the inspectorate suffering a shortage of personnel, another problem identified 
by central and district officials was the lack of training inspectors receive: 
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“But this training [that inspectors receive] was only for one day. It was not a training as 
such. It was an orientation on how to use the forms for inspection.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“A problem we face is having training to make sure the inspectorate teams are really 
monitoring the standards efficiently in schools.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
Inspection of schools is undertaken according to the National Education Standards launched 
by the Ministry of Education in 2015. In total, there are 26 standards that fall under three 
areas154 (GoM, 2015b).The aim of the Standards “is to specify both minimum requirements 
and what constitutes effective practice in educational provision and practice” (GoM, 2015b; 
p. 4).  
Of the 26 standards, that which most closely aligns to the discussion of this chapter relates 
to Standard 21 (Staff deployment and management). Standard 21 requires, at a minimum, 
that “teachers are on time for school and classes and are rarely absent” and “where teachers 
work together to support classes, they both take active roles in helping students to learn” 
(see Appendix Table A.9 and Appendix Table A.10). However, while there are 26 standards, 
the inspection teams currently only focus on assessing certain standards prioritised by 
MoEST, which are specifically to do with raising learning outcomes:  
“So, we wanted them to concentrate on these areas first…. plus looking at the way which 
inspections are done. We cannot do an inspection based on all the 26 standards. It would 
take us a whole month in a school.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
Education Standard 21 is not currently one of the standards assessed during school 
inspections. When questioned who monitored elements relating to team teaching practices 
as set out under Education Standard 21, ministry officials cited the importance of the PEA in 
addressing areas covered under other standards not inspected: 
“When the PEA goes into the schools, he is able to look at that perspective as to what is 
going on in the school. So, yeah, he may touch on other standards that when the inspectors 
– when they go – they are not able to fully focus on these.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
 
154 These are 1. Student outcomes that should be achieved as a result of being at school (six standards), 2. 
Teaching process that leads to students achieving these outcomes (eight standards) and 3. Leadership and 
management processes that are necessary for good teaching and learning to take place (12 standards). 
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Interviews with school actors also revealed the PEA being seen as an authority figure in 
curbing school practices that led to larger class sizes. During discussion around the 
combining of classes at School B, for instance, the school figures indicated that the PEA’s 
visits led to temporary change:  
“When the PEA says it, it works. The teachers split the classes – but after a while, it happens 
that it starts again.” 
 (Deputy headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
“When the officials come they do that. They divide the class and someone is taking learners 
to the other class. But when the officials are out of the school, they combine again, that is 
what usually happens.” 
 (Senior standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
Likewise, the change in how the timetable was being taught to the Standard 4 class in 
School I was temporarily rectified during the PEA’s supervisory visit to the school:  
“But the PEA doesn’t allow that. Most of the times when he comes, he can scold me [and 
say] ‘Why won’t your teachers listen?’ And it changes, but not for long.”  
(Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
Both PEAs, as is the norm, travelled to their school visits by motorbike. In Zone 9, the 
furthest school from the Teacher Development Centre (TDC)155 is 11 kilometres away, while 
in Zone 12 the equivalent is at 14 kilometres distance. A challenge identified by ministry 
government officials when questioned about the problems that PEAs (and inspectors) faced, 
was the inability to conduct school visits due to the lack of resources for fuel, together with 
the poor maintenance of their primary means of transportation:  
“The other challenge for both inspectors and the advisers that we have now is their 
mobility. Most of them were given motorcycles, but most of these have broken down and 
the districts are, maybe, not maintaining those.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
 
“There is an issue of funding where, OK, the motorbikes are there, but the DEMs are not 
giving them fuel to go and visit the schools. So yeah, people are just sitting in the offices 
without working.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
The PEAs of both zones reported how they had failed to make the minimum number of 
visits, as stipulated under government guidelines. Resources constraints were explained as a 
 
155 The TDC refers to the office where the PEA’s office is based in the zone. 
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reason for why schools were irregularly inspected, together with other PEA responsibilities, 
as was highlighted by the PEA of Zone 9: 
“As PEAs we are also supposed to be given – we call them Zonal Improvement Grants – 
every year. Unfortunately, we have stayed three if not four years without receiving these. 
It’s just this year when we have been given this.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“As we have remained without it [Zonal Improvement Grant], it impede[s] many of our 
activities. Supervision of schools in my zone, providing training to headteachers, SMCs and 
PTAs at [the] TDC.”  
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
Both PEAs confirmed that the lack of resources to purchase fuel was particularly 
problematic when visiting schools that were a considerable distance away from the TDC 
where they were based: 
“Now schools like School I, they are very far away. What we do is we need to visit such 
schools maybe at a very good time.156 Sometimes the teachers take it as an advantage ‘We 
are very far away; he cannot come here to supervise us.’” 
 (Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“It is easier for the schools that are nearer to the TDC. For example, this [school next to 
TDC], I can come here without planning to come here. Because, if I find out I have no fuel, I 
cannot go to the farthest school. The only option is to come here and supervise.” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
In both the case of inspectors and PEAs, the responses revealed how underfunding was a 
challenge to providing effective advisory and inspection services. Regarding which, it is 
important to relate back to the neo-patrimonial political system that Malawi sits under. As 
discussed at length in Chapter 4, several global studies have proposed that access reforms 
are preferred by the national elite over those focusing on quality-enhancing reforms, which 
would include expenditures relating to an improved school inspectorate and better 
monitoring systems (Hickey & Hossain, 2019; Kingdon et al., 2014). 
Aside from resources, the lack of training that PEAs are given was also identified by central 
and district government officials when questioned about the challenges faced by PEAs in 
carrying out their official responsibilities:  
 
156 Further clarification as to what “good time” referred to confirmed that this relates to when the road is 
passable, which is normally outside of the rainy season.  
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“You know the PEAs that we have they are not trained. They start working and if at all we 
give them training, it’s not on a regular basis. We don’t come back to get feedback from 
them.”  
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
 
“Even academically they need to be upgraded to degree level. Um, because as it is now, I 
don’t think their level of thinking is up to date. They may have the experience of teaching, 
but in terms of planning for their zones activities, I don’t think they are capable of that.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Central and district government officials also discussed how PEAs have been recruited from 
a cadre of primary school teachers. This is not dissimilar to what was identified in Chapter 7 
in relation to District and Zonal Education Management Information System (D/ZEMIS) 
officers, who were mostly ex-primary school teachers. Officials pointed to the blurred lines 
of accountability between PEAs and those they managed:  
“PEAs are basically teachers, so we take them from the teachers pool. Give them a little in-
service training on the job that they are supposed to be doing. So, they are basically 
teachers also.” 
 (District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“At the same time, some of them are junior to the headteacher. So, you don’t go and 
supervise your senior, ideally. So, that again is a systemic challenge.” 
 (District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“Some of them are even junior to the headteacher that they are going to advise.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
 
“PEAs would be [Grade] TJ157….Some, they have been picked as acting positions, so they 
may not have reached TJ. But the pool, they will take mostly from senior teachers.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
In Chapter 3, the reviewed literature discussed the importance of inequality and the large 
power distance, which characterise social relationships in Malawi (Booth et al., 2006). 
Davies et al. point out that the “Malawi Civil Service….is characterised by a strict and 
hierarchical grading which ought to lead to clear lines of accountability” (2003; pg. 148). The 
interview responses above regarding the PEAs pay-grade being below or equal to that of 
headteachers illustrates the opposite, and potentially leads to the problem of low power 
distance and something that is emblematic of the decentralisation experience in Malawi. In 
terms of the latter point, officials who should have received a salary-scale upgrade at sub-
 
157 The interviewee indicated that the salary grade was TJ. This would be the equivalent grade to a “principal 
teacher.” Personal emoluments information I managed to source for the 2017/18 budget year indicated that 
PEAs in Zomba Rural district were all on a lower pay-grade TI (the equivalent grade to a “chief teacher”). 
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national levels of government were, instead, being informed by central government that, 
“there were ‘no vacancies at this level’” (ibid.). 
9.3.3 Headteachers are failing to implement government policies 
Subsection 9.3.2 presented an overview of why the Inspectorate and Advisory arm of the 
primary schooling system has failed to curtail school-level practices that negatively affect 
the allocation and utilisation of teachers. In this subsection, the focus is on the role of the 
headteacher in terms of shedding light on the failures relating to the enforcement of 
government policies.  
Within the various roles and responsibilities attributed to actors in the education system, 
one of the main headteacher responsibilities is to manage teachers effectively and to ensure 
that they are in class and teaching (Watkins & Ashforth, 2019). This was confirmed by 
government officials, who argued that it was headteachers who were ultimately responsible 
for stopping practices leading to large class sizes and poor utilisation of teachers:  
“The headteacher – that’s his job. He should not let the teachers be combining the classes. 
OK, if one is sick then I would understand. But if everyone is at the school – no they are not 
supposed to do it.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
 
“The headteacher has got the power to give a warning letter to the teacher. Advising 
‘would you please dismantle your class?’ and if the teacher does not heed to the warning, 
he may give a written warning and at the same time report him to the office.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“That is what I am saying that [with] some teachers, the headteacher should come with 
force and say as if we are at a military, like, ‘Do this.’”158 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
When asking government officials what they perceived were the main reasons for certain 
practices relating to teacher allocation and utilisation failing to be stamped out, the aversion 
to headteachers taking on their responsibilities was regularly cited:  
“So, it’s the headteachers, maybe, that are bringing in the laxity, because they cannot 
control their teachers.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
 
“Some of our headteachers do not want to take these nasty responsibilities. That’s a 
cause!” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
158 On this occasion, he was speaking about School B, where classes were being combined even where there 




“Yes, they don’t want to take responsibility for that, for fear of being marked as a difficult 
headteacher. They may leave the situation, the prevailing situation like that and say ‘OK, 
when the DEM comes, he will find out for himself. I will leave you like that.’” 
(Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
Headteachers, however, offered a different perspective to that offered by government 
officials when questioned why they were unable to eradicate such practices. Rather than 
presenting it as a shirking of their responsibilities, they criticised the lengthy bureaucratic 
procedure when headteachers report teachers’ behaviour to senior officials: 
“Our powers are limited, because generally, when we report the matter to the PEA, and the 
PEA has not also the final say. So, the final say is in the hands of the DEM. Because of that 
long channel, it is difficult sometimes to manage [teachers].” 
(Headteacher, School I, Zone 9) 
 
“It needs to go through to the PEA – the matter then goes to the DEM. And the DEM is also 
very busy, so time lapses and because of that some [teachers] do not take it serious[ly].” 
(Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
Discipline can be defined “as actions or behaviours on the part of authorities in an 
organization aimed at restraining all behaviours that threaten to disrupt the functioning 
of the organization” (Dzimbiri, 2016; p. 88). While headteachers alluded to the problem 
of the disciplinary process being too lengthy, district officials also referred to the limited 
control they had in disciplining teachers: 
“Demotions, interdictions,159 promotions – all  of this we do not have control over. So 
somehow – my personal view – [is that] we are failing to deal with our troublesome 
teachers here.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
 
“In cases of teacher wrong-doing, we here [at the district] are able to move them to 
another school. But beyond that, that is left to our colleagues at the central level.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
As stated in government documentation, the “[d]ecentralization Policy of 1998 has no 
implications on the disciplinary process as provided under the Government Teaching Service 
Regulations. The Responsible Officer (RO) still remains the Secretary for Education, even at 
local level” (GoM, n.d.; p. 1). Limited district-level powers under decentralisation to mete 
out punishments to school actors was further compounded with the vacant position of the 
 
159 Interdiction in the context of this conversation turned out to be a form of punishment that would lead to a 
civil servant having a certain proportion of his or her pay docked for a given period of time.  
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Principal Human Resource Officer at the district level. The responsibility160 of the person in 
such a position would be to administer teacher punishment: 
“Because they are conversant with the Malawi Public Services Regulation,161 they have to 
say ‘No’ to this teacher, if he has gone wrong. We have to follow this way of punishing this 
teacher and trying to warn him and so on and so-forth.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
Aside from decentralisation making it problematic to mete out punishment to teachers, in 
one interview response the discussion turned to how disciplinary action against teachers is 
negatively affected by political interference. In a discussion around discipline and teacher 
absenteeism it was intimated that the presence of political interference appeared 
motivated by political patronage and “vote-buying”: 
“Politicians who would just like to get mere political mileage by supporting other worthless 
people to advance their political ambitions. For example, here teachers who are always 
absent from school, they don’t prepare. When you….give them warning letters and you 
speak against their bad behaviour they will go to the politician.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
In past elections, teachers and headteachers have also been recruited as polling staff, 
returning officers and presiding officers. According to numerous reports, some teachers and 
headteachers were implicated in the irregularities that marred the 2019 national elections. 
Another district official who had previously worked in the then-President’s district in 
Thyolo,162 discussed teachers going to politicians when the then-DEM of Thyolo district had 
instigated stricter disciplinary measures. Due to this, as the official explained, political forces 
caused the DEM to be transferred to the less desirable district of Mangochi:  
“They will go to the politician and say they have done A, B, C, D and E. Trying to implicate 
the DEM….because of his strictness.” 




160 The Principal Human Resource Officer is also the person responsible for taking forward serious or persistent 
cases of teacher misconduct to officials at central headquarters.  
161 These refer to 26 acts that a civil servant would be considered guilty of. Within the education sector, the 
Government Teaching Service Regulations has adopted all the misconduct actions identified under the MPSR 
and added one more misconduct type unique to teachers, thus bringing the total up to 27 (GoM, n.d.). 
162 At the time of my fieldwork, Peter Wa Mutharika was the President of Malawi (2014-2019). His brother, 
Bingu Wa Mutharika, had been President of Malawi between 2004 and 2012. The home district of both these 
Presidents was Thyolo district. 
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“When he tried to discipline other teachers, the teachers instigated a situation, whereby 
Stephen163 [the DEM] was removed from Thyolo to Mangochi. But looking at the issues, 
Stephen was just doing his professional duties.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
It is useful to apply this sub-national government perspective to the context of Dzimbiri’s 
(2016) discussion on the Malawi Public Service Regulation, which lists absenteeism as one of 
26 acts of misconduct amongst civil servants. At higher levels of the government system, the 
findings of the 2014 Public Service Review Commission noted, “there is fear by Senior 
Government officials of their juniors as well as lack of respect by junior staff of their 
superiors” (cited in Dzimbiri, 2016; p. 89). This has led to “unregulated 
absenteeism….leading to….a negative impact on delivery of services” (ibid.). 
Besides the challenge of discipline discussed above, the lack of training headteachers 
received concerning how teachers should be allocated and utilised was identified as being 
problematic. Currently, no formal policy is in place to direct how headteachers should 
allocate teachers to different classes. This is compounded by what both the PEAs identified 
as the lack of training and skills available for headteachers to implement this effectively: 
“It is to do with leadership at school level. There is no document which prohibits them from 
doing that.164 It’s to do with the way they do their planning. I don’t think they have that 
advance level of skills to do planning.” 
 (Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9) 
 
“We have noted that a good number of the challenges we are facing in the primary schools 
are coming in because of the overall management at school level. We appoint people to 
become headteachers, but we don’t capacitate them.” 
 (Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12) 
Government officials at the central level verified that the MESIP is the only training that 
specifically trains headteachers on how teachers should be allocated within schools. 
Component 3.1 of the MESIP states that headteachers, deputy headteachers and PEAs 
should be given training on resource management at the school level. One of the issues 
pertains to the allocation of teachers within schools. During interviews with Ministry 
officials, I was informed that this component of MESIP had been delayed in starting and was 
anyhow only applicable to the MESIP districts. 
 
163 Name changed. 
164 This related to discussion specifically around why headteachers are failing to allocate teachers in such a way 
so as to allow teachers to teach certain subjects across multiple standards.  
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However, the MESIP project is restricted to eight of the 32 education districts and does not 
currently include Zomba Rural district: 
“You know, MESIP is about school leadership and training headteachers….and one of the 
issues is about the allocation of teachers. Unfortunately, it’s just about 1,100 headteachers 
who will be trained.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
Beyond the responses discussed so far, an underlying theme relating to why certain 
practices forbidden by government were continuing to occur was the power dynamics 
between headteachers and teachers. These dynamics at the school level appear to reflect 
Dzimbiri’s quote above, which highlights the insubordination of junior staff towards their 
superiors.  
These were identified as occurring due to several reasons. The first was the duration a 
teacher may have served in a school versus that of a headteacher.165 In School B, for 
instance, the deputy headteacher recounted to me the unsuccessful efforts to separate 
classes in Standard 2 and Standard 4. She attributed teacher resistance to the length of time 
some of the teachers had been teaching at the school166 compared to the more recent 
appointment of both her and the headteacher: 
“Most of the teachers they have stayed here long. So, they are not taking it as if it is a place 
of working, but just a place that it’s like their home. So, like I am a new person. So, when I 
am telling them other things, they are just saying ‘We can’t do this way, we will do this 
way.’” 
(Deputy headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
Similarly, in School I the senior standard teacher recalled how after arriving at the school, 
the headteacher made attempts to curtail the combining of classes:  
“He [the headteacher], he didn’t want us teachers who were sharing a class with our 
colleagues to be outside the classroom. ‘No’ he said ‘You must assist the one who is 
teaching to be managing that class.’” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
However, the teacher explained that this was unsuccessful as all the teachers aligned 
themselves against the headteacher, who was newly appointed: 
 
165 In two of the four schools that I conducted my fieldwork in, the headteacher was relatively new and had 
been in place for less than one year. 
166 While government policy states that teachers should not be teaching in the same school for more than five 
years, the PEA often fails to transfer teachers from schools where they have been teaching for a time in excess 
of this.  
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“Teachers made an alliance, so all the teachers ganged up against him. At least for a month 
or two months, at least he has changed.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
A second reason identified as to why teachers may disobey headteachers was related to the 
teacher’s proximity to people of influence. In the case of School B, the well-connectedness 
of some teachers167 was one of the reasons identified by school actors for why classes in 
Standard 2 continued to be combined:  
“Some of our teachers here are married to government people in town. These are our 
bosses’ bosses. So, of course, asking these teachers to change their ways is sometimes 
difficult [trails off]…. but anyway we are trying.” 
 (Headteacher, School B, Zone 9) 
 
“Some of our teachers here, they are not serious. If the [school] management or PEA’s 
office instructs them to do something against their will, eeh! They can refuse. But it is 
because of who they know.” 
 (Infant standard teacher, School B, Zone 9) 
Thirdly, interviews with both teachers interviewed in School Z revealed that the 
headteacher was not seen as a figure of authority in the same way as other principals in the 
system were perceived:  
“So this PEA does not play, he can ask you to write a report, he can give you any discipline 
at any time. But the headteacher – we are used to being with him for a long time, so we 
take advantage of that.” 
 (Infant standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
 
“You know this PEA it’s the same as a relationship with a son and a dad. A dad is so cruel 
most of time. But with the headteacher it is like a mother-son relationship – no cruelty.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12)  
This could partly be related to the pay-grade of the headteacher of School Z being the same 
as a newly recruited teacher (discussed further down). In using the “mother-father” 
analogy, the teacher interviewed was insinuating that while a dad is willing to use physical 
punishment in certain instances on his children, a mother would not be. Relating this 
analogy back to the education system, the teacher’s perception appears to be that the PEA 
is more willing – or indeed more able – to execute punitive measures against a teacher than 
the headteacher.  
 
167 Chapter 7 discussed how the strong connections that some of these teachers to the local elite also allowed 




Discussing further the reason why teachers did not feel answerable to the headteacher, one 
respondent linked this directly to seeing himself as accountable to those who recruited him, 
rather than the headteacher, who was an “inferior” boss: 
“Most of the teachers don’t obey. I think most of the time they look down upon the 
headteacher. They may say ‘The PS [Principle Secretary] is the one who recruited me, so you 
are not my boss.’ So, the headteacher is an inferior boss.” 
(Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
This raises an important and wider point about the pseudo implementation of 
decentralisation, and the negative effects this has on relationships of accountability. While 
the discussion above prefaces it in the context of headteacher-teacher relations, other 
studies have considered how the centralised recruitment of teachers in Malawi has 
weakened district-teacher relationships of accountability (Chimombo, 2008; Thomas, 2017).  
Above, teachers discussed some of the reasons for their insubordination towards 
headteachers. Government officials raised this matter further in the context of how 
headteachers were not formally appointed to their roles:  
“We are having a lot of headteachers that are acting. So, some of them are not very strict, 
because maybe they are afraid of their fellow teachers. [The teachers] say ‘Why are you 
being harsh to us. You are acting. You are not even the headteacher.’” 
 (District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
The pay-grade of a headteacher when formally appointed should be four grades higher than 
that of a teacher starting out in the education system (Appendix Table A.11). None of the 
headteachers in any of the 26 schools I collected information in either Zone 9 or Zone 12 
had the pay-grade officially designated to a headteacher. Data given to me on salary grades 
at Zomba Rural district as a whole indicate that just nine names corresponded to the 
headteacher grade (TH). Of the four case study schools, the headteachers’ pay-grade in 
School B, School I and School S was the equivalent to that of a senior teacher. This is just 
one grade up from the pay-grade of a teacher who has only just entered the profession. In 
School Z, the headteacher’s pay-grade was the same as a teacher just starting out in the 
primary teaching profession (Appendix Table A.12). Compounding the problem was the low 
numbers of teachers who succeed in getting promoted:  
“It has not been very easy for most of the teachers, because some teachers have attended 
interviews four times without being promoted….So, I can say in Zomba we have a 
challenge, because very few teachers have been promoted yearly.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
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Which, according to the same official, translated into poor school leadership: 
“So, it’s very difficult for us….because we have many headteachers at the lowest grade. So, 
it’s very difficult to give leadership to a school according to the policy.” 
(District Education Office official, Zomba Rural district) 
This reflects a similar discussion to that in Subsection 9.3.2 in relation to the PEA. The low 
pay-grades not only causes problems relating to leadership, but given that the majority of 
teachers and headteachers fall under the lowest pay-grade the threat of demotion as a form 
of sanction is also difficult to implement in practice. As one teacher put it, the actual 
punishment meted out to teachers where it occurs is not enough to change behaviour:  
“it’s just a slight punishment…maybe like giving a punishment to a relative. The punishment 
does not force people to change.” 
(Infant Grade Teacher, School I, Zone 9) 
Where large-scale teacher promotions have occurred in the past, this appears to have been 
linked to issues of political patronage. Chapter 3 discussed how, under Joyce Banda’s 
presidency, technocrats at the Ministry of Education were instructed by the political elite to 
promote all 20,000 teachers at PT4 grade prior to the 2014 election (Dzimbiri, 2016). More 
recently, in the run-up to the 2019 National Elections, over 15,000 primary school teachers 
at grades TK, TJ and TH were promoted (Muheya, 2019).  According to one central 
government official, Joyce Banda’s sudden policy announcement severely delayed the 
recruitment of newly graduated IPTE teachers due to the cap on the wage bill:  
“The monies….used to promote the current, or existing, teachers in the system….created a 
gap in terms of financing the recruitment of the teachers who had graduated. And since 
that time up to now. it’s still a challenge, because we have been failing to employ all the 
teachers that we have trained.” 
(MoEST official, Central head-quarters) 
A last reason identified for headteachers being unable to discipline teachers related to staff 
shortages in the system. In Subsection 9.1.4, the headteacher of School I discussed how the 
fear of losing a teacher from his school was why he condoned teachers not working every 
day. Teachers discussed how this teacher insubordination went largely unpunished due to 
the headteacher’s fear that this would lead to the school to losing teachers:  
“If this headteacher will report more negatives about his teachers, then maybe the PEA can 
decide to remove more teachers. It will mean the school will go back to the understaffed 
status. So, most of the headteachers will just try to discuss with the teachers.” 




“It is with difficulty that teachers stay here at School Z, you know? So, the headteacher 
knows this, his boss [the PEA] knows this. If teachers are forced, they will find ways to leave 
[to another school].” 
(Infant grade teacher, School Z, Zone 12) 
Apart from the headteacher in School I, no headteacher interviewed linked the inability to 
stop practices contrary to government policies with the systemic challenge of teacher 
shortages. However, in Chapter 7 three of the four headteachers did complain about the 
teacher shortages that their schools were suffering from.168  
9.3.4 Summary on weak management of teachers  
In Section 9.3 some of the main weaknesses education officials responsible for managing 
teacher allocation and utilisation face when trying to implement official government policies 
around these issues have been uncovered. These have been related back to challenges 
concerning human capacity and resource constraints. Beyond these factors, stakeholders 
identified the resistance principals (DEM, Inspectors, PEA and headteachers) face from 
teachers in being able to implement these policies effectively.  
Conclusion 
In Chapter 8, the main trends relating to the ways in which teachers were being allocated 
and utilised within schools were presented. These were found to be to the detriment of 
equity and efficiency considerations. The purpose of Chapter 9 was to explore the main 
underlying reasons behind these trends. The availability of infrastructure, the practice of 
specialisation and the broader structural issues weakening the effective management over 
teacher allocation and utilisation were all found to be important causes. In respect to how 
the poor management of teacher allocation and utilisation specifically relate to Levy-
Walton’s conceptual framework, the findings from this chapter reveal a number of things.  
The characteristics of Malawi’s national political settlement appear to have directly affected 
teacher allocation and utilisation at the school level. Clientelism has led to the politicisation 
over how public resources are used, which has had a direct impact upon headteachers’ 
decisions concerning the allocation of teachers within schools. This supports previous 
research undertaken in this area (Chiweza & Waldock, 2011; Chiweza, 2016). Political 
 
168 This is a similar to the discussion in Chapter 7, where it was found that the PEA’s control over teacher 
deployment was hampered by the power of the teachers themselves. This was due to the uncertainty the PEA 




interference was also identified by district officials when discussing the use of punitive 
measures against teachers. Where this was raised, this appeared to pertain to the intent of 
strengthening relationships of patronage between local politicians and teachers.  
The second set of findings relate to the challenges identified by district, local and school 
level actors in effectively enforcing government policies regarding the allocation and/ or 
utilisation of teachers. A number of reasons were acknowledged, including the power 
dynamics between principals and agents (in particular headteachers and teachers); the 
delegation-finance failure (Pritchett, 2015);169 and decentralisation failing to give sub-
national level actors the powers to implement policy more effectively.  
The third set of findings concern the poor monitoring of government policies relating to 
allocation and/ or utilisation of teachers through the inspectorate and advisory arm of the 
education system being severely challenged. These appear to mainly relate back to the 
shortage of resources and capacity in terms of regularly and effectively carrying out 
inspections and supervisions. This aligns with what previous studies have concluded, which 
is that under competitive clientelist political regimes, the political elite prefer to invest 
resources in visible areas that promote their standing, such as access, rather than 
investments that can improve quality (Hickey & Hossain, 2019; Kingdon et al., 2014). 
In Chapter 10, the discussion moves on to what the findings presented in this and the last 
three chapters reveal in relation to teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation. This is 
considered in the context of the conceptual framework used for the study, and the extent to 





169 This relates to Pritchett’s discussion of incoherence within education systems (2015), which was discussed 
in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 10: Discussion of the results 
Chapter purpose and structure 
This study set out to provide an understanding of the reasons why the inequitable 
distribution of teachers to and within schools has continued to persist in Malawi.  Chapter 6 
presented the trends relating to teacher deployment between schools. Chapter 7 explained 
the reasons for these trends through the perspectives of stakeholders at different levels of 
the education system. Chapter 8 presented the trends relating to teacher allocation within 
schools, and their utilisation. Chapter 9 sought to elucidate why these trends occur through 
interviews with key education stakeholders. The purpose of Chapter 10 is to bring together 
and discuss the main overarching findings of this thesis. This is pursued by considering their 
relevance to the conceptual framework, together with how these relate to previous studies 
undertaken on teacher management, particularly in relation to Malawi.  
The chapter is arranged as follows. Section 10.1 revisits the Levy-Walton Framework which 
was discussed in Chapter 4 and discusses what part of the framework was suitable for this 
study. Section 10.2 then goes onto discuss the four main overarching conclusions which can 
be drawn from the data overall and how these specifically relate to the Levy-Walton 
Framework. These conclusions are interrogated specifically in relation to the characteristics 
of Malawi’s national political settlement, and how these ultimately have impacted upon the 
governance of teachers at sub-national levels of government. 
10.1 Revisiting the Levy-Walton conceptual framework and its 
application to findings of this thesis 
The conceptual framework used for this study was discussed at length in Chapter 4. The 
central premise of this framework considers service delivery outcomes from the perspective 
of: 
1. A country’s particular political settlement and how this manifests itself upon a 
particular sector and at the various levels of governance through the enforcement 
and monitoring of rules.  
2. A diagnosis of organisational behaviour within the overall system and across 
different sectors and different levels of governance. 
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The design of this study has been specifically focused on Point 1 above in relation to the 
governance of teacher deployment, utilisation and allocation in Malawi. This was 
undertaken with a focus on Zomba Rural district, the zonal levels of government and the 
level of the school (see Chapter 5).  
10.2 What have been the main findings of this thesis 
10.2.1 Introduction 
Chapters 6 to 9 presented the findings relating to what this thesis was primarily interested 
in interrogating, which would lead to greater understanding of what accounted for the 
persistence in inequity and inefficiency in how primary teachers were being deployed, 
allocated and utilised. The four overarching findings identified in the data are: 
1. Political interference in matters relating to teacher management (10.2.2) 
2. Unequal distribution of power between central and sub-national government 
adversely affecting teacher management (10.2.3) 
3. Poor information and inspection systems contributing to poor implementation of 
teacher management strategies (10.2.4) 
4. Absent, weak or contradictory policies contributing to greater discretionary decision-
making powers relating to teacher management (10.2.5) 
The following subsections discuss each of these in turn and how they relate to the 
conceptual framework used for this study as well as the existing literature on the particular 
area of teacher management this thesis has been focused on. Throughout this chapter, the 
discussion makes specific reference to Figure 4.4, which illustrates the conceptual 
framework, as was presented in Chapter 4. The findings are related back to the particular 
parts of the framework they apply to, which are presented in this chapter in green text for a 
more transparent mapping to the framework. 
10.2.2 Political interference in matters relating to teacher management  
Main findings 
The first main finding of this thesis is how political interference in matters relating to 
resource allocation has negatively affected the way in which teachers have been deployed, 
allocated and utilised. This was largely discussed in reference to nepotism. Teachers’ 
personal connections with the local and national political elite was overwhelmingly found to 
have had adverse consequences for the equitable deployment of teachers. Elsewhere, 
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however, it was areas or schools with some sort of connection to politicians that were found 
to either have benefited from additional teachers or else, attracted the types of resources 
that traditionally make certain schools more appealing to teach at. While nepotism was 
found to be the context within which political interference was the most prevalent, several 
examples of such interference in teacher management issues appear to have been 
motivated by matters of patronage and vote-buying. This was both in regard to teacher 
deployment and teacher utilisation. 
How these findings relate to the Levy-Walton Framework 
The issue of political interference in matters to do with teacher management can be related 
back the overarching focus of the Levy-Walton framework. This pertains to the 
”characteristics of a country’s national political settlement” and how these manifest at 
various levels of governance. In relation to political interference, it is useful briefly to remind 
the reader of some of the attributes of a competitive clientelist state, which is of relevance 
to this particular finding. The first is that the governance of the public bureaucracy is around 
norms relating to nepotism, clientelism and patronage. The second is that political parties 
are organised around transferring patronage to inside clients (Levy, 2014). This has been 
discussed at length in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. Specifically in relation to this thesis, I found 
that these characteristics of Malawi’s political settlement were strong drivers for political 
interference in teacher management issues.  
The issue of political interference relates directly back to the part of the framework that 
focuses on “engagement by external stakeholders.” The formalised roles assigned to 
bureaucrats concerning teacher distribution, allocation and utilisation at different levels of 
the system were explored in relation to this external engagement. Particularly in relation to 
teacher deployment, my findings illustrate the negative effects of interference by external 
stakeholders, which include politicians, along with other members of the local elite.  
This relates to a third part of the framework reflected upon in Figure 4.4, which considers 
the influence of “informal internal power structures” in being able to enforce rules and/or 
policies concerning teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation. Official power structures 
relating to teacher management, as shall be discussed in Subsection 10.2.3, are still 
overwhelmingly concentrated at the level of central government. The thesis findings would 
appear to suggest that this distribution of power means that even where district officials 
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have jurisdiction over certain teacher functions, politicians (and other members of the elite) 
can over-turn this either directly or through officials in central government.   
The extent to which these findings corroborate or differ from previous research 
The revelation of political interference in matters relating to teacher management aligns 
with what previous research in Malawi has found, particularly in regard to teacher 
deployment (Asim et al., 2017; Ndalama & Chidalengwa, 2010). These studies, however, 
concluded that political interference in matters pertaining to teacher deployment issues are 
due to nepotistic relationships, “rather than political patronage or clientelist vote-buying” 
(Asim et al., 2017; p. 20). This reflects what Bennell & Akyeampong (2007) concluded, which 
was that the politicisation of the teaching force is less of a systematic problem in the sub-
Saharan African region. 
It is certainly true there is less evidence to be able to generalise that systematic 
relationships of patronage between teachers and politicians are as institutionalised as, say, 
those in South Asia (Béteille, 2009; Bari et al., 2016). However, my findings do point to 
particular instances where political interference was deemed to be expedient due to 
teachers being viewed as a potentially important voting bloc. These matters included the 
potential change to the rural hardship allowance policy, a pattern of promoting teachers 
nearer to election time and the sanctioning of district officials for punishing teachers.170   
My findings on how nepotism specifically affects teacher deployment differ from these 
previous studies owing to the fact that I probed beyond teachers’ personal connections with 
the political elite. The social capital of a school/geographic area in terms of its connections 
with the political elite is a less well-explored issue in terms of teacher distribution. The data 
provided evidence to support this capital as influencing how teachers themselves are 
distributed and/or how resources act as a “pull” factor as to where a teacher would want to 
work. 
Elsewhere, my thesis also offers a new perspective on political interference by extending 
the discussion to the sort of repercussions district government officials may face should 
they disobey political actors. Booth et al. (2005) and Casley-Hayford et al. (2007) have 
 
170 And as an addendum to the fieldwork, in the run-up to the 2019 Presidential Elections 20,000 primary and 
secondary school teachers were promoted.  This was similar to the 2014 election, when almost 20,000 primary 
school teachers were promoted shortly before elections took place (Dzimbiri, 2016). 
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discussed the fear of victimisation bureaucrats feel in the context of the sub-Saharan African 
region more broadly. However, my thesis narrows this specifically to what the ramifications 
are for education bureaucrats in Malawi should they disobey orders from informal actors. 
These mainly relate to negative professional and personal consequences for the bureaucrat 
involved.   
10.2.3 Unequal distribution of power between central and sub-national 
government adversely affecting teacher management 
Main findings 
The second main finding of this thesis pertains to how aspects of low power distance have 
rendered formal relationships of accountability at the district level ineffectual when it 
comes to matters concerning teacher management. I identified four main reasons for the 
prevalence of low power distance. The first related to how teachers with connections to 
political elite created low power distance between themselves and the officials managing 
them. This was either through direct political interference or through the elite approaching 
central level officials. The second revealed teacher shortage as weakening the principal-
agent relationships of accountability due to official principals fearing the loss of teachers to 
other districts, zones or schools, if they administered official policies too strictly. The third 
related to district and local officials not possessing the formal authority to sanction teachers 
for “behaviours that threaten to disrupt the functioning of the organization” (Dzimbiri, 2016; 
p. 88). Lastly, weak relationships of accountability were found to exist due to the pay-grades 
of district, local or school-level staff being too similar or even lower than the employees 
these education stakeholders were meant to be managing. 
How these findings relate to the Levy-Walton Framework 
The issue of low power distance at sub-national levels can be traced back to what the Levy-
Walton framework terms “characteristics of a country’s national political settlement” and 
how these manifest at various levels of governance. It is useful to remind readers that 
political settlement is primarily concerned with how power is distributed between different 
groups (Di John & Putzel, 2009). By extension the way power distribution is undertaken can 
have a direct influence on issues relating to hierarchy, power distance and subordination. 
Decentralisation is broadly about redistributing power through shifting decision-making 
functions to lower levels of government (Barnett, 2018). However, as is argued in several of 
the studies discussed in Chapter 4, decentralising decision-making functions in a 
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competitive clientelist state, such as in Malawi, reduces the power of the national political 
elite to distribute resources in a way that ensures their political survival (Abdulai, 2017). 
Malawi’s political culture is one that has been defined as having a “centralizing 
authoritarian tendency of the hierarchy” (Chinsinga, 2012; p. 11). As the findings above 
illustrate, in relation to teacher management the failure to redistribute power from the 
centre to the sub-national level has manifested itself in several negative ways concerning 
teacher management. 
A second and related part of the Levy-Walton framework that these findings align with, is 
regarding the practical consequences that a low distribution of power has had on “enforcing 
rules at each level of governance.” Retaining the bulk of power at the central levels of 
government – whether this be through failing to give districts enough powers relating to 
teacher management or not giving them sufficient resources – has appeared to make the 
enforcement of rules at district, local and school levels difficult to achieve. The functions 
relating to the recruitment and discipline of teachers remaining at central government 
appears to have weakened the relationships of accountability between teachers and those 
at the sub-national level who are managing them. This has been exacerbated by the 
inadequate staffing at district levels, together with their corresponding pay grades. While 
the Malawi Civil Service is meant to have a hierarchical grading system (Davies et al., 2003), 
my thesis has illustrated that those managing teachers are not only ex-teachers themselves, 
but also, are on pay grades similar to the teachers. Within a socio-political culture that gives 
great “deference to hierarchy” (Chinsinga, 2012; p. 11), this appears to have contributed to 
the weak official relationships of accountability in Malawi. 
The framework’s emphasis on the connections  between the different levels of the system 
considers this from the perspective of “informal internal power structures” and how this 
affects the monitoring and enforcement of rules. However, a weakness of this aspect of the 
framework, especially when factoring in what has been discussed, is the inadequate 
attention it gives to the formalised distribution of power. The framework fails to detail 
explicitly what effect the distribution of “official power” has, and what the implications of 
this are for the functional relationships of accountability.  
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The extent to which these findings corroborate or differ from previous research 
Studies reviewed in Chapter 3, specifically in relation to Malawi, revealed that in a society 
characterised by hierarchy and inequality, social relationships where citizens are able to  
hold civil servants to account inevitably fail (Booth et al., 2006; Watkins & Kaler, 2016). High 
power distance between citizens and civil servants (including teachers) has been found to 
have negatively affected relationships of accountability in Malawi and elsewhere 
(Barquedano- López et al., 2013; Essuman & Akyeampong, 2011; Rawal & Kingdon, 2010; 
Watkins & Ashforth, 2019). Less well-explored in Malawi, has been an explicit analysis of 
what the consequences for accountability are in relation to low power distance. This is 
despite the Government of Malawi’s 2014 Public Service Review Commission identifying the 
insubordination of junior staff to their seniors as being an area of concern (cited in Dzimbiri, 
2016). 
While a number of studies have been critical of Malawi’s pseudo implementation of 
decentralisation (see Chapter 4), the practical consequences of what this means for teacher 
management has not been well explored. Studies elsewhere in the Global South have 
investigated the low power distance between teachers and those who are managing them 
(Akyeampong & Asante, 2006; Jaffer, 2010). The findings from my thesis appear to 
corroborate what these studies have discussed, whilst also expanding upon their 
conclusions. One area that was extensively explored was how teacher management was 
affected by the overall teacher shortage in the system. The interview responses clearly link 
what the consequences of this shortage have meant in relation to the distribution of power 
between teachers and those managing them. 
10.2.4 Poor information and inspection systems contributed to poor 
implementation of teacher management strategies 
Main findings 
The third main finding of this thesis relates to the asymmetry of information concerning 
where teachers are teaching in the system, and how much time they spend teaching. 
Information and inspectorate systems monitoring the compliance of the system deploying, 
allocating and utilising teachers in line with government policy were found to be ineffective 
and served to undermine the principal-agent relationships of accountability (Booth & 
Cammack, 2013; O’Neil & Cammack, 2014). This very much reflects the principal-agent 
problems identified in Chapter 4, where agents “have more information about what they 
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are doing than does the principal [which] giv[es] them an advantage allow[ing] them to 
pursue their own interests” (Bossert, 1998; p. 1516). The interviews revealed that 
inadequate resources, including the number of inspectors and Zonal Educational 
Management Information System (ZEMIS) officers, financial resources for equipment and 
transportation, were barriers to being able to monitor schools effectively. Similar to what 
was discussed in Subsection 10.2.3, the interview data has elicited that these functions have 
not yet fully been decentralised in the true sense. This was found to be either due to 
capacity constraints, or else, the centre still retaining control over some of these functions. 
How these findings relate to the Levy-Walton Framework 
The main findings regarding poor information and inspection systems appear to relate to 
resourcing issues. These are both in terms of shortage of personnel and financial resources, 
which have rendered these functions ineffective. Relating this back to the part of the 
framework that looks at the ”characteristics of a country’s national political settlement,” it 
is worthwhile to remind readers of the discussion in Chapter 4. This considered how, under 
certain political settlements, spending on investments that increase their visibility to the 
electorate are prioritised. Quality enhancing reform not only has few tangible results in the 
short-term, but also, may threaten the personal interests of politicians in clientelist settings, 
given their focus on issues to do with accountability and cost-effectiveness (Harding & 
Stasavage, 2014; Hickey & Hossain, 2019; Kingdon et al., 2014). Specifically in relation to this 
this thesis, the findings reveal an underfunded inspectorate system, both in terms of 
insufficient staff and limited means of transportation to inspect a large number of schools. 
This is similarly true of the shortfall in ZEMIS officers. This directly links to the part of the 
framework that focuses on “monitoring mechanisms over lower levels.” 
Aside from reflecting how these types of investments are not prioritised under certain 
political settlements, it also relates to what Pritchett (2015) terms system “incoherence”, or 
more specifically, “delegation-finance” failure (see Chapter 4). In resource-poor contexts, 
such as Malawi, a gap between plans versus implementation due to a lack of resources is 
not uncommon. Linking this to relationships of accountability, the incoherence makes it 
“harder to impose performance disciplines where mandates are unclear and policies contain 
serious internal and external inconsistencies” (Booth & Cammack, 2013; p. 81). Despite its 
importance, however, the delegation-finance incoherence or indeed, any type of 
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incoherence is difficult to map directly onto the Levy-Walton framework. The framework 
does acknowledge, however, that “[e]ven if the rules governing participation in rule-setting 
are clear….there could be weaknesses in the arrangements for monitoring, and for enforcing 
non-compliance at lower levels” (Levy & Walton, 2013; p. 9).  
The extent to which these findings corroborate or differ from previous research 
Asim et al. (2017) forensically detailed how Malawi’s information systems were 
inadequately equipped for knowing where teachers were working in the primary education 
system. While this thesis supports these findings, it also identified other structural reasons 
for the underlying weaknesses concerning information systems relating to Malawi’s primary 
education system, which relate to resource and capacity constraints. Little research has 
been undertaken on the inspectorate in Malawi. The findings appear broadly supportive of 
research in other Global South contexts, where a lack of resources was found to contribute 
to infrequent and limited school inspection visits (De Grauwe, 2001; Herselman & Hay, 
2002; Hossain, 2017; MacPherson, 2011, Mazibuko, 2007; Uwazi, 2009; Wanzare, 2002).  
10.2.5 Absent, weak or contradictory policies contributed to greater 
discretionary decision-making powers relating to teacher management 
Main findings 
The fourth and final overarching finding of this thesis relates to how education bureaucrats 
have been able to employ discretionary decision-making when implementing teacher 
management policies. Teacher deployment policies, which are very broadly defined, gave 
the District Education Office a great deal of discretion regarding where teachers could be 
deployed. Similarly, the absence of policies specific to transfers concerning teachers led to 
cultural-cognitive rules being commonplace in the teacher transfer system. Teacher 
allocation policies were also found to be absent, thus meaning that the criteria 
headteachers selected when assigning teachers to classes were not necessarily based on 
enrolment levels per class. Moreover, policies relating to the utilisation of teachers were 
found to be contradictory. Government policy clearly states that every teacher should be 
assigned his or her own class. However, at the school level this was clearly difficult to 
implement due to the shortage of classroom infrastructure. Lastly, while there appear to be 
policies relating to the transfer of civil servants and what their working hours are supposed 
to be, the lack of specificity concerning teachers appears to have left these rules open to 
interpretation amongst education officials. These absent, weak or contradictory policies also 
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raise the question concerning the criteria different stakeholders should be judged on, or 
should be answerable to, if certain standards have not been set. 
How these findings relate to the Levy-Walton Framework 
In relation to the Levy-Walton framework, this finding corresponds to the part of the 
framework that considers the “characteristics of a country’s national political settlement” 
and how these manifest at various levels of governance. The issue of discretionary decision-
making powers can be traced back to an underlying feature of neo-patrimonial states like 
Malawi, which is the “lack a common set of predictable rules, but also formal and informal 
rules [which] are often contradictory” (Cammack et al., 2007; p. 3). Chapter 4 discussed why 
it was that competitive clientelist political states provide very weak incentives for a rules-
based approach to governance. In such a system, it is dominated by personalised rather 
than impersonalised norms. This, by extension, means there is little motivation to “work 
together to build institutions that will deliver national public goods over the long-term” 
(O’Neil & Cammack, 2014; p. ix). 
The findings from the data discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 9 revealed that across all 
aspects of teacher management that this thesis focused on, the “rules” were open to wide 
interpretation. Discretionary decision-making was able to happen, because of weak, absent 
or contradictory rule-setting around these areas of teacher management. This maps onto 
what the Levy-Walton framework terms the “extent of managerial and worker discretion at 
each level.”  
While the absent, weak or contradictory rules has meant a proliferation of discretionary 
decisions, this also needs to be considered alongside the lack of resources needed to 
implement these rules. Shortfalls in funds for implementing policies set out in the Education 
Sector Implementation Plan (ESIP) relate to what Pritchett (2015) terms the delegation-
finance failure. In the case of some policies, such as the double-shift and the rural allowance 
policy, delegation-motivation failure could also be cited as a reason. This is a similar to what 
was discussed in Subsection 10.2.4 in relation to information and inspection. As was 
explained there, one of the weaknesses of the Levy-Walton framework in respect to my 
findings is that it does not adequately incorporate this role of incoherence in its model. 
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The extent to which these findings corroborate or differ from previous research 
The findings broadly corroborate what studies reviewed for Chapter 3 found in relation to 
absent or weak policies regarding teacher deployment and transfer policies, both in Malawi 
and elsewhere in the Global South  (Asim et al., 2017; Bari et al., 2016; Kota et al., 2018; 
Sharma, 2009). Where this study has expanded upon these past studies is in the context of 
within school allocation and utilisation decisions and importantly, what the consequences 
have been of absent, weak or contradictory policies concerning teacher management. 
Moreover, this thesis has also contextualised the failure of these policies in relation to 
problems of resourcing. 
Conclusion 
Much of the work undertaken over the last 15 years in Malawi has begun to consider the 
importance of its political settlement on the delivery of public services (Booth et al., 2006; 
Cammack, 2011; Cammack, 2017; Chiweza, 2016; Said & Singini, 2017; Tenthani & 
Chinsinga, 2016 ). The thesis’ findings build on this past research by using the Levy-Walton 
Framework to interrogate what particular impact Malawi’s national political settlement has 
had on formal principal-agent relationships regarding teacher accountability at sub-national 
levels of government. It has been argued that the retention of power and by default, 
resources at the central level of government, has left sub-national stakeholders more open 
to capture by the local elite, and incapacitated in terms of being able to implement 
government policies relating to teacher management effectively. These weak relationships 
of accountability at sub-national levels of government institutions appear to have been very 
much due to the characteristics defining Malawi’s neo-patrimonial state. Over the last 25 
years, these characteristics have been accompanied by an increasingly fragmented political 
landscape, with competing elites vying for power through the capture of public resources 
and institutions. The weakly defined or absent policies relating to teacher management (in 
themselves characteristics of a neo-patrimonial state) have further exacerbated these 
tensions. 
The Levy-Walton Framework has been useful as a broad framework going forward. This has 
been due to its integration of political settlement theory, and how this has affected 
relationships of accountability at lower levels of governance and service providers. This, in 
turn, has allowed for interrogation of what this has specifically meant in the context of 
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teacher management issues in Malawi. This thesis has added to the field of research on 
teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation by illustrating how official principal-agent 
relationships are directly and negatively affected by the characteristics of Malawi’s political 
settlement. 
In the next chapter, Chapter 11, I present the main contributions of this thesis to existing 
knowledge, together with the limitations of the research. I conclude by considering what 
future directions research can take to understand more fully the complexities surrounding 



























Chapter 11: Conclusion 
Chapter purpose and structure 
In Chapter 10, the main messages emanating from this thesis, and how these relate to the 
literature reviewed (Chapter 3) and the conceptual framework (Chapter 4) used for this 
study were presented. From the main findings, I concluded that several elements of 
Malawi’s political settlement have negatively encroached on the effective operationalisation 
of sub-national governance in managing issues relating to teachers. As Chapter 10 
summarised, this appears to mainly be through a weakening of relationships of 
accountability across different state actors at these lower levels of government 
Having discussed the main findings from my research in Chapter 10, the purpose of this 
chapter is to conclude this thesis with some closing reflections. Section 11.1 discusses the 
main ways in which this work has contributed to research on teacher management in the 
field of international comparative education. Section 11.2 considers the limitations to this 
study and finally, Section 11.3 contains some proposals for ways forward for future 
research.  
11.1 What contributions has this thesis made?  
11.1.1 Situating teacher management problems in Malawi within its political 
settlement  
Chapter 4 discussed the emerging interest over the last few years in better understanding 
the different types of political settlements, and their impact on the quality of education 
systems (Hickey & Hossain, 2019; Wales et al., 2016). Amongst these studies are those that 
have focused exclusively on teacher accountability, with a specific focus on teacher 
absenteeism at sub-national levels of government (Ampratwum et al., 2018; Hossain et al., 
2017). Where this thesis has contributed to this emerging field is to interrogate what effect 
Malawi’s political settlement has had on formal relationships of accountability concerning 
teacher management at the district, local and school levels. 
Previous studies undertaken on Malawi’s political settlement have largely been through a 
national-level prism, without interrogating what the characteristics of that neo-patrimonial 
state have meant for different sectors (Booth et al., 2006; Cammack, 2011; Cammack, 2017; 
Said & Singini, 2017). O’Neil & Cammack (2014) go some way to addressing this, but do not 
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focus specifically on education or teachers. Research on teacher deployment, allocation and 
utilisation in Malawi has mostly looked at data trends to document the entrenched inequity 
and inefficiency of the system (DeStefano, 2013; Ravishankar et al., 2016). A few of these 
studies have investigated the conditions under which these trends have been continuing but 
have been largely apolitical in nature. Work by Asim et al. (2017) is the only available study 
on Malawi that has engaged with these shortcomings through a network analysis of formal 
and informal stakeholder influences on teacher deployment. However, it fails to give 
sufficient attention to the ways in which these pressures have manifested themselves into 
influencing decision-making.  
A major contribution this thesis makes is in addressing the gaps discussed above. This has 
been achieved by integrating the strands of literature concerning the broad concept of 
“political settlement” into the more technical areas of “teacher management” that I have 
focused on. In applying the concept of political settlement theory – which is primarily about 
the distribution of power – to the different levels of the education system, I have addressed 
the problems relating to teacher management from angles previously not explored. In the 
context of Malawi’s education system, the thesis’ main contribution has been to 
demonstrate the different ways sub-national stakeholders’ management of teachers 
(relationships of accountability) has been weakened due to the concentration of power at 
central levels. 
11.1.2 Research design 
Another main contribution that this thesis makes is in regard to its design. Firstly, this is 
through the emphasis on addressing the three inter-related issues of teacher deployment, 
allocation and utilisation together. Based on the review of the literature discussed in 
Chapter 3, these issues by-and-large tend to be addressed separately. In relation to Malawi, 
research by Ndalama & Chidalengwa (2010) and DeStefano (2013) comprised the only 
studies I could find that address the phenomena of teacher deployment, allocation and 
utilisation together through a descriptive analysis of the trends. In addressing these issues in 
conjunction with one another, this thesis has probed more deeply what impact a system 
defined by huge variation in teacher numbers between schools has had on school-level 
operations. This was primarily aided by the research design which involved selecting 
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comparator primary education schools and zones on the basis of whether these were 
experiencing a teacher shortage or surplus. 
Secondly, only a very limited number of studies have investigated the issue of teacher 
deployment, allocation or utilisation using a mixed methods approach. The exceptions to 
this are Béteille (2009) and Asim et al. (2017), whose studies in India and Malawi, 
respectively, utilised such an approach when exploring the very specific issues of teacher 
management this thesis has also been focused on. An approach utilising quantitative 
methods alone is only able to identify patterns that exist without necessarily explaining 
them. On the other hand, a purely qualitative approach risks minimising or exaggerating the 
scale of the problem. In the context of Malawi, this thesis has gone beyond what past 
studies have done. It has involved identifying the deep-rooted structural reasons why 
practices continue to exist, causing teachers to be distributed in an unequal and inefficient 
way. A further contribution this thesis makes is that the quantitative data I analysed for this 
study has built on past data analysis carried out for previous studies. This was specifically 
the case in that I used administrative data to track teachers’ movements in the system to 
build a more comprehensive picture of the (in)equitable deployment of teachers. 
11.2 Limitations of the research  
Whilst the study has aimed to provide a more comprehensive understanding of why the 
problems relating to teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation persist, in this section, I 
discuss two specific limitations relating to this work. These concern constraints relating to 
data and the research design of this thesis.  
11.2.1 Data constraints 
Regarding the collection of secondary data sources for this study, this largely relied on 
government administrative data – namely information from the Education Management 
Information System (EMIS) and staff returns data. Some of the limitations of these sources 
have been discussed elsewhere in the thesis, but are worth reiterating here. Asim et al. 
(2017) found that specifically in relation to teacher data, 16 percent of teachers were 
missing in the 2016 EMIS database. During my own experience of analysing multiple years of 
EMIS data, I was also able to corroborate similar weaknesses in the way EMIS was capturing 
teacher data. While the monthly staff returns data was a way of trying to ameliorate this 
weakness, owing to these not being systematically collected and/or recorded on a monthly 
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basis the underlying problems relating to the EMIS remained. In the absence of any other 
data source that captured both enrolment and teacher numbers by school, the EMIS data 
was utilised, whilst recognising its shortcomings. 
Another data constraint was in relation to the poor/inaccurate data recorded in the EMIS 
concerning teacher allocation and utilisation (see Chapter 5 for further discussion). Due to 
this concern over its reliability, I instead, collected data from 26 primary schools in the two 
primary education zones of interest for this study. A limitation of this approach, however, 
was the extent to which the data results could be generalised to primary schools in the rest 
of Zomba Rural district, or the country as a whole.  
11.2.2 Research design constraints 
The Levy-Walton Framework is conceptualised in such a way that it “allows for 
heterogeneity within the overall system….with the possibility of domains of more effective 
service delivery co-existing alongside domains of ineffectiveness” (Levy & Walton, 2013; p. 
8). A number of studies that have used this framework have done so in a manner that has 
allowed for a comparison between one part of the education system which is relatively 
ineffective against another part which is more effective (Levy, 2018). The design for this 
study, however, was focused exclusively on one district and the lower levels of governance 
accompanying this.171 Time and financial constraints meant that the research design 
focused on a comparison between two zones within the same district, which were selected 
on the basis of variation between teacher surpluses and shortages. As such, the aspect of 
the Levy-Walton Framework, which focuses on heterogeneity in service delivery within 
education systems, was absent from this study.  
Another research design limitation was the prominence given to education government or 
primary school officials. The interest in exploring the challenges faced by formal actors in 
implementing teacher management strategies informed this participant choice. However, 
multiple stakeholders corroborated how informal institutions outside the sector had been 
instrumental in decisions relating to teacher management. With this in mind, the narratives 
 
171 While I list this as one of the limitations of the study, further on in this chapter, I discuss how this presents 
an opportunity for how future research in this area can be developed. 
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of non-education actors could also have been integral to further perspectives surrounding 
this investigation.  
11.3 Implications of the findings for future research  
11.3.1 The interests of the political elite in deploying teachers  
A selection of the studies reviewed in Chapter 3 focused on the inequitable deployment of 
teachers in many countries in the Global South being due to economic geography, which 
influences where teachers prefer to teach. A related but less well explored approach to 
understanding the existence of spatial inequalities in teacher deployment, is the extent to 
which the political representation of regions and districts affect this. Evidence of the ruling 
political elite and their vast influence over the allocation of public resources forms a 
considerable part of the political settlement discourse (Therkildsen, 2008). However, 
comparatively more has been written about this distribution of spoils by the national 
political elite in relation to the more lucrative resources emanating from the productive 
sectors. Less well explored and researched is the distribution of social sector public 
spending.172   
This thesis’ own findings lend support to the proposition that the distribution of education 
resources in Malawi has been influenced by the national and local political elite, particularly 
in relation to capital investment. A future area of research would be to extend the findings 
from this thesis, which are quite specific to Zomba Rural district. A proposal would be to 
consider the extent to which political representation of the national political elite by region 
has directly affected how public education resources are distributed by region/ district. 
11.3.2 Heterogeneity in service delivery between different parts of the 
system 
Subsection 11.2.2 explained how the Levy-Walton framework can be a model through which 
to consider how certain parts of the system which are ineffective in delivering public 
services exist alongside other parts that produce more effective outcomes (Levy & Walton, 
2013). The purpose of this study was not to compare two parts of the system that are 
performing differently in relation to teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation. 
However, the data I collected and analysed for this thesis did illustrate the wide variation 
 
172 Abdulai & Hickey (2014) is a rare study, which focuses on Ghana, where the regional composition of the 




across districts when considering the extent to which the deployment of teachers was being 
undertaken according to enrolment levels (Chapter 6). Similarly, the stakeholder interview 
data I analysed for Chapter 9 provided evidence that certain districts were implementing 
strategies that allowed for teachers to specialise in subjects, whilst also teaching across 
multiple classes/ standards. This strategy was perceived as a more flexible and efficient way 
to utilise teachers’ teaching time, but was absent in the teaching arrangements in Zomba 
Rural district. 
An extension to the above would be to consider the political fault-lines between the three 
main regions of Malawi in the context of the multi-party system, as was discussed in 
Chapter 2. While I concluded there was the existence of political interference in district 
decision-making over teacher issues, the design for this thesis did not allow for a 
comparison with a district in another region where a larger number of politicians sat in 
opposition to the party in power. The work carried out by Asim et al. (2017) in modelling 
whether a relationship exists between the party affiliation of an MP and the pupil-teacher 
ratio (PTR) is a starting point to this. 
Conclusion 
The motivation for this study, as Chapter 1 set out, was to account for the persistence in the 
extreme variations in the deployment and allocation of primary school teachers in Malawi. 
Up until very recently, studies exploring these issues approached them from a very apolitical 
perspective. This has meant that the corresponding policy recommendations obfuscate the 
governance realities on the ground by narrowing their focus to concentrating on formal 
institutions. Through this thesis, I believe I have achieved its principal aim, which was about 
understanding why teacher deployment, allocation and utilisation has continued to retain 
its problems of inequity and inefficiency. The main conclusion is that the characteristics of 
Malawi’s national political settlement have negatively affected formal principal-agent 
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Appendix Figure A.2: Confirmation of attachment with the Centre for Educational 
Research and Training (CERT) for duration of fieldwork 
 
                    CENTRE FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING (CERT) 
 
DIRECTOR        Chancellor College 
Dixie Maluwa Banda,  Dip. Ed, B.Ed, , B.Ed(Hons), M.Ed, Ph.D   P.O. Box 280, Zomba, Malawi 
         Telephone: (265) 524 222 09999 55667          Fax: (265) 524 046 
                         E-mail: dmbanda5@gmail.com 
        
24th July, 2017 
 
Ms Asma T. Zubairi 
University of Cambridge 
Trinity Lane, 
Cambridge CB2 1TN 
UK 
 
LETTER OF AFFILIATION 
 
I am pleased to inform you that your request  for your attachment  to facilitate  your doctoral studies 
on “The difference in the distribution, use and voice over teachers and resources between primary 
schools in Malawi” with the Centre for Educational Research and Training  (CERT) has been  approved. 
 
We would like to welcome you to CERT family, 
 
We would like also to wish you success in your research work. If we can be of any assistance do not 
hesitate to come to us. 
 
Yours  sincerely 
 
Professor Dixie Maluwa Banda 
DIRECTOR, CERT 





Appendix Figure A.3: Confidentiality form administered to interview participants 
 
Background 
My name is Asma Zubairi and I am a PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom. I 
have previously worked in the Education Sector in Malawi at the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology with the Directorate of Planning. This research piece, however, is for my PhD and is an 
independent piece of work.  
This research will contribute to the wider debate around the debate around equitable and inclusive education 
systems, specifically in the context of teacher distribution. The overall objective of the piece is to understand, 
in the context of Malawi’s primary education system, the: 
• Processes affecting the distribution of teachers across and within primary schools 
• Stakeholders who exert influence over how teachers are distributed and used 
• Extent to which teachers have become more equitably distributed and used 
In order to gain access to this information, I would like to conduct three interviews with you. Each interview 
will last approximately 45 to 60 minutes where we will discuss your views around the distribution and use of 
teachers. These interviews will be spread out over the course of two to three weeks depending on your 
availability.  
Ethics and Confidentiality 
With your consent, I would like to record the interview. This is to ensure accuracy when I am conducting my 
analysis. The data, once collected, will be stored on my personal laptop of which only I will have access to. All 
materials, including audio-recordings and transcripts made of these, will be destroyed once the study is 
complete. All interviews will be confidential, including your name, the name of the school and its location, 
together with any other personal information which may inadvertently lead to your identification. To ensure 
complete anonymity I will instead assign you with a code name of which only I will be aware of.  
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. Should you not wish to answer a question, you are free to 
do so. Should you not want to record the interview, or would like me to stop recording at any point during the 
interview then please inform me. You are free to withdraw from this study at any time without any negative 
repercussions.  
How the data will be used 
The data collected from this interview will contribute towards completing my final thesis in fulfilment of the 
PhD requirements of the University of Cambridge. The findings of my study will be presented to my degree 
committee at the University of Cambridge and potentially may also be shared amongst interested policy-
makers both here in Malawi and internationally. With your permission, I would like to be able to use the 
interviews I administer with you to inform the findings for my final thesis. For that purpose, could you please 
confirm that you agree to take part in the study and that you give permission for me to quote or make 
reference to what you say by signing the agreement below.  
Raising a complaint 
Should you have any concerns or complaints concerning your treatment as a participant in this project you 
should contact the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee at the University of Cambridge 







PhD Candidate, University of Cambridge 





Informed consent for participants interviewed 
 
 
Please mark all statements you agree with by putting an “X” in the box next to it 
 
 
























I understand how personal data will be stored and what will happen to the data at 






I understand that research will be written up in a thesis, be published as an article in 











I consent to be a participant in this study having fully understood my rights as a 
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Appendix Figure A.5: Researcher-administered survey administered to 371 teachers in the 
26 primary schools in Zone 9 and Zone 12 
 
1. Name of Teacher: 
 
2. What teaching pay-grade are you currently on?  
TL  TK  TJ  TI  TH 
 
3. Which is the main Standard you are responsible for teaching in? 
Std. 1  Std. 2   Std. 3   Std. 4 
 
Std. 5  Std. 6   Std. 7   Std. 8  
 
4. Do you teach this Standard/ Class alone, or with another teacher? 
Alone  With another teacher 
 
5. If you answered that you teach this Standard/ Class with another teacher for Q4, what is 
the name of the teacher/ teachers you share teaching responsibilities with? 




6. Which subjects are you responsible for teaching in this Standard/ Class? 
Agriculture   Bible Knowledge  Chichewa 
 
English   Expressive Arts  Life Skills 
 




7. How many periods a week do you teach for each subject for this Standard? 
Agriculture   Bible Knowledge  Chichewa 
 
English   Expressive Arts  Life Skills 
 




8. How long do you teach each period for? 





9. ONLY RELEVANT IF TEACHER ANSWERED “WITH ANOTHER TEACHER” FOR Q4: Does the 
other teacher you share this Standard/ Class with assist you inside the classroom for any 
of the subjects you are responsible for teaching? 
Yes    N 
 
10. ONLY RELEVANT IF TEACHER ANSWERED “WITH ANOTHER TEACHER” FOR Q4: If 
you answered “yes” to Q9, please indicate which subjects s/he assists you with? 
Agriculture   Bible Knowledge  Chichewa 
 
English   Expressive Arts  Life Skills 
 




11. Do you teach any other Standard/ Class? 
Yes    No 
 
12. Which other Standard/ Class do you teach? 
Std. 1  Std. 2   Std. 3   Std. 4 
 
Std. 5  Std. 6   Std. 7   Std. 8  
 
13. Do you teach this Standard/ Class alone, or with another teacher? 
Alone  With another teacher 
 
14. If you answered that you teach this Standard/ Class with another teacher for Q13, 
what is the name of the teacher/ teachers you share teaching responsibilities with? 




15. Which subjects are you responsible for teaching in this Standard/ Class? 
Agriculture   Bible Knowledge  Chichewa 
 
English   Expressive Arts  Life Skills 
 











16. How many periods a week do you teach for each subject for this Standard/ Class? 
Agriculture   Bible Knowledge  Chichewa 
 
English   Expressive Arts  Life Skills 
 




17. How long do you teach each period for? 
30 minutes   35 minutes 
 
18. ONLY RELEVANT IF TEACHER ANSWERED “WITH ANOTHER TEACHER” FOR Q13: 
Does the other teacher you share this Standard/ Class with assist you inside the 
classroom for any of the subjects you are responsible for teaching? 
Yes    N 
 
19. ONLY RELEVANT IF TEACHER ANSWERED “WITH ANOTHER TEACHER” FOR Q13: If 
you answered “yes” to Q18, please indicate which subjects s/he assists you with? 
Agriculture   Bible Knowledge  Chichewa 
 
English   Expressive Arts  Life Skills 
 


























Appendix Table A.1: List of participants interviewed for study 
 Participant Reference in findings 
1 Directorate of Inspectorate and 
Advisory (DIAS), Ministry of Education 
MoEST official, Central head-quarters 
2 Directorate of Basic Education, 
Ministry of Education 
MoEST official, Central head-quarters 
3 Directorate of Planning, Ministry of 
Education 
MoEST official, Central head-quarters 
4 Directorate of Human Resource 
Resources, Ministry of Education 
MoEST official, Central head-quarters 
5 District Education Manager, Zomba 
Rural District Education Office 
District Education Office official, Zomba Rural 
District 
6 Head of Inspectorate, Zomba Rural 
District Education Office 
District Education Office official, Zomba Rural 
District 
7 DEMIS official, Zomba Rural District 
Education Office 
District Education Office official, Zomba Rural 
District 
8 Principal Accountant, Zomba Rural 
District Education Office 
District Education Office official, Zomba Rural 
District 
9 Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9 Primary Education Adviser, Zone 9 
10 Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12 Primary Education Adviser, Zone 12 
11 Headteacher, School B173 Headteacher, School B, Zone 9 
12 Deputy headteacher, School B Deputy headteacher, School B, Zone 9 
13 Headteacher, School I Headteacher, School I, Zone 9 
14 Headteacher, School S Headteacher, School S, Zone 12 
15 Deputy headteacher, School Z Deputy headteacher, School Z, Zone 12 
16 Teacher 1, School B Infant standard teacher, School B, Zone 9 
17 Teacher 2, School B Senior standard teacher, School B, Zone 9 
18 Teacher 1, School I Infant standard teacher, School I, Zone 9 
19 Teacher 2, School I Senior standard teacher, School I, Zone 9 
20 Teacher 1, School S Infant standard teacher, School S, Zone 12 
21 Teacher 2, School S Senior standard teacher, School S, Zone 12 
22 Teacher 1, School Z Infant standard teacher, School Z, Zone 12 














173 Mid-way through interviews with the headteacher at School B was called away to his home village in the 
North of Malawi for an unexpected funeral. Given these developments, the remaining interviews were carried 
out with the deputy headteacher. 
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Appendix Figure A.6: Interview guide 
A. Interview guide for District Education Office officials 
Interview 1: Processes regarding the distribution of teachers and resources to and within 
schools 
1. What is your role and responsibility working at the District Educational Office? 
Prompt 1: What are your overall responsibilities in relation to primary school teachers? 
2. To whom are you directly answerable to in relation to fulfilling your roles and 
responsibilities? 
Prompt 1: Who do you feel most accountable to? 
Prompt 2: How is your performance measured, and by whom? 
Prompt 3: Who has the power to promote, sanction, demote or dismiss you? 
3. Who are you directly responsible for managing? Does this include teachers? 
Prompt 1: Do you have the power to promote, sanction, demote or dismiss teachers? 
4. What is the official policy as to how newly recruited teachers should be deployed to 
schools?   
Prompt 1: Are there any specific provisions made concerning remote/ hard-to-reach schools? 
5. What is the official policy concerning how teacher transfers (both voluntary and 
involuntary) are to be administered? 
Prompt 1: What makes a teacher eligible for a voluntary transfer? 
Prompt 2: Is there a process to identify teachers subject to an involuntary school transfer? 
6. What is the official process in deciding which schools in the district receive new teachers 
each year? 
7. What information do you rely upon when distributing teachers schools? 
Prompt 1: What about the sort of information to monitor which schools teachers are currently 
teaching in? 
Prompt 2: Does any information allow you to track teacher movement between different primary 
schools? 
Prompt 3: What is the process in terms of reporting information on where you have deployed 
teachers to central government officials? 
8. What is the official process concerning how teachers should be distributed to different 
classes? 
Prompt 1: Who is responsible for allocating teachers to different classes? 
9. Is there official guidance on the number of hours a teacher is required to work according 
to their employment contract? 
Prompt 1: How does this relate to the number of lessons a teacher is required to teach in given 
week? 
10. What information do you rely upon to monitor which classes teachers have been 
allocated to go and teach in? 






Interview 2: Challenges in enforcing the equal distribution of teachers and resources 
equitably between schools 
1. What are teacher preferences in terms of which schools they would like to be deployed 
to work in this district? 
2. How does the current practice of teacher deployment and teacher transfers in this 
district differ to that recommended by official government policy? 
Prompt 1: What are some of the challenges you face in ensuring that teachers are deployed to 
schools which suffer from a shortage of teachers? 
3. What, in your view, are the main reasons a teacher can present to this office in order to 
successfully transfer to a school of his/ her choosing? 
4. What are some of the common mechanisms which a teacher has successfully utilised to 
be deployed or transferred to a school of his/ her choosing? 
Prompt 1: How many of these fit under formal government rules? 
5. Are there other stakeholders or institutions who, based on your own experience, can 
influence where teachers are deployed to work? Who? 
Prompt 1: How practical is it to resist these stakeholders? If not why not?  
Prompt 2: How does the involvement of these stakeholders affect formal rules around teacher 
transfer policies? 
Prompt 3: Do these stakeholders have any influence on how other education resources are 
transferred? If yes what resources? 
6. Based on your experience to what extent do teacher’s personal relationships with the 
local political elite affect where they end up being deployed to work? 
7. In your opinion are the better resourced schools in this district more well-connected to 
the local political elite in this district compared to poorer resourced schools?   
Prompt 1: What influence, if any, does this have over how resources end up getting distributed? 
Prompt 2: What about in relation to teacher distribution? 
8. What role do schools themselves play in attracting additional government resources? 
Prompt 1: What makes some schools more successful (e.g. school capacity, headteacher 
characteristics, school patronage network)? 
Prompt 2: Do stakeholders lobby on schools’ behalf? 
9. What are some of the challenges you face in monitoring where in the system teachers 
are teaching? 
10. Do you follow-up on whether a teacher is actually teaching at  the school she or he  







Interview 3: Challenges in enforcing the equal distribution of teachers equitably within 
schools 
1. What training are headteachers currently given as to how teachers should be allocated 
within the schools they manage? 
Prompt 1: Are there any factors which influence how a headteacher allocates teachers to 
different classes/ standards? 
2. Based on your experience of this district, to what extent do you think headteachers 
favour certain classes over others insofar as teacher allocation to different standards is 
concerned?  
Prompt 1: Why do you think this is the case? 
Prompt 2: What are some of the consequences of a school performing badly/ well in the PSLCE 
examinations taken at  the end of Standard 8? 
3. Have government policies relating to over-lapping, double-shift or multi-grade 
mechanisms been implemented at school level in this district?   
Prompt 1: If not implemented, why not? 
4. Based on your experience what are some of the current school practices relating to 
school allocation which deviate from government policies across the district? 
Prompt 1: What do you think the reasons for this are? 
5. What are the different funds available for the construction of classrooms in this district? 
Prompt 1: Who decides on how these funds should be allocated to different schools? 
Prompt 2: What are some of the challenges you face in utilising these resources effectively? 
6. What is the official district policy on teachers specialising in certain subjects? 
Prompt 1: Does this policy differ according to Standard? If so why? 
Prompt 2: What are some of the justifications for specialisation?  
7. What, in your view, are some of the reasons for why practices relating to teacher 
allocation and utilisation at school level which go against government policy continue at 
school level [specifically relating this to the practice of class combination and teacher 
absenteeism] 
8. What are some of the challenges the district personally faces in sanctioning teachers who 
go against government policies relating to allocation and utilisation? 
Prompt 1: To what extent do you think challenges are related to teacher connections?  
Prompt 2: Similarly what are some of the challenges the PEA or headteachers face in sanctioning 
teachers? 
9. What are the current mechanisms in place to monitor whether teachers are teaching 
their own class and the number of lessons as per government guidelines? 
Prompt 1: How effective are these mechanisms? 
Prompt 2: What are some of the challenges relating to these mechanisms? 
10. What is the criteria for selecting which schools will be inspected in any given year? 





B. Interview guide for Primary Education Advisers 
Interview 1: Processes regarding the distribution of teachers and resources to and within 
schools 
1. What are your overall roles and responsibilities as Primary Education Adviser? 
Prompt 1: What are your overall responsibilities in relation to primary school teachers? 
2. To whom are you directly answerable to in relation to fulfilling your roles and 
responsibilities? 
Prompt 1: Who do you feel most accountable to? 
Prompt 2: How is your performance measured, and by whom? 
Prompt 3: Who has the power to promote, sanction, demote or dismiss you? 
3. Who are you directly responsible for managing? Does this include teachers? 
Prompt 1: Do you have the power to promote, sanction, demote or dismiss teachers? 
Prompt 2: What are some of the challenges you face in managing teachers? 
4. What is the official policy how newly recruited teachers should be deployed to schools?   
Prompt 1: Are there any specific provisions made concerning remote/ hard-to-reach schools? 
5. What is the official policy concerning how teacher transfers (both voluntary and 
involuntary) are to be administered? 
Prompt 1: What makes a teacher eligible for a voluntary transfer? 
Prompt 2: Is there a process to identify teachers targeted for an involuntary school transfer? 
6. What is the official process in deciding which schools in the district receive new teachers 
each year? 
Prompt 1: What is your role in this process, specifically in relation to this primary education zone? 
7. Do you, as Primary Education Adviser, have control over which schools in your zone 
should receive new teachers? If “yes” please describe your role? 
8. What information do you currently rely upon to monitor which teachers are teaching in 
schools that you manage within your zone? 
Prompt 1: How frequently is this information updated? 
Prompt 2: Who is responsible for collecting this information? 
9. What is the official process concerning how teachers should be distributed to different 
classes? 
Prompt 1: Who is responsible for allocating teachers to different classes? 
10. Is there official guidance on the number of hours a teacher is required to work 
according to their employment contract? 
Prompt 1: How does this relate to the number of lessons a teacher is required to teach in given 
week? 
11. What information do you rely upon to monitor which classes teachers have been 
allocated to go and teach in? 





Interview 2: Challenges in enforcing the equal distribution of teachers and resources 
equitably between schools 
1. What are teacher preferences in terms of which schools they would like to be deployed 
to work in this zone? What schools do teachers not want to be deployed to go and work 
in? 
2. How does the current practice of teacher deployment and teacher transfers in this 
district differ to that recommended by official government policy? 
Prompt 1: What are some of the challenges you think the District Education Office faces in 
ensuring that the deployment of teachers is to schools which suffer from a shortage? 
3. What, in your view, are the main reasons a teacher can present to this office or the 
district education office in order to successfully transfer to a school of his/ her choosing? 
4. What are some of the common mechanisms which a teacher has successfully utilised to 
be deployed or transferred to a school of his/ her choosing in this zone? 
Prompt 1: How many of these fit under formal government rules? 
5. Specifically in relation to this zone, do teachers wish to be deployed here? 
Prompt 1: Do teachers who are deployed to this zone stay here long? 
Prompt 2: Do all teachers who have been deployed to work in this zone report for duty? 
6. Are there other stakeholders or institutions who, based on your own experience, can 
influence where teachers are deployed to work? Who? Examples from this zone? 
Prompt 1: How feasible is it to resist these stakeholders? If not why not? 
Prompt 2: How does the involvement of these stakeholders affect formal rules around teacher 
transfer policies? 
Prompt 3: Do these stakeholders have any influence on how other education resources are 
transferred? 
7. Based on your experience to what extent have teacher’s personal relationships with the 
local political elite affected where they end up being deployed to work? Examples from 
this zone? 
8. In your opinion are the better resourced schools in this zone more well-connected to the 
local political elite in this compared to poorer resourced schools?   
Prompt 1: Does this have any influence over how resources are distributed? 
9. What role do schools themselves play in attracting additional government resources?  
Prompt 1: What makes some schools more successful (e.g. school capacity, headteacher 
characteristics, school patronage network)? 
Prompt 2: Do stakeholders lobby on schools’ behalf? 
10. What are the current mechanisms in place to monitor where in the system teachers 
are teaching? 
Prompt 1: What are some of the challenges relating to these mechanisms? 
Prompt 2: Do you regularly physically audit schools to determine where teachers are teaching? 
11. Do you follow-up on whether a teacher is actually teaching at the school she or he  




Interview 3: Challenges in enforcing the equal distribution of teachers equitably within 
schools 
1. What training are headteachers currently given as to how teachers should be allocated 
within the schools they manage? 
Prompt 1: Are there any factors you think which influence how a headteacher allocates teachers 
to different classes/ standards? 
2. Based on your experience of this zone, to what extent do you think headteachers favour 
certain classes over others insofar as teacher allocation to different standards is 
concerned?  
Prompt 1: Why do you think this is the case? 
Prompt 2: What are some of the consequences of a school performing badly/ well in the PSLCE 
examinations taken at  the end of Standard 8? 
3. Have government policies relating to over-lapping, double-shift or multi-grade 
mechanisms been implemented at school level inn this zone? 
Prompt 1: If not implemented, why not? 
4. Based on your experience what are some of the current school practices relating to 
school allocation which deviate from government policies across this zone? 
Prompt 1: What do you think the reasons for this are? 
5. What are the different funds available for the construction of classrooms in this zone? 
Prompt 1: What are some of the challenges schools face in utilising these resources effectively? 
6. What is the official district policy on teachers specialising in certain subjects? 
Prompt 1: Does this policy differ according to Standard? If so why? 
Prompt 2: What are some of the justifications for specialisation?  
7. What, in your view, are some of the reasons for why practices relating to teacher 
allocation and utilisation at school level which go against government policy continue at 
school level [specifically relating this to the practice of class combination and teacher 
absenteeism] 
8. What are some of the challenges this zone personally faces in sanctioning teachers who 
go against government policies relating to allocation and utilisation? 
Prompt 1: To what extent do you think challenges are related to teacher connections?  
Prompt 2: What are the particular challenges headteachers face in sanctioning teachers? 
9. What are the current mechanisms in place in this zone to monitor whether teachers are 
teaching their own class and the number of lessons as per government guidelines? 
Prompt 1: How effective are these mechanisms? 
Prompt 2: What are some of the challenges relating to these mechanisms? 
10. What schools in your zone have been inspected by district officials in the two years?  






C. Interview guide for headteachers 
Interview 1: Processes regarding the distribution of teachers and resources to and within 
schools 
1. Please can you introduce yourself and tell me how long you have been teaching at this 
school, and where else you have worked both as a headteacher and as a teacher? 
2. What are your overall roles and responsibilities as headteacher? 
Prompt 1: What are your overall responsibilities in relation to primary school teachers? 
3. To whom are you directly answerable to in relation to fulfilling your roles and 
responsibilities? 
Prompt 1: Who do you feel most accountable to? 
Prompt 2: How is your performance measured, and by whom? 
Prompt 3: Who has the power to promote, sanction, demote or dismiss you? 
4. Who are you directly responsible for managing? Does this include teachers? 
Prompt 1: Do you have the power to promote, sanction, demote or dismiss teachers? 
Prompt 2: What are some of the challenges you face in managing teachers? 
5. What is your understanding of the official policy regarding how newly recruited teachers 
should be deployed to schools?   
Prompt 1: Are there any specific provisions made concerning remote/ hard-to-reach schools? 
6. What is your understanding of the official policy concerning how teacher transfers (both 
voluntary and involuntary) are to be administered? 
Prompt 1: What makes a teacher eligible for a voluntary transfer? 
Prompt 2: Is there a process to identify teachers targeted for an involuntary school transfer? 
7. What is the official process in deciding which schools in the district receive new teachers 
each year? 
Prompt 1: What is your role in this process, specifically in relation to this school? 
8. Do you provide information on which teachers are currently teaching in this school? 
Prompt 1: How is this information collected? 
Prompt 2: How frequently is this information updated? 
Prompt 3: Who collects this information? 
9. What is the official process concerning how teachers should be distributed to different 
classes? 
Prompt 1: Who is responsible for allocating teachers to different classes? 
10. Is there official guidance on the number of hours a teacher is required to work 
according to their employment contract? 
Prompt 1: How does this relate to the number of lessons a teacher is required to teach in a given 
week? 
11. Do government officials collect information on which classes teachers have been 
allocated to go and teach in? How is this done? 





Interview 2: Challenges in enforcing the equal distribution of teachers and resources 
equitably between schools 
1. What are teacher preferences in terms of which schools they would like to be deployed 
to work in this district? Why are these schools favourable? 
2. Are there any schools in this zone that teachers would prefer to be deployed to go and 
work in? What schools do teachers not want to be deployed to go and work in? 
3. Specifically in relation to this school, do teachers wish to be deployed here? 
Prompt 1: Do teachers who are deployed here stay here long? 
Prompt 2: Do teachers who have officially been deployed to come and work at this school mainly 
report here for duty? 
4. To what extent do you feel that teacher deployment in Zomba Rural district is based on 
schools that suffer from a shortage of teachers? 
Prompt 1: What other factors do you think could affect teacher distribution? 
5. In your view what sorts of teachers get a favourable school placement or transfer? 
Prompt 1: Does it depend on a teacher merit or seniority? 
Prompt 2: What other factors do you think can affect a favourable placement? 
6. To what extent do you feel teachers need good connections in order to be deployed or 
transferred to a school of their choosing? 
Prompt 1: What connections are particularly useful?    
Prompt 2: Based on your experience can you give any examples – either in relation to you or 
other teachers – where connections have led to a good school placement? 
7. What other methods, based on your experience, are an effective mechanism which 
teachers can use to get a transfer of their choice? 
Prompt 1: Can you give practical examples of where these mechanisms have worked?  
8. Do you receive information from the district on teachers your school will receive? 
Prompt 1: What information do you receive e.g. teacher numbers, teacher names? 
Prompt 2: What do you do if you do not receive the numbers of teachers stipulated?    
9. Do you recall anyone from the government coming here to find out which teachers are 
working at this school? 















Interview 3: Challenges in enforcing the equal distribution of teachers equitably within 
schools 
1. What training are you, as a headteacher given as to how teachers should be allocated 
according to class or standard? 
2. What are some of the factors which influence how you as the headteacher of this school 
decide to allocate teachers to different standards/ classes in this school? 
3. In this school do you think certain classes or standards should have additional teachers? 
Which classes, standards? Why do you think this is the case? 
Prompt 1: If the school performs badly or well in the PSLCE examination taken at the end of 
Standard 8 what are some of the consequences for you? For the school?  
4. To what extent does the classroom availability influence your decisions relating to how 
classes and teachers should be distributed in this school? 
Prompt 1: Where does this school get resources from for infrastructural development? 
Prompt 2: What are some of the problems you have experienced relating to infrastructural 
development? 
5. Have government suggested policies relating to over-lapping, double-shift or multi-grade 
mechanisms been implemented at this school?   
Prompt 1: If not implemented, why not? 
6. What are some of the challenges you face, as headteacher, in managing teacher 
misbehaviour at your school? [specifically relate this to practice of class combination and 
teacher absenteeism] 
Prompt 1: What are the reasons for this? 
Prompt 2: Are you, as headteacher, able to sanction teachers for these practices? How? Do you? 
Prompt 3: To what extent are you, as headteacher, able to enforce directives given by the PEA or 
District office in relation to teacher allocation/ utilisation decisions? 
7. Who do you report teacher misbehaviour to? 
Prompt 1: What happens when teacher misbehaviour has been reported? 
Prompt 2: Has it led to a change in teacher behaviour? 
8. Besides you, who else monitors whether teachers are teaching their own class, and 
whether they teach the number of lessons stipulated under government guidelines? 
Prompt 1: How is this done? 
Prompt 2: What typically happens when a teacher is found to be contravening government 
guidelines by these officials? 
9. When was the last time the PEA came to supervise teachers at this school? When was the last 








D. Interview guide for teachers 
Interview 1: Processes regarding the distribution of teachers and resources to and within 
schools 
1. Please can you introduce yourself and tell me how long you have been teaching at this 
school, and where else you have worked?  
2. What are your main roles and responsibilities as a teacher?  
3. To whom are you directly answerable to in relation to fulfilling your roles and 
responsibilities? 
Prompt 1: Who do you feel most accountable to? 
Prompt 2: How is your performance measured, and by whom? 
Prompt 3: Who has the power to promote, sanction, demote or dismiss you? 
4. What is your understanding of the government official policy concerning how teachers 
should be deployed to schools?  
Prompt 1: What was the process utilised when you were deployed to work as a new teacher 
according to your first assignment? 
Prompt 2: Was the district you were sent to work in amongst the preferences you had listed? 
5. If you were seeking a transfer from one school to another, what process would you 
follow? 
Prompt 1:  What is your understanding as to what makes you eligible for a transfer? 
6. Do  you know or recall if government officials have come to this school to collect 
information on the name and numbers of teachers who work here? 
Prompt 1: When was this last done? 
Prompt 2: How regularly do you recall this being done? 
7. What is the official process concerning which class/ standard you should be allocated to 
teach in?  
Prompt 1: Who is responsible for this? 
8. Is there official guidance on the number of hours you, as a primary school teacher, are 
required to work according to your employment contract? 
Prompt 1: What about in relation to the number of lessons you are required to teach in a given 
week? 
9. Do government officials (e.g. PEA, district official) collect information on which classes 
teachers have been allocated to go and teach in? How is this done? 











Interview 2: Challenges in enforcing the equal distribution of teachers and resources 
equitably between schools 
1. What are teacher preferences in terms of which schools they would like to be deployed 
to work in this district? Why are these schools favourable? 
2. Are there any schools in this zone that teachers would prefer to be deployed to go and 
work in? What schools do teachers not want to be deployed to go and work in? 
3. Specifically in relation to this school, do teachers wish to be deployed here? 
Prompt 1: Do teachers who are deployed here stay here long? 
Prompt 2: Do teachers who have officially been deployed to come and work at this school tend to 
report here for duty?  
4. To what extent do you feel that teacher deployment in Zomba Rural district is based on 
schools that suffer from a shortage of teachers? 
Prompt 1: What other factors do you think could affect teacher distribution? 
5. In your view what sort of teachers get a favourable school placement or transfer? 
Prompt: Does it depend on a teacher merit or seniority? 
Prompt: What other factors do you think affect favourable placement? 
6. In your opinion, do you think it is possible to succeed in getting a favourable school 
placement or transfer using regular/ formal processes? If not why not? 
7. To what extent do you feel teachers need good connections in order to be deployed or 
transferred to a school of their choosing? 
Prompt 1: What connections particularly do you think are needed? 
Prompt 2: Based on your experience can you give any examples – either in relation to you or 
other teachers – where good connections have led to a favourable school placement? 
8. What other methods, based on your experience, are an effective mechanism which 
teachers can use to get a transfer of their choice? 
Prompt 1: Can you give practical examples of where these mechanisms have worked?  
9. Do you recall whether anyone from  the government (e.g. Primary Education Adviser, 
District Education Office officials) coming to check whether you had reported for duty at 
the school you had been deployed to work in? 
Prompt 1:  What about for other teachers who have  been deployed to come and work at this 
school? 
10. Do you recall anyone from the government coming here to find out which teachers  
are working at this school? 











Interview 3: Challenges in enforcing the equal distribution of teachers equitably within 
schools 
1. What class do you teach and what is the current teaching arrangements in place? e.g. do 
you share a class, teach across multiple class or just teach one class alone? 
2. What are some of the factors which influence how you think the headteacher of this 
school decides how teachers should be distributed to different standards/ classes in this 
school? 
3. In this school do you think certain classes or standards should have more teachers than 
others? Which classes, standards? Why do you think this is the case? 
Prompt 1: Do you think the headteacher favours certain classes/ standards over others? Why? 
Prompt 2: If the school performs badly or well in the PSLCE examination taken at the end of 
Standard 8 what are some of the consequences for the school, headteacher, teachers? 
4. To what extent do you think classroom availability influences how the headteacher 
arranges teachers and classes are arranged in this school? 
Prompt 1: Where does this school get resources from for infrastructural development? 
Prompt 2: What are some of the problems you think the school experiences in relation to 
infrastructural development? 
5. Have government suggested policies relating to over-lapping, double-shift or multi-grade 
mechanisms been implemented at this school?   
Prompt 1: If not implemented, why not? 
6. What are the reasons which are preventing each teacher from managing his or her own 
class according to what government guidelines instruct? 
7. What is your own opinion of a single teacher handling all subjects by themselves? 
Prompt 1: What in your own view makes it necessary for teachers to have to specialise in certain 
subjects? 
8. To what extent do you feel accountable to the headteacher at this school? What about 
the other teachers here? 
Prompt 1: What, in your view, are some of the reasons teachers do not listen to the 
headteacher? 
Prompt 2: What about the PEA? District officials?  
9. When was the last time the PEA came to supervise teachers at this school? When was 
the last time this school was inspected by district officials? 
Prompt 1: Have these officials instructed changes on how classes and teachers should be 
arranged? 









Appendix Table A.2: Increase in teacher numbers for Zomba Rural district over the period 
of Joyce Banda’s presidency (2012-2014) 
 Number of teachers Pupil-teacher ratio (PTR)  




Chitipa 1,094 1,212 1,303 1,405 65 62 58 54 1.4 
Karonga 1,346 1,459 1,490 1,595 72 72 72 69 1.3 
Likoma 65 64 72 73 52 57 52 52 0.0 
Mzimba North 1,886 2,018 2,128 2,199 61 62 60 58 1.6 
Mzimba South 1,776 2,000 2,182 2,184 80 75 70 74 2.6 
Mzuzu City 825 876 901 985 64 60 61 57 0.6 
Nkhata Bay 1,235 1,391 1,423 1,474 64 58 58 58 1.8 
Rumphi 1,115 1,250 1,296 1,370 58 55 54 52 1.6 
Central East 
Dowa 2,356 2,934 2,972 3,099 75 66 67 66 6.8 
Kasungu 2,741 3,235 3,398 3,408 81 75 75 76 5.8 
Nkhotakota 1,357 1,540 1,600 1,700 75 71 69 68 2.2 
Ntchisi 1,106 1,302 1,306 1,349 70 64 65 63 2.3 
Salima 1,444 1,812 1,848 1,897 69 60 63 63 4.3 
Central West 
Dedza 2,476 2,829 2,784 3,238 76 71 77 67 4.2 
Lilongwe City 2,331 2,486 2,657 2,733 65 67 65 63 1.8 
Lilongwe Rural 
East 
2,265 2,825 2,977 3,268 85 76 77 73 6.6 
Lilongwe Rural 
West 
2,813 3,484 3,727 3,762 73 64 62 63 7.9 
Mchinji 1,892 2,267 2,226 2,401 76 68 73 70 4.4 
Ntcheu 2,218 2,543 2,538 2,852 71 64 68 62 3.8 
South East 
Balaka 1,476 1,829 1,956 2,046 75 67 66 62 4.2 
Machinga 1,755 2,022 2,051 2,323 86 82 83 76 3.1 
Mangochi 2,643 3,007 3,032 3,251 83 82 86 82 4.3 
Zomba Rural 2,229 2,827 2,783 3,025 85 70 750 71 7.0 
Zomba Urban 521 544 503 555 48 49 52 49 0.3 
South West 
Blantyre City 2,075 2,098 2,230 2,309 77 80 78 74 0.3 
Blantyre Rural 1,926 2,394 2,643 2,657 65 56 52 53 5.5 
Chikwawa 1,672 1,887 1,894 2,144 82 77 80 77 2.5 
Mwanza 554 624 572 678 60 55 61 55 0.8 
Neno 539 587 623 690 70 69 70 67 0.6 
Nsanje 1,173 1,258 1,162 1,369 68 66 74 66 1.0 
Shire Highlands 
Chiradzulu 1,476 1,358 1,627 1,651 65 75 63 64 0.0 
Mulanje 2,194 2,470 2,420 2,666 79 77 82 79 3.2 
Phalombe 1,500 1,769 1,616 2,009 76 67 77 65 3.2 
Thyolo 2,460 2,833 2,792 2,998 79 71 73 70 4.4 
NATIONAL 56,534 65,034 66,732 71,363 74 69 70 67 100.0 
Source: Researcher’s calculations based on EMIS databases, various years. 
 
174 Share of the total increase in teachers between 2012 and 2013 which benefited each district. 
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Appendix Table A.3: World Bank classification of schools for rural hardship allowance 












A1 > 14 kilometres No All (2 or more) 
MK 25,000 
per month 
A2 > 14 kilometres No Partial (1 or less) 
A3 > 14 kilometres Yes Partial (1 or less) 
A4 7-14 kilometres No All (2  or more) 
A5 7-14 kilometres No Partial (1 or less) 
Category B 
B1 > 14 kilometres Yes All (2 or more) 
MK 10,000 
per month 
B2 7-14 kilometres Yes Partial (1 or less) 
B3 < 7 kilometres No Partial (1 or less) 
B4 < 7 kilometres Yes Partial (1 or less) 
Category C 
C1 7-14 kilometres Yes All (2 or more) MK0 or 
MK5,000 per 
month 
C2 < 7 kilometres No All (2 or more) 
C3 < 7 kilometres Yes All (2 or more) 


































Appendix Table A.4: Allocation of teachers in Standard 1 versus Standard 8 
A. Zone 9 
 Standard 1 Standard 8 
  No. of 
classes 
Enrolment No. of 
Teachers 
PTR No. of 
classes 
Enrolment No. of 
Teachers 
PTR 
School A 1 88 2 43 1 35 2 18 
School B 2 
80 2 40 
1 36 3 12 79 2 40 
School C 1 162 2 81 1 35 2 18 
School D 1 239 2 148 1 39 2 20 
School E 1 239 1 239 1 78 3 31 
School F 1 101 2 51 1 30 3 10 
School G 2 
87 2 44 
2 
48 2 24 
86 2 43 85 2 43 
School H 1 225 2 113 1 50 2 25 
School I 1 279 1 279 1 49 2 32 
School J 2 
114 1 114 
1 87 3 29 
116 1 116 
School K 1 220 2 110 1 87 2 44 
School L 1 140 2 70 1 43 3 14 
School M 2 
70 1 70 
1 53 3 18 
79 2 40 
 
B. Zone 12 
 Standard 1 Standard 8 








School N 1 110 1 110 1 27 1 20 
School O 1 225 1 225 1 59 1 59 
School P 1 294 1 294 1 76 2 38 
School R 1 189 1 189 1 70 2 35 
School S 1 195 0 509 1 20 1 23 
School T 1 118 1 118 1 45 1 45 
School U 2 160 1 160 1 28 2 14 135 1 135 
School V  2 
102 1 102 1 50 1 34 96 1 96 
School W 1 272 2 136 1 61 1 44 
School X 1 154 1 194 1 23 1 33 
School Y 3 
99 1 99 
2 
45 2 30 
100 1 100 44 2 29 99 1 99 
School Z 1 107 1 107 1 61 2 31 














Appendix Table A.5: Classes affected by teaching arrangement in School S for Standards 2, 
3, 4 and 8 
A. Standard 8  
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 




















08.40-09.152 Expressive Arts Sci + Tech Bible Knowledge Sci + Tech Sci + Tech 
09.15-09.503 Mathematics Chichewa Mathematics Chichewa Mathematics 
09.50-10.05 Break 









































12.45-13.204 English English  Agriculture English English  
13.20-13.555 SES Bible Knowledge  English Agriculture Sci + Tech 
13.55-14.306 Life Skills Mathematics Life Skills Mathematics Mathematics 
Standard 2 teacher Standard 3 teacher Standard 4 teacher 
Notes: Times in brackets relate to actual time teacher is in class teaching Standard 8 class. 
1. Tikwere (radio instruction programme) for Standard 2 (08.30-09.00am).  
2. Tikwere (radio instruction programme) for Standard 3 (08.40-09.15am).  
3. Tikwere (radio instruction programme) for Standard 4 (09.15-09.50am). 
4. Standard 2 will have finished for the day, but Standard 3 and 4 still learning. 
5. Standard 2 and 3 will have finished for the day, but Standard 4 still learning. 
6. Standard 2, 3 and 4 have finished for the day. 
 
B. Standard 2  
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
























09.15-09.45 English English Chichewa Mathematics Chichewa 
09.45-10.15 Chichewa Mathematics English Bible Knowledge Expressive Arts 




















12.00-12.30 Life Skills 
Bible Knowledge 
(12.15-12.30) Expressive Arts Expressive Arts English 











C. Standard 3  
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
07.30-08.05 
Mathematics 
(07.55-08.05) Chichewa English Mathematics Chichewa 





















10.40-11.15 Mathematics SES  
SES 
(11.05-11.15) SES Chichewa 
11.15-11.50 Expressive Arts Chichewa Chichewa Life Skills Expressive Arts 
11.50-12.05 Break 
12.05-12.40 Life Skills English Mathematics English Bible Knowledge 
12.40-13.15 SES Bible Knowledge Expressive Arts Expressive Arts Life Skills 
Note: Shaded orange boxes relate to overlap with Standard 8 class and time actually taught indicated in 
bracket. 
 
D. Standard 4 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 









08.05-08.40 Chichewa Mathematics Life Skills English Agriculture 















(10.30-10.40) English  English  Chichewa  
English 
(10.30-10.40) 
















12.40-13.15 Life Skills Bible Knowledge Expressive Arts Expressive Arts Life Skills 
13.15-13.50 Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture Expressive Arts 
Note: Shaded pink boxes relate to overlap with Standard 8 class and time actually taught indicated in bracket. 




















Appendix Table A.6: Teaching arrangement in School S for Standard 1 and Standard 7 who 
share a teacher 
A. Standard 1 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
07.30-08.00 
Mathematics Chichewa English Mathematics Mathematics 
(07.30-07.40) (07.30-07.40) (07.30-07.40) (07.30-07.40) (07.30-07.40) 
08.00-08.30 Tikwere Tikwere Tikwere Tikwere Tikwere 
08.30-09.00 
English English Mathematics Chichewa English 
(08.40-8.55) (08.40-8.55) (08.40-8.55) (08.40-8.55) (08.40-8.55) 
09.00-09.15 Break 
09.15-09.45 
English English Chichewa Chichewa English 
(09.15-09.30) (09.15-09.30) (09.15-09.30) (09.15-09.30) (09.15-09.30) 
09.45-10.15 
Chichewa Mathematics English English Chichewa 
(09.50-10.05) (09.50-10.05) (09.50-10.05) (09.50-10.05) (09.50-10.05) 
10.15-10.45 
Mathematics Bible Knowledge Mathematics Expressive Arts Mathematics 
(10.30-10.40) (10.30-10.40) (10.30-10.40) (10.30-10.40) (10.30-10.40) 
10.45-11.00 Break 
11.00.11.30 
Chichewa Mathematics Chichewa English Chichewa 
(11.05-11.20) (11.05-11.20) (11.05-11.20) (11.05-11.20) (11.05-11.20) 
11.30-12.00 
Expressive Arts Chichewa Expressive Arts Bible Knowledge Expressive Arts 
(11.45-12.00) (11.45-12.00) (11.45-12.00) (11.45-12.00) (11.45-12.00) 
 
B. Standard 7 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 









08.05-08.40 Expressive Arts (08.05-08.40) 
































































12.45-13.20 SES  Agriculture  Agriculture Expressive Arts Life Skills  
13.20-13.55 Agriculture Agriculture Life Skills  English  Sci + Technology  
13.55-14.30 Life Skills SES Sci + Technology Mathematics Sci + Technology 















Appendix Table A.7: Comparing double-shift salary with overall teacher salaries 
Teacher grade TL TK TJ TI TH 
Annual Salary 916,488 1,179,554 1,488,014 2,242,483 2,630,632 
Leave Grant 28,000 28,000 28,000 30,000 33,000 
Rural Teacher Allowance 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 
Double shift salary 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 
Total renumeration 1,164,488 1,427,554 1,736,014 2,492,483 2,883,632 
Double shift salary as a share 
of renumeration (%) 9 7 6 4 3 
Double shift salary as a share 
of total salary (%) 11 8 7 4 4 






































Appendix Table A.8: Official versus actual Standard 4 time-table in School I 
A. Time-table in headteacher’s office for Standard 4 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
07.30 – 08.05 Mathematics Chichewa English Mathematics Chichewa 
08.05 – 08.40 Chichewa Mathematics Chichewa English Mathematics 
08.40 – 09.35 Agriculture English SES Agriculture English 
09.35 – 09.50 English Mathematics Agriculture Mathematics Agriculture 
09.50 – 10.05 Break 
10.05 – 10.40 Chichewa English Mathematics Chichewa English 
10.40 – 11.15 English SES English SES Mathematics 
11.15 – 11.50 Tikwere Tikwere Tikwere Tikwere Tikwere 
11.50 – 12.05 Break 
12.05 – 12.40 Expressive Arts Agriculture Chichewa Life Skills Bible Knowledge 
12.40 – 13.15 Life Skills Bible Knowledge Mathematics Chichewa Life Skills 
13.15 – 13.50 SES Life Skills Expressive Arts Expressive Arts Expressive Arts 
Subjects taught by Teacher 1 Subjects taught by Teacher 2 Subjects taught by Teacher 3 
 
B. Time-table in Standard 4 classroom for Standard 4 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
07.30 – 08.05 Mathematics Chichewa Chichewa Mathematics Chichewa 
08.05 – 08.40 Chichewa Mathematics English Agriculture Expressive Arts 
08.40 – 09.35 Agriculture Life Skills Chichewa Mathematics Mathematics 
09.35 – 09.50 English Mathematics Agriculture Life skills Agriculture 
09.50 – 10.05 Break 
10.05 – 10.40 Chichewa English Mathematics Chichewa English 
10.40 – 11.15 English SES English Expressive Arts Mathematics 
11.15 – 11.50 Tikwere Tikwere Tikwere Tikwere Tikwere 
11.50 – 12.05 Break 
12.05 – 12.40 Expressive Arts Agriculture SES Life Skills Bible Knowledge 
12.40 – 13.15 Life Skills Bible Knowledge Mathematics Chichewa SES 
13.15 – 13.50 SES English English Expressive Arts English 
Subjects taught by Teacher 1 Subjects taught by Teacher 2 Subjects taught by Teacher 3 




















Appendix Table A.9: National Education Standards 
Area No Education Standard 
Outcomes for students 
1. Learning in lessons 
2. Students’ outcomes in the curriculum 
3.  Attainment across the school 
4. Students’ participation in education 
5. Students’ behaviour and involvement in school life 
6. Students’ safety and protection 
 
The teaching process 
7. A curriculum which is appropriate and relevant 
8. High expectations  
9. Teachers with good professional, subject and curriculum 
knowledge 
10. Well-planned lessons 
11. Teaching for effective learning 
12. Accurate and constructive use of assessment  
13. Teaching which meets the needs of all students 
14. Effective management of behaviour  
 
Leadership  
15. School vision, goals and values 
16. School self-evaluation and improvement  
17. School governance  
18. School leadership  
 
Management 
19. Partnership with parents and the community  
20. Staff supervision and development  
21. Staff deployment and management 
22. Care and welfare of students 
23. Access, equity and inclusion 
24. Management of buildings and facilities 
25. Management of material resources 
26. Financial management 





















Appendix Table A.10: Education Standard 21 
Level of Achievement  Requirements 
4. Effective Practice 
 
21.1 Staff are deployed within the school in line with their training, 
experience and skills. 
21.2 Senior managers work very effectively with staff at all levels to 
improve the quality of students’ educational experiences.  
3. Exceeds minimum  
    standards 
21.3 Staff are deployed in line with classroom availability and class 
size at each stage. 
21.4 Staff carry out their delegated responsibilities diligently.  
2. Meets minimum  
    standards 
 
21.5 The school has sufficient qualified staff to teach classes and 
carry out management tasks. 
21.6 Teachers are on time for school and classes and are rarely 
absent. 
21.7 Where teachers work together to support classes, they both 
take active roles in helping students to learn. 
1. Below minimum 
standards  
The school does not meet all the requirements relating to Minimum 
Standards (Level 2). 
Sources of evidence: 
• Records of staff experience, qualifications, appraisal and training  
• Observation of extent of implementation of Teaching Service Regulations, school policies, and Code 
of Conduct (or similar) for staff  
• Records of staff attendance and punctuality 
• Discussions with teachers, headteacher, senior staff, students and parents 
Links with other Education Standards: 
• Education Standard 2: Students’ outcomes in the curriculum 
• Education Standard 16: School self-evaluation and improvement 
• Education Standard 18: School leadership 
• Education Standard 20: Staff supervision and development 
• Education Standard 24: Management of buildings and facilities 























Appendix Table A.11: Teacher pay-grades  
A. Teacher pay-grades  
 Teacher grade/type 
 TL TK TJ TI TH TG TF TE 











   
























B. Primary teacher pay-grades 
 TL TK TJ TI TH 
Level 1 93,754 107,943 149,781 177,778 199,069 
Level 2 93,985 110,457 152,359 180,378 199,950 
Level 3 94,457 113,278 155,720 183,451 200,650 
Level 4 94,683 116,101 158,901 187,008 201,509 
Level 5 94,952 119,801 161,541 190,051 203,600 
Level 6 95,471 122,698 164,491 193,435 206,954 





































Appendix Table A.12: Paygrade of headteachers and teachers by school 
School B 
















1 Female TL JCE 1A 3 38  Team teaching 
2 Female TL MSCE 1A 3 30  Team teaching 
3 Female TL MSCE 1B 3 30  Team teaching 
4 Female TL MSCE 1B 3 38  Team teaching 
5 Female TL MSCE 2A 6 
93  
Class taught by 
one teacher 
6 Female TL MSCE 2B 3 27  Team teaching 
7 Female TL MSCE 2B 3 33  Team teaching 
8 Female TL MSCE 3A 3 36  Team teaching 
9 Female TL  MSCE 3A 4 53  Team teaching 
10 Female TL MSCE 3B 7 
89  
Class taught by 
one teacher 
11 Female TL MSCE 4A 8 
98  
Class taught by 
one teacher 
12 Female TL MSCE 4B 4 42  Team teaching 
13 Female TL MSCE 4B 4 46  Team teaching 
14 Female TL MSCE 5 3 29  Team teaching 
15 Male TL JCE 5 3 24  Team teaching 
16 Female TL MSCE 5 3 44  Team teaching 
17 Male TL MSCE 6 3 42  Team teaching 
18 Female TL MSCE 6 3 22  Team teaching 
19 Female TL MSCE 6 3 27  Team teaching 
20 Male TK MSCE 7 2 18  Team teaching 
21 Male TI MSCE 7 2 27  Team teaching 
22 Male TK JCE 7 3 27  Team teaching 
23 Male TL MSCE 7 2 27  Team teaching 
24 Male TK MSCE 8 2 29  Team teaching 
25 Male TK MSCE 8 3 31 Team teaching 




































1 Male TL JCE 1 5 63  Teaching alone 
2 Male TL MSCE 2 6 82  Teaching alone 
3 Female TL MSCE 3 4 47  Team teaching 
4 Male TI MSCE 3 4 53  Team teaching 
5 Female TL MSCE 4 3 32  Team teaching 
6 Male TL MSCE 4 3 30  Team teaching 
7 Male TL MSCE 4 3 38  Team teaching 
8 Male TL MSCE 5 5 55  Team teaching 
9 Male TK JCE 5 4 45  Team teaching 
10 Male TL MSCE 6 6 65  Team teaching 
11 Male TK MSCE 
6 2 
44                                  
Teaching more 
than one class 8 3 
12 Male TL MSCE 
6 1 
85                                   
Teaching more 
than one class 8 6 
13 Male TK MSCE 7 5 55                           Team teaching  
14 Male TL MSCE 7 4 45                                Team teaching 
15 Male TL MSCE On study leave 
16 Male TL MSCE On study leave 
 
School S 
















1 Male TL MSCE 1 5 100 
Teaching more 
than one class 7 9 
2 Male TK MSCE 2 6 100 
Teaching more 
than one class 8 3 
3 Male TL MSCE 3 7 100 
Teaching more 
than one class 8 3 
4 Male TL MSCE 4 8 100 
Teaching more 
than one class 8 3 
5 Male TL MSCE 5 9 95 Teaching alone  





























1 Female TL MSCE 1 2 50 Teaching alone 
2 Male TL MSCE 2 6 93 Teaching alone 
3 Male TL MSCE 3 7 89 Teaching alone 
4 Male TL MSCE 4 8 90 Teaching alone 
5 Female TL MSCE 5 9 95 Teaching alone 
6 Male TL MSCE 6 9 95 Teaching alone 
7 Male TL MSCE 7 9 95 Teaching alone 
8 Male TL MSCE 8 4 38 Team teaching 
9 Male TL MSCE 8 5 56 Team teaching 
Source: Data collected from school survey administered by researcher. 
Note: Highlighted line relates to headteacher information. 
